| Home > South-East Asia >> Indonesia | |
The Indonesian military's threat to human rights and democracy
Following are statements made by two former US Diplomats to a congressional hearing on the future of US relations with Indonesia.
Edmund McWilliams, a former Political Counselor with the US Embassy in Jakarta, is now a director of the Indonesia Human Rights Network. Alphonse La Porta, a former US Ambassador to Mongolia, is now president of the United States-Indonesia Society (USINDO).
Their statements, made on Thursday (10/3/05), are via the website of The US House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/aphear.htm
Edmund McWilliams. Testimony for Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Hearing: Implications of Recent Indonesia Reform. March 10, 2005.
The Annual Human Rights Report regarding Indonesia, recently released by the State Department accurately portrays the Indonesia as a fragile, fledgling democracy whose government is not yet capable of protecting the fundamental human rights of its people. As documented clearly in the State Department's report, the principal menace to those rights and to that fledgling democratic government itself is a rogue institution with vast wealth and power that has committed crimes against humanity and perhaps genocide and which remains unaccountable.
That institution, the Indonesian military, recently saw its stature dangerously enhanced by a decision of the US administration to end a bipartisan Congressionally imposed sanction against the military, imposed over a decade ago.
The decision, announced by Secretary of State Rice, restored International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance to the Indonesian military. The Congress banned that assistance in 1992 in response to the military's murder of 276 peaceful demonstrators in East Timor. The Congress reinforced the ban in 1999 in response to the military's ravaging of East Timor following the Timorese people's courageous vote for freedom.
In 2004, the Congress narrowed the ban to a single condition. It required that the State Department certify that the Indonesian government and military were cooperating in an FBI investigation of an August 31, 2002 assault on a group of US citizens at the Freeport copper and gold mine in West Papua that saw two US citizens killed and eight wounded.
Dr. Rice's February 26 certification that the Indonesians were cooperating manifestly misrepresents the obstructions and malign inaction of the Indonesian side with regards to that investigation. Contrary to the State Department's contention that the Indonesian side is "cooperating," the Indonesians have failed to bring charges against or even detain the one individual indicted by a US grand jury in the attack. Moreover, for over eight months it has stalled a return of the FBI team to Indonesia to continue its investigation.
This Indonesian obstruction of the FBI investigation is possibly explained by indications that the Indonesian military itself was involved in the attack. The initial Indonesian police report, as well as reports by independent researchers, journalists and others, all point to military involvement. Recently, evidence of ties between the one indicted individual and the military was provided to the FBI and the State Department. Moreover, the military's presentation of false evidence and subsequent military threats and intimidation targeting those Indonesian human rights advocates who had assisted the FBI also suggest the military's culpability.
Ms. Patsy Spier who was wounded and widowed in the attack has asked me to share with you her concern about the importance of genuine Indonesian cooperation in the investigation:
"The investigation into the Timika Ambush, a terror attack, is completely in Americans interest. Two American citizens who were working in Indonesia for an American company were murdered on a secure road. The ambush lasted from 35 to 45 minutes before help came. The eight Americans wounded were American citizens working in Indonesia (the eighth American being a 6 year old girl). The investigation, and cooperation needed, is in Americans interest to assure the safety of the other thousands of Americans working and living in Indonesia. The Indonesian authorities must cooperate fully with our US investigators. American companies working, and thinking of working, in Indonesia must be assured that the murder of Americans is taken seriously by the Indonesian Government... and cooperating with our investigators would show that."
In addition to being indefensible on the basis of the "cooperation" criterion established by the Congress, the decision was also a practical blunder. Restoration of IMET assistance removes the only leverage available to the US to press for the genuine Indonesian cooperation essential to a successful completion of the FBI's investigation.
On the basis of this erroneous certification alone, the Congress should restore the ban on IMET in FY2006. It is also imperative that the Congress maintain the ban on FMF for the Indonesian military which remains in place despite the restoration of IMET.
But there are broader issues in play than even the critical matter of ensuring justice in this case of murdered and wounded US citizens.
The restoration of IMET dangerously conveys to the Indonesian military that long-standing US concerns about its notorious and continuing human rights abuses, its threats to its neighbors, illegal business empire and its impunity in committing these acts is no longer on the US agenda.
Such a US exoneration of the Indonesian military removes a well-founded international censure that has given Indonesian government and civil society members the political space to press for reform of that notorious institution. It is not surprising that leading Indonesian human rights activists reacted with dismay to the US action.
The notorious record of the Indonesian military is well documented by reliable reporting of well-respected human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Tapol as well as in the State Department's Annual Human Rights Reports. Therefore, I will only summarize that record here and then focus the rest of my remarks on the current activity of the Indonesian military, specifically its ongoing abuse of human rights, its involvement in a broad range of criminal enterprises, its contempt for and threat to democratic institutions and its unaccountability.
In 1965-68 the Indonesian military engineered the slaughter of more than a half million Indonesians whom it alleged had been involved in a "coup" against the sitting President Soekarno. Employing a tactic it would resort to again in the current period, the Indonesian military allied itself with Islamic forces that did much of the actual killing. The Soeharto regime which rose to power as a consequence of the coup and which directed the massive killings sought to justify them in US and western eyes by labeling the victims as "communists."
Following the Indonesian military's invasion of East Timor in 1975, an estimated 200,000 East Timorese, one quarter of the population, died as a consequence of living conditions in TNI-organized re-location camps or as direct victims of Indonesian security force violence.
In West Papua, it is estimated that over 100,000 Papuans died in the years following the forced annexation of West Papua under a fraudulent "Act of Free Choice," perpetrated by the Soeharto regime in 1969. An April 2004 study by the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at the Yale Law School concluded that the atrocities in West Papua are "crimes against humanity" and may constitute genocide.
In Aceh, over 12,000 civilians have fallen victim to military operations that have included mass sweeps and forced relocations. These operations, almost constantly since the late 1970's, have entailed brutal treatment of civilians including extra judicial killings, rape, torture and beatings.
While the military's quarry in these attacks, the pro-independence Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM has also been responsible for human rights abuses, the State Department's Annual Human Rights reports have consistently reported that most of those civilians died at the hands of the military.
Throughout this period, extending from 1965 to the early 1990's the US military maintained a close relationship with the Indonesian military, providing training for thousands of officers as well as arms. From the late 1970's to 1992, that training included grant assistance under IMET.
The arms provided by the US were employed by the Indonesian military not against foreign foes (the Indonesian military has never confronted a foreign foe except for brief clashes with the Dutch in West Papua) but rather against their own people. In the 70's and 80's, US- provided OV-10 Broncos bombed villages in East Timor and in West Papua. Military offensives conceived and directed by IMET-trained officers against usually miniscule resistance caused thousands of civilian deaths.
Even with the end of the cold war, the US embrace of the dictator Soeharto and his military continued as if US policy were on auto pilot.
That relationship endured largely unquestioned until 1991 when the Indonesian military was caught on film by US journalists slaughtering peaceful East Timorese demonstrators. The murder of over 270 East Timorese youth by Indonesian soldiers bearing US-provided M-16's so shocked the US Congress that in 1992 it imposed tight restrictions on further US military-to-military aid, including training for the Indonesian military.
Since the imposition of those restrictions various US Administrations, with the support of non-governmental organizations bankrolled by US corporations with major interests in Indonesia have sought to expand military to military ties. Those efforts were accompanied by claims that the Indonesian military had reformed or was on a reform course.
Claims of Indonesian military reform were confounded in 1999, when, following an overwhelming vote by East Timorese for independence from Indonesia, the Indonesian military and its militia proxies devastated the tiny half island. UN and other international observers were unable to prevent the killing of over 1,500 East Timorese, the forced relocation of over 250,000 and the destruction of over 70 percent of East Timor's infrastructure. The Indonesian justice system has failed to hold a single military, police or civil official responsible for the mayhem. That failure to render justice demonstrated that even when confronted by unanimous international condemnation, the Indonesian military remained unaccountable.
Moreover, TNI abuse of human rights is not a matter only of history.
Indonesian military operations that began in mid-2004 in West Papua continue. Burning villages and destroying food sources, the Indonesian military has forced thousands of villagers into the forests where many are dying for lack of food and medicine. A government ban on travel to the region by journalists and even West Papuan senior church leaders has limited international awareness of this tragedy. More critically, the ban has prevented Papuan church leaders and others from distributing humanitarian relief to the thousands forced into the forests. A similar campaign in West Papua in the late 1990s led to the death of hundreds of civilians who did not survive their forced sojourn in the deep jungles of West Papua.
The recent devastating Indian Ocean tsunami turned international attention to Aceh, another primary arena in which the Indonesian military continues a brutal military campaign. Notwithstanding calls by President Yudhoyono for a ceasefire and declaration by GAM of unilateral ceasefire the Indonesian military has continued to conduct operations. These operations jeopardize relief operations and will likely stall rehabilitation and reconstruction. Both GAM and the Government appear to be genuinely pursuing a settlement through talks organized by former Finish President Martti Atahisaari. But as the former Finnish President has emphasized, to be successful, both sides must act with restraint in the field. With boasts that it has killed over 230 GAM members since the tsunami struck, the TNI clearly is not acting with restraint.
Throughout the Soeharto period (1965-1998) critics and dissenters generally were not tolerated. Despite the genuine democratic progress made since the fall of the Soeharto dictatorships, critics of the military and those whom the Indonesian military regard as enemies are in grave jeopardy. Reflecting the Indonesian military's power in "democratic" Indonesia, those critics who meet untimely ends are often the most prominent. Indonesia's leading human rights advocate, Munir, a prominent critic of the Indonesian military died of arsenic poisoning in 2004. An independent investigation authorized by the Indonesian President has uncovered evidence of Government involvement in this murder. In recent years Jafar Siddiq, a US green card holder who was in Aceh demanding justice for Achenese suffering military abuse was himself tortured and murdered. Theys Eluay, the leading nonviolent Papuan proponent of Papuan self-determination was abducted and strangled to death. In a rare trial of military officials, his Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) killers received sentences ranging up to three and one half years. Yet Army Chief of Staff, Ryamazad Ryacudu publicly described the murderers as "heroes." Farid Faquih, a leading anti-corruption campaigner who has targeted military and other government malfeasance recently was badly beaten in Aceh by military officers as he sought to monitor tsunami aid distribution. He was arrested and is now facing charges of theft of the assistance he was monitoring. Papuan human rights advocates who supported FBI investigations of the US citizens murdered in 2002 in West Papua are under continuing intimidation by the military and were sued by the regional military commander.
More generally, the Indonesian military poses a threat to the fledgling democratic experiment in Indonesia. It receives over 70 percent of its budget from legal and illegal businesses and as a result is not under direct budget control by the civilian president or the parliament. Its vast wealth derives from numerous activities, including many illegal ones that include extortion, prostitution rings, drug running, illegal logging and other exploitation of Indonesia's great natural resources, and as charged in a recent Voice of Australia broadcast (August 2, 2004), human trafficking. With its great institutional wealth it maintains a bureaucratic structure that functions as a shadow government paralleling the civil administration structure from the central level down to sub-district and even village level.
There are also reasons why many of us should be directly concerned about the TNI's lawlessness. As investors -- through our pension and mutual funds - our hard-earned wealth is invested with US-based corporations: ExxonMobil and Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold, Inc., among others -- that are subject to extortion of "protection money" from the TNI for their Indonesian operations. Recognizing the reputational risks and potential and actual shareholder liabilities resulting from these financial relationships between US companies and the TNI, institutional investors including all of New York City's employee pension funds have brought shareholder resolutions this year calling on Freeport and ExxonMobil management to review and report to shareholders about the risks associated with corporate ties to the TNI. In short, investors should be concerned, too, about the TNI's human rights record and the implications for the bottom line.
For much of the last decade, advocates of closer ties between the Indonesian military and the US military have contended that a warmer US embrace entailing training programs and education courses for TNI officers could expose them to democratic ideals and afford a professional military perspective. This argument ignores the decades of close US - Indonesian military ties extending from the 1960's to the early 1990's when US training was provided to over 8,000 Indonesian military officers. This 30-year period also encompasses the period when the Indonesian military committed some of its gravest atrocities and when a culture of impunity became ingrained.
The argument for reform through engagement also ignores the fact that the US Defense Department already maintains extensive ties and channels for assistance under the guise of "conferences" and joint operations billed as humanitarian or security-related.
In the wake of 9/11, proponents of restored US-Indonesian military ties have also argued that the US needs the Indonesian military as a partner in the war on terrorism. This argument overlooks the Indonesian military's close ties to and support for domestic fundamentalist Islamic terror groups, including the Laskar Mujahidin and Front for the Defense of Islam.
The Laskar Jihad militia, which the Indonesian military helped form and train, engaged in a savage communal war in the Maluku Islands in the years 2000 to 2002 that left thousands dead. Many thousands more died in Central Sulawesi in the same period, in fighting that involved militias with security force ties.
Absent tangible evidence of Indonesian military action to curb abuses, to allow itself to be held accountable, to end corruption, to submit itself to civilian rule and to end its sponsorship of terrorist militias, the Indonesian military should be seen for what it is: a rogue institution that directly threatens democracy in Indonesia. Existing restrictions on military-to-military ties between the United States and Indonesia must remain in place, conditionality should be strengthened and the IMET ban reinstated in FY 2006.
Finally, a word about the future. The Indonesian people, Indonesian non-governmental organizations, the Indonesian media and individual Indonesians have demonstrated great courage in standing up to the intimidation of entrenched corrupt interests in their society and most especially its security forces to demand their right to live in a democratic society. The brave students who rallied in the streets in 1998 wrought a revolution, though since that historic victory, entrenched undemocratic elements have sought to undo reforms. Sadly, in some parts of Indonesia the 1998 reforms have had little meaning. The military, often employing terrorist militias, have most brutally repressed the popular struggle for reform in Aceh, West Papua and the Maluku Islands. It is vital that the central government engage civil society in these areas in peaceful dialogue and, in order to make such a dialogue viable, demilitarize those areas.
The US should encourage reform and peaceful dialogue where it can. It should encourage the Government to enforce worker rights, to make far more serious efforts and to end injurious exploitation of child labor and human trafficking. The US should encourage the Indonesian Government to pass legislation implementing the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The US should also urge an end to intimidation of journalists through physical threat and intimidation through misuse of the courts. Moreover, the US Government should itself recognize the importance of social, economic and cultural rights and encourage the Government of Indonesia to pursue development strategies that address the urgent health, education and shelter needs of the poor.
But direct US involvement in Indonesian affairs would be unwelcome and most likely ineffective. Critical questions such as the role of Islam in modern Indonesia and the shape and character of its economy are for Indonesians to decide. The most pro-active course for the US at this time is to step back from its growing embrace of the Indonesian military that remains the gravest threat to democracy and human rights throughout the archipelago.
Alphonse F. La Porta. "Opportunities for United States Relations with Indonesia". Thursday, March 10, 2005
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before this committee today to discuss United States relations with Indonesia -- a country which you, Mr. Chairman, aptly observed is the "single largest country in the world where the US remains only tangentially involved."
My remarks today are my own and are based on over 38 years of diplomatic experience in the US Foreign Service and close involvement with Indonesia. They do not necessarily reflect those of USINDO and its Board of Trustees.
Mr. Chairman, we have a tremendous opportunity before us to strengthen our relationship with Indonesia and to support Indonesia in its journey of democracy. With the recent free and open election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono last September, and a new determination among the Indonesian government and people to pursue fundamental democratic reforms, we can truly say that Indonesia is a nation striving for democracy.
Furthermore, the tragic earthquake and devastating tsunami of December 26, 2004 has provided both the United States and Indonesia with a new opportunity for positive cooperation. It is essential that the United States take advantage of these opportunities so that we can support Indonesia in its efforts at democratization and pursue our mutual interests.
I need not remind this committee of the important role that Indonesia can play in our world at this time. It is not only the largest democratic nation in the world with a predominantly Muslim population. But as an Asian nation Indonesia is a vital partner for the United States in a new century where an expanding Asia indisputably has a main economic and political role.
Today I would like to share with you some views on Indonesia's recent efforts at democratization and in the process discuss how the United States can further support Indonesia by offering some specific policy recommendations in four key areas:
It is especially significant that the armed forces and police did not involve themselves in the three elections held in 2004, except for a very few minor localized instances. As I observed as a member of the Carter Center's delegation for the first round presidential election last July, grassroots democracy is prospering and accountability will be further enhanced by the first-ever popular election of provincial and local officials beginning this year.
Indonesia's democratic experience since the fall of Soeharto and the first free elections in 1999 clearly show that Indonesia is not only on the road to democracy, but that democracy and Islam can exist side by side. Indonesia exemplifies to the world how Islam can play a positive and healthy role in a society. Within Indonesia, as well as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, there exists vigorous discussion over the nature of how Islam should be practiced. Indonesians think critically about Islam and the role of religion in their lives. The positive role it has played in Indonesian society, with its strong and unique culture, far outweighs the negative consequences generated by fringe groups of the Muslim body politic.
The United States has already played a significant role in contributing to Indonesia's progress both as a democratic nation and progressive Muslim nation. Most welcome is the continuing support that USAID is providing for the direct election of provincial and local officials beginning this year and continuing assistance to develop local government capabilities and political party effectiveness. On the national level, maintaining US assistance to the Parliament (DPR), civil society organizations, and pushing forward on judicial reform and other measures to promote the Rule of Law are likewise to be applauded.
Mr. Chairman, I wish to underscore that US assistance in tsunami relief has been exemplary and a strong determinant in generating support among the Indonesian people for improved ties with the United States. Indeed, there may already be a turning of the tide of public opinion as shown in a poll sponsored by a US non-governmental organization, Terror Free Tomorrow, which was conducted by the authoritative Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia). The results, released only last Friday, March 4, indicate that the role of the US armed forces in tsunami relief was viewed positively by 65% of the 1,200 poll respondents.
Moreover, the poll showed that appreciation of US counter-terrorist actions has increased and regard for Osama bin Laden has dropped to less than half of former levels. It is important to note however, that while this poll found overall US popularity increased from 15% in 2003 to almost 34%, we still have a long way to go in establishing an overall positive opinion of the United States.
Recommendations
I would like now to suggest how the United States can enlarge its support of democracy in Indonesia and Indonesia's role as a progressive Muslim-majority society by implementing policies in four key areas: legislative and executive level exchanges; continuing to assist in tsunami recovery and reconstruction; assistance to higher education; and defense cooperation.
1. Continuing to Strengthen Indonesia's Democratic Political System
Mr. Chairman, the United States can continue to strengthen Indonesian democratization through interactions on the executive and parliamentary levels. High level dialogue not only fosters increased understanding of democracy and its global benefits, but also increases the political will and enthusiasm of elected Indonesian officials for sound democratic practices.
As you may know, last week a delegation of Indonesian parliamentarians, members of the People's Consultative Assembly or DPR, visited Washington and had a wide range of meetings with Members of Congress. Dialogues and exchanges such as this lead to knowledge-sharing in key areas such as foreign affairs and defense, a transfer of skills in budgeting, legislative drafting and research, and the promotion of sound oversight practices. It is important that the United States continue to promote interaction through Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) mechanisms and through Indonesian participation in the new congressional Democracy Assistance Initiative. The United States Congress should also send a strong delegation to the Asian Parliamentary Union (APU) meeting to be held in Indonesia in January 2006.
The continued advancement of democracy in Indonesia depends on establishing a closer pattern of relations and mutual understanding with the Yudhoyono government. Recent visits of high administration officials and Members of Congress have been instrumental in identifying areas of common concern, and these contacts have a beneficial public impact.
Consideration also should be given to establishing a high level continuing Leadership Dialogue, comprising the public sector, business and industry, academia, the media and civil society representatives, similar to the bilateral dialogues with China, Australia and others in the Asia region.
2. Earthquake and Tsunami Reconstruction
Indeed, there is already good news. A USINDO colleague who is developing our Aceh school reconstruction project visited the devastated west coast of Aceh last week. On the ruins of the flattened town of Calang, Indonesian Marines were establishing schools for orphaned and homeless children and were helping local citizens to construct temporary housing.
Signs of new growth, both physical and psychological, are beginning to emerge and the always resourceful Acehnese are developing their own plans for reconstituting their communities.
I would submit that opportunities also should be found, through the wise use of external assistance, to upgrade priority national sectors, particularly tertiary education, Islamic schools and universities, and secondary schools so that no region is left behind. Creating a "gold standard" for only the hardest-hit disaster areas will not contribute in my view to national solidarity or democracy building.
3. Education, Education, Education
USINDO Co-Chair Edward Masters testified before this committee a year ago about the importance of human resource development to strengthen United States-Indonesian relations. As recommended in the National Commission report 18 months ago, there is a pressing need to expand cooperation between educational institutions of our two countries as existed in the 1970's and 1980's when US assistance programs were better funded and centered on a web of university-level collaborations. Reductions in US development assistance, public diplomacy and other programs in the 1990's have taken a serious toll.
President Bush's initiative to channel US$157 million into mainly basic education over the next six years is an excellent start, but US educational assistance should be increased to focus especially on developing university centers of excellence to increase the numbers of Ph.D.'s, vastly upgrading tertiary-level teacher training, and enhancing English language and other academic skills. Attention should also be given to encourage the development of first-class academic research capabilities and enlarging the flow of students to the United States (presently less than 9000 Indonesians are in American colleges and universities in contrast to 60,000 Chinese and 80,000 Indians). Finally, it is important that the United States continue to assist mainstream Islamic schools, universities and civil society organizations in a balanced and non-intrusive way.
Mr. Chairman, USINDO has been very active during the past year to promote university-to-university partnerships, the development of which will be pursued further in a conference in Jakarta on March 17-18, 2005. The United States should provide additional assistance to Indonesian higher education, and it is hoped that concrete proposals for a Presidential Scholars Initiative, named for President Bush and President Yudhoyono, will emerge from these deliberations, together with expanded individual university cooperative programs. Other bi-national and multilateral donors should also contribute to this effort, which is also aimed at restoring tertiary education in badly hit institutions in Aceh where over 100 Ph.D. scholars were lost in the tsunami disaster.
4. New Cooperation in Defense Relations
Mr. Chairman, the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono -- still less than six months old -- and its renewed commitment to democratic reforms offer unparalleled opportunities to expand bilateral defense cooperation. It is little secret that Indonesian military capabilities have suffered from nearly 15 years of constrained assistance and contacts with the United States. This was seen in command and control deficiencies, airlift and technical shortcomings, and diminished interoperability skills during the recent disaster relief operations.
The reasons for the downturn in military-to-military cooperation have also permeated the overarching US-Indonesian political relationship. But let me be clear: no one is arguing for impunity in alleged abuses that have been cited over the years, whether related to East Timor, domestic insurgencies, the suppression of democratic rights in connection with the reformasi movement beginning in 1999, inter-ethnic and inter-religious strife, or the killings of Americans and others in the well known Timika incident of August 2002 in Papua. Accountability, personal and national reconciliation, new efforts to promote political accommodation, and the application of internationally accepted human rights standards should pervade the more intensive relations now manifest between our two nations.
Mr. Chairman, within this frame of reference, there are important opportunities not to be lost.
An experts' review of United States-Indonesia defense relations, supported by a private foundation, was issued by USINDO in December 2004 and was discussed in conferences held in Washington, D.C. and Jakarta. USINDO soon will publish three monographs in the important areas of internal stability and defense reform, counter-terrorism and maritime security. The overriding conclusion of these experts (copies of their report are available) was that urgent and overlapping interests regarding maritime security and counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia require expanded US assistance to the Indonesian armed forces in addition to substantial upgrading of police (POLRI) capabilities. Furthermore, access to US training in order to upgrade the professionalism of middle grade officers is a cardinal requirement, combined with assistance to modernize logistical and other systems, in order to promote defense reform and contribute to internal stability, taking into account the new roles of the TNI and POLRI in a democratic society.
Mr. Chairman, my view is that future United States assistance should be addressed in two ways: first, build up TNI capabilities, and second, advance defense reform in the government and civil sectors.
Core military priorities are:
1. Training: IMET, Enhanced IMET and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) should be devoted to a five-year "crash" program to retrain captains, majors and lieutenant colonels in essential military skills, the humanitarian and other roles of today's military forces, and international standards of conduct. Improved military professionalism not only will lead to better individual performance, but also will promote interoperability with foreign forces (a need evidenced in Aceh relief operations), update international peacekeeping skills, and enhance sensitivity to the human rights aspects of military operations. This upgrading of military skills across the board is needed to fulfill the TNI's valid internal security role until police capabilities can be considerably improved.
2. Air transport and logistics: It is gratifying to know that, due to the US release of impounded spare parts and equipment, 13 C-130 aircraft are operating now in contrast to 4 before the tsunami disaster. Other forms of air transport and logistical systems of the air force, navy and ground forces should be upgraded to minimum operational standards. If there is to be effective regional cooperation in counter-terrorism and maritime security, the TNI must have the support platforms necessary to sustain patrolling and interdiction operations.
3. Maritime security: The full US$6 million in FMF, as proposed in 2004, should be provided for the Indonesian Navy in 2005 to upgrade its sea patrolling operations. Additional assistance should be sought from South Korea and Japan, which also have important interests in maintaining maritime vigilance in Southeast Asia. The United States should also assist Indonesia and its neighbors to develop a Common Maritime Picture, entailing the integration of information from all sources, to track ship traffic in the Malacca Strait and critical sea space in the surrounding region. Secure, compartmented and reliable communications are also required to facilitate exchanges of information relating to counter-terrorism and maritime law enforcement. Consequently, I recommend that the United States fund a modern multi-nodal communications network whereby military, intelligence and law enforcement officials in the region can readily exchange sensitive operational information.
Mr. Chairman, an essential part of the advancement of democracy is capacity building to promote effective command and control of the armed forces as well as to enhance civil society's role in national defense and security affairs. My suggestions for priority US assistance in the civil sector would include:
1. National command authority: The Aceh experience showed that Indonesia's command and control system requires upgrading and connectivity with the President's Office, the Coordinating Minister for Justice, Political and Security Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, TNI headquarters at all levels, the Police, associated national security bodies, and disaster management agencies. Any chief executive in today's world must have reliable and redundant means of communicating with all key elements of government.
The United States is uniquely qualified to help Indonesia construct a modern command, control and communications (C3) network to provide connectivity with the top-most level of government that would also include an effective, real-time reporting system for all echelons of the national security structure.
2. National Defense Council and expert staff: There already is provision in law for the creation of a National Defense Council and US experience is directly applicable to Indonesia's needs. The United States should provide advisory assistance to establish a system in the President's Office to ensure that the chief executive is able to coordinate with his key national security advisors and that processes are in place to expedite essential advice on important policy and operational matters.
3. Ministry of Defense: Training and advisory assistance, in addition to expanded technical staffs in strategic planning, management, budgeting, logistics, and force planning are needed to enable the ministry under its present farsighted and experienced leader, Minister Juwono Sudarsono (who will visit Washington next week) to fulfill its essential constitutional role. The United States should set up special programs at the US Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey and elsewhere to provide intensive assistance and training on a multi-year basis. Additionally, the Center of Excellence of the Pacific Command should provide intensive training and other assistance to develop an effective national disaster management system.
4. Civil Sector: US assistance should not only be confined to the government and armed forces, but civilian capacities also should be built up, perhaps through a qualified non-governmental organization (NGO) or think tank, to expand academic courses and research for the study of military affairs, civil-military policy development and institutional reform. Elevating public discussion of important politico-military policy matters will enrich national policy making as appropriate in a democratic society.
5. Military Justice System: In a little heralded development last September, the military justice system was placed under the Supreme Court which is undergoing its own wide-scale reform and restructuring. Targeted US assistance could be provided through a qualified NGO to help mesh the military and civil systems, provide cross-training, enhance judicial accountability, and sponsor training in international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict.
6. Parliamentary Oversight: As evidenced in the visit to Washington of a parliamentary delegation last week, there is scope for improving linkages between the US Congress and the DPR, as well as providing training and orientation in key defense and foreign relations subjects, international human rights law and practice, legislative drafting and research support. USAID assistance and direct Congress-DPR programs should be expanded to promote effective oversight by Indonesia's democratically elected representatives.
7. Reconciliation with East Timor: With the imminent launching of a Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) by Indonesia and East Timor, it should be possible for the United States to provide legal and other advisory assistance through a qualified NGO to make this process more meaningful. As the former head of the US Department of State's Cambodian Genocide Initiative, I believe that American specialists can offer a great deal to enrich the work of the commission in a non-intrusive and politically neutral fashion, while correctly upholding the responsibility of the two governments to guide this process.
8. Aceh and Papua Demobilization: As done in the southern Philippines, the United States should support qualified organizations to retrain and resettle demobilized insurgents in war-torn Aceh and also in Papua. Providing insurgents with new livelihoods, reuniting them with their families, and relocating them in stable and non-threatening environments would facilitate political accommodations within the framework of Indonesia's special autonomy law.
9. Police Assistance: The United States should help marshal international assistance to increase the size national police (POLRI) to over 1 million officers, closer to the United Nations civil policing standard. Community policing should also be expanded, as should the number of indigenous police officers in Aceh and Papua taking into account special autonomy provisions. US counter-terrorism assistance to the police should also be maintained.
10. Privatization: The Ministry of Defense, under national law, has already begun to regularize the status of military-run businesses and to try to supplant extra-budgetary support with annual allocations from the national budget. This process should be enhanced and there is an opportunity for the United States to provide assistance, perhaps in connection with the World Bank, to bring military businesses under appropriate national surveillance, prepare them for privatization, and provide compensatory budgetary support.
Mr. Chairman, I fully realize that the foregoing menu of areas for potential US engagement with Indonesia is extensive, if not overly ambitious. We at USINDO are hopeful that next week's visit to Washington of Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono, who is a well-recognized authority on defense reform, will launch the United States and Indonesia on a path of collaborative, multi-year cooperation to address foremost professional, capabilities, structural and civil sector needs. Strong United States commitment to advance democracy is fully justified in light of developments in Indonesia since 1999. In my personal view, the Bush Administration's decision to lift restrictions on US training and assistance is timely, if overdue, in terms of pressing joint interests in maritime security and counter-terrorism as well as the recent earthquake and tsunami tragedy.
Concluding, Mr. Chairman, my assessment is that the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono offers the best opportunity in well over a decade to deepen cooperation along a broad front for the purpose of locking in democracy for all the people within a united Indonesia. As Professor Karl Jackson of Johns Hopkins University, a prominent expert on Indonesia, remarked at a USINDO seminar last November, "If not SBY, who? If not now, when?"
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time and attention of this eminent committee.
[Ambassador La Porta's remarks are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the USINDO boards of trustees and advisors, corporate supporters or Friends of the Society.]