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Suharto's New Order regime still in power

By James Balowski

Following massive student demonstrations which started in February and the wave of rioting which shook Jakarta on May 14-15, Suharto was forced to resign on May 21 and appoint vice-president B.J. Habibie to replace him.

World leaders immediately welcomed the resignation portraying it as the act of a "great statesman", stepping aside for the greater good of the nation and claiming it would open the way for democratic reform.

A May 21 report by Reuters news service for example, quoted US President Bill Clinton as saying "We welcome President Suharto's decision, which provides an opportunity to begin a process leading to a real democratic transition for Indonesia -- an opportunity for the Indonesian people to come together and build a stable democracy for the future". The same report quoted Australian prime minister John Howard as saying his government would cooperate with Habibie's administration. "I welcome the fact that the changes are within the framework of the constitution. It [the transition] should be orderly, it should be without bloodshed and it should be within the framework of the current constitution that forms the Indonesian state," Howard told a news conference.

Far from being the act of a great statesman, his resignation was forced on the regime for fear that unless it quickly distanced itself from Suharto -- who's resignation was the key focus of the mass student demonstrations -- the whole structure of the New Order regime would begin to unravel. In the days leading up to his resignation it had become clear to the political establishment in Jakarta that the student protest were not just going to go away and the option of a military crackdown would be politically too costly. The massive rioting in Jakarta was a direct consequence of popular anger against the shooting of six students at the Trisakti university in Jakarta on May 12.

The political establishment decided therefore, that the easiest concession to make was to get rid of Suharto, but without any clearly stated accompanying reforms. Since then, it has worked hard to ensure that the so-called reform process stays within its control and has strived to keep the initiative out of the hands of the democratic opposition -- especially the student movement.

Habibie's new "reform" cabinet announced on May 22, was stacked with Suharto appointees with only the most unacceptable figures being removed such as Suharto's daughter Tutut, billionaire crony Bob Hasan and the fascist-minded education minister, Wiranto Arismunandar.

The military actually increased its representation with General Wiranto retaining his defence minister portfolio and position as commander in chief of the armed forces. The positions of coordinating minister for political and security affairs, minister of information and minister of home affairs went to senior military figures.

The only significant liberal figure to be included was a 1960s student activist and researcher, Adi Sasono -- who is also secretary-general of ICMI (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association) -- previously headed by Habibie. Although Sasono has called for political prisoners to be released, for reform of the electoral laws and for new and early elections, he represents a very small minority in the new cabinet.

Token gestures

Since becoming president, Habibie's "democratic reforms" -- which have been applauded loudly by mainstream media -- have amounted to little more that token gestures and have largely been concessions to gains the mass movement had already won.

Around 20 political prisoners have been released but they do not include anyone who could genuinely threaten the regime. The majority are leaders of organisations that have been able to operate openly for some time, although suffering significant harassment. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, chairperson of the Indonesian United Democratic Party, Mochtar Pakpahan chairperson of the Indonesian Prosperity Trade Union (SBSI) were released first, followed by Nuku Sulaiman from the student network Pijar, Andi Syahputra from the Alliance of Independent Journalists and three activists from a women's protest group.

Designed to weaken the resolve of the radical student movement to maintain the pace and uncompromising demands for total reform, the tactic of selectively releasing some political prisoners is also designed to strengthen the hand of those forces attempting to build a consensus or "loyal opposition" with the Habibie government.

East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao remains imprisoned, as do leaders of the People's Democratic Party (PRD) such as Budiman Sujatmiko and Dita Sari. The only exception being three "disappeared" PRD activists who were released on May 17 -- largely due to mounting domestic and international pressure over a number of pro-democracy activists who had been disappeared by the military since February. There is no indication that members of the Indonesian Communist Party -- many of whom have been in jail for more than 30 years -- will be freed. Even then the regime has already warned that those who have been released could be rearrested. A June 24 report by the Jakarta daily Kompas quoted the minister of justice, Muladi, as warning that they should refrain from "political actions which could disturb `public security and order'" and if they "violate the law" they will be rearrested.

The PRD, militant organisations such the East Timorese national student organisation, Renetil, other Timorese resistance organisations and the PRD affiliated Centre for Labour Struggle remained banned. Despite launching an internal investigation into the disappeared pro-democracy activists and a recent admission by Wiranto that "renegade" sections of the military may have been responsible, dozens remain missing in East Timor as do at least five Indonesian activists, including a number of PRD members.

New elections delayed

The regime is also trying to delay demands for new elections -- a key demand of the opposition movement -- in the hope that when they are held, the radicalisation process will have dwindled. Attempting to preempt the growth of a united movement around this demand, the government has agreed to an election schedule which requires that new laws to regulate elections and political parties be drafted first and that the elections be held sometime in 1999. This timetable allows time for the regime to reorganise its own political tools with leaders of the state party Golkar already gearing up to "reform" the party and relaunch it as the Indonesia Karya Party.

Initially promising that the current restrictions on political parties will be lifted, the regime is now moving to place restriction on how many and what kind of new parties can be formed. The minister of home affairs, General Syarwan Hamid (who was in charge of the campaign to suppress the PRD in 1996), has already stated that there will have to be limits on the number of parties allowed. He has also said that new political parties must adhere to the state ideology, Pancasila, and not carry out activities such as organising mass demonstrations until the new laws are in place.

He has also argued that it is not necessary to repeal all five of the 1985 repressive political laws*. It is enough, he said, to revise those laws that affect elections and the composition of parliament.

Military role remains

Although the armed forces has been more "cautious" in the use of force against recent demonstrations, its social and political role in Indonesian society remain in place. An end to the "dual function" of the military continues to be a key demand of many in the democracy movement. The military has also made it clear that it supports Habibie and will protect Suharto from growing demands that his wealth be investigated or that he be tried for his crimes against the Indonesian people.

In a June 3 television broadcast, Wiranto strongly defended Suharto's record and pleaded for people to recognise his overall positive achievements. He also said the mushrooming reform actions were "tending to demand change in everything and anything". He ended the statement by saying that anybody who stepped outside the limits of officially sanctioned reform would "have to face the armed forces". Other key military figures such as Hamid and recently sacked Jakarta Military Commander General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin have made similar threats.

The regime has gone to great lengths to portray Wiranto as a "thinking general", committed to reform. This has been parroted by the mainstream media and even a number of high profile international human rights organisations. Frequently this is done in the context of contrasting Wiranto against "hard-liners" such as Suharto's son-in-law General Prabowo, who Wiranto recently sacked as commander of the elite military command Kopassus. Unsubstantiated reports that Prabowo was behind the disappearances of pro-democracy activists or engineered the Trisaki shootings and the riots in Jakarta, have been exploited to give the impression that the armed forces has now been "purged" of its more extreme elements.

Quickly forgotten in the scramble to rehabilitate the armed forces is that it was Wiranto who oversaw the policy of preventing students from protesting outside university campuses all through this year. The scores of students who were hospitalised, the use of police and soldiers to barricade students inside the campuses and the unconstitutional use of force to prevent students from peacefully demonstrating on city streets was carried out on Wiranto's orders.

More recently troops have again been used to repress demonstrations in Jakarta at joint student worker rallies at the University of Indonesia and against a planned demonstrations by SBSI workers. In May, fully armed troops violently broke up a demonstration by East Timorese calling for a referendum and the release of Gusmao at the national parliament in Jakarta.

East Timor

On June 9, Habibie announced that he was prepared to grant special status to East Timor and release Gusmao on the condition that the UN accept the territory's integration into Indonesia. While some have welcomed the move, Gusmao and the East Timorese independence movement have unanimously rejected the offer and the size and frequency of demonstrations demanding full independence have continued to grow.

Although a number of East Timorese prisoners in Dili have been released and in some cases, demonstrations demanding an act of self-determination have been allowed to proceed, no troops have yet to be withdrawn. Incidents of extra-judicial arrests and execution have continued as the case of Herman das Dores Soares, who was shot dead by Indonesian troops on June 16.

The regime has also begun organising "pro-integration" demonstrations to counter the massive rallies demanding an act of self-determination over the last few weeks. On June 27, one person was killed and five injured when Indonesian intelligence officers opened fire on pro-independence demonstrators during a visit by three European Union ambassadors to the coastal town of Baucau.

Campaigning for real reform

With the removal of Suharto, the focus for the democratic movement and the demands it is putting forward, have become less clear. More militant sections of the student movement and opposition groups such as the PRD stress that unless the movement continues the mass struggle for more concrete and far reaching demands, the key elements of the Suharto regime will remain intact under the Habibie government.

Such demands must included that Suharto and the military be tried for their crimes against humanity, Suharto and his family's wealth be nationalised, the abolition of the repressive political laws and an end to the dual function of the military, the release of all political prisoners and an act of self-determination for East Timor.

These are demands that Habibie's "reform cabinet" and the military will resist at all costs, precisely because unlike the token gestures offered so far, these would truly mean an end to Suharto's New Order regime.

* The five laws passed in 1985 allow for only three recognised political parties; ban party activity from villages and small towns; allow the government to appoint 575 non-elected members (75 representing the military) to the People's Consultative Assembly; impose a single, state-defined ideology on all social, political and cultural organisations; and give the state the right to intervene in the internal affairs of organisations.

James Balowski is ASIET's Information and Publications Officer