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Australian foreign policy: 'blood for oil'

By James Balowski

In 1978, Australia became the first and only western nation to give de jure recognition to Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. This was reaffirmed by prime minister Malcolm Fraser and yet again in 1985 by Bob Hawke.

Barely two months after the Dili massacre, Garath Evens, who had welcomed Jakarta's "independent" enquiry into the killings as a confirmation of Australia's soft diplomatic approach, smiled to the cameras and drank champagne with Indonesian foreign affairs minister, Ali Alitas, after they signed the East Timor Gap Treaty to exploit East Timor's massive oil and gas reserves in a jet flying over the disputed territory.

Within months of being elected, prime minister John Howard and foreign affairs minister, Alexander Downer separately visited Jakarta. Only weeks before, on July 27, 1996, the world had witnessed armed troops beating and arresting demonstrators in Jakarta, both returned from the visits applauding Suharto's wise leadership of the country. No public statement was made on the question of East Timor other than to say that it had been raised "privately" with Suharto.

"Batik diplomacy"

The mainstream media is fond of referring to the issue of East Timor as an ongoing "problem" in relations between the two countries or as some have put it, "a festering sore" in an otherwise cosy relationship. But even a cursory look at the actions and policies of past and present Australian governments during and after the 1975 invasion paints a very different picture; a picture of governments willing to exchange the lives of thousands of East Timorese for the interests of big business and profit.

In talks between prime minister Whitlam and president Suharto in September 1974, the Australian position was that they favoured the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. But this should be followed by an internationally accepted act of self-determination without the use of force. This was reiterated by Whitlam in April 1975, despite the fact that the Australian government was by then well aware that the overwhelming majority of East Timorese did not support integration with Indonesia. Suharto assured him that force would not be used.

By August 1975, after an Indonesian backed a coup attempt against FRETILIN, who were campaigning for full independence and commanded the support of the majority of the East Timorese people, it was becoming clear that Indonesian military intervention had begun in earnest. The Australian ambassador, Richard Woolcott sent a secret cable to the head of the foreign affairs, Alan Renouf recommending that:

"... I would suggest that our policies should be based on disengaging ourselves as far as possible from the Timor question... leave events to take their course and, if and when Indonesia does intervene, act in a way which would be designed to minimise the public impact in Australia and show privately understanding to Indonesia of their problems...
We are all aware of the Australian defence interest in the Portuguese Timor situation but wander whether the Department has ascertained the interest to the Minister or the Department of Minerals and Energy... this Department might well have an interest in closing the present gap in the agreed sea border and this could be much more readily negotiated with Indonesia... than with Portugal or an independent East Timor".

As preparations for a full-scale invasion began, Whitlam persisted with publicly opposing the use of force. Yet the Defence Signals Directorate which had been monitoring Indonesian military radio traffic in and around East Timor knew the exact details of Jakarta's military activities, often before the Indonesian generals in Jakarta themselves knew.

In October 9, 1975, Bill Pritchett, a senior defence department official, in a memo to defence minister Bill Morrison contesting Woolcott's line.

"Basically... we have pursued incompatible lines of policies that Portuguese Timor should be integrated into Indonesia but that there should be a an act of self-determination and that Indonesia should not effect integration by coercion. Since the weight of evidence from the outset has been that any act of self- determination would oppose integration, in effect what we have offered Indonesia with the one hand, we have sought to deny them with the other..."

US strategic interests

The US position was frighteningly similar. Since 1965, US strategic interests had coincided with Suharto's bloody anti-communism and the US had invested considerable amounts of military aid to its ally to achieve this.

Also important for the US was maintaining access to the deep water channels of the Ombai and Wetar straits on the northern side of East Timor which provide the only suitable passage for US nuclear submarines from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. Washington, like Canberra was well informed of about Indonesia's intentions. In fact the original date of the invasion in the beginning of December was, at the request of the US Administration, postponed until December 7 to allow Ford and Kissinger to make their scheduled visit to Jakarta on December 6.

The US chief delegate to the UN, Daniel Moynihan, later openly bragged about the hatchet job he did on the Timorese. "...the US wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the UN prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. The task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success."

Australia was even worse. While claiming to support UN policy on East Timor, Canberra actively worked to frustrate it. First the Fraser government blocked the UN envoy, then they closed down the two-way radio link between Darwin the East Timorese Resistance. When a new radio link was established by Australian supporters they were apprehended and the radio seized. When a clandestine operation was mounted, Canberra tracked it down and arrested the operators.

"Damage control"

Despite the world wide condemnation of Indonesia following the 1991 Dili massacre, Australian governments have continued to provide international damage control' for Jakarta leaving Indonesia to do the dirty work while Australia, the US and Japan provide international cover and preserve their economic and political interests in the region.

This was well illustrated in the role they played in preventing a resolution being passed in the UN Human Rights Commission condemning Indonesia for the November 12 massacre. Initiated by Portugal and supported by most of the European community, the resolution would have been the first of its kind and would have forced Indonesia to allow international human rights organisations into East Timor.

By applying pressure on Portugal to withdraw the resolution, Australia, the US and Japan were able have the resolution "watered down" to a statement of "understanding" between Portugal and Indonesia. The final resolution contained no obligation whatsoever to allow international observers into East Timor.

Government ministers like Garath Evans, are fond of describing incidents such as the Dili massacre as some kind of "aberration". In doing so, they conveniently neglect to mention the events of 1965, Tanjung Priok, Lampung and numerous other mass killings by the Indonesian military. In continuing to apply a "soft diplomatic" approach to Jakarta, they also neglect to mention that the kind of international pressure which followed the Dili massacre and which Australia worked so hard to deflect was precisely what might have forced Jakarta to agree to a UN sponsored resolution and end the military occupation of East Timor.

James Balowski is ASIET's Information and Publications Officer.