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Why is it difficult to build unity in the opposition, and how to move forward

[The following is a statement issued by the Central Leadership of the People’s Democratic Party (PRD), which was distributed as a leaflet at a mass meeting of the National Coalition held on February 23, 2003. Translated by James Balowski.]

Criticism of current opposition unity

Based on the various joint activities organised by the National Coalition (Koalisi Nasional) it can be seen that from the perspective of the serious efforts to unite -– as reflected in joint actions which have been agreed to -– it still has many weaknesses. This could be seen for example, in the lack of seriousness in mobilising a Jabotabek wide meeting (Priok, Karawang and several Jakarta campuses) as a pre-condition for the mass meeting in Jakarta on February 23. In fact, this lack of seriousness had an impact not only in failing to maximise the February 23 mass meeting but also on the capacity to broaden the structure of the National Coalition itself in the Jabotabek region -– which moreover, will influence the success or failure of broadening the national structure of the National Coalition. If the structure of the National Coalition can be broadened, the National Coalition will be superior in (perspective) its capacity to struggle compared with other groups which have united from the sectoral and multi-sectoral opposition which is been increasingly lively of late. After declaring (the superiority) of its program –- which stood firm with the needs of ordinary people -– it follows that the need for strategy and tactics to broaden its structure are an absolute necessity for the National Coalition in order that it is able to become a real vehicle and force -– opening up the active mass participation –- for pubic opposition against the anti-people government. The National Coalition has shown itself to represent the interests of the people in its struggle and done so with intelligence, courage and loyalty (see its founding declaration) and, even more so, has succeeded in socialising itself in a number of larger cities.

This weakness can also be seen from the local mass mobilisation in Jakarta which in truth, could become a trigger for the rise and realisation of the (positive) strategic and tactical potential for a national platform of the National Coalition: 1) a working agenda which can test the capacity for maximum mobilisation of the masses and 2) at the same time be an arena of socialisation -– which in the initial stages, will be easier and more popular if it is organised in Jakarta -– to strengthen and facilitate, the founding and building of local National Coalition branches. Furthermore, at this time, there is a high level of political passion within elements of the opposition to unite, both at the national and local level. One of the reasons for this weakness is for example, because individuals from mass organisations and political parties which are involved in the National Coalition are unable (moreover, it is as if they do not have the will) to encourage their comrades, to hold discussions with and instruct their local branches to assist in making the mobilisation and establishment of local National Coalition branches a success; in fact these steps represent the most minimal and moderate agenda.

In fact there have been a number of political developments which have prepared the (potential) objective conditions which could facilitate the broadening of the structure of a unified opposition -– which if seen from the strength of the regime at this moment, in terms of the parliament (the election mechanisms) or in terms of the extra-parliamentary movement (mass mobilisations, unification of the opposition), represent an absolute necessity for the struggle at this time. The support of hundreds of Elaine workers [who occupied their factory after it was closed by the owners who fled the country], who went to the National Coalition offices, represents a test of its capacity to become a vehicle, a tool in the people’s struggle, and also showed the increasingly broad support that exists for the National Coalition. In the present economic crisis which is continuing to accumulate, there are scores, hundreds, even thousands of factories, where workers are being oppressed, which have a huge potential to re-ignite the passion of working class resistance; there is also potential for struggle by workers in state owned industries – where conditions for active participation in the struggle already existed. The liquidation of national economic assets, which is primarily a result of state colonialism by large capitalists -– which neoliberalism is using as a solution to overcome the global capitalist crisis –- and the policies of the authorities, which at a certain level will attract middle and small-scale capitalists into the arena of struggle -– has already been demonstrated in the position taken towards the recent price increases to fuel, electricity and telephone charges, privatisation and divestment. Likewise, farmers have threatened to launch an immediate struggle if the liberalisation of food imports is not stopped. Among students the level of politicalisation in their struggle continues to rise. Just in a period of less than two months, almost all moderate elements have hardened their position: desiring change in a better direction. And these hopes will only become possible by overthrowing the anti-people government. New elements of struggle have already emerged, but are they are weak in terms of leadership and perspective, that is what must become the ongoing basis for the broadening of the pioneering struggle of the National Coalition.

If the spirit of unity has already been accepted by opposition elements, this spirit should be manifested in real political action in accordance with the needs of the struggle. This means: The National Coalition must endeavour to make itself a pool of attraction; so that the National Coalition can take the initiative to open up the national political platform (mass meetings, press conferences, seminars), actively expanding its campaign to broaden its structure, and patiently explaining this to other pro-people organisations, opposition figures and pro-people intellectuals. The National Coalition must also expand to other cities, in the villages, the factories and campuses and so on. And from all of this, it must be ready to reap this political harvest, to become a structure of mass mobilisation, secretariats, branches and small groups of the National Coalition. This need can only be fulfilled if all elements which have joined with the National Coalition are capable of implementing joint political decisions in a manner which is consistent, militant and with full dedication. The People’s Democratic Party has reaffirmed its position that all of its organisational activities, as fully as possible, will be committed to the strengthening the unity of a progressive opposition which is capable of becoming a tool of political struggle (which is of a certain capacity) for the ordinary people.

Opportunities

1. New elements have already emerged which are thinking and acting progressively in their struggle. This is in comparison to a year ago when there were only a few organisations which pioneered (in a radical way) the program to overthrow the government of President Megawati Sukarnoputri and Vice-president Hamzah Haz and put forward the perspective of forming a new government. That perspective has now spread to other organisation, for example student organisations -– primarily radical student organisations which were born in the cauldron of the struggle to overthrow former President Suharto in 1998-1999 -– trade unions (who’s potential is big but who have yet to experience a significant expansion), political parties, non-government organisations and the like. What is necessary therefore, is the unification of these different sectors as a vehicle for the unification of the broader opposition. There has already been a process of unification in these different sectors such as the Poor People’s Front for Struggle (FPRM), the National Coalition, the Message of the People’s Suffering Front and the like. The present situation has also resulted in the consolidation of other sectoral fronts such as the Youth and Student Opposition Front (BOKMM), the All Indonesia Student Executive Council (BEM) and the Workers’ Committee Against Oppression and others.

2. The relationship of the factors above influence each other in the accumulating crisis which has broadened mass spontaneous struggle by ordinary people. All layers of society can be said to be in motion. This development has been sufficient to produce a common platform (which is relatively solid post the overthrow of Suharto) in the movement: strengthening the anti-colonialist sentiment against large capital (Western and their local agents); a sentiment against price increases; and a sentiment supporting the overthrow of the Mega-Hamzah government (who are already considered by ordinary people to be agents of large Western capital). The various anti-people policies of the Mega-Hamzah government have already given birth to political demands from new more moderate elements to increase the quality of their demands and articulate the demand for Mega-Hamzah to resign. In less than a month, BEM has shifted from promoting demands for reforms to policies on price increases, against corruption, divestment and privatisation, to demands for the Mega-Hamzah government to resign. Up until now, BEM has been the force with the broadest networks and ability to mobilise the student sector. The obstacle for BEM is that demands for the government to resign which are made without any perspective of a new and progressive government, prepares the grounds for its deviation by the fake reformists (within and outside of parliament) –- as occurred in overthrowing former president Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), which should be a lesson: that the Mega-Hamzah government is a logical consequence of a pragmatic alliance. (The objective conditions which made it easy to overthrow Gus Dur are no longer present: previously the Golkar party [the ruing state party under the Suharto regime], the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle [Megawati’s party], the United Development Party [Hamzah Haz’s party], the Reform Fractions and other elements in parliament who were anti-Gus Dur -– who were only seeking power and wealth -– were able to use the parliament to overthrow Gus Dur “constitutionally”; aside from this the military’s position is clear, they also had an interest in overthrowing Gus Dur. Should we, the opposition, now place our hopes in the compassion of the parliament –- the key to which is in the hands of Golkar -– and the support of the military? If not what goal then should we work towards now, as the opposition, should it only be to garner potential popularity so that the votes of ordinary people will fall into our party’s laps in the 2004 elections. For us, and even more so the opposition, if we do not advance together as one party in the 2004 elections, there is little possibility of hoping for a large number of votes, because of course, the votes of the ordinary people will be split, fragmented –- even more so if the ruling and other conservative parties are able to use the election for in the interest of their parities, except, as in the Philippines, were the election was safeguard by the power of mass mobilisation so that it could not be manipulated by the ruling and conservative parties. If there is no change in the strategy and tactics of the opposition, and supposing the opposition parties succeed in increasing the people’s vote -– which will of course not be significant enough to eliminate the remnants of the old order -– that represents a gradualist endeavour which will sacrifice ordinary people, abandoning the people to wait longer for change while they are burdened with a life of suffering -- to do this would be absolutely contemptible.

3. The parliamentarist solution to win an alternative government has been shown to have failed, totally. In addition, the possibility of collaboration between the extra-parliamentary forces and the parliament as in the case of the overthrow of Gus Dur is almost impossible. At that time, the majority of the elite in parliament, including the military, agreed to overthrow Gus Dur, the role of the extra-parliamentary movement was nothing more than an emblem of political legitimisation. This resulted in a level of democracy which was far worse than the previous regime, the perspective of extra-parliamentary collaboration at the crucial moment, is in its essence tending toward betrayal. All of the elite in parliament at this time are tending to choose a safe path, criticism against the government by the parliamentary elite is aimed at winning power concessions from the Mega-Hamzah government, at most a cabinet reshuffle or working together to cover up the crimes of the different elite factions or washing their hands of unpopular political acts, and at the least, making a political investment in the 2004 elections.

4. The military’s position is clearly one of ensuring the continuation of the Mega-Hamzah government. This is quite natural considering how cowardly democracy has been under the Mega-Hamzah government, as a result the political interests of the military which have been broadened and even protected. Militarism which is marked by the spread of repression and the strengthening of the military’s political position is increasingly becoming an obstacle for the people’s struggle. However various formal democratic obstacles which were successfully broken down by the movement when Suharto was overthrown have resulted in manifestations of militarism encountering a strong resistance from the people. There is no other way of eliminating repression except by resisting it though intensifying mass meetings, mobilisation and broadening the process of unity.

5. This is not to reject the strategy and tactics of parliamentary work, but at this time, the parliamentarist strategy and tactics require strong pressure from the opposition forces (which are united) and the masses. However, it appears that some sections of the opposition are still convinced of the strategy of such collaborative tactics. The failure of the Justice Party and the Indonesian Muslim Students Action Front (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI) and perhaps also elements of BEM in utilising the strategy of parliamentarism to overthrow Mega-Hamzah, and also the failure of the Justice Party its attempts to revising election legislation -– which was intentionally drafted to benefit the conservative parties in parliament and kill off the small parties -- at a certain point will become a reason for them to abandon the extra-parliamentary mobilisation of the masses. The potential of mass mobilisation has been made subservient to creating a split among the majority of the parliamentary elite and the military, so in essence they still believe in parliamentary transition as the solution. So they do not locate the solution in the formation of an alternative government but though parliamentarist methods (which is being pressured for by the different opposition forces and the masses which are stronger) which are extra-parliamentary. As far as the quality of their program, they continue raise demands for democracy and the destruction of the remnants of the old order, so the tendency of an opposition of this kind can still provide a positive impact for the development of the movement -- the development of a progressive movement which will go on to scrap all of these kind of tendencies. If the development of the progressive movement increasingly determines this, the limits of moderation will increasingly be forced to the rear.

6. The radical elements in the student organisations are still in the minority. However new student committees are still blossoming as was the case in the situation leading up to the fall of Suharto. However the new radical elements, also the moderates -– especially outside of the BEM network -– have a great deal of potential. For the National Coalition, the next step for these new elements (in the student movement) is activating the political platform of the National Coalition on the campuses which can be intensified by student elements which have joined the National Coalition. Above all, for all radial elements of the student movement the extension of their network is an absolute necessity to create the conditions for the development of these new elements. The political platform which needs to be strived for is to immediately hold closed or open mass meetings (if it is given permission) on campuses throughout the country (most importantly on the large campuses in the big cities) and establish secretariats for the radical student movement networks (which can take advantage of existing campus facilities, establish regular or emergency secretariats or also establish student settlements around campuses). If such a thing is done, there will be a significant increase of the dynamic elements in the student sector, both in the scope of their struggle and in the quality of their leadership and unification in and among students themselves.

7. The ongoing development of the potential which emerges from the new elements in the struggle is the basis, the driving force, for the National Coalition to further reaffirm the fact that the National Coalition has the capacity to become a genuine tool of struggle for the people. The new elements, either from emerging student committees, workers’ committees, people’s mass organisations, intellectuals, NGOs and extra-parliamentary figures who are pro-people, will prepare the potential for the development of the National Coalition in the future, and represent a potential for the unification of a broader opposition in order that step by step, it will advance even further. For example, the National Coalition has been called on to show it is clearly taking sides with oppression which is being experience by the working class, and to show that the National Coalition truly has the capacity to become a tool of struggle for workers, this is already very clear in the National Coalition manifesto. Likewise taking sides with farmers and fisherpeople who everywhere are restless, and seize the great potential to be involved in the cauldron of the struggle.

8. Although the National Coalition’s capacity to mobilise has yet to be effectively tested, it does in fact have significant potential. All most all of the progressive organisations in the movement who have experience, who have been tested and are militant, stand of the side of the National Coalition. And the National Coalition has elements within it and a program which is more advanced compared to the other coalition groups -– only the Justice Party, KAMMI and BEM have structures which are relatively broader and better tested. The tendencies of the Ciganjurist [political meetings of elite opposition figures in 1998] model is a basic weakness but, if there is a change in their strategy and tactics, they can prepare the potential for uniting a new opposition which is even more advanced. So it all depends on how far the more advanced elements lead it.

9. Therefore, strengthening the sprit of opposition unity, which is certainly an absolute requirement for the movement, must continue to be tested, demanding militancy and continue to be professionalised. The narrow agenda of various elements which have united in the National Coalition must be marginalised. Conversely, and in dialectic terms, each development within the National Coalition will become the basis for the development of those elements themselves which have united within the National Coalition. Moreover it raises the possibility that even the most moderate elements (for example if the opportunity for an extra-parliamentary movement fails to be utilised effectively, or the people are unable to be awakened and still have illusions in the authorities and the best solution to the problem can be though parliamentarist means –- the 2004 general elections) will realise that the National Coalition is the tool which is most effective for the progressive opposition to intervene in this momentum in order to advance the copiousness of the people: putting forward the National Coalition as a party participating in the elections.

10. Enough, do not abandon the people –- who for more than 30 years have been oppressed by Suharto’s New Order regime and have obtained no political education -– to choose the wrong leader for their nation (in the legislative, executive and judiciary).

LONG LIVE THE UNITY OF THE OPPOSITION!

People’s Democratic Party