APSN Indonesia News Digest No 35 - September 7-1, 2003

The head of the military operation in Aceh, Major General Bambang Darmono was quoted by the Serambi newspaper Sunday as saying troops on Saturday raided nine rebel camps in the Gunung Seulimon area. A total of 27 suspected guerrillas were arrested in the camps and are being questioned in North Aceh district.

Meanwhile, the head of the state of military emergency in Aceh, Major General Endang Suwarya was quoted by Serambi as saying the leaders of the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) were continously "on the move, moving from place to place" and evading arrest.

Still on the run are the GAM top military commander Muzakkir Manaf, his spokesman Sofyan Dawod, East Aceh military regional commander Ishak Daud Darwis Djeunieb who heads the Bireun district military command and a number of other regional commanders.

The military is now in its fourth month of intensive operations to rid the resource-rich province at the northern-most tip of Sumatra island of the rebels who have been fighting for independence since 1976.

On Saturday, the military said it had so far killed 830 guerrillas while more than 1,700 others have been arrested or had surrendered since the campaign was launched on May 19. The military lost 36 soldiers and the police 15 men. The Aceh police said at least 319 civilians have been killed during the same period while 108 have gone missing.

The military campaign is to last until November when it would be reviewed.

TNI and police levels in Aceh will not be reduced

Kompas - September 5, 2003

Jakarta - The Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, has explained that the government would not be reducing TNI [Indonesian military] and national police levels in Aceh.

"[As a result of] observations undertaken in the field, there is no plan on the part of the government to reduce the size of the forces in Aceh, either the TNI or police", he said after a cabinet meeting on Thursday September 4 at the State Secretariat building in Jakarta.

The decision [that was taken], according Yudhoyono, is to maintain the momentum and improve the results that have been achieved in the operation. "On the question of its status, we will be considering which [option] is best, in order to maintain the momentum and increase the intensity of the operation", he said.

In order for this, Yudhoyono continued, there is still a possibility that the government may increase funding for the military operation. "Certainly, if that is a pressing need and for the success of the operation, of course the government will consider [increasing the level of funding]. But he (TNI chief General Endriartono Sutarto) has not yet proposed this to the government", Yudhoyono reiterated.

At a working meeting with the People's Representative Assembly Commission I on the previous day, TNI chief [Sutarto] reveled that there would be additional funds provided for the implementation of the military operation.

Yudhoyono explained that the government had never set a target of six months for the military operation to be completed. "What the government did was to put into place a military emergency which would be in force for six months and could then be extended", he said.

Listening to TNI's views

Earlier, after attending a seminar of retired TNI and national police armed services officers and army widows in Jakarta, Yudhoyono said that extending or not extending the status of a military emergency and the integrated operation in Aceh will be determined by the government though a political decision.

But the government will listen to the views and recommendations of the TNI and national police who will recommending that the status of a military emergency and the integrated operation be extended.

With regard to the TNI chief's recommendation to extend the status of a military emergency and the integrated operation Yudhoyono said "The TNI and national police have an interest in [the issue] because they are the one who are taking on the principle role in the integrated operation".

Furthermore said Yudhoyono, as well as listening to the TNI and national police's recommendations, the government will also consider other factors. What is clear, is that the integrated operation cannot be disrupted and the momentum to disable the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) must be continued, in order that at the same time the lives of the Acehnese people can be improved. "This is what we are doing", he explained.

With regard to the hundreds of Acehnese citizens who have sought asylum in Malaysia and Thailand, Yudhoyono explained that coming out of President Megawati Sukarnoputri [recent] overseas visit, it is now certain that the two neighbouring countries [Malaysia and Thailand] will not give political asylum [to the Acehnese] because what is happening in Aceh is an internal affair of Indonesia.

On the question of those [Acehnese] who are already in Malaysia and Thailand, they have been coordination over the issue in order to solve existing problems, including the repatriation of the asylum seekers to Aceh.

"On their repatriation to Aceh, we will look at it in its entirety and not [just] consider them as members of GAM. We will look at the humanitarian issues which caused them to go to Malaysia", explained Yudhoyono.

With regard to the legal process being pursued by the Swedish government against Hassan Tiro (a GAM leader), Yudhoyono said, "It's the same as before. The [Indonesian] government's final position has been handed over the attorney general's office in Stockholm. We will see what follows, whether it will reach the level of becoming a legal case which will be tried [in court]. However communication with Sweden at the level of the foreign affairs department is continuing."

Revoke the military emergency

In a press release yesterday, the Centre for Electoral Reform (Cetro) urged the government to immediately end the military emergency status [in Aceh] as a precondition for holding the 2004 general elections.

This appeal was raised in response to the TNI chief's statement on extending the integrated operation until the 2004 elections. According to Cetro, holding the elections under a military emergency clearly conflicts with the principles of democracy.

Cetro's view is that if there are concerns that the elections will be disrupted by an armed group, then it is the function of the police which should be optimized. (INU/ely)

[Translated by James Balowski.]

'108 Acehnese have vanished'

Jakarta Post - September 5, 2003

Nani Farida and Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, Jakarta -- At least 108 people have gone missing in Aceh since the government launched its integrated operation in the troubled province on May 19, a police officer says.

Aceh police spokesman Sr. Comr. Sayed Husaeny said on Thursday that those who went missing, believed to have been kidnapped by members of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), were civil servants and village heads. "We have received the information from the local people," Sayed told The Jakarta Post on Thursday.

Sayed said that of the 108 people, 30 were from West Aceh, five from Aceh Besar, 16 from Central Aceh, 12 from East Aceh, 21 from North Aceh, nine from Pidie regency, and 13 from South Aceh.

"I have no information yet as to how many of them are dead, because people usually file a report when someone has gone missing, not when they find them dead," he said.

Among the missing are the two reporters of private television station RCTI, who were kidnapped by GAM in late June on their way to Lhokseumawe, North Aceh.

Sayed said four bus passengers traveling from Langsa to Lhokseumawe were kidnapped by GAM last Thursday. "Their fate is still unknown," said military operation spokesman Lt. Col. Ahmad Yani. The four, according to Yani, were taken by GAM to Paya Gajah village in Peureulak, East Aceh.

At least two GAM rebels and one paramilitary Mobile Brigade (Brimob) officer were killed on Thursday during a skirmish in Blang Leout village, Aceh Besar.

The two GAM rebels were identified as M. Husen bin Abdul Manaf, 25, and Muslem bin Abu Bakar, 25, while the police officer was identified as First Pvt. Alex Mariadi. His body was flown on Thursday to Padang, West Sumatra.

Sayed said the conflict flared up when Mobile Brigade members besieged a house in the Leupung area. "We received information from local people about the presence of several GAM members in that area. The skirmish broke out when police surrounded the suspected house.

At least 16 police officers have been killed and over 60 others injured since the government launched the operation to crush the GAM rebels from Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, where they have been fighting for independence for the resource-rich province since 1976.

The Indonesian Military (TNI), which deployed 35,000 troops to Aceh, has lost almost 800 soldiers in the war aimed at ending the decades-long rebellion.

Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said earlier that government troops had managed to incapacitate at least 35 percent of GAM's 5,000-strong guerrilla force in the past three months.

In Jakarta, the government hinted yesterday that it might keep its massive armed force in Aceh for as long as needed to secure the province.

Susilo said the government had never set a timetable for the Aceh war, and that "The martial law will be applied for six months and can be extended if needed. We have to ensure that the operation proceeds effectively." The top security minister underlined that there was no immediate plan to downgrade the status of the security alert in the province. "We have to maintain the momentum toward a more secure condition in Aceh," he said.

UNHCR concerned over plans to expel Aceh asylum seekers

Agence France Presse - September 5, 2003

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Ruud Lubbers has voiced concern to Malaysia over its plans to expel some 250 asylum seekers, including women and children, who fled the war-torn Indonesian province of Aceh.

In a statement Thursday, Lubbers said the plans outlined in "persistent reports" ran counter to assurances provided by the Malaysian authorities, according to which the asylum seekers "would not be returned to a situation which could endanger their lives and well-being".

In recent weeks several hundred asylum seekers fled Aceh and were arrested as they approached UNHCR offices in Kuala Lumpur. They remain in detention.

Lubbers said he hoped that, following phone conversations on Wednesday with the Malaysian foreign ministry, a moratorium on deportations would be introduced. A UNHCR delegation is due in Kuala Lumpur next week to discuss the asylum situation.

Malaysian authorities have argued that the Acehnese entered the country to seek employment and not to seek refuge.

Malaysia has rejected previous criticism from the UNHCR over the arrests, saying the Acehnese were picked up because they did not have valid travel documents and that allowing them in could spark a flood of illegal immigrants. Malaysia, which is not a signatory to the UN convention on refugees, has maintained that it does not recognise refugees or asylum seekers.

The conflict in Aceh has left more than 10,000 people dead, mostly civilians, since 1976. Jakarta has refused all calls for independence for the 4.2 million Aceh inhabitants.

319 civilians killed and 108 disappeared in Aceh

Kompas - September 5, 2003

Banda Aceh -- At least 319 civilians have been killed, 108 disappeared and 117 others have been wounded since the military emergency in Aceh came into force on May 19.

This is according to data from the Aceh Police Operational Command up until Thursday September 4. "The 319 people which have been killed are civilians, [and this includes] both those who had identification and those who did not", said Chief Superintendent Sayed Hoesainy, spokesperson for the Acehnese local police.

This is the first time that data compiled on civilian casualties has been released since the military emergency in Aceh came into force 109 days ago. Previously, the information office of the regional emergency military command (PDMD) in Banda Aceh had only provided data on casualties who were [usually] referred to as members of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), without [providing precise] data on civilian casualties.

In a statement the day before, marshal law administration spokesperson Navy Colonel Ditya Soedarsono stated that 806 rebels had been killed since the military operation began. Aside from this, 598 had been arrested and 465 others had given themselves up. There have been TNI members killed including 16 who's death was not a result of combat operations.

Civilians

With regard to the 319 civilian casualties who have been killed, according to Sayed they were found dead at a number of locations. Sayed did not say whether these casualties were GAM members or not, but referred to them as local people or civilians.

[Sayed said that] police need to conduct an investigation to determine the perpetrators. However Sayed said that in general it is GAM who are the perpetrators. Most of the victims came from the areas under the legal jurisdiction of the North Aceh police (91), followed by East Aceh (67), Central Aceh (42), South Aceh (36), Greater Aceh (24), Pidie (24), West Aceh (18), Banda Aceh (13), South-East Aceh (3) and Sabang (1). With regard to the 108 people who have disappeared, he said that they are still the subject of a search. They include RCTI journalist Ersa Siregar and camera operator Feri Santoro, their driver Rahmatsyah and two wives of TNI officers [who were traveling with the journalist when they were abducted by GAM].

Brimob soldier killed

On Thursday meanwhile, a member of the Mobile Brigade (Brimob) originating form the West Sumatra local police was killed in an armed contact with GAM in the Leupung area of Greater Aceh.

Sayed said that the fire fight occurred when a Brimob group were planing to ambush five GAM personnel at a house in the village of Masjid in the Leupung sub-district. "There was information which mentioned that there was an armed group at the house so the Leupung sectoral police were sent to the location", he said.

Before arriving at the house however, they were fired upon. The armed contact, which continued for around 15 minutes, resulted in the death of First Brigadier (sic) Alex Masriadi (23), a member of the West Sumatra local police. Meanwhile the GAM fighters faded into the jungle surrounding the village. The latest news is that two GAM members were killed. "However I have not yet obtained a detailed report on the matter", said Sayed. (NJ)

[Translated by James Balowski.]

TNI may extending Aceh operation until elections

Kompas - September 4, 2003

Jakarta -- Indonesian armed forces (TNI) chief General Endriartono Sutarto has stated that the TNI is considering extending the integrated operation in Aceh until the 2004 general elections. [He said that] conducting the 2004 elections in Aceh, which will be held concurrently with elections in other provinces, represents one of the targets of the integrated operation in Aceh. On the issue of whether the status of the military emergency will be scaled down, this will be assessed later based on the situation on the ground.

These issues emerged in Endriartono's answers to questions from members of the People's Representative Assembly (DPR) in a working meeting of the DPR Commission I with the TNI chief on Wednesday September 3, in Jakarta.

According to Endriartono, holding the 2004 elections in Aceh concurrently with other provinces is one of the targets of the integrated operation which began on May 19, which covers the humanitarian operation, law enforcement, empowerment of government and the restoration of security.

"We are in agreement that the elections for legislative representatives and the president in Aceh are to be held concurrently with other provinces. On the question of whether it is necessary to do this under the status of an emergency or whether the status be scaled down, this will be given consideration based on various aspects and in accordance with the situation on the ground", he said.

This [view] was presented in answer to a question by a member of Commission I from the TNI/Police fraction, Major General Sang Nyoman Suwisma. The former TNI army territorial assistant was asking about the possibility of scaling down the status of a military emergency.

"If the status of the military emergency is scaled down, it is possible that the momentum which has now been achieved will not be able to be maintained, particularly in relation to how we confront the 2004 elections", explained Endriartono.

Meanwhile, in a written explanation, Endriartono reveled that the emergency status in Aceh was applied in order to give more power to the emergency military command so that it could take steps to improve the effectiveness of the operation to restore security.

In the period ahead, an evaluation is still needed in so far as whether the military emergency status in Aceh needs to be extended or not on the basis of the situation on the ground, bearing in mind the rapid changes which have occurred in the dynamics of situation.

"In order to safeguard the momentum of the success of the integrated operation, whatever decision is taken by the government, as long as the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is still capable of disrupting security, the military operation in Aceh will still be needed. Therefore TNI troop numbers in Aceh will be maintained until conditions are considered to be safe for life to return to normal", he said.

The meeting, which was headed by the vice-chairperson of the DPR's Commission I, Amris Hasan (from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle fraction), ran smoothly and with a general agreement on [the issues discussed]. There were not many comments or critical views put forward by the 25 commission members who were present.

Dilemma

Endriartono also reveled that the is a dilemma in the implementation of the integrated operation in Aceh [saying] the humanitarian operation should be more intensive and prominent compared to other operations. However in certain situations, the humanitarian operation can only be carried out if security is created first.

"Obviously the humanitarian operation must be more prominent because it is of course what can resolve the roots of the problems in Aceh", he said.

Endriartono gave an example of times when the Department of Housing and Regional Infrastructure had repeatedly asked the TNI to undertake road construction work. However, if this were to be done and security over construction projects was given to the TNI, the TNI would not be able confront GAM effectively.

"What we can do and prioritise is the humanitarian operation which continues to touch on the needs of ordinary people, such as the construction of the people's schools and houses which have been burn down", he said.

Once again, Endriartono revealed the difficulties in confronting GAM which uses the strategy of a guerrilla war. Because of this, [the TNI] feels that six months is not long enough to debilitate GAM forces.

"A guerrilla war cannot be finished in one or two months. In our experience in confronting Darul Islam(1) [for example], was it required several decades. East Timor, that took 23 years, even though it [eventually] separated from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The United States in Vietnam [fought for] decades and fled in disarray. There has never been a guerrilla force which could be dealt with in just three or six months", he said.

With regard to the DPR Commission I proposal that a regional military command (Kodim) be established in each regency and a sub-district military command (Koramil) in each sub-district in Aceh, the TNI was in agreement. However its realisation would be based on the availability of funds. For the period 2000-2004, it is planned to establish two Kodims in the Singkil and Sabang regencies along with a number of Koramils. (KSP/INU)

Notes

1. Darul Islam - House of Islam movement, which fought a bitter but unsuccessful 14-year (1948-62) campaign to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.

[Translated by James Balowski.]

Independence day

Four Corners (ABC) - September 1, 2003

As Indonesia celebrates 58 years of independence, Four Corners looks at south-east Asia's most brutal and unrelenting conflict ... the Aceh civil war.

Chris Masters, reporter: Two weeks ago, Indonesia celebrated its 58th anniversary as an independent nation. Two weeks earlier, another terrorist attack left questions looming large in the thick Jakarta air. How safe is this nation and where do the main dangers lie?

In the Indonesian province of Aceh, which has long struggled for its own independence, the death toll at the Marriott is repeated every day, the casualties largely hidden behind martial law regulations drawn tightly by the Indonesian Government.

Sidney Jones, International Crisis Group: There's nobody there monitoring what's taking place in the areas where the military operations are hardest.

Chris Masters: Asia's longest-running civil war is another Timor, but one in hiding. From a concealed jungle camp these Acehnese claim as one that the principal victims are civilians rather than rebel separatists.

Acehnese men in Malaysian jungle camp (translation): No not GAM. They were ordinary people. Civilians.

Chris Masters: Aceh's self-proclaimed prime minister in exile believes there is time to wait for Indonesia to destroy itself.

Mahlik Mahmud, GAM Prime Minister: They create more problems than they can solve. So, in our view, Indonesia will disintegrate by itself.

Chris Masters: The question now, on this 58th anniversary, is how safe is Indonesia from itself?

Acehnese man (translation): I saw three fishermen from Batee going by sea to pay for a boat. When they arrived in Meureudu, TNI soldiers were there. The soldiers called out to stop, but they did not stop. The soldiers opened fire on the boat. One of the fishermen was shot and killed. The soldiers brought the remaining two ashore, stripped them and forced them to frog jump. They accused them of being GAM and shot them dead. When their families came it was proved they were not rebels, they were civilians. Their families wanted to pay for the boat but no money was found in the men's pockets.

Chris Masters: Over the past 27 years, the story of arbitrary execution in Aceh has been repeated many thousands of times. Three months ago, Indonesian troops moved into Aceh in massive numbers following the declaration of martial law which forced outside observers to leave.

Lucy Carver, Peace Brigades International: In mid-June, there was a presidential decree, um, regulating the actions of foreigners within Aceh and that was followed by two further decrees. And, basically, these regulations meant that foreigners couldn't work in Aceh without special permits.

Ralph Boyce, US Ambassador to Indonesia: I think that it's a little troubling that there is no international media and very little international assistance or voluntary agencies operating up there at this time.

Chris Masters: Reporting on Aceh is strictly controlled, so getting behind the curtain is problematic. But witnesses can be found. Many Acehnese have fled the province, bringing with them fresh experiences of life and death under martial law.

Fitriani, Wife of GAM commander (translation): When the TNI soldiers saw young people sitting in the coffee shops they would ask them to produce identity cards. Even though they had done nothing, the TNI would shoot them dead. I have seen such incidents many times with my own eyes.

Major-General Syafrie Syamsuddin, TNI spokesperson (translation): According to prescribed standards, the military operation in Aceh is based on obedience to the law and on the principles of military operations and humanitarian operations. So accusations that we have behaved improperly are not true.

Chris Masters: For hundreds of years, before the Dutch finally conquered Aceh, it was a powerful Muslim kingdom known for its fierce resistance to colonial rule. Resistance in its present form is the Free Aceh Movement, known as GAM, which was formed in the '70s -- about the same time oil and gas reserves were discovered.

Professor Harold Crouch, ANU: Here's this enormous wealth being dug out of Aceh or from the sea around Aceh, whereas people's ordinary ... ordinary people just lived in the same way. And it's precisely in that area where GAM has been the strongest.

Chris Masters: To find GAM's leadership requires an even longer journey to Sweden. The Tengku, the titular head of the independence movement, is Hasan di Tiro. 72 years old, and fragile, Di Tiro wants the reinstatement of something like the sultanate that prevailed before Dutch colonial rule. The GAM government-in-exile is run from this Stockholm flat with its spokesman, Prime Minister Mahlik Mahmud.

Mahlik Mahmud, GAM Prime Minister: For Acehnese, we always think we are a nation by ourself, by our right to be a nation. But before -- long before the existence of Indonesia, even in this matter, Australia, Aceh was already an established, prosperous state in South-East Asia.

Chris Masters: From here they direct operations of an armed wing estimated between 2,000 and 5,000 strong, a fraction of the 4.3 million population.

Sidney Jones: About a quarter of those people are not ethnically Acehnese, and within that non-ethnically Acehnese population there isn't that much support for GAM. There's a really hard core of support, but even within that hard core of support for independence, not everyone sees GAM as the vehicle for achieving their independence. There's some people who are unhappy with GAM, but who still very much want to be separate from Indonesia.

Harold Crouch: The local fighters are just, you know ... just local people who've taken up arms. They're not great philosophers. And often in the past when they've been interviewed, they often ... If they're asked a difficult political question, they say, "Well, our job is not to talk about politics -- leave it to Hasan di Tiro in Sweden."

Chris Masters: In the 1990s, during President Suharto's last decade of office, there was a concentrated effort to close down the separatists. A military operation zone known as DOM was declared with the intention of eliminating the tiny rebel movement.

Harold Crouch: And the military came down very heavily on them and there was no concept of protecting human rights or anything. They were just killing people and leaving the bodies out on the street and that sort of thing to frighten other Acehnese. And that led to ... that seems to have led to a lot of alienation, naturally enough, in that part of Aceh.

Chris Masters: The DOM period ground on from 1989 to 1998. This man, who says he has no connection to GAM, was, through that period, repeatedly tortured in an effort to force a confession.

Acehnese exile (translation): Then they hit me, they hit me here, they hit me all over. I don't know how many times they hit me. Then they got a knife and stabbed me with it. When I saw the gleam of the knife, I fainted. [Displays large scars on his leg] These are all scars from being beaten. I didn't feel anything after the first six or seven blows. But when I started bleeding, I did feel it. I saw the blood, saw the blood spurting out when they stabbed me.

Chris Masters: When he was finally released and returned home, he learned other family members had also been targeted.

Acehnese exile (translation): They were shot in the village of Pulo Tambo in Tiro, in front of a crowd of people. According to lots of witnesses, they were tortured first. After being tortured, they were shot.

Chris Masters: When the DOM period finally came to an end in 1998, the mass graves were uncovered. But after nine grisly years, GAM was still alive and Indonesia had more enemies in Aceh.

Sidney Jones: Well, resistance has intensified as abuses have been carried out in the name of suppressing resistance.

Chris Masters: The end of DOM coincided with the end of the Suharto era. And in Aceh, "Reformasi" -- the reform period -- energised dissent. The Indonesian military moved to suppress a growing student movement who pushed for an East Timor-like independence referendum.

Acehnese student (translation): When I came home from Banda Aceh to my village during the school holidays, I was rounded up by the TNI and they asked me, "Are you a student?" I said, "Yes, I am," and they bashed me. So I was bashed just because I was a student.

Chris Masters: Student leaders went into hiding as one by one they learned their colleagues were arrested, and in some cases disappeared.

Mahmudal, student activist (translation): This is how the soldiers and the police treat almost everyone who is arrested. I mean, we were tortured and beaten. The second time I was arrested, I was even stripped naked in a room in the regional Parliament in Banda Aceh.

Exiled student leader (translation): People's houses in the town of Idi were burned down by the TNI and Brimob posted there. My house, my family's house, and my grandmother's house were all burned down by Brimob. Not only were houses burned down. When this happened people were frightened and ran away. Some of them were shot, including innocent small children.

Chris Masters: Events further south had given hope to the impossible dream. East Timor had achieved its independence after it took its struggle to the world.

Harold Crouch: In one way, it has had a tremendous impact -- that is, "We lost East Timor. We didn't crush them hard enough. We ... we wanted to negotiate with them, and then it ended up with a referendum. So ... and then the foreigners came in and put pressure on us." So there was that sort of nationalist reaction.

Lesley McCulloch, research fellow, Deakin University: I think that for anyone who wants to understand what's happening in Aceh, they need only think of East Timor. It is a mirror image of what happened in East Timor, and some of the military who are responsible for the abuses and the terrible atrocities that happened in East Timor are now in Aceh.

Chris Masters: Three years after East Timor separated, a new effort was made to broker peace in Aceh. The mediator was a private institution -- the Henri Dunant Centre -- with the Japanese and Americans in the background. In December 2002, the Indonesians announced a ceasefire.

Yutaka Iimura, Japanese Ambassador to Indonesia: The Acehnese could enjoy the peaceful life, although it was short-lived. And, secondly, for the first time in the history of Indonesia and in the history of Aceh, the international community, uh ... showed their readiness to support peace process, and also their readiness to assist a reconstruction, rehabilitation in the region of Aceh.

Chris Masters: The mediators had a tall order bringing together parties with fixed and opposing goals. The Acehnese would not give up on independence. The Indonesians would not surrender sovereignty. What the negotiators hoped for was that by degrees both sides would get used to the idea of peace. Of at least getting a delayed settlement?

Ralph Boyce: Of getting into a process where confidence and trust could be created by the process itself. I think both sides recognised they were a long way from that. Unfortunately, they didn't get that process really going.

Chris Masters: Australian-based academic Lesley McCulloch watched the disintegration of the peace process from behind bars. After the ceasefire began, McCulloch and an American nurse were locked up on suspicion of supporting the separatists.

Lesley McCulloch: We saw people being kicked in the face and in the ribs, hit with rifle butts, hit with planks of wood and batons, hit with large books, water being thrown at them -- just abused, actually, basically, in any way that you can think of. We saw people whose faces had been completely smashed open. We saw people whose ribs were bust and legs were broken. It was ... That was the most distressing experience and time of the whole episode ... the five months I was detained.

Chris Masters: In March this year, Joint Security Council monitors were attacked and, in April, withdrawn. Observers mostly blamed TNI. Both GAM and the Indonesian military were suspected of breaches, with GAM using the time to build its strength and the TNI unwilling peacemakers.

Sidney Jones: On the army's side, they never wanted to negotiate in the first place. They regarded negotiations as a sign of weakness. They regarded it as a mistake for the administration of Abdurrahman Wahid to agree to negotiate with rebels, and they were forced to the negotiating table by the international opinion and the force of 'Reformasi' or reform, but they really weren't interested, and when it got to the agreement called COHA -- the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement -- in December, you had two parties who didn't trust one another.

Chris Masters: When the talks were due to recommence in Tokyo in May, Indonesian police arrested five GAM negotiators.

Mohammed Nur Djuli, civilian negotiator for GAM: The fact that they held up our ... half our team in Aceh, what does it mean? That's to, uh ... you know, bulldoze the ... you know, to, uh ... make the meeting fail. How could anyone negotiate with half of the team being held hostage?

Ralph Boyce: I think that a lack of trust on both sides ultimately doomed it.

Lesley McCulloch: It was quite clear, well before the talks in Tokyo, that Indonesia had come to the end. There had been the creeping internationalisation of the issue of Aceh, and it was too much for Indonesia.

Chris Masters: On May 17, the talks broke down. The following day, martial law was declared and the troops rolled in. The navy, the air force, armoured vehicles, and 40,000 soldiers and police arrived, giving themselves six months to eliminate between 2000 and 5000 GAM guerrillas. An early victim of the destruction was the Acehnese education system. In three months, almost 600 schools were burned down, sending the aspirations of a generation up in smoke.

Village woman (translation): They want to make Acehnese people stupid.

Chris Masters: As is the way with this conflict, both sides appeared to fan the flames.

Legal aid worker (translation): The schools were burnt down by both TNI and GAM. I think GAM burns down schools to show that with the state military emergency, community activities will grind to a complete halt. But the TNI also burns down schools because they want to isolate GAM.

Chris Masters: JARI Indonesia, a non-government investigator, sees corruption at the heart of the tactic, with the military taking a cut of the rebuilding budget.

Fakhrulsyah Mega, JARI Indonesia (translation): By using military engineering personnel to rebuild the schools, they keep costs down but still receive all the money allocated. The scheme is that it's a civilian contractor but it's the military that does the work.

Chris Masters: The Indonesian Army, the TNI, shares with its opponents a need to live off the countryside. Up to 70 per cent of its operating budget is obtained through local enterprise. Aceh, a comparatively wealthy province, provides rich pickings.

Lesley McCulloch: I have, over the last four years, documented from all around Aceh evidence of all these levels of illegal business activities. Um, I've seen the logging and the fishing and the trade in wildlife, the drugs economy, the gunrunning, and the petty economic activities such as helping themselves from the shops, etc.

Chris Masters: Insecurity gives rise to extortion, with both sides seeking payment for protection. The US ExxonMobil natural gas plant -- closed down for a time because of the fighting -- is in all likelihood TNI's richest customer.

Harold Crouch: Somehow or other, the payments are made to the military. Now, they ... Exxon, the officials of the company, say, "Well, we ... the military provides us with security services. And we, of course, have to pay for that." But by the looks of things, the amount seems to be rather more than you would expect to pay for security services.

Chris Masters: Corruption is hardly confined to the military. The civilian administration also comes with a poor reputation for siphoning wealth to itself and Jakarta.

Lesley McCulloch: Well, Aceh is the most corrupt province in Indonesia. And the Governor Abdullah Puteh and his Vice-Governor and many of the local elite politicians are, um ... known to be creaming off huge amounts of money from the various aid budgets that are given from central government for funding -- for humanitarian relief, relief when there has been flooding, etc. A lot of this money never makes its way ... finds its way to the villages and to the people for whom it's intended.

Chris Masters: Roadblocks -- and there are plenty -- are common collection points.

Harold Crouch: But one of the problems here is, of course, you've got two institutions -- the police and the army -- and sometimes they overlap in the areas they're trying to raise money from. And from time to time in Indonesia, not just Aceh, you actually get shoot-outs between these people.

Fakhrulsyah Mega (translation): Aceh is like a supermarket: a supermarket for weapons, a supermarket for careers, a supermarket for political office, a supermarket for all sorts of activities, including a supermarket for corruption.

Chris Masters: Does Jakarta not take seriously the need to confine corruption?

Sidney Jones: No, Jakarta doesn't see any, uh ... Jakarta has not only no program to fight corruption, and has done nothing in any way, shape or form to get at this rot throughout the political system, but the Megawati administration itself, from the top down, is a corrupt and venal administration.

Chris Masters: The first victims of the corruption are the weak. Small farmers and villagers are vulnerable to a military strategy of cleansing the countryside. The soldiers move in, the people move out, the theory being that anyone left behind is GAM.

Harold Crouch: They just go and look for anyone and shoot anyone who's in the village. These people are put into a camp for a few weeks while this campaign goes on. Now, the village are, of course, concerned about their goats and their chickens and things like that and if they have a TV set or whatever in the house. So the military say "No, we guarantee it will be secure." And sure enough, the people come back to the village and there are no goats, there are no TV. Now, who knows who took it?

Chris Masters: Conscious of the poor reputation of TNI following abuses in areas like Timor, the army has made efforts to improve its image. This promotional video shows the army in its idealised form protecting villagers against a rapacious GAM.

Syafrie Syamsuddin (translation): One very striking development of the military operations, of the integrated operation currently being implemented in Aceh, is that the atmosphere in the community has become safe and peaceful as evidenced in the lead up to August 17th 2003. A second development is the people's enthusiasm for playing a part in creating security by providing information to the security forces concerning the whereabouts of GAM rebels in Aceh.

Chris Masters: Typically, when people return to the villages, they find the dead. Typically, if the dead are civilian, TNI blame GAM. And they're not always wrong. GAM, often poorly controlled and barely cohesive, has its own history of extortion and reprisal killing.

Mohammed Nur Djuli: They are guerrilla forces. They are not 100 per cent in control of their units. There are even members, individuals who went to Malaysia, worked for a couple of years, get some money, bought a gun and return [to Aceh] and call themselves GAM. Probably he saw his father being killed and he wants revenge. So have there been human rights violations by GAM? I'm sure.

Mahlik Mahmud: On our part, we welcome the international, er, investigation team, especially the reporters from the United Nations to conduct the, er ... human rights abuses for both sides.

Chris Masters: The witnesses we met said Indonesian soldiers were the worst abusers, with lesser-trained units such as the police mobile brigade, Brimob, conspicuous offenders. We were told of one group of women who claimed Brimob officers raped them. Soon after, police arrested the women along with their legal aid worker who then witnessed the intimidation and its outcome.

Legal aid worker (translation): We were arrested in the morning and interrogated in separate rooms. That night, about 11 o'clock, they brought us all back together. I met the five victims and suddenly they'd completely changed their statements. They said they hadn't been raped by Brimob, but by GAM.

Chris Masters: Another witness released from a cell containing two severed heads says he was taken to a room and forced to watch two women being raped.

Acehnese man (translation): They raped her. I was shocked. They raped her and she screamed for help. I couldn't help her. They said, "If you've got guts, there are guns on the table. Defend her." I was really weak. I couldn't do anything but watch as she was raped in front of me.

Chris Masters: He was released, he says, and told to keep his silence for fear of the same thing happening to his family. Not that all is covered up. Indonesia has put on trial in Aceh some of its soldiers for abuses such as rape.

Syafrie Syamsuddin (translation): We admit that there have been excesses during the operation. Violations committed by soldiers both as individuals within the community and as soldiers during operational activities. But immediate action has been taken, so the operational deviations cannot be called violations because the court has already taken legal action.

Chris Masters: But too much has not changed. A look into the dark heart of Aceh reveals the resurrection of the failed strategies of East Timor. Here, out-of-uniform militia fight alongside TNI.

Lesley McCulloch: They're not disciplined at all, and the problem is in Aceh and elsewhere in Indonesia that many of the military and also the police don't wear uniform, so it's very difficult to know who, for example, burned the schools, who shot this person, who raped the women and who is responsible for the extortion, because it is common practice for them not to wear uniform, for them to come in unmarked trucks, for them to travel on motorbikes that they've often stolen from locals. A lot of the military and a lot of Brimob, the mobile police unit, are very young. They're badly trained. Of course, they're underpaid, they're afraid, they're nervous, and this causes people to behave in a very dangerous way. And they're armed, which makes them even more dangerous. So they're young, badly trained, nervous and armed. That's a lethal combination.

Harold Crouch: Now, maybe you can maintain discipline with troops like that in a campaign for a few months. But the longer that goes, the less disciplined they become.

Sidney Jones: The fact that while some changes may have been made at the very top, no fundamental changes have been made in the training structure, or the ideology, or the image that the army has of itself as this guardian of national unity and anybody who doesn't subscribe to that view is an enemy.

Chris Masters: There is another inescapable conclusion -- that the longer this drags on, far from crushing GAM, Indonesia creates more recruits for GAM.

Faisal, farmer (translation): There is not a day in Aceh without TNI brutality and excesses. The TNI search for GAM soldiers, who they claim are rebels and traitors. But when they can't find GAM soldiers, they turn on ordinary people and kill them.

Haji Ibrahim, trader (translation): I realised Aceh was lawless, people were being killed, arrested, arbitrarily tried and punishments arbitrarily decided. Because of that we could not defend ourselves, we had nothing to defend ourselves with. I am old but they still ask questions about me, they want to treat me as they wish.

Acehnese exile (translation): I have absolutely no connection with GAM. But to tell the truth, perhaps I would like revenge, because I've had relatives killed, and my brother has been kidnapped.

Legal aid worker (translation): I think that villagers are in an extremely difficult situation, because they are unable to distance themselves from GAM. This can be because their husband, child or relative is a member of GAM. Then, on the other hand, when the TNI carry out operations in the villages, they force people to tell them the whereabouts of GAM members.

Chris Masters: On the streets of Jakarta on Independence Day, there are signs of resurgent nationalism. But for the majority of the 220 million population, independence for Aceh is not an option.

Edward Aspinall, lecturer, University of Sydney: There's very few people who would, uh ... could even tolerate the suggestion that Aceh would one day separate from Indonesia. Therefore, since the recent military operations began there have been many opinion polls, you know, radio talkback programs, and so on, which, almost without exception, suggest that, you know, a very, very large majority of certainly the active political public are very strongly in favour of taking a hard military line.

Indonesian news bulletin (translation): The military operation in Aceh has had a significant effect on people's lives...

Chris Masters: Jakarta reports progress in Aceh with the war and the peace.

Syafrie Syamsuddin (translation): One of the principles in Aceh is that we must gain the hearts of the people. This is an operation to win the people over and persuade them so they are not trapped or misled by propaganda or caught in a trap laid by GAM.

Chris Masters: In Aceh, nationalism is stage-managed.

Edward Aspinall: The Indonesian authorities often have this very odd, almost bizarre means of judging whether they're winning the hearts and minds of the population. That is, they almost measure it quantitatively -- how many red-and-white flags, Indonesian national flags, are flying in the towns and villages, how many Acehnese citizens are participating in these ceremonies pledging loyalty to the Indonesian state.

Mahmudal, student activist (translation): It's just something they've been forced to do. They haven't raised the flags out of love. The flags are something frightening for the Acehnese. The priority for Acehnese people at the moment is to keep themselves safe. I mean, if they don't fly the Indonesian flag and all that, they'll be intimidated. They could even be shot.

Chris Masters: In the areas where the cameras can travel, there are signs that martial law is working. But the camera is no more free than the people. These GAM suspects have been captured by TNI.

Prisoner (translation): I don't want independence. We've already joined Indonesia, haven't we?

Chris Masters: Across the Straits of Malacca in neighbouring Malaysia, Acehnese refugees from the fighting hide in a makeshift jungle camp. They say that where the camera cannot travel the brutality is even worse than during the hated DOM period.

Faisal, farmer (translation): I, as an Acehnese man, had to leave my wife and my two-year old child. I had to leave because they (TNI) accused me of being a terrorist, a separatist.

Haji Ibrahim, trader (translation): I have erased all traces of my past. The TNI called us dirt, while in reality I have never committed any wrongdoing in my life. What I did was the right thing. But today I can't live in my own home. I moved my wife to East Aceh and I am here seeking refuge in Malaysia.

Chris Masters: But even in Malaysia, the Acehnese are not safe. Right outside the United Nations High Commission for Refugees office, we observed what, for the Acehnese, was a heart-stopping moment. Between them and accreditation stood the Malaysian Police. One by one, with the UNHCR helpless onlookers, they were stopped and taken off to prison. The following day, the Malaysian Government declared the 250 Acehnese would be deported to Indonesia and an unknown fate.

Mohammed Nur Djuli: Many people have been killed who return there, but how many, I have no idea. Maybe I would put it as high as 30 per cent -- 40 per cent of those returned have been detained. And then what happened after that can only be termed as 'disappeared'.

Chris Masters: The Indonesians are now halfway through the six- month program they set themselves to clear the province of GAM. There have been subsequent revised estimations that it might take years.

Sidney Jones: Right now, the military is talking already about extending it, and not just extending it for six months. There's no end in sight and no exit strategy in the works for how they get out.

Chris Masters: Do you think that TNI can achieve a military solution? Can there be such a thing?

Ralph Boyce: I think even the Government of Indonesia expresses publicly that this is not a problem that will be solved by military means alone. This is going to have to have a durable political solution. There are going to have to be concessions and negotiations made. So I guess the answer is no, this is not something that can be resolved by a military campaign.

Chris Masters: On the other side of the world, the GAM leadership has its own blind confidence that independence will come.

Mahlik Mahmud: This is our national struggle. So that makes us very strong. We know what each of us doing. And we can feel it. The people in Aceh can feel it. We can feel the people in Aceh, even ... they've suffered. We are here, OK. Nobody touch us, alright. When they got killed, they got, uh ... tortured, we feel it, we cry. We feel it, and that doesn't mean that make us weak -- we make us more stronger.

Chris Masters: GAM is now admitting what was formerly suspected -- that its tactic is to wait for its enemy to destroy itself.

Mahlik Mahmud: Because Indonesia, in fact, it is a fabricated nation. It is a nation being imposed on us.

Sidney Jones: I think that's a complete illusion on the part of GAM. I don't think it will happen. And I think if that's the ultimate strategy of GAM, it's going to fail. The problem is that every time you have a new emergency taking place or a new military operation, what you're doing is sowing the seeds for a new generation of rebels.

Chris Masters: Despite the poverty, despite the terrorism, despite the separatist movements in Aceh and West Papua, our northern neighbour is holding together, despite the organisation that is supposed to provide the glue. It was in the vacuum of the current leadership that TNI was allowed its mission to Aceh.

Sidney Jones: If you take the period of the Suharto Government and you look up through 1998, it's clear that the TNI, in many ways, was a destabilising force, because the areas that broke out in violence, particularly after Suharto fell, were areas where abuses by the TNI had led to real grievances on the part of the population. So far from being the glue that binds this diverse country together, as many like to portray it, I think, in many ways, the TNI did just the opposite.

Harold Crouch: It's precisely in places where the military has had a big presence that you've got the biggest problem for people wanting independence. So the glue's not working all that well, I would say.

Chris Masters: The Aceh mission will be a test of the TNI. The military emergency has already descended into misery. The true emblem of this struggle is the red of the blood and the white of the bones. In six months, in twelve months time, when the curtain obscuring Aceh finally comes up, who would be brave enough to say they won't be digging up more mass graves?

Indonesia to send Sweden more evidence on Acehnese leader

Antara - September 2, 2003

Jakarta -- The Indonesian government will soon send Swedish prosecutors more evidence on Acehnese separatist leader-turned- Swedish citizen, Hassan Tiro's alleged involvement in criminal acts in Aceh, Foreign Affairs Minister Hassan Wirajuda has disclosed.

"The dossiers on Hassan Tiro's involvement in the separatist movement in Aceh, are being investigated by the office of the public prosecutor in Stockholm," Wirajuda said here Tuesday.

He however said Stockholm has requested more legal evidence on Hassan Tiro's involvement in criminal and terrorist acts, such as the bomb blasts at the United Nations' representative office and the Philippine embassy, both in Jakarta.

"The office of the public prosecutor in Stockholm needs additional legal evidence," he said, adding that these would be sent within the week. Wirajuda said Swedish prosecutors would act against Hassan Tiro after reviewing the additional evidences.

Meanwhile, spokesman of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Marty Natalegawa, said the Indonesian government, through its embassy in Sweden, continues to interact with prosecutors in Stockholm. "The interaction is being made to answer a number of questions the Swedish government has in relation to Hassan Tiro's case," Marty said.

He noted that the Indonesian government should answer these questions. "The questions are intended to complete information in [Hassan Tiros's] dossiers," Marty added.

Five more killed in war-torn Aceh

Agence France Presse - September 2, 2003

Four suspected separatist rebels and a civilian have been killed in Indonesia's Aceh province where troops are in the fourth month of an assault on the guerrillas, the military said.

Soldiers shot dead two Free Aceh Movement (GAM) members in clashes in the Meureudu area of Pidie district on Monday, said military spokesman Ahmad Yani Basuki. Two other rebels were killed in two separate clashes in Pidie and Bireuen districts the same day, Basuki said.

Residents discovered a male corpse bearing severe torture marks in East Aceh on Monday.

Troops on Monday arrested a 26-year-old female rebel following a raid on a guerrilla base in the Gandapura area of Bireuen district, Basuki said.

Security authorities confiscated a 60-kilogram home-made bomb from the rebels after a raid in Aceh Jaya district.

Basuki also accused GAM of kidnapping four civilians including a 47-year-old woman in Central Aceh and Aceh Besar districts on Monday. The rebels could not immediately be reached for comment.

As of Monday, the military said 798 GAM rebels have been killed and 342 weapons seized during the operation that began May 19. It said more than 1,700 rebels have been arrested or surrendered, while 46 soldiers and 13 police officers have been killed.

Human rights activists and other groups have questioned whether the military figure for guerrilla deaths also includes civilians.

Aceh is under martial law as the military carries out its biggest offensive since the 1975 invasion of East Timor.

West Papua

Papuan separatist slam Jakarta-sponsored people's assembly

Associated Press - September 6, 2003

Jakarta -- A pro-independence activist Saturday denounced a government plan to quell separatist sentiment in Indonesia's easternmost province by setting up a local legislature, saying the body would be unrepresentative and lack strong political powers.

The comments by Thaha Al-Hamid come after Jakarta on Friday rejected a proposal from tribal elders in restive Papua province to elect their own representatives to the proposed Papua People's Assembly. "Things will sour unless there is a willingness from Jakarta to sit down with the local Papuans and find a solution," the pro-independence activist said from the Papuan capital of Jayapura. "This is an illegal move."

The central government also reduced the proposed assembly's powers by prohibiting it from vetoing administrative and political decisions by the Papua governor or lawmakers, who are mostly chosen by Jakarta. Instead, the assembly would be confined to discussing cultural issues such as indigenous people's rights, Thaha said.

Rebels have maintained a low-level insurgency in Papua, a remote province 2,300 kilometers east of Jakarta, since Indonesia took over the region from the Dutch in 1963. Jakarta's sovereignty over the region was formalized in 1969 through a stage-managed vote by about 1,000 community leaders.

Jakarta to send more troops to restive Papua

Associated Press - September 5, 2003

Jakarta -- Indonesia will deploy 2,000 more troops in its easternmost province of Papua after recent anti-government protests left five people dead.

Dozens of others were injured by spears and arrows during violent protests last month in Timika, a mining town 3,700km east of Jakarta, over a controversial plan to divide Papua into three provinces: Papua, Central Papua and West Papua.

In the latest sign of Indonesia's readiness to use military force to stifle political dissent, the military chief, General Endriartono Sutarto, said in a statement that the current garrison in the province would be reinforced by four extra battalions that would be dispatched immediately.

He blamed outsiders for stoking the latest violence in Timika. "Noting that the Papuans are simple people, the military believes that there must be outside provocateurs behind the clashes," he said in a written statement to Parliament on Wednesday.

Although he did not elaborate, the country's top brass has long blamed the Free Papua Movement for the anti-government violence in the vast mountainous province. The movement is said to comprise a loose grouping of tribesmen who have waged a low-level struggle for decades against Jakarta's rule.

However, local human rights groups accuse the military of using the threat of armed separatists to clamp down on the resource- rich province.

Pro-independence groups call for Australian intervention

Radio Australia - September 2, 2003

Pro-independence groups in Papua have issued an urgent call for immediate assistance from Australia to help stop escalating violence in the Indonesian province. A total of six people have been killed in the past week in fighting between supporters and opponents of a plan by Jakarta to divide the province into three.

John Ondowame claims they are part of a government strategy to undermine the province's long-running separatist movement.

Presenter/Interviewer: Sonya De Masi

Speakers: Dr John Ondowame, international spokesman of the Free Papua Movement (OPM); Dr Richard Chauvel, head of Asian and International Studies, Victoria University; Senator Bob Brown, Australian Greens

De Masi: The Indonesian government last week suspended plans to divide the province of Papua into three, after days of sustained street fighting in the town of Timika. The clashes, in which at least four people were killed and scores more wounded, followed the inauguration of the new province of Central Papua. After the violence, Jakarta announced it would review its plans before deciding whether to continue with the process of partition. But now there are reports of fresh violence and rising tensions, with at least two people killed and four more wounded.

Dr John Ondowame, is the international spokesman of the OPM, the Free Papua Movement.

Ondowame: I believe this is a result of provocation by the Indonesian military using local people to raise this sort of social unrest in Timika region. In my view the Indonesian government must take responsibility for what happened in Timika, and similar situations that have occurred in the past.

De Masi: Dr Ondowame has appealed for immediate assistance from Australia's Foreign Affairs Minister, Alexander Downer.

Ondowame: I'm calling on the Australian government, particularly Mr Downer to immediately intervene in this situation and send a fact-finding mission to West Papua to monitor the situation closely and take steps to avoid further escalation of ethnic and religious conflict. In the absence of international monitoring groups, there will be no hope that we can restore security in the region.

De Masi: Dr Ondowame says the situation threatens to imitate the 1999 post-referendum violence in East Timor, between pro- independence and pro-Indonesian supporters. His warning has been echoed by Australian Greens Senator Bob Brown...

Brown: The Australian government should offer Jakarta the hand of mediation or any other assistance, and request a fact-finding mission because its a tinder box

De Masi: Why should Australia get involved again in something in Indonesia's backyard?

Brown: Well, this is in Australia's front yard. West Papua is part of the Pacific. We've just deployed 2000 troops to help the Solomon Islanders and as a good neighbour we should be offering help to Jakarta and the West Papuans.

De Masi: The latest violence in Timika appears to be between indigenous Papuans from the Amungme tribe and the migrant community. Reports in the Indonesian media and by human rights groups say the two people killed were Muslims from South Sulawesi. Papuan pro-independence groups say migrants from other parts of Indonesia are among supporters of the plan to create three new provinces.

Ondowame: This is an Indonesian orchestrated event. The policy of division of West Papua into three provinces is introduced by Indonesian military services, to undermine special autonomy law. Not surprisingly, most migrants support the policy of division.

De Masi: Dr Richard Chauvel is the head of Asian and International Studies at Victoria University. He says the initial confict in Papua was between groups for and against the province's division, but this has now shifted to clashes between indigenous Papuans and migrants. But he says although the pattern of conflict might have changed, it's clear the Indonesian government has not successfully managed its plans for the province.

Chauvel: The violence we've seen in teh last week or so has clearly occurred in the context of policy confusion emanated from jakarta since President Megawati issued her Presidential instruction to speed up the partition of province into three. Many Papuan political figures and Indonesian commentators have seen that desire to partition in conflict with government's previous centrepiece of special autonomy.

Papua division another Jakarta game?

Laksamana.Net (part I of II) - September 1, 2003

The premature declaration of Central Irian Jaya province by six regents together with the speaker of the regional parliament on Saturday has given rise to suspicion that the division of Papua is driven by the desire to dominate the natural resources and political allegiances of the area.

Papua is a sparsely populated but economically important part of Indonesia. It is the site of world's largest gold and copper mining operation and has large gas and oil deposits.

The new, already inaugurated province of West Irian is rich in LNG, while Central Irian Jaya's economic strength would rely on the gold and copper of PT Freeport Indonesia.

Irian Jaya, later re-named Papua, was a source of wealth for the inner circle of former President Suharto. The economic exploitation of the New Order naturally caused resentment and anger on the part of the provincial political elite.

In a society where, as the announcement of the new province of Central Irian proved, violence is often seen as an appropriate response to perceived injustice, Papua has long held the capacity to explode.

The prospect of Papuan separatism was one of the most serious problems faced by B.J. Habibie when he took over the presidency from Suharto. Habibie's rise to the presidency in July 1998 was the first time that pro-separatists had the chance to their demands. Supporters of the tribal-based Free Papua Organization (OPM) movement took to the streets, raising the "Morning Star" flag of an independent West Papua.

The low-intensity insurgency of the OPM was driven largely by dissatisfaction with Jakarta's rule, including the domination of the provincial administration by those coming from Jakarta and the other provinces, with their disregard for local cultures, and exploitation of the province's vast natural resources under terms that did little to benefit the local population.

The degree of vested interest of the Jakarta political elite in Papua surfaced for the first time when Northwestern University political scientist Jeffrey A. Winters uncovered the involvement of Ginanjar Kartasasmita in grabbing 9.4% of PT Freeport Indonesia shares for Indocopper Investama, a company controlled by Aburizal Bakrie.

Ginanjar allegedly organized the deal while he was Minister of Mines and Energy at the time of the renewal of the contract between the Indonesian government and PT Freeport Indonesia in 1991.

Winters' account of the deal surfaced when Ginandjar was in one of the most strategic positions in the Habibie cabinet, Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs. The report had serious repercussion not only on his personal reputation, but on Golkar and its network as a whole.

Bakrie, chairman of Bakrie brothers, was implicated as a major partner in the alliance between senior indigenous business, Golkar, and the power center around Ginandjar and former Vice President Sudharmono, who in 1991 still ran the State Secretariat, Suharto's most reliable political and economic bastion.

Facing such strength, the local elites in Papua had no choice but to close ranks with the OPM as a means of strengthening their bargaining position with the central government in Jakarta over the distribution of resources and business access.

The existence of OPM was not considered a threat to Jakarta's governing circle in terms of military power and scale. The OPM reportedly had a core of about 200 fighters in bands dispersed throughout the immense province, but mostly along the border with Papua New Guinea.

Given the background of OPM as the reflection of dissatisfaction rather than a true ideological struggle for an independent Papua, the OPM commitment to independence was always halfhearted.

Facing such a situation, President Habibie initially pushed for a national dialogue on Papua in the hope of creating a degree of justice between the central government and the local elites. This move was suspended when the province's leaders demanded independence at a meeting with Habibie in Jakarta.

The Wahid government went much further by agreeing to change the province's name from Irian Jaya, the name it was given after the Indonesian takeover, to Papua. This provoked the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to reject the change at its August 2000 session. The name was finally bestowed with the start of regional autonomy.

Wahid also apologized for past human rights abuses and replaced hard-line military and police commanders, but as in Aceh, he ruled out any prospect of Independence.

Wahid seemed to have gone too far when he provided state funds for a provincial assembly called the Great Consultation (Musyawarah Besar), which brought together about 400 regional representatives in February 2000 to discuss common concerns.

As a result of the meeting, the Papuan Council Presidium was established to lead the independence movement. The presidium organized the Papuan Congress, an even larger gathering, involving some 500 official delegates and thousands of supporters from every part of the province, as well as from exiled communities in Papua New Guinea, the Pacific islands, and Europe.

In terms of goals, the Papuan Council Presidium (PDP) and OPM are the same thing. The differences rest on method rather than principle. OPM takes up armed resistance, whereas PDP fights through peaceful means like political statements questioning the legitimacy of the integration of Papua into the unitary republic of Indonesia.

The delegates adopted a resolution stating that the province's incorporation into Indonesia was illegal, and therefore null and void, and that West Papua, the delegates' name for the province, had been an independent state since 1961.

Deliberately or not, Wahid's move to support the Papuan Council Presidium (PDP) also uncovered the reality that PDP was not a genuine independence movement

Research conducted by Muridan S. Wijoyo from the Social-Economic Research and Education Institute (LP3ES) entitled Between the Necessity of Democracy and the Victory of Violence, a Transition to Democracy in Papua, showed that the leadership composition of PDP had been closely connected with Golkar.

According to Muridan, the head of the Papuan Congress, the late Theys Eluay was well known as a traditional chief who had served as a Golkar member of the provincial parliament and had voted for incorporation into Indonesia in the 1969 Act of Free Choice.

Even in late 1996, Theys was quoted as calling the idea of an independent Papuan state "rubbish". Theys was also associated with the task force Papua militia, which was headed by one of his sons and was believed to be funded by an associate in the Papuan Council Presidium, Yorrys Raweyai.

Yorrys, of ethnic Chinese and Papuan background, was well known as deputy leader of Pemuda Pancasila, the New Order youth organization and subordinate wing of Golkar.

This finding indicated the close connection of the Papuan political elites, even among the pro-independence movement, and Suharto, the Cendana family and Golkar. Muridan also noted the involvement of several PDP leaders as commissioners of Freeport or as brokers for several big projects at Freeport.

In the 1999 general election, Golkar continued to dominate the provincial government and parliament. Several analysts saw that the proposed division of Papua would have serious political repercussions for the 2004 elections, including aggravating tension between the ruling Struggle Democratic Party (PDI-P) and Golkar.

The analysts believed that the division into three provinces would benefit PDI-P and enable the new governors to divert funds to the local PDI-P campaigns. On many occasions, the party of President Megawati Sukarnoputri has accused governors of using special autonomy revenue for Golkar.

The Papua Police chief confirmed in the wake of the recent clash at Timika that his officers were searching for five people believed to have masterminded the clash. He suggested that they may come from the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) and the Home Affairs Ministry.

This report was later denied by national police spokesman Basyir Ahmad Barmawi on Saturday (30/8/03). The disagreement demonstrated that suspicion of involvement of the Jakarta political elites in instigating the riot in Papua is strong.

Tribal war over Papua split faces uneasy truce

Jakarta Post - September 1, 2003

Nethy Dharma Somba, Jayapura -- The deadly clashes between opponents and supporters of the creation of Central Irian Jaya province has come to an uneasy truce, after it turned into a tribal war upon the local "eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth" principle.

The issue first flared up on August 23, when Central Irian Jaya was declared by members of the local political elite and thousands of people in Mimika regency, prompting protests from opposing and supporting groups that soon escalated into violence.

Thom Benal, secretary-general of the Papua Presidium Council (PDP) and chairman of the Amungme tribal group based in Mimika, said the clashes were initially between the two rival groups, but turned into a tribal war after three people were killed. "When a member of one tribe is killed, that tribe must avenge the death by killing a rival member. This is what we call [in Papua] the 'head with head' or 'blood with blood' tribal principle. "The war will not stop until a rival tribe member is killed," he said.

The war started with the death on August 24 of Jemy Kibak from the group opposed to the establishment of the new province in troubled Papua. The day after Jemy was killed, his group avenged his death by killing Tinus Mom, a member of its rival tribe. As the tribes had each lost one member, the situation became relatively calm.

But on August 25, the third day of the clashes, Jemy's fellow tribesman, Terry Murib, was killed, and the situation heated up again. That night, when the two opposing groups suspended open fighting, opponents of the creation of Central Irian Jaya province snuck into their rival's camp and killed Lambertus Unioma and injured Yulita Takati.

The situation again grew calm. But Yulita died early on Friday, so the group supporting the division of Papua had lost three members, while the opposing group had lost two. Because the toll was again uneven, the situation could have led to another revenge killing. However, the warring groups agreed to end the fighting, and to compensate Yulita's death with money, pigs, a woman or other goods and property agreed upon by the two rival tribes.

Mimika regency, one of the six regencies that formed Central Irian Jaya province and intended provincial capital, is home to seven major tribes: the Amungme, the Dani, the Damal, the Nduga, the Moni, the Ekari and the Kamoro. It is not clear which tribes were directly involved in the war, nor which tribes were grouped in the opposing sides. Based on the 2000 population census, the regency has a total of 89,861 people, including 35,813 indigenous Papuans.

Tribal wars could be triggered by various factors, such as murder, sleeping with the wife of another, stealing pigs and power struggles. Though tribal wars are generally aimed at killing and defeating an enemy, there are unwritten codes of honor that are shared and followed by all tribes.

For example, women cannot fight wars and it is forbidden for men to sexually abuse women and children during a war. Looting during a war is also forbidden, as is killing women, children and elderly people. A tribal war is fought on a battleground far from villages, and stops temporarily for lunch, when tribeswomen deliver provisions to the field. After lunch, one of the rival tribes gives a sign to resume the fighting. A tribal war can last months, even years, and generally ends when the number of casualties is equal on both sides.

Controversial split in Papua blamed on political elite

Jakarta Post - September 1, 2003

Kurniawan Hari and Syaiful Amin, Jakarta/Yogyakarta -- The controversial division of Papua, which sparked deadly violence in Mimika regency last week, has been blamed on the political elite in Jakarta, particularly those in the two largest parties, and the Indonesian Military (TNI).

Analysts say the political elite would profit from the division of Papua into three provinces -- West Irian Jaya, Central Irian Jaya and Papua -- despite the fact that this would only bring misery to the Papuans in general.

Ikrar Nusa Bhakti of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) said that many political interests were at play in the decision to partition Papua. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) would likely benefit from the partition as it could use the new political structures to increase its vote in the 2004 elections in Papua, where it lost to the Golkar Party in the 1999 elections, he said. Golkar apparently rejected the plan to divide Papua as this would only lessen its domination there in the next elections.

Papua Governor Jaap Salossa and speaker of the Papua legislative council John Ibo, both from Golkar, have firmly rejected the split. Similarly, political scientist Riswandha Imawan from Gadjah Mada University (UGM) said the conflict in Papua over the partition decision was related to the rivalry between the PDI Perjuangan and Golkar ahead of the 2004 elections. He said similar conflicts had taken place in other resource-rich provinces, like Riau, East Kalimantan and Aceh. Ikrar said the division of Papua had received strong backing from the TNI and National Police because they also had political interests in weakening separatist sentiment in the troubled province.

With the split, which would also entail establishing more military and police bases in the new provinces and regencies, separatist rebels could be more easily controlled, he argued. "Basically, the partition of Papua is driven by the government's intention to weaken the separatist movement," Ikrar told The Jakarta Post on Saturday.

At least five people were killed in five days of clashes between supporters and opponents of the August 23 official inauguration of Central Irian Jaya province in Timika, the capital city of Mimika regency. However, no violence was reported when other Papuans officially declared West Irian Jaya a province on February 6, 2003. However, the five deaths last week and mounting opposition from analysts and critics forced the central government to delay the creation of Central Irian Jaya province, but not West Irian Jaya.

Supporters of the partition claimed the move was based on Law No. 45/1999 on the separation of Papua into three provinces. Moreover, President Megawati Soekarnoputri, who also chairs the PDI Perjuangan, issued a presidential instruction early this year to speed up the enforcement of the law.

However, opponents say the creation of the new provinces runs against Law No. 21/2001 on special autonomy for Papua. Under the special autonomy law, all crucial policies on Papua, including the partition policy, must be approved by the Papua People's Assembly (MRP), which does not exist as yet. Worried by the powerful role of the MRP, the central government has many times delayed the establishment of the body.

Ikrar and Riswandha further said they doubted that the policy of splitting Papua would benefit the majority of Papuans, most of whom still live in isolation and poverty, despite Jakarta's much-touted claims of bringing "development" to the province. "Support for the partition of Papua does not really mean support for development in Papua," Ikrar said.

Meanwhile, President Megawati has insisted that the central government could not speed up Papua's split without taking into account the growing aspiration among Papuan people. "Sometimes we just want to rush although we do not know how to split [Papua], let alone the growing aspiration in Papua. This is not a process that can just finish in one or two days," she was quoted by Antara as saying in a press conference late on Saturday. Asked when the delay of Central Irian Jaya split from Papua will last, Megawati said the central government was still considering all political, economic and social hindrances in implementing the law on the new provinces. "However, is it possible for one governor to handle problems in all regencies with such a very large area? Therefore, this case must be resolved wisely," she said.

Government to emasculate Papua's special autonomy

Jakarta Post - September 2, 2003

Moch. N. Kurniawan, Jakarta -- The government again made clear on Monday its determination to prevent an overly powerful Papuan People's Assembly (MRP), throwing into question the status of the province's special autonomy.

The government has been halfheartedly implementing Law No. 21/2001 on special autonomy for Papua, and has been reluctant to establish the MRP because, according to Minister of Justice and Human Rights Yusril Ihza Mahendra, the assembly would function as a powerful institution that overrides bylaws and gubernatorial decrees.

"How can the planned MRP become such a powerful institution when, comparably, the nation's amended 1945 Constitution no longer gives such powerful authority to the People's Consultative Assembly?" Yusril said before meeting with Vice President Hamzah Haz. Because of this, the government is reluctant to approve the establishment of the assembly with its extraordinary powers, he said.

Yusril said the government was also considering giving special autonomy to the provinces of West Irian Jaya and Central Irian Jaya, whose formation was regulated in Law No. 45/1999. The controversy over these new provinces has triggered bloodshed in Timika over the last two weeks.

The people of Papua are confused and angered by the decision to split the province in three. Critics say the law regulating the split violates the special autonomy law. With the implementation of Law No. 45/1999, Papua lost almost two-thirds of its territory and annual revenue, as it would no longer enjoy income from copper and gold mining in Timika and oil and gas mining in Tangguh, Manokwari, West Irian Jaya.

Yusril acknowledged that the planned MRP was the result of a political compromise between the people of Papua and the central government, which wanted to curry favor with Papuans after years of indifference or repression. "But now every party must realize the MRP cannot play such a great role with such extraordinary powers," he said, adding that the law was a product of former president Abdurrahman Wahid's administration.

President Megawati Soekarnoputri has indicated that the government will go ahead with its plan to split Papua into three provinces, because the territory is too large to be governed by a single governor.

Yusril also said the government has set up a small team to review the laws on special autonomy for Papua and the division of the province, as well as Presidential Instruction No. 1/2003 on the acceleration of the province's partition.

More blood spilled fresh in Papua

Jakarta Post - September 2, 2003

Nethy Dharma Somba, Jayapura/Jakarta -- Ahead of a planned tribal celebration for peace, the situation in Timika, the capital of Mimika regency, abruptly turned tense on Monday following the killing of two migrant people on Sunday evening.

Although the incident had no apparent connection to the earlier violence that ensued from the recent inauguration of Central Irian Jaya province -- now retracted -- the local police and military have tightened security in the capital to avoid a possible open war between indigenous Papuans and the migrant community.

The situation was worsened by rumors that four migrant women had been raped by Papuans.

Some 500 riot police were deployed to guard the two opposing groups and to launch an operation to disarm everyone in Timika.

Timika Police chief Adj. Sr. Comr. Paulus Waterpaw told The Jakarta Post by telephone from Timika that the situation heated up again on Monday when a group of Papuans opposing the new province attacked a number of ojek (motorcycle taxi) drivers with spears and arrows.

"Two were killed instantly, while four others are in critical condition at Mitra Masyarakat Hospital," he said. The body of Sabaruddin was flown on Monday to his home town in Makassar, South Sulawesi, at the request of his family, while Ismail, who came from Buton, South Sulawesi, was buried in Timika.

Waterpaw explained that the attack was triggered when a migrant ojek driver stabbed a Papuan man, Bustami Gomo, for refusing to pay his fare. "Feeling that he'd lost face, the ojek driver took a machete and stabbed Bustami in his stomach and slashed his head, then ran away," he said.

Bustami survived the attack and reported the incident to his tribe. An hour later, dozens of Papuans attacked ojek drivers in the area, claiming that they were spying for security authorities. Waterpaw said the incident was criminal in nature and had nothing to do with the new province. Police were still searching for the ojek driver to look into the matter further.

Chairman of the Mimika administration Andareas Anggaibak and Tom Beanal, secretary-general of the Papua Presidium Council and chairman of the Amungme Tribal Development Institute, also stressed that the latest incident was not related to the conflict over the new province.

Mimika regent Klemen Tinal condemned the killing of the migrants, saying the people could not take the law into their own hands.

Papua Police chief Insp. Gen. Budi Utomo confirmed that he had ordered Mimika police to disarm everyone in Timika and to ban ojek drivers from working nights to prevent the conflict from turning into an open feud between Papuans and migrants.

"In addition, all tribal and informal leaders, religious figures and representatives of women's and youth groups have been called to a meeting, where we will explain the incident and ask the leaders to control their own tribes ahead of the peace process," he said.

The rival groups are ready to conduct a tribal ceremony "to end the conflict [over the new province] and to discuss the detainees' release and compensation for all the victims during the clash", he said. The police have donated 14 pigs and 30 sacks of rice for the ceremony.

In Jakarta, National Police chief Gen. Da'i Bachtiar asserted that the bloody incident on Sunday evening was "an ordinary crime." In Makassar, a score of Papuan students staged a demonstration, demanding the government cancel the division that triggered the bloody conflict of the past week.

Since the inauguration of the new province on August 23, at least five people have been killed and dozens injured a week of clashes between supporters and opponents of the split.

Indigenous Papuans, mostly from the highlands of the province, came down and attacked those supporting the new province, including migrants.

Labour issues

Government to provide compensation for PT DI workers

Jakarta Post - September 5, 2003

Moch. N. Kurniawan and Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, Jakarta-The government rejected on Thursday demands to void a decision by state aircraft maker PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PTDI) to suspend indefinitely 6,000 employees, but promised to raise some US$50 million to provide them with compensation.

Speaking to reporters on Thursday, Vice President Hamzah Haz said the compensation would be taken from the restructuring fund allocated to the company.

"The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) has proposed a program to save the company, which requires those who intend to acquire PTDI to prepare US$50 million as a compensation fund for the 6,000 dismissed workers," he said.

Hamzah said the manner of the suspension showed the government's commitment to treating the company's employees fairly, as "it [the suspension] was carried out in accordance with the existing law." By suspending most of its employees, the aircraft maker was given a chance of recovery, he said. "If the company's financial condition starts to recover, it can reemploy those who have been suspended," he added.

Hamzah warned the employees against venting their disappointment through violence, as it would only make additional complications and discourage potential investors to acquire the company.

The company suspended indefinitely 9,000 employees in May, citing financial constraints. The decision sparked protests, as employees claimed the had not been consulted before the policy was carried out.

After days of demonstrating, the company allowed 3,000 employees to complete standing orders from both foreign and domestic institutions.

The Bandung-based company plunged into a financial crisis with the fall of President Soeharto in 1998, who regarded the technology sector as the nation's pride. It was built with the help of then research minister B.J. Habibie, who later succeeded Soeharto following his downfall.

The post-Habibie administrations considered the company was unhealthy and a financial burden to the state.

Thousands of PTDI employees took to the streets on Thursday for the second time in as many days to renew their demand to be reemployed. They gathered in front of the State Palace after driving in a motorcade across the capital from the haj dormitory in Pondok Gede, East Jakarta.

The rowdy protest could be heard inside the Palace, where President Megawati Soekarnoputri was accepting credential letters from new ambassadors from Canada, Kuwait and Slovakia. The rally proceeded peacefully.

On Wednesday, the workers staged a protest at the House of Representatives. Some of the protesters said they would continue to demonstrate either in Bandung or Jakarta until the government complied with their demand.

In response to the demand, State Minister for State Enterprises Laksamana Sukardi appealed to the employees to understand that the restructuring program was aimed at saving the company. "We have to understand that the financial and organizational conditions of the company need to be restructured. The company is bleeding," he said.

He said the government was aware that the decision could not satisfy everybody, but insisted that the survival measure was unavoidable. "We have all agreed that we will abide by the regulation and the manpower minister will facilitate the problem-solving process," Laksamana said, referring to Jacob Nuwa Wea.

He promised his office would open a training center for the employees, so they could find placement at other state-owned enterprises.

Reformasi

Reformasi has become a commodity of those in power

Kompas - September 2, 2003

Jakarta -- The reform movement which has the principle aim of eliminating corruption, collusion and nepotism can no longer be left to the large political parties who obtained significant votes in the 1999 general elections. After almost five years in power, not one objective of reformasi has been carried though by the big parties.

"Reformasi has only become a political commodity of the elite parties which are in power at the moment", said People's Representative Assembly (DPR) member Meliono Suwondo from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) fraction in an open discussion titled "The Democratic Movement and the 2004 Elections" at the Joang Building in Jakarta on Monday (1/9).

As a [PDI-P] party member, Meliono is absolutely certain that the agenda of reformasi will not be carried out by the large parties. "In the coming general elections, don't hold any hopes in or vote for the big political parties", he said.

Meliono explain that in the time that he has been a DPR member from the party which received the largest number of votes in the 1999 elections, policies on the implementation of the agenda of reformasi, such as the elimination of corruption, collusion and nepotism along with abolishing the dual function [social and political role] of the armed forces have never obtained support.

"In PDI-P, the elimination of corruption is only the seventh priority and is not considered important. I have seen that there is no sincerity [in dealing with corruption]", he said. Meliono hoped therefore that the new political parties which have not been proven to be "rotten" will carry out the agenda of reform.

Kleptocracy

Appearing as a speaker in the open discussion was Budiman Sudjatmiko (an activist from Movement Indonesia) and the chairperson of the management board of the Indonesian Catholic Student Association, Maria Restu Hapsari. Like Meliono, these two youth activists are also pessimistic that the 2004 elections will bring about any change in the democratic life of Indonesia.

"It does not requires a grounding in political science to become a politician in Indonesia. What is needed is a sufficient amount of money and believing that enough people think your important. There is no democracy in Indonesia. What there is, is kleptocracy, where those who are in power are busy thieving. Money politics cannot be separated from this kind of democracy", explained Budiman.

According to [Budiman], the former chairperson of the People's Democratic Party (PRD), under these kind of conditions, it is hard to create a civil society in Indonesia because political society is full of thieves. "Unfortunately, those who glorify civil society do not understand that civil society [is only] able to be created though a dialectic with a healthy political society", he said.

According to Maria, the failure of the agenda of reformasi has been caused by the political parties which won the 1999 elections and those who have emerged as leaders who do not sincerely think about the issue. "The political parties are only busy thinking about consolidation themselves and fighting for their own interests", she said.

Because there is no contribution from the political parties which can be experienced directly by the people, the popularity of these parities and their leaders has declined sharply. According to Meliono, the popularly of PDI-P has declined in the last six months. The general chairperson of PDI-P, President Megawati Sukarnoputri is not as popular as other [political] figures, for example in the special region of Yogyakarta [in Central Java] and West Java [where PDI-P has it main base of mass support]. (INU)

[Translated by James Balowski.]

Sukhoigate

Anticlimactic ending in Sukhoi inquiry

Jakarta Post - September 5, 2003

Kurniawan Hari, Jakarta -- The House of Representatives' inquiry into the highly publicized and controversial Russian jet fighter purchase reached an anticlimax on Thursday with just a call for penalties against those involved in the scandal.

The House investigating committee which was initially optimistic about successfully investigating the scandal, could not reveal the alleged irregularities in the US$192.6 million deal and even harvested criticism on the way it carried out the investigation.

Many sides, including the national press, questioned the authority of the House when the committee refused to allow several ministers and related officials to accompany Minister of Industry and Trade Rini M.S. Suwandi to give a clarification about the countertrade deal.

"We agree not to define penalties because it's not our responsibility," inquiry committee chairman Ibrahim Ambong said in the committee's final meeting to close its two-month investigation here on Thursday.

The committee also recommended that the government regulate countertrade procedures in order to avoid irregularities in such deals with foreign countries in the future.

The atmosphere in the meeting was said to be not as intense as it was in the past. Djoko Susilo, one of 20 committee members attending the closed door meeting left the meeting without giving any comments to the press.

The House had asserted there were irregularities in the deal because the Ministry of Defense was not involved in the arms purchase while a small part of the deal was paid in advance from the National Logistics Agency (Bulog) and state-owned Bukopin Bank, instead of the 2003 state budget.

Several legislators said the meeting became tense when legislators were at odds about what recommendations should be issued from the investigation.

Happy Bone Zulkarnaen of the Golkar Party faction said that some factions proposed questioning President Megawati Soekarnoputri to get a clear explanation about the deal but many other factions, including the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), opposed it. Effendi Choirie, the committee deputy chairman, admitted that his National Awakening Party (PKB) faction was among those that suggested the House question the President.

"This is a political struggle. We can not force others to accept our proposal," Choirie added. Asked about government officials who were allegedly involved in the scandal, Effendi said that they were Minister Rini M.S. Suwandi, Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, and State Logistics Agency (Bulog) chief Widjanarko Puspoyo.

Ambong said that a 24-page report on the investigation would be brought soon to a meeting of the House defense commission for approval.

After a series of hearings with a number of high-powered government officials as well as businessmen, the inquiry committee concluded that the purchase of the four Sukhoi jet fighters and two MI-35 assault helicopters was not in line with the state budget and defense laws.

The deal was signed during President Megawati Soekarnoputri's visit to Russia in April. All four warplanes which were delivered last week and early this week are still being assembled at the Air Force Air Base in Madiun, East Java.

'War on terrorism'

Jemaah Islamiya 'damaged but dangerous'

Asia Times - September 4, 2003

David Isenberg -- Despite the four-year sentence handed on Tuesday to radical Islamist cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and the August 11 capture of top Jemaah Islamiya leader Riduan Isamuddin, aka Hambali, reports of JI's demise, to paraphrase Mark Twain, are premature.

Ba'asyir, 65, was convicted of forgery, immigration violations and treason-related charges. The judges found there was not enough evidence to back prosecution claims that he headed JI, the Southeast Asian terror group that has murdered hundreds in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in recent years, and is alleged to be linked to with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda.

A recent report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) details the threat posed by JI. Released on August 26, the report "Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous" finds that it remains active, and deadly.

Considering the August 5 bombing of a hotel in Jakarta, which killed 12 people, and that on Tuesday four suspected JI members were arraigned for plotting terrorist attacks on five embassies in Thailand and tourist spots in the country's premier tourist spots of Pattaya and Phuket, this should come as no surprise.

But the ICG report is noteworthy for its detailed analysis. It finds that it is "a bigger organization than previously thought, with a depth of leadership that gives it a regenerative capacity. It has communication with and has received funding from al-Qaeda, but it is very much independent and takes most, if not all, operational decisions locally." The report also notes that several members of the central command have not yet been identified, let alone apprehended. The cell structure is also considered more extensive than originally believed.

While the arrest of Hambali weakens JI and many of its members are being hunted down -- more than 200 are now in custody -- it remains a big organizations whose members probably number in the thousands, and it is spread across a very big and populous archipelago. And JI is organized well enough that no single individual is indispensable.

According to the ICG report, the JI organization is something of a family affair. "The JI network is held together not just by ideology and training but also by an intricate network of marriages that at times makes it seems like a giant extended family. Insufficient attention has been paid to the role the women of JI play in cementing the network. In many cases, senior JI leaders arranged the marriages of their subordinates to their own sisters or sisters-in-law to keep the network secure."

Furthermore, according to the report, despite some past media reports, JI is hardly an al-Qaeda franchise. While the two groups have some elements in common, notably jihadist ideology and a long history of shared experience in Afghanistan, JI's focus, despite the claims about wanting to establish a Southeast Asian caliphate, continues to be on establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia.

In theory JI has a formal structure. At the top sits an emir. Beneath him are four councils -- governing council, religious council, fatwah council and disciplinary council. The governing council is headed by a central command that exerts control over four regions. One covered Singapore and Malaysia and provided financing for JI operations. Hambali was its head until early last year. The second region covered most of Indonesia and was considered the target of jihad efforts. The third region covered Mindanao, Sabah and Sulawesi. The last covered Papua and Australia and was responsible for fundraising.

As with al-Qaeda, Afghanistan was a crucial catalyst for JI. All of its top leaders and many of its bombers trained there from 1985 to 1995. Their experience there was also critical in terms of forging bonds among themselves and building an international network that included members of al-Qaeda. The process of sending recruits to Afghanistan began at least seven years before JI formally came into being in 1992.

In 1995 JI decided to set up training facilities in Mindanao in the Philippines to replicate the Afghan training as closely as possible, including using many of the same instructors. Regular "cadets" went through a six-month course including weapons training, demolition and bombing, map reading, guerrilla and infantry tactics, field engineering, leadership and self-defense.

It also included a religious curriculum, providing instruction in basic law, traditions of the Prophet, proselytization and jihad. Yet, according to the ICG report, members of JI's central command are not constrained by a formal hierarchy. JI also maintains alliances with a loose network of like-minded regional organizations all committed in different ways to jihad. They share a commitment to implementing salaafi teachings -- a return to the "pure" Islam practiced by the Prophet Mohammed.

In fact, the bombs that exploded in Makassar last December were carried out by two South Sulawesi-based organizations, Wahdah Islamiya and Laskar Jundullah, "which cooperate with JI and may even have been modeled after it but were completely independent in terms of leadership".

The one bit of good news in the ICG report is that internal dissensions within JI appear to be growing. "The Marriott [hotel] bombing, in particular, generated a debate about appropriate targets, but there were apparently already divisions over the appropriateness of Indonesia as a venue for jihad, once the Ambon and Poso conflicts had calmed down. The Marriott attack appears to have intensified that debate."

Cheers, groans greet Abu Bakar Bashir verdict

Radio Australia - September 3, 2003

Supporters of radical Indonesian cleric, Abu Bakar Bashir, say the four year jail term handed down by a court in Jakarta is only a token sentence to spare the Indonesian Government the embarrassment of an acquittal. The alleged spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiah was found guilty of participating in a campaign of treason against Indonesia. The Australian Government has suggested it's happy but expected a longer sentence.

Presenter/Interviewer: Tim Palmer, Indonesia Correspondent

Speakers: Adnan Buyung Nasution, chief lawyer; Hussein Umar, head of a radical group sympathetic to Abu Bakar Bashir

Tim Palmer: Seven hours into the reading of the judgement, the first suggestion of a surprise decision emerged, and with it the first signs of celebration from Bashir's hundreds of supporters in and outside the court.

"Considering all these matters," the Chief Judge read, "the court has the opinion that the Defendant, Bashir, legally has not been proven to be the leader of Jemaah Islamiah."

(Sound of cheering)

The court had effectively ruled against the contention of prosecutors and the belief of many Western and regional intelligence agencies that Abu Bakar Bashir had been the Emir or Supreme Head of JI.

There were more cheers when the judges threw out the testimony of the key witness, Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, ruling that his evidence given by video from custody in Singapore was uncorroborated by any of the dozens of other witnesses. That meant the judges also discounted the allegation that Bashir had proposed an assassination attempt against then Vice-President Megawati.

But the cheers were replaced by groans as the judges approached their conclusion. While they found that Abu Bakar Bashir didn't lead or organise a campaign of treason aimed at collapsing the Indonesian Government, they did find him guilty of participating in such a plot.

His sentence four years. If there's no success at appeal, he's likely to be out in less than three. Still his supporters were disappointed. Hussein Umar, head of a radical group sympathetic to Abu Bakar Bashir said the sentence was a token to spare the Government the embarrassment of an acquittal.

(Sound of Hussein Umar speaking)

"There's been pressure on the whole process," he said. "They've made Abu Bakar Bashir a big terror figure, so it would be naove to think they'd let him go. They have to punish him, even if it's just four years."

Abu Bakar Bashir sat passionless throughout the entire judgement, showing no emotion when the verdict was reached. But immediately after the decision he told his chief lawyer, Adnan Buyung Nasution, to launch an appeal.

Adnan Buyung Nasution: Well, he said this is cruel, cruel. Because I never did anything wrong in the sense to overthrow the Government, or to take part in overthrowing the Government or in the bombings.

Tim Palmer: He'll be out in three years. Do you think the Government will be unhappy?

Adnan Buyung Nasution: This is face saving for the Government because he was charged already in accordance with the pressure from the foreign countries. The fact that the court now found him guilty and sentenced although only for four years, I think the Government will be happy.

Tim Palmer: But what about his supporters? Will they be happy?

Adnan Buyung Nasution: Oh, certainly not. I think this will be stimulating for the followers of him to further go on with the struggle against the establishment.

Tim Palmer: In what way? Do you think that might invite...

Adnan Buyung Nasution: A lot of violence, a lot of violence. I don't believe the violence.

Tim Palmer: With the Australian Government already suggesting the sentence was lighter than might have been expected, questions will be asked here about how well the prosecution of Bashir was handled.

But likewise, questions will be asked over whether other countries helped Indonesia sufficiently in this case. Why was Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana not allowed to attend the Jakarta court to give his evidence in person, for example? And where was the evidence from another Jemaah Islamiah figure, Omar al-Faruq, who's been in American hands since last year and who allegedly first fingered Abu Bakar Bashir for his role in JI?

That must raise questions about whether the Indonesian Government would face the potential difficulty of ever trying to bring charges against Abu Bakar Bashir for what many believe was his involvement in the Bali bombing, unless an irrefutable case can be built.

Military seeks more power after Marriott bombing

Green Left Weekly - September 3, 2003

James Balowski, Jakarta -- Taking a leaf out of US President George Bush's cynical manipulation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the Indonesian military (TNI) is trying to take advantage of public fear and anger over last month's deadly bomb attack at the Marriott Hotel in central Jakarta to get more power to deal with "internal security threats".

The August 5 bombing of the Marriott Hotel -- the largest since the October 12 terrorist bombings in Bali -- left 12 people dead and 147 wounded. The Islamist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah -- which was also blamed for the Bali bombing -- is believed to be responsible and a number of alleged JI members are being sought by police.

Indonesians were shocked and angered by the attack -- the latest in a string of bombings in Jakarta over the last two years -- partly because the majority of the victims were ordinary Indonesians (taxi drivers and security guards).

Given that the Indonesian authorities had been forewarned that the Marriott Hotel was a likely target for an imminent terrorist attack, questions have inevitably arisen as to why police and intelligence agencies were not able to prevent the attack.

However, rather than focusing on these questions, President Megawati Sukarnoputri's government has sought to focus on "inadequacies" in the recently passed anti-terrorist law, which it claims fails to give the security forces enough power to take "preemptive" action against suspects.

In apologising to the victims of the bombing, the chief of Indonesia's State Intelligence Body (BIN), Hendropriyono, was quoted in the August 9 Jakarta Post as saying that BIN wanted the power to act, not just to give early warnings.

"How can we prevent a certain action from taking place if we know a suspect but we cannot make an arrest", he said. "Without the power to make an arrest, BIN would be like a German shepherd dog whose tail was held by its owner so that it could not run after the target."

Indonesia has several intelligence agencies, including the BIN, the TNI's intelligence body (BAIS) and intelligence units within the national police and in the attorney general's office. BIN has been tasked to coordinate their work.

Public debate over the apparent failure of the intelligence agencies to stop the Marriott bombing began in earnest on August 12 when defence minister Matori Abdul Djalil floated the idea of adopting a draconian Singapore- or Malaysia-style Internal Security Act (ISA). Matori's suggestion was quickly supported by political and security affairs minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and TNI chief Endriartono Sutarto.

All three took the line that existing anti-terrorist laws are not strong enough to prevent terrorist attacks. "The [anti-terrorist] law says that judges can use intelligence reports to legalise the arrest of a suspect", said Yudhoyono. "But that is not enough. We are in a very weak position when it comes to stopping things from happening."

Matori's proposal sparked immediate protests from human rights activists. Their concerns centre on the fact that Singapore's and Malaysia's internal security laws give security officials the power to detain anyone suspected of planning a terrorist attack for two years without trial.

Indonesia used to have a similar law -- the notorious "anti- subversion" law. But this was scrapped in 1999 following the overthrow of the Suharto dictatorship. During Suharto's New Order regime, the anti-subversion law was used to jail thousands of political opponents for long periods without trial.

Human rights activists like Hendardi from the Indonesian Legal Aid Association and Munir from the National Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) slammed Matori's proposal, saying that it was aimed at deflecting attention from the government's own failure to prevent the Marriott bombing. They argued that the government should improve the work of its intelligence agencies and use the existing laws, including the criminal code, to stop terrorist attacks.

In the face of a growing chorus of opposition from human rights activists, analysts, politicians and even top government officials, Yudhoyono admitted on August 13 that the government was unlikely to enact an ISA as it would only stir up strong opposition around the country.

"We will not adopt an internal security act like Singapore's or Malaysia's. Our situation is different from that of Singapore or Malaysia. The ISA does not provide guarantees for political freedom", he told Jakarta Post.

Yudhoyono went on to say that he now favoured the option of revising the anti-terrorist law, saying: "Having enacted this law, we now believe that the powers of the security authorities to prevent terrorist attacks are inadequate. Our security agencies need more legal powers than they have been given by the current law so as to allow them to carry out early detection of terrorist threats."

It may be, however, that talk of introducing an ISA was merely an exercise in kite-flying to prepare the ground for the TNI's real agenda -- reasserting its internal security role. This was supposed to have been handed over to police when the two institutions were formally separated in 2000.

On August 14, Yudhoyono said that the government would give more power to the military to "detect" and "find" possible terrorist threats. "There has been a long-standing impression that the TNI should only handle external defence while internal security is in the hands of the police", he told reporters. "The government will give a greater role, or appropriate space, for the TNI to carry our their duties as long as it is related to national interests, although the focal point remains the police."

This is consistent with the policy position outlined in the TNI's white paper released in March. This described various threats facing the country including separatist movements, terrorism, piracy, illegal logging and people trafficking, and argued that it was the TNI's task to "safeguard the nation" from all these threats.

Under the Suharto regime, the TNI's internal security role was carried out through the military's territorial command structure, which gave the TNI a presence at every level of civil administration, from the cabinet and national legislature down to local districts and villages.

The TNI is determined to reassert this role, not just because it entrenches its political power, but because it provides its officers with huge business opportunities -- ranging from protection rackets, gambling, prostitution, monopolies on commodity distribution and bribes from the massive informal sector. TNI officers can use the wealth thus accumulated to deliver or withhold electoral support to civilian politicians.

The TNI's role as the "guardian of the nation" has been greatly enhanced since the government launched the "integrated operation" in Indonesia's northern-most province of Aceh on May 19 -- an operation which has been dominated by a vicious military campaign to crush the Free Aceh Movement and characterised by widespread human rights abuses.

Sydney Jones, Indonesia's project head of the International Crisis Group told Reuters on August 20: "The army wants nothing more than to regain total control over internal security. They are extremely dismissive, if not contemptuous, of the police in this regard."

Munarman, head of the Legal Aid Institute, concurred. "The military could abuse new regulations, because they have the experience, they already own a powerful political machine with a wide territorial structure that reaches into the villages", he told Reuters.

So far, the government has only indicated it wants to make amendments to Article 26 of the anti-terrorist law which specifies what information can be used and what preemptive action can be taken against a suspect.

"The shift in the anti-terror laws is not clear at this stage", Damien Kingsbury, head of Indonesian studies at Deakin University in Victoria, told Reuters. "But it would seem any talk of increases to security powers regarding terrorism would implicitly include the military, at least through the [national intelligence agency] and Kopassus."

The elite Kopassus special forces unit has been widely condemned for its role in the torture and abduction of dissidents during Suharto's rule and for gross human rights violations in East Timor and West Papua. Australia recently announced it would be renewing military ties with Kopassus to help "fight terror in the region".

Unjust or too light? Jail term pleases no one

Straits Times - September 3, 2003

Devi Asmarani, Jakarta -- The four-year jail sentence on Abu Bakar Bashir proved a disappointment for both supporters and detractors of the militant cleric.

While his followers and sympathisers believe the guilty verdict was unjust, others think the four-year imprisonment was too light, especially compared to the 15-year jail sentence demanded by the prosecutors.

The reduced sentence prompted many to think that the police and prosecutors had failed to produce hard evidence to link Bashir to the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) terrorist network.

"I think the lack of professionalism of the police in preparing the evidence file and presenting credible witnesses are the reasons why the judges could not do much in producing a satisfying verdict," said Mr Azyumardi Azra, dean of the State Islamic University in Jakarta. "The police and prosecutors only presented circumstantial evidence instead of hard proof," he told the AFP news agency.

Yet analysts believe government pressure led the judges to decide on the four-year jail term. Those who think Bashir was guilty thought that the verdict was another "middle ground" move, a compromise sought by the government to please both the international and domestic audience.

A Jakarta-based political consultant said: "A stiff sentence could provide ammunition for the opposition which is eager to call the government a United States lackey. But at the same time, Indonesia cannot let Bashir free, as it would only validate the allegation that it is too lenient with the militants and the terrorist suspects."

The largest Muslim group in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama, came out in support of the verdict. Its deputy secretary-general, Mr Masduki Baidowi, told The Straits Times: "I think many religious figures would see the ruling as a step forward in the fight against terrorism."

But the second largest Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah, was less supportive of the verdict. Its chairman Ahmad Syafii Maarif told The Straits Times: "I think since the judges had a very weak case against him, their decision could be overturned in the higher court of appeal." He added: "If he is only guilty by association, then the old man should be freed."

Bashir's ardent followers claimed the decision was the latest move in the conspiracy to discredit Islam involving the US and its allies. Mr Fauzan Al-Anshori, spokesman for the Basyir-led Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, told The Straits Times: "The judges were smart enough to conclude that Bashir was not the JI leader, but they were not brave enough to acquit him of all the charges."

Mr Din Syamsudin, the secretary of the country's highest Muslim fbody, the Indonesian Ulema Council, told The Straits Times: "This ruling has struck a sour note within the Muslim community, and the administration will forever be remembered for it."

People in the street were equally divided in their views. But many generally thought that if the court had enough basis to determine Bashir's links to the terrorist group, then he should go to jail.

Sentence delivers wrong message

Straits Times - September 3, 2003

Derwin Pereira, Jakarta -- Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir did not have to shed any tears in court when his verdict was read out yesterday. His four-year jail sentence -- with a prospect of an appeal -- was a far cry from the 15 years Indonesian prosecutors had pressed for.

If the treason case was seen as a litmus test or a barometer in Indonesia's fight against terrorism, the verdict left little doubt that the Megawati administration and the courts continue to tread the ground carefully in dealing with radical Islam. Jakarta is sending mixed signals once again, taking one step forward and two steps back in confronting a politically sensitive issue.

The lengthy and contradictory judgment of the Indonesian court yesterday reflected this acute dilemma. It charged that Bashir was guilty of taking part in a plan to overthrow the government but said that he was not complicit in leading the plot.

Chief judge Muhammad Saleh also said there was no proof that he was leader of the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) terror network. He said that the only witness to implicate Bashir in such a plot had been Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, a JI suspect detained in Singapore.

There was never any doubt that the 65-year-old cleric would serve time behind bars. The issue was for how long. During the past year, the public tide had slowly turned against him, making it difficult to regain his moral high ground.

The Bali bombing was a crucial turning point in this repect. It shattered the edifice of an "untouchable" Bashir and opened the possibility of Indonesia being a haven for terrorists. Jakarta has been riding the tide of changing public sentiment.

One reason the authorities were prepared to act with greater decisiveness against him was a calculated decision that an eventual conviction would not generate the backlash that it had threatened to initially.

The ferocity that hundreds of his students displayed before television cameras when he was first arrested last year seems to justify fears of an Islamic backlash and nationwide violence.

But the J.W. Marriott Hotel bombing and persistent intelligence reports of further terrorist strikes in the capital might have deterred the authorities from imposing a tougher sentence.

Obviously, security concerns were a significant factor in the lighter-than-expected sentence but it dents the government's credibility in combating the terrorist scourge.

Indonesian culture is predisposed to compromises. The government is prepared to let a small fish like Amrozi, who took part in the Bali bombing, face the firing squad. Indeed, others involved in the attacks on two nightclubs in Bali last October are likely to face death.

Bashir's light sentence is an expedient short-term solution but its political ramifications are stark for Indonesia and the region. It sends a clear message to his supporters that, in the absence of a decisive stance against extremism, there is still hope for them to carry out acts of terrorism in the name of Islam.

Bashir: We won

Straits Times - September 3, 2003

Robert Go, Jakarta -- Abu Bakar Bashir ended his day in court yesterday in the same way that he had begun it.

Wearing a black jacket, a sarong, a white scarf and the white cap of a Muslim cleric, he urged followers to keep the peace because victory was at hand. "Stay calm. Regardless of the verdict, we have won. Don't be provoked into violence. Show them what real Islamic values are," he had said before the session started.

Supporters of Bashir, who has campaigned openly for the establishment of Islamic law in Indonesia, crammed into the court and milled about outside at the start of the day.

As a panel of five judges, resplendent in their red and black robes, read out witness statements and their final judgments against him, Bashir looked slightly nervous. He gyrated left and right on his swivel defendant's chair.

His general demeanour, however, belied the seriousness of the charges against him: That he was the leader of Jemaah Islamiah terrorist group and had committed treason by sanctioning attacks throughout the region.

Others at the session appeared as bored as usual with the methodical Indonesian courtroom procedure. It took the five judges, who included one woman, nearly seven hours to read their findings. Lawyers yawned, played with their cell phones or read magazines as the judges took turns reading out the 220-page trial record and verdict.

Heads drooped and were then pulled up again among the audience, as one Bashir disciple after another lost control and dozed in air-conditioned comfort.

The police mobilised a security force of hundreds for the trial, but most of the young men -- who looked barely old enough to grow moustaches let alone wield machine guns, sticks or riot shields -- slumped on their chairs.

The judgment had several climactic moments, however, enough to please everybody.

Some of the 200 people inside began chanting "Allahu Akbar", or "God is great", as presiding judge Muhammad Saleh first declared Bashir acquitted of the most serious charges against him. Outside, another 200 to 300 Bashir supporters started to yell "Free him, free him" as the final judgment neared ever so slowly.

Speakers outside aimed their rhetoric at the usual targets, blaming America and the West for framing Bashir and wanting to wage a war against Islam.

A stunned silence fell over the courtroom, however, when judges decided there was enough evidence to make stick a second, lesser charge against Bashir.

An hour later, after judges said Bashir's punishment was just and should "deter anyone else from committing the same offences", they handed down a fairly lenient four-year jail term.

Some ordinary Indonesians thought Bashir got off lightly. Supri, 35, a Jakarta store assistant, told Reuters: "Bashir is evil, he is against human rights. I support the judges' decision, but I think he deserved more than that."

Mr Ken Conboy, head of RMA Indonesia, a Jakarta-based security risk company, said: "I think a lot of people, they were looking at this as a litmus test to see how serious the government was. Four years, considering he'll probably get [time] off for good behaviour, is more or less a glorified slap on the wrist."

Bashir guilty but cleared of leading JI

Sydney Morning Herald - September 3, 2003

Matthew More, Jakarta -- Indonesia has failed in its attempts to prove Abu Bakar Bashir is the head of the terrorist organisation Jemaah Islamiah that was responsible for carrying out the Bali bombings.

Bashir was jailed for four years last night on charges of planning to bring down the Government. But the prosecution failed to prove to a panel of judges in the Central Jakarta District Court that Bashir was the head of JI. It also failed to prove two of the other three main charges against him.

The 65-year-old cleric sat impassively as the judges read out their findings. But Bashir told them he would appeal against their decision, because it was not just. "I believe I fight for Islam and I cannot accept your decision," he said.

His supporters inside and outside the court -- who had gathered behind police lines outside to hear the judgement on loudspeakers -- erupted with shouts of "God is great".

Showing the first emotion of the day, Bashir flashed a broad smile, strode to the prosecution bench and shook hands with the five men who wanted him jailed for 15 years.

Despite Bashir being found guilty of treason, it was the shock decision to dismiss the claim of his leadership of JI that reverberated most strongly. It undermines an attempt by Indonesia, under pressure from Western powers, to prove Bashir leads the South-East Asian organisation responsible for a string of bombing attacks over the past five years.

The court's decision is certain to be greeted with dismay by Western countries that have argued since well before Bali that Bashir was the head of JI. The thrust of the case against Bashir came from alleged JI members detained under internal security laws in Singapore and Malaysia.

Bashir maintained steadfastly throughout his trial that he is not the head of JI and that JI does not exist. But more than a dozen of the Bali bombers attended his pesantren (Islamic school) at Ngruki in central Java and he knows many of those accused of carrying out terrorist acts for JI.

Before the judges began proceedings Bashir addressed his followers inside the courtroom, urging them not to riot and calling on police to allow more of them into the court. "If someone provokes, it must be the US provocateurs," he said. "Just believe we will win as long as we fight for God's law." Several statements from witnesses had alleged Bashir was the "emir" of the organisation and had blessed a campaign of bombings in 2000 to bring down the Indonesian Government.

Prosecutors argued that a series of Christmas Eve church bombings, which left 19 dead, a bombing at Jakarta's Atrium Mall in 2001, and a plot approved by Bashir to kill the then vice- president Megawati Sukarnoputri were acts of treason.

Judges spent nearly half an hour detailing what had been thought to be the most damaging testimony against Bashir which was given via video link from Singapore by the JI informer Faiz Abul Bakar Basana, who remains in detention there. He had earlier told the court he had gone to Solo in Central Java four times to meet Bashir and discuss JI business.

The judges repeated Basana's evidence that his second visit there was to "seek the defendant's blessing" for the Christmas bombing campaign, while the next visit was to discuss the replacement by Hambali, then JI's most senior operational figure. Basana said the idea to kill Ms Megawati was Bashir's. Bashir had also discussed a plan called "Operation C" which involved attacking US targets in Singapore, Basana told the court.

Last night, the Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, welcomed the conviction, "but I think there will be some controversy about the shortness of the sentence. We were expecting something more like 10 or 12 years". He said he believed Bashir was the spiritual leader of JI despite the judges finding otherwise. He believed many Bali bombing victims would be disappointed by the shortness of the sentence. Mr Downer called it a small step towards winning the fight against terrorism, which would be a long battle.

2004 elections

KPU asked to delay registration dateline

Jakarta Post - September 2, 2003

A'an Suryana and Mochammad N. Kurniawan, Jakarta -- A senior government official has asked the General Election Commission (KPU) to postpone its October 9 deadline for political parties to register for the 2004 general elections.

Ramly Hutabarat, a senior member of political party verification at the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, said the ministry was extremely busy attempting to screen 84 parties and would only be able to announce the results on October 13 at the latest. "We have asked that the deadline be extended by 10 days till October 20," said Ramly in Jakarta on Monday.

Once a party passes the screening process, it will only need to register at the KPU to take part in the elections scheduled for April next year. Eighteen parties have been screened by the ministry, nine each in the first and second phases, taking three-weeks each.

They are the Justice and Prosperity Party (PK Sejahtera); Democratic Catholic Party (PKD), Indonesian Union Party (PSI), Justice and Unity Party of Indonesia (PKP Indonesia), Crescent Star Party (PBB), the Crescent Party of Reform (PBR), the Love the Nation Democratic Party (PDKB), the National Concern Party (PKPB), the Love the Nation Peace Promoter Party (PPDKB), Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), Golkar and National Mandate Party (PAN), New Indonesia Party (PIB), Nation Unifying Party (PPB), Prosperity and Peace (PDS), Indonesian Marhaenist National Party (PNIM), Democrat Party (PD) and Nationality and United National Democrat Party (PPDK) These parties need only one more step to be eligible for the election.

The ministry has begun screening the last 66 parties in the third and last phase. As of Monday, four of the 66 parties had passed preliminary screening, namely the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Independence Bull National Party (PNBK), the Indonesian National Unifying Party (PMNI) and the Pancasila Patriot Party (PPP). It was hoped all information would be collected by September 27.

The preliminary screening ascertains whether the political parties have met requirements at the central board level, including whether parties possess secretariats and have valid organizational structures. The screening normally starts at the central board level, and is followed by further screening in the parties' branches and chapters in the regions.

Meanwhile, KPU chairman Ramlan Surbakti said its decision to set the first round of the presidential election on July 5, 2004 and the second round on September 20, 2004 was the best choice. Ramlan said Monday that it was unable to hold the second round before September 20 as demanded by the head of the Constitutional Court, Jimly Asshidiqie.

The KPU is slated to announce the final results of presidential election on October 5. The president will be installed on October 20 next year.

Jimly said the 15-day period was too short a time as the court needed time to settle any legal disputes that may emerge from the presidential election.

Ramlan said the schedule was difficult to change. "It takes time to print and distribute ballot papers in the countries' 32 provinces, so we need time between the first and second rounds of the presidential election." Ramlan said the KPU would meet with politicians and the Constitutional Court soon to explain its decision.

Hubby pulling the strings to get Mega re-elected

Straits Times - September 2, 2003

Derwin Pereira, Jakarta -- Behind every man is a powerful woman, or so runs an old cliche. In the corridors of Indonesia's presidential palace, the roles have been reversed. President Megawati Sukarnoputri's husband Taufik Kiemas is exerting his influence in politics to get his wife re-elected next year and bolster his own standing within the Indonesian Democratic Party -- Struggle (PDI-P) that he is being tipped to lead.

Insiders say that his manoeuvring does not have the full support of Ms Megawati. But the business tycoon, who was instrumental in her rise to power two years ago, is undeterred. With or without her backing, he has been removing obstacles that could block her chances next year.

A palace source told The Straits Times: "Mega has her own views on things but she does not articulate them as forcefully. Taufik is playing the role as a 'shadow president', making sure that Mega stays on track." With elections looming, his focus has been to forge political alliances with parties that can make up the numbers to give Ms Megawati a majority in a direct presidential poll. Top on his list of targets is Golkar chairman Akbar Tandjung.

He has been holding meetings with Mr Akbar to get the backing of the wily politician and his party's grassroots reach and well- oiled infrastructure. In return, Mr Akbar was offered a chance to join the presidential ticket as Ms Megawati's No. 2.

Both Mr Taufik and the president see Golkar as the natural ally for the PDI-P. Both parties represent the political mainstream and have the most acceptable ideological platform -- secular nationalism -- for the majority of Indonesians. But they differ in their choice of Golkar candidates. Ms Megawati is more inclined towards Mr Jusuf Kalla, who is the Coordinating Minister for Welfare.

On balance, Mr Taufik's instincts might be sharper given that the Golkar leader controls more than 70 per cent of party branches. But Golkar is not the only party he is cultivating. He is also reaching out to Indonesia's largest Muslim group, the 35-million-strong Nadhlatul Ulama.

And then, within the PDI-P, he has been weeding out opponents of the president. He has been instrumental in getting Ms Megawati to axe at least 20 members from provincial party branches. He is also in the running to head the PDI-P. But there are at least three other contenders including the president's youngest brother Guruh Sukarnoputra, who is believed to be Ms Megawati's choice.

If his track record in politics over the past two years is any guide, Mr Taufik looks set to play a bigger role.

Local & community issues

Hundreds rally against dam roject

Jakarta Post - September 5, 2003

Bandung-More than 400 people from Sumedang regency, West Java, protested at the provincial governor's office in Bandung on Thursday against the government's revived plan to build the Jatigede dam.

The protesters, grouped in the Jatigede People's Communication Forum (FKRJ), were among those to be affected by the project, which was initiated in 1985.

They opposed the plan, saying it would harm their futures and create social problems.

"We suggest that the project be relocated to the Beureumbeungeut area in Cipasang village, Cibugel subdistrict, Sumedang, because the area is less populated and barren," said FKRJ member Asep Suryana.

Moreover, he said the compensation for communal land, where the Jatigede dam was to be built, should have been set at between Rp 30,000 (US$3.50) and Rp 70,000 per square meter in 1985, but land owners received only Rp 6,800 to Rp 8,400 per square meter.

Meanwhile, West Java Governor Danny Setiawan said on Thursday that he would receive five ministers on Friday to discuss the dam project, which would entail the eviction of more than 7,000 families from Jatigede.

Focus on Jakarta

Jakarta water table has dropped

Jakarta Post - September 3, 2003

Jakarta -- The water table in Jakarta has dropped by two meters due to the severe drought in Java this year, threatening water supplies to nearly half of Jakarta's 8.6 million population, a Cabinet minister says.

State Minister of the Environment Nabiel Makarim said on Tuesday that the worst examples had occurred along Jl. Daan Mogot, West Jakarta, and large parts of North Jakarta.

"Areas along Jl. Daan Mogot and Jelambar, West Jakarta, as well as Kapuk, Sunter and Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta, have suffered the worst drop in the water table," Nabiel was quoted by Antara as saying at a hearing with House of Representatives (DPR) Commission VIII for the environment.

According to Nabiel, the drop in the water table would affect 46 percent of Jakarta residents who relied on both shallow and deep groundwater as their water source.

This means people relying on artesian wells for their water supply will have to dig deeper if they want clean underground water.

Based on the latest census carried out by the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) in 2003, about 8.6 million people live in Jakarta.

A severe drought has hit Indonesia south of the equator this year, including Java, with hardly any rain falling between May and August. Water levels at a number of important reservoirs in Java are perilously close to a critical level that would leave reservoirs unable to supply water to hydropower plants or tap water companies, or meet demands for irrigation.

Some areas have even suffered from a severe water shortage, and crop failure has caused Indonesia to lose 600,000 tons of rice production.

Power outages are also likely if the severe drought continues until October.

Rain has indeed fallen intermittently in several areas of Java, but the Meteorology and Geophysics Agency (BMG) warned that the rain was localized and not an indication that the rainy season was about to begin.

BMG also said widespread environmental destruction in the country, including uncontrolled logging and development of open land, had exacerbated this year's drought, believed to be the second-worst since the 1997 prolonged dry season caused by the El Ni$o phenomenon.

Nabiel went on to say that lack of water supply in Jakarta had caused most areas in the city to experience a water crisis, particularly in South Jakarta, southern parts of East Jakarta and southern parts of West Jakarta.

"Some water problems in Jakarta would appear to be a battle for access to groundwater between residents and industry, as well as being a contributory factor to an increase in fires," he said.

He added that electricity supplies to Jakarta might soon reach critical levels; thus, alternating power blackouts might become inevitable.

In the event of alternating power outages, water would have to be supplied via tanker trucks, he added.

At such a time, people would have to reduce electricity consumption, including the use of water pumps, Nabiel said.

BMG has predicted that the rainy season will start in November in Jakarta, although it may begin earlier in some parts of Java.

'Greedy officials ignore the poor'

Jakarta Post - September 2, 2003

Leo Wahyudi S -- Governor Sutiyoso's idea to plate the Arjuna Wijaya statue in bronze, along with his plans to beautify the city -- by placing statues of heroes on streets named after them -- have incited various responses. Most people are incredulous that the project will cost Rp 4 billion (US$470,588). The Jakarta Post talks with them.

Suleman, 40, is a newspaper boy on Jl. Medan Merdeka Barat, Central Jakarta. He lives in Kota Bambu, West Jakarta, with his wife and three children: I read about the statue a few days ago in the newspaper. I also read about the plan to erect more statues.

I can't see the importance of these projects. What's the purpose? We already have the National Monument (Monas).

It's really insulting that this will cost billions of rupiah. It's just a chance for officials to cheat. But we can't do anything even if we are against the project ...

The administration should open their eyes to the miserable lives of the poor. It's hard for me to earn money -- even thousands of rupiah a day.

Avi, not her real name, 29, works at a private company in South Jakarta. She lives in Cakung, East Jakarta, with her family: I can't find the words to comment on the administration's plans.

Although the project will have a sponsor, such a project is susceptible to irregularities, moreover it will cost billions of rupiah.

I believe the officials -- both from the administration and the City Council -- are looking after their own interests. They are greedy and ignore the fate of the poor.

I am afraid to say, I wish the terrorists had targeted the selfish councillors and officials, instead of common people. I'm sick of them.

Sukir, 60, is a street food vendor in Monas Park, Central Jakarta. He lives in Pancoran, South Jakarta, with his wife and five children: I can't believe that the administration will spend so much money on one statue. Its claim -- to side with the poor -- is rubbish! The governor and other officials are b -- -ards. They want to kill poor people, while they let corruptors steal money without penalty.

What's the benefit of funding statues? We don't need that at all! If only the officials had brains. They could have empowered street vendors in the city, or relocated them to avoid eviction by the Public Order Office.

The money could have provided soft loans to small-scale businesspeople.

Those ideas are meaningful to the poor. If implemented they would help us survive.

Squatters protest Mayor Sarimun

Jakarta Post - September 2, 2003

Jakarta -- Hundreds of squatters staged a rally in front of West Jakarta Mayoralty on Monday, protesting Mayor Sarimun Hadisaputra for issuing an eviction order against them.

The squatters claim the owner of the one-hectare plot next to Mal Taman Anggrek shopping center, Munawar Salbini, permitted them to occupy and cultivate the land.

The mayor, upon the request of private firms PT Sinar Slipi Sejahtera, PT Bank Dewa Rudji and PT Surya Dewata, which have claimed the land, has issued three eviction orders, urging the squatters to vacate the plot.

The squatters have vowed not to leave the land and have ignored the mayor's order, because they were there by permission of the landowner, city news portal beritajakarta.com reported.

Munawar and the private firms have been embroiled in a legal dispute over the land, but it is unclear whether the issue has been settled.

Health & education

East Java plans to offer free education

Jakarta Post - September 3, 2003

Nugroho and Ainur R. Sophiaan, Surabaya -- The East Java administration plans to promote free education for the first nine years of school in the country's second most populated province next year by providing subsidies for more than five million students of elementary and junior high schools.

East Java Governor Imam Utomo said on Tuesday his administration would allocate Rp 1.1 trillion (US$132 billion) from the 2004 provincial and regental budgets to finance the education program.

The central government will provide assistance to be earmarked from its budget for national education, he added. "We will ask the central government for the funds. If there is any remaining finances, we will use it for other [educational] activities," Utomo said.

The governor said the province had at least 5,674,872 elementary and junior high school students, including private ones, who are entitled to the subsidies. The would-be recipients would comprise 4,187,677 elementary school students and 1,487,197 those from junior high schools. "Therefore, we need Rp 1,110 trillion [to subsidize them]," Utomo said.

Under the program scheduled to start in 2004, the elementary school students would receive Rp 15,000 each per month, and junior high school students would be given Rp 20,000 each per month. In East Java, private and state schools charge elementary school students Rp 15,000 in monthly tuition fees on average, while junior high school students are generally charged around Rp 20,000.

"The program will be carried out in 2004. Now we are gathering data on the number of students. It would be carried out directly in their classes in every school in order to avoid excluding any potential recipients," Utomo said.

He said the Rp 1 trillion fund was nowhere near as much as the Rp 41 trillion that East Java, a province of around 36.2 million people, provided annually to the central government in taxes. The central government in turn returns only Rp 9.5 trillion of the amount. That is why there should be no reason for the central government not to help finance the program, Utomo added.

On Tuesday, the newly reelected governor chaired a meeting with all the East Java regents at the Grahadi Hall in Surabaya to discuss the preparations for implementation of the free education program.

To support the program, the local government approved the establishment of the East Java Education Council chaired by Dhaniel M. Rosyid, a professor from the Surabaya Institute of Technology (ITS). Marsetio Donosaputro, another professor from the same university, was appointed as chairman of the council's supervisory board.

Daniel said the implementation of the program should be tightly monitored to prevent or reduce possible cases of manipulation and irregularities. "We should prevent this gesture of goodwill being misused by irresponsible people," he added.

He said the free education program would be effective to fight poverty and illiteracy in East Java. "If the program proceeds smoothly, East Java will be free from dropouts by 2007," Daniel said.

Marsetio said that not only parents but also teachers should support the mandatory nine-year education program. "Without the involvement of teachers, the program will be useless."

Armed forces/police

Jakarta's army tightens grip on Aceh, Papua

Jakarta Post - September 6, 2003

Robert Go, Jakarta -- Indonesia's military (TNI) showed signs this week of tightening its hold on Aceh and Papua, two resource-rich regions at either ends of the sprawling archipelago that have voiced separatist sentiments and seen much violence in recent years.

On Thursday, military chief General Endriartono Sutarto said he would immediately dispatch four fresh battalions, or 2,000 troops, to Papua. The move followed violent anti-government protests in Papua that have killed five in the past two weeks.

At the western end of the country, despite claims that soldiers have killed more than 800 Aceh rebels and captured hundreds more in the past 3 1/2 months, top officials said there was no plan to reduce the size of the Indonesian forces there. The TNI currently has 35,000 soldiers, while the police have around 14,000 men serving in Aceh.

Instead, Security Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said there was a possibility the government might even give the military more cash for its Aceh campaign. He said: "From our point of view, there is no plan yet to reduce our forces in Aceh. We are still mulling over that operation's status, including whether or not we need to intensify activities."

General Endriartono also hinted that soldiers may continue operations in the province until April, well beyond the initial decree of six months that will end in November.

The military, which faded into the background slightly after the downfall of former president Suharto, has regained some lustre since President Megawati Sukarnoputri took office in mid-2001. Since then, it has secured new weapons and engaged in a controversial campaign in Aceh.

Critics argue that the military is not merely establishing peace or defending the country's interests in those two regions. It may actually be fighting an altogether different battle, one where financial resources are at stake, they say.

The TNI allegedly has vast business interests in both regions. A Jakarta-based foreign observer said that given the military's meagre budget, it needed additional sources of income to pay, house, feed and arm its soldiers adequately, and ensure that its weaponry was upgraded from time to time. The military, he said, either protects or outright owns shares in mining and logging projects throughout the country, and offers security services to big companies operating in both Aceh and Papua.

Dr Benny Giay, an activist with Papuan human-rights group Elsham, said there was a possibility that the military had directed provocateurs in Mimika regency last month to create disturbances and justify the deployment of more troops. He argued: "Many Papuans fear the military is here to rob our natural resources and run businesses."

Other observers said as long as the military was preoccupied with running side businesses, it would never become a professional force. The larger question now is how Indonesia's military is going to move away from Suharto-era-style crackdowns.

The foreign observer said: "The system is still feudalistic. Officers maintain patronage systems with their subordinates." As long as that remained, the expert said, Indonesia's military was still a long way from real reforms.

International relations

Hamzah's attack on US raises fears of split

Sydney Morning Herald - September 5, 2003

Matthew Moore, Jakarta -- Indonesia's Vice-President, Hamzah Haz, has accused the US of being the "king of terrorists" in a scathing attack that echoed the language of many of the Bali bombers.

In remarks that may signal a split in the Indonesian Government's campaign against terrorist groups, Mr Hamzah ridiculed suggestions Indonesia had a serious terrorist problem.

Less than a day after an Indonesian court cleared the Muslim cleric, Abu Bakar Bashir, of heading the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiah, Mr Hamzah went to an Islamic boarding school in Central Java where he launched his assault.

"Who is the real terrorist? It is the United States for they have attacked Iraq. In fact they are the king of terrorists," Mr Hamzah, head of the Islamic-based United Development Party, said in the town of Brebes.

"As if Indonesia is the hotbed of terrorists and [home of] Jemaah Islamiah network -- they [the US] have accused us of aiding terrorists," the official Antara news agency quoted him as saying. "We are being cornered and Islam is being scrutinised."

Mr Hamzah's remarks appear to show he will seek support from hardline Muslims in the lead-up to next year's election. If that is the case, Indonesia's campaign against terrorist groups could become entangled in the snowballing election campaign.

Riza Sihbudi, a political analyst at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, told the Detik news service that Mr Hamzah seemed to be chasing votes. "He should not have spoken like that as he is the Vice-President," he said.

A spokesman for the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, Marty Natalegawa, declined to elaborate on Mr Hamzah's remarks. "The world can interpret them in any way they wish," he said. "We are not going to add or subtract to what Hamzah Haz has said. It speaks for itself, the view that he has expressed." Asked whether Indonesia's position on terrorism was changing, he said: "Absolutely not." But he was sensitive to the difficulties the remarks could cause. "Our concern is that obviously we don't wish this to be a complicating factor in our relations with a friendly government," he said.

Yesterday Mr Hamzah appeared to back away from his earlier statements: "We are not anti-America. In fact, we have to work together," Agence France-Presse quoted him as saying. But Indonesia "has to pay a very steep price" for allegations that Jemaah Islamiah had infiltrated Indonesia, he said. He later refused to take questions from journalists before attending a cabinet meeting.

Before the Bali bombings, Mr Hamzah was criticised for publicly associating with several of Indonesia's more hardline Islamic leaders, including Bashir.

In the fallout from the Bali attacks, he severed those connections as the Government campaigned to discredit and break up the JI group blamed for a host of bombings in South-East Asia. But after Bashir's acquittal on all the serious charges on Tuesday Mr Hamzah may have decided to renew some links.

Military ties

Training unwanted interference transition to democracy

ASAP protest letter - September 2, 2003

The Australian government's support for closer military ties with the Indonesian armed forces (TNI), including the Kopassus special forces, is a discredited form of interference in Indonesian politics and society, according to a number of non-government organisations.

By restarting cooperation with Kopassus, the Howard government is helping drag Indonesia back to the past; it is interfering in Indonesian politics on the side of the most militaristic and anti-democratic groups. It is helping Jakarta to defeat the movements for genuine democracy and social justice, begun with the overthrow of Suharto in 1998.

Military ties were scaled back following the post-ballot carnage in East Timor in 1999 by the TNI and its militia proxies. US military ties were cut back, and restrictions placed on the sale of military hardware to Indonesia by the US, Britain and some European countries. Low-level Indonesian officer training continued in Australia, with joint military exercises involving US forces taking place over the last few years.

The Howard government's pretext of "fighting terrorism" has conveniently replaced the old, and now thoroughly discredited, justification of training Indonesian troops to improve the TNI's human rights record. As former Labor foreign minister Gareth Evans himself stated last year: "I am one of those who has to acknowledge, as Australia's foreign minister at the time, that many of our earlier training efforts helped only to produce more professional human rights abusers".

However, "fighting terrorism" is an equally false pretext. Aiding and abetting Kopassus will bolster the most terroristic elements in Indonesian society, against the vast majority of Indonesian people who rejected the "New Order" regime of Suharto and deeply distrust the military. Already, the Howard government's unqualified support for a "military solution" in Aceh and West Papua has shown its determination to back those political forces in Indonesia resisting change towards full democracy.

Since the beginning of 2003, the National Human Rights Commission and other human rights organisations, prominent intellectuals and researchers, and some of Indonesia's most prominent writers and artists, have called on the Megawati government to halt military operations in Aceh. There have been public meetings, rallies, prayer vigils and peace concerts all reflecting such views.

President Megawati, backed by the TNI, along with Suharto's old party Golkar and the conservative Islamic party that Suharto created, the United Development Party, do not represent the democratic future of Indonesia. The Indonesian Defence White Paper, published earlier this year, argues that Indonesia faces no external threat. It can thus be fairly assumed that any military assistance from the West will be used against the peoples of the Indonesian archipelago.

Terrorism in Indonesia, and elsewhere, can only really be tackled by reducing the inequalities between the impoverished majority and a tiny elite, and by ending the reliance on the old Suharto methods of violence, repression, and intrigues by the military and intelligence agencies -- what Indonesians call the "security approach".

Canberra must end its "special relationship" with the Indonesian elite. It should build one with the democratic forces, including non-government organisations, across Indonesia.

Ending all military ties would send a clear message that Australia does not support this militaristic policy which is unlikely to solve the complex range of issues currently facing the peoples of Indonesia.

Kopassus push for training pact

The Australian - September 1, 2003

John Kerin -- Indonesia's notorious Kopassus special forces soldiers are eager to resume counter-terrorism training with the Australian military and do not understand lingering concern about their alleged brutality or links to terrorist groups, a parliamentary inquiry has heard.

However, some resentment remained within Kopassus over Australia cutting ties with it six years ago, Defence Department deputy secretary Shane Carmody told the inquiry. This was related to the unit losing valuable training opportunities rather than Australia's concerns about Kopassus's human-rights record.

"At the special forces level, certainly they [Kopassus] have felt quite keenly that we have not worked with them since 1997, and they have seen a diminution of their skills," Mr Carmody, who returned recently from a visit to Indonesia, told the inquiry into Australia's relationship with Indonesia. "[But] the soldiers are saying, 'We don't know what all the fuss is about, let's get on with it' [resuming ties]."

The federal Government has been criticised over plans to begin limited exercises with Kopassus to deal with hostage and hijack situations in response to a heightened threat to Australians from terrorism in the archipelago. Australia cut its ties with Kopassus after the special forces were implicated in killing political activists in the dying days of former president Suharto's regime. Kopassus-trained militia also fired on and wounded Australian soldiers in the lead-up to East Timor's independence in 1999. Elements of Kopassus are also suspected of training terrorist groups such as Laskar Jihad.

Other senior Australian military officials, including army chief Peter Leahy and special forces chief Duncan Lewis, have also visited Indonesia since June in a bid to smooth the way for a resumption of ties. Mr Carmody said renewing ties was crucial because "if something happened tomorrow it would be inappropriate for our special forces and the Indonesian special forces to meet for the first time in a hangar five minutes before the assault". "Our view is we need to try and find ways to build a very narrow relationship in [counter-terrorism]," he said. A defence submission to the inquiry has suggested that lingering misunderstandings over Australia's 1999 East Timor intervention are hampering efforts to resume defence ties between the two countries.

But Opposition foreign affairs spokesman Kevin Rudd, who has just returned from Indonesia, said Australia had an alternative to working with Kopassus. He said the US Government, which had concerns about Kopassus's involvement in the killing of US citizens in Papua last year, was building a counter-terrorism capacity within the Indonesian national police. He said it was devoting $45 million to developing a 300-strong counter-terrorism unit within the police force. "The [Australian Federal Police] has developed an excellent relationship with the Indonesian national police and it is the police that Australia should also be developing its counter-terrorism ties with," he said.

Economy & investment

Stock index hits fresh three-year high

Jakarta Post - September 5, 2003

Dadan Wijaksana, Jakarta-The Jakarta Composite Index surged on Thursday to its highest level in more than three years as foreign funds continued flowing into the bourse.

Led by continued heavy buying of blue chips shares, the index closed at 575.19 points, around 3 percent higher than the previous day's closing.

The index also recorded a multi-month high of Rp 1.5 trillion (US$176.78 million) in daily trading value, which dealers attributed the surge in foreign fund inflows.

"Just like on Wednesday, heavy buying by foreigners of blue chips shares was the reason for this," a dealer with a local bank said, adding that JP Morgan Securities and ING Securities were among the busiest traders of the day.

The hectic buying started on Wednesday, when trading value jumped to Rp 1.3 trillion from its normal daily range of Rp 300 to Rp 400 billion. This means that in the past two days alone, the index has risen by around 7 percent, and since the start of the year by 30 percent.

The dealer said that the capital inflows had to be seen in the light of the country's macroeconomic performance, notably the declining trend in Bank Indonesia's benchmark one-month SBI interest rate.

"The stable macroeconomic picture has helped boost foreign investors' confidence in Indonesia's economy," he said, adding that the falling SBI interest rate had made the stock market more attractive for portfolio investment, especially for those seeking quicker and higher returns.

The central bank slashed its rate to an historic low of 8.83 percent this week, down from 8.91 percent the previous week, on the back of continued easing in inflation. Many have predicted inflation will be only between 5 percent and 6 percent by the end of the year.

The relatively calm political and economic situation following the recent bombing at a Jakarta hotel had also supported foreign investor confidence, he added.

Meanwhile, thanks to the capital inflows, the rupiah remained stable despite dollar demand from importers, which had put the local unit under pressure over the past few days. The dollar closed on Thursday at Rp 8,480, unchanged from its close the day earlier.

Dollar demand from importers pushed the rupiah down to 8,495 per dollar at midday, but the flow of funds into the stock market helped the local currency regain ground.

Analysts have said that the planned Rp 5 trillion bond issue next week would likely keep the capital inflows going, ensuring an even brighter outlook for the rupiah.

Indonesian textile giant's woes

Asia Times - September 4, 2003

Bill Guerin, Jakarta -- Russian writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky said "there is no subject so old that something new cannot be said about it". And so it is with the long-running saga of Indonesia's serial crony conglomerates. Freeing the legacy of a huge corporate debt overhang by bailing out recalcitrant debtors continues to cost the country dearly.

The latest cry for help comes from textiles and engineering giant Texmaco, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency's (IBRA's) biggest debtor. Texmaco has defaulted for the second time in four months on payments agreed under what was Indonesia's biggest-ever corporate debt workout two years ago.

A major scandal involving Texmaco was the first test case in former president Abdurrahman Wahid's new administration. Spanning, as it did, 15 months of his watch in 1999-2000, it is a prime example of how the battle against cronyism, collusion and corruption was lost in Indonesia from the outset. The current dilemma over what to do about Texmaco underscores how successive administrations have failed to make hard economic decisions, especially those affecting the well connected.

The story began just before the financial crisis hit the country in 1997, when Texmaco borrowed heavily to finance its expansion in textile-related engineering endeavors. With the rupiah's depreciation during the crisis, the company's debt, much of it in US dollars, ballooned.

The government then injected trillions of rupiah to keep the company afloat and IBRA, the largest creditor in Indonesia, took over Texmaco's debts, which totaled Rp29.09 trillion (US$3.4 billion at the current exchange rate) from several banks, mainly the state-run Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI).

By 2001 Texmaco still owed IBRA 17.3 trillion rupiah. The restructuring signed in May 2001 allowed IBRA monitors access only to the holding company, not to the productive units where all the cash was being generated.

Though Texmaco had pledged to hand over all its assets to a new holding company under IBRA, Marimutu Sinivasan, the charismatic founder of the group, retained control and the ability to call the shots. By April this year IBRA had to give Texmaco three months to improve its performance after it failed to honor a $25 million letter of credit due to BNI, which had lent the money to the holding company with IBRA's guarantee.

The letter of credit had been taken out by Texmaco's publicly listed textile company, PT Polysindo Perkasa, but in what is almost standard operating procedure for indebted Indonesian companies, the funds had been diverted into Texmaco's struggling engineering unit.

After an emergency meeting of IBRA, BNI, Texmaco and Finance Sector Policy Committee representatives, IBRA announced that it would pay the outstanding $29 million to BNI. IBRA, BNI and Texmaco then inked an agreement that they promised would improve Texmaco's overall performance so that it could pay its debts.

Control over cash flows was to be monitored by IBRA-watchers from the inside, and an escrow account would be opened to receive income from sales and control its use. IBRA agreed that Texmaco would get the letter of credit to avoid BNI calling in its $100 million debt and forcing a shutdown of the group's operations.

State-Owned Enterprises Minister Laksamana Sukardi, the de facto head of IBRA, wanted the bank to act as a bank and take firm action. "Every kind of loan involves risks and the ones who take on the risks are the banks," he said, though Sinivasan had successfully persuaded IBRA to take a different stance.

The results are plain to see. Texmaco missed an interest payment of Rp139 billion ($16.5 million) due last month on an exchangeable bond coupon, sparking the current crisis.

There is no love lost between Sinivasan, an Indonesian national of Indian origin, and Sukardi. in November 1999, Sukardi, who held the same state enterprises portfolio under then-president Abdurrahman Wahid, testified to the House of Representatives that former president Suharto and Texmaco had engaged in "high-level collusion and conspiracy".

"I am a businessman. I have around 45,000 employees to take care of. If I didn't have anything to do like Laksamana, then I might sue him," Sinivasan retorted.

In his dealings with Suharto, Sinivasan cleverly played on themes that would be music to the old man's ears, in the same way as the latter's protege, B J Habibie, had always been able to play the right tunes for his wild and grandiose plans for the country's embryo aircraft industry, now in danger of collapse (see Garuda Indonesia left to the wolves, August 29).

Writing to Suharto on December 29, 1997, Sinivasan reminded the president that Texmaco had given work to 40,000 employees, and had blessed the nation with petrochemical and heavy engineering plants. He asked Suharto to give Texmaco a special facility for 100 percent pre-shipment finance outside of the legal lending limits. Within two months a total of $754 million and Rp1.9 trillion of government money was bestowed on Texmaco in loans from BNI and another state bank, BRI, as instructed by the central bank, forced to obey instructions from Suharto.

The bulk of the money was used to repay the company's short-term debts to foreign lenders and not for pre-shipment finance to support exports, as requested in the letter to Suharto.

The scene had been set to symbolize the struggle between the country's future and its past -- dealing firmly with Texmaco would represent a step forward, away from the corrupt legacy of Suharto's rule.

The response from several legislators to the exposure of a state bank being forced by a letter from Suharto to extend credit to the conglomerate was an ominous sign of the resistance ahead. Many argued that Texmaco should be seen as a "national asset". Like Jakarta's elite, they were fond of turning normal legal precepts on their head, demanding that those accused of any misdeeds were viewed as innocent until proven guilty. Sinivasan complained publicly that the public had a "wrong perception" of the facts in the case.

"Texmaco should be considered a national asset and is entitled to assistance in times of crisis," said one PDI-P legislator. It was a stance echoed by the chairman of House Commission IX, who concluded that "the Texmaco loans did not amount to preferential treatment because the facility was available to other export- oriented companies".

True, perhaps, but there rested the case for the defense. Continued failings of the legal system were drawing fire from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which noted at the time that "a number of cases in both the commercial courts and the Supreme Court have been decided against creditors and in favor of large debtors on grounds that ... cannot be supported by the underlying law".

Moreover, the Fund said, "the widespread perception ... is that many of the controversial rulings have been the result of unlawful external influences on the court". It need not have worried about the Texmaco scandal. There was no attempt to bring the case to court. Wahid quickly kowtowed to the "national asset" swan song and the "hands off Texmaco" refrain from the parliament. The key argument was the social consequences posed if this "state asset" went belly-up, throwing thousands of Indonesians out of work.

Ingenious indeed, but far from true. Texmaco is not a state asset, although it could, of course, be taken over by the state. It is a private company, very successful in what it does, and continually claiming that its assets are worth more than its outstanding loans.

The saving grace for taxpayers was to be the Shareholders Obligation Resolution scheme, by which cooperative debtors could escape criminal prosecution for misuse of state funds, but at least the country would get some sort of return on its forced investment in these private individuals and their companies.

Unfortunately the majority of indebted tycoons, including Sinivasan, have paid little attention to it, preferring to lobby IBRA and seek support in the corridors of power to avoid the remote possibility of being taken to court.

IBRA has hinted that it might even take Texmaco over, lock, stock and barrel. It is difficult, however, to see what benefits this would bring. The agency, due to wind up early next year, needs to sell almost $5 billion of the country's strategic assets, but an earlier auction of Texmaco assets failed to reach the floor price, despite one bidder being backed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's son Mirzan.

Texmaco's woes have reached out to other countries in the region. Bangkok Bank this year filed a bankruptcy suit against Polysindo Eka Perkasa, Texmaco's publicly listed textile company, over $473,500 of debt.

The Texmaco chairman, Sinivasan's younger brother Manimaren, died in an apparent suicide when jumping from a highrise hotel in Jakarta on August 5. Maniraman was previously a member of the "Habibie Success Team" that was tasked with raising funds and maneuvering for Habibie's re-election. He was the earlier Baligate scandal treasurer of Suharto's political machine Golkar, and had been summoned a week before his death by a parliamentary working committee probing a counter-trade deal between Jakarta and Moscow for Suhkoi fighter jets and Mi-35 helicopters.

Sinivisan, now 65, has successfully charmed three presidents -- Suharto, Habibie and Wahid -- but it looks as if he may have drawn a blank with the current president, Megawati Sukarnoputri. His dealings with IBRA have been characterized by secrecy, but he looks certain now to be forced out of any remaining vestige of control of his corporate empire.

Timber companies close due to rampant levies and fees

Jakarta Post - September 2, 2003

Indra Harsaputra, Surabaya -- As many as 150 out of 250 timber and sawmill companies in East Java have closed down due to the increasing number of levies being imposed by some government institutions, an official said.

It was not immediately clear, however, how many employees were affected by the closure of the companies.

Hariono Arsudin, the executive secretary of the Indonesia Timber and Sawmill Business Association in East Java, confirmed that the ailing timber and sawmill companies could not afford to pay the various legal and illegal fees being imposed by state agencies.

"The levies are being imposed at a number of inspection gates for timber and wood products in each city," he told reporters on Monday.

Citing an example, Hariono said a company transporting timber from Tanjung Perak seaport in Surabaya to nearby Banyuwangi in the eastern part of East Java had to allocate a certain amount of money to pay legal and illegal levies in every regency the truck passed through.

"Such practices obviously hamper the performance of companies in this sector," Hariono said, adding that the situation had been worsened by a decline of up to 20 percent in the prices of wood products on international markets.

Currently, the prices of wood products ranged between US$500 and US$600 per square meter, compared to $700 dollar in previous months.

Hariono also complained about frequent police investigations into the illegal timber trade in the province, which led to firms being unable to deliver their products on time.

"The investigations sometimes take one month. In the end, the timber owner suffer financial losses," he explained.

Hariono asked the government to pay attention to the problem as it was affecting the growth of timber and wood product companies in East Java.

Inflation remains in check, August rate at 0.84%

Jakarta Post - September 2, 2003

Jakarta -- Inflation, as measured by the consumer price index (CPI), rose in August by 0.84 percent, bringing the rate for the first eight months of the year to 2.11 percent, the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) said on Monday.

BPS chairwoman Sudarti Soerbakti attributed the slight rise in inflation to the marginal increase in the prices of most basic commodities and services during the month.

The prices of food commodities rose by 0.15 percent in August, while the prices of housing, clothing and health care grew by 0.61 percent, 0.28 percent and 0.23 percent, respectively. Prices in the transportation and telecommunications sectors increased by 0.09 percent.

The education, recreation and sports sector recorded the largest price increase of 7.82 percent in August, largely the result of a rise in demand for education-related products ahead of the new school year.

Despite the increase, however, Indonesia is still keeping inflation in check.

The 2.11 percent inflation posted as of August is below the government's full-year target of 9 percent, as stated on the 2003 state budget.

Bank Indonesia has predicted inflation will reach 6 percent at the highest by the end of the year.

Theoretically, low inflation will strengthen the public's purchasing power. This will in turn boost domestic consumption, which has been the main driver of the country's economic growth over the past three years.

Also, a relatively mild inflation rate would pave the way for Bank Indonesia to continue cutting its benchmark interest rate, which is already at a historic low. This would push banks to lower their lending rates.

The interest rate on Bank Indonesia's one-month SBI promissory note currently stands at 8.91 percent, compared to about 13 percent early this year. Many analysts have said the SBI rate could fall even further.

With year-on-year inflation at just 6.38 percent in August, optimisms is high that Bank Indonesia will continue to cut its benchmark rate.

A low SBI rate is seen as beneficial for the economy. Not only will it save trillions of rupiah of state funds the government has to pay in servicing its domestic debts, it also will force banks to lower the interest rates of commercial lendings for the private sector.

According to one estimate, a 1 percent decline in the SBI rate could save up to Rp 2 trillion allocated to pay the interest of recapitalization bonds the government issued in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Most of the recap bonds' interest rates are tied to the movement of the SBI rate.

While predicting strong inflationary pressure in the period leading up to the end of the year, the BPS remains optimistic the inflation rate for the year will not exceed single digits. Prices normally go up at the end of the year due to a rise in demand for goods for religious celebrations.

Inflation Rates

Period	2001	2002	2003
1. August (on-month	-0.21%	0.29%	0.84%
2. January-August	7.48%	5.61%	2.11%
3. August (on-year)	12.23%	10.60%	6.38%