Aceh

Aceh war to last until separatists rooted out: military

Agence France Presse - July 27, 2003

War in Indonesia's Aceh province will last until separatist rebels are rooted out, the military said. "What is clear, the operation to crush Aceh separatist rebels is not limited to six months. As long as those rebels still exist, they will have to be rooted out," Aceh military commander Major General Endang Suwarya was quoted by the official Antara news agency as saying.

The government imposed martial law in Aceh and launched a major military campaign to crush the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on May 19 after peace talks broke down. The martial law was to be in force for six months but the government has said it can be extended.

The military said Saturday that troops had killed 531 rebels and seized 255 weapons since the operation began, while more than 1,277 rebels had been captured or surrendered.

An international thinktank, in a report Wednesday, said the military assault was only alienating Acehnese and fuelling support for GAM. The International Crisis Group also questioned military figures for rebel dead, saying there was no way to verify whether these were really guerrillas.

TNI chief offers apology to Acehnese people

Jakarta Post - July 26, 2003

Tiarma Siboro, Jakarta -- The Indonesian Military (TNI) chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto apologized to the Acehnese people on Friday for what he called the negative impacts of the war there.

Evaluating the two-month old military offensive in Aceh, Endriartono admitted that the campaign had brought unnecessary suffering for Acehnese civilians and promised to punish troops committing violations.

Endriartono, who was accompanied by TNI chief for General Affairs Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago, and TNI chief for Strategic Intelligence Lt. Gen. M. Luthvie, was particularly referring to the forced evacuations of tens of thousands of families which, according to him, had created unnecessary misery for civilians.

Placing Acehnese in makeshift refugee camps for the sake of military operation "has only prevented them [Acehnese] from continuing their normal life," he said. "I do understand that the people there should not suffer from the military operation in Aceh. With some considerations, we [TNI] forced people to leave their homes and take refuge while soldiers tried to root out the rebels who often try to blend with civilians in their villages.

"Even if the refugees stayed in the camps for three or four days only, they found their homes looted when they moved back to their homes. I ask for an apology for that. I don't want people to sacrifice that much," said Endriartono, admitting that certain military personnel were caught stealing the people's belongings.

He also vowed to prosecute soldiers who had allegedly been involved in the looting spree, stressing that "the presence of soldiers in Aceh is to protect civilians, and not to take advantage of their suffering." Endriartono, however, would not reveal how many soldiers had been questioned in the theft cases.

In an apparent bid to prevent the civilians from being caught in possible clashes between government troops and members of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), thousands of Acehnese were ordered to flee their homes and stay in makeshift camps since the government imposed martial law on May 19. Most of the refugees are from regencies identified as GAM strongholds such as Bireuen and Pidie.

But complaints have been raised as the camps provided by the government lacked proper facilities, including clean water and medical services. Some refugees were stricken with serious illnesses, but medical staffers failed to provide medicine for them.

The situation became even worse for them when they found out that their belongings, including refrigerators, vehicles and jewelry, had been stolen. Villagers from Juli district in Bireuen regency who once took refuge at Cot Gapu soccer field were also victims.

A court martial hearing began on Tuesday in the trial of two soldiers suspected of theft during raids on the home of a suspected separatist rebel. Military prosecutor Maj. Maryanto Bandji accused the pair of taking Rp 2 million (US$242) in cash and 2.6 grams of gold jewelry from a home in North Aceh. They face a maximum of seven years in jail.

Last Saturday a court martial convicted three soldiers for raping four women, with the heaviest sentence being just three years and six months. All of these soldiers were also discharged from military. In an earlier trial, a military court jailed six soldiers for between four and five months for beating up civilians at Lawang village in Bireuen during the operation.

"My operation in Aceh was aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the Acehnese, so I will not excuse such violations," Endriartono said.

US reporter's trial opens in Indonesia

San Francisco Chronicle - July 24, 2003

Marianne Kearney, Jakarta -- William Nessen, an American freelance journalist who spent weeks traveling with independence-seeking guerrillas in the restive northwestern province of Aceh, went on trial Wednesday on charges of immigration violations.

Nessen, 46, who has written for The Chronicle and other publications, was brought under heavy guard to court in the provincial capital of Banda Aceh. He faces a maximum penalty of six years for violating two immigration laws.

Fearing for his safety after being trapped behind rebel lines with Free Aceh Movement (GAM) fighters, Nessen surrendered to authorities June 24.

In court Wednesday, the prosecution presented Mohammad Nazar, who leads the Aceh Referendum Information Center, a lobbying group demanding an East Timor-style referendum for Aceh, and three detained GAM members in an attempt to establish links between Nessen and the rebels.

An immigration expert told the court that Nessen's journalist's visa was legal, but his activities in Aceh were not. Prosecutors say Nessen acted illegally by covering the guerrillas' side of the war. The hearing continues July 30.

Defense attorney Amir Syamsuddin said Nessen was being charged with violating his journalist visa for writing for more than one newspaper and failing to obtain a press card and permission to visit Aceh after martial law was declared at the outset of the military campaign in mid-May.

Syamsuddin said his client had a "strong defense," pointing out that Nessen had a valid journalist visa that doesn't limit him to working for one publication and had entered Aceh before the law was changed to require journalists to obtain special permission prior to traveling to the province. Nessen, who has been detained without bail at police headquarters in Banda Aceh, said he was not mistreated.

In a telephone interview Tuesday, Nessen said he was allowed to jog around the police parking lot under guard and make calls to his lawyer and the US Embassy in Jakarta. His days are spent in a small room reading books or chatting with his jailers.

The charges against Nessen come at a time when the Indonesian military is making it almost impossible for foreign reporters to cover the 26-year conflict.

Western diplomats in Jakarta say the military is trying to close off the province as they did in East Timor in 1999 to limit coverage of human rights violations. In a report on the two-month government offensive in Aceh, the International Crisis Group, a Brussels think tank that studies global conflicts, charged Wednesday that "virtually everything [the government] is doing now are tactics used before, to disastrous effect. They do not help end separatism; they generate more support for it."

'Mass graves excavation violates Criminal Code'

Jakarta Post - July 23, 2003

Muninggar Sri Saraswati, Jakarta -- Topo Susanto, a legal observer from the University of Indonesia's School of Law, said on Tuesday that despite the imposition of martial law, the martial law administration in Aceh did not have the power to impose martial law on civilians.

"Martial law applies to military personnel only while the Criminal Code applies to civilians, including alleged members of GAM," he said, referring to the separatist Free Aceh Movement.

Topo was asked to comment on the excavation of mass graves by military personnel in Aceh. Some experts have suggested that whatever evidence was found in these graves would now be inadmissible in a court of law. Under the prevailing law, only the police, in the presence of forensic experts, have the right to excavate a mass grave.

According to Topo, the martial law administration should also use the Criminal Law Procedures Code to prosecute police officers responsible to manage the investigation.

"Under martial law, the military administration is allowed to do some of the jobs of the police, such as making some arrests. But they must later hand the suspects over to the police for further investigation as required by the Criminal Law Procedures Code. The police should then continue the investigation," he explained.

Brig. Gen. Aryanto Sutadi, the director of the National Police's criminal investigation unit, declined to comment on the issue, only promising that the police would be present during any future excavations of mass graves in Aceh.

"Don't make a fuss about it. Don't let us blame each other. What is more important is that we will be present at any excavations in the future," he told reporters after a meeting with the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM).

He defended military officers who excavated the graves without the presence of police officers, saying the police "could not easily reach the sites, which were far from villages and dangerous. They are also officials. If they didn't excavate the sites, the villagers would," Aryanto claimed.

Komnas HAM, which had earlier announced the finding of three possible mass graves in Aceh, has consulted with the police about their excavation. M.M. Billah, who heads the commission's ad hoc team on Aceh, expected that the graves could be excavated next month.

According to the Criminal Law Procedures Code, the findings resulting from the excavation of a mass grave will only be legal and capable of being used in court proceedings if the excavation is conducted by both the police and forensic experts.

Komnas HAM has accused the military of destroying evidence by excavating the graves without the presence of police officers. Destroying evidence is a crime punishable by a jail term. Aryanto said that the police could only carry out an excavation with the permission of the martial law administration in Aceh.

Military losing 'hearts and minds' campaign in Aceh: ICG

Deutsche Presse Agentur - July 23, 2003

Jakarta -- Three months after placing Aceh province under martial law, Indonesia is losing its campaign to win the "hearts and minds" of the Acehnese people, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) warned on Wednesday.

"The message coming through clearly is that far from winning the hearts and minds, the government is managing to alienate Acehnese even further," said the ICG think tank in a six-page report on Indonesia's war-torn Aceh province released in Jakarta and Brussels.

Indonesia placed Aceh under martial law on May 19, scrapping a five-month-old ceasefire with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) which has been waging an independence struggle in the oil-rich region since December, 1976.

In tandem with launching a military offensive to crush the 5,300 strong GAM guerrilla force, the government also professed to be engaging in a campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Acehnese people with development programs and a respect for human rights.

ICG argued that its strategy, thus far, has been seriously flawed. "The government appears to have no clear objective in this war, no criteria for success, other than control of the territory and body counts, and no exit strategy," it said.

ICG warned that the TNI's recent efforts to win over the Acehnese seem doomed for failure. "Ultimately, the Indonesian government needs to design a strategy for Aceh that builds on the three pillars cited by [coordinating minister for political affairs] Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono: respect, justice and prosperity," concluded the ICG.

Aceh's war centres on resources

Reuters - July 23, 2003

Al Gedicks, who teaches sociology at the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse and is the author of "Resource Rebels: Native Challenges to Mining and Oil Corporations", says the internal conflict in Aceh is much more about politics and economics than religion. He accuses the United States of failing to do everything in its power to stop the Indonesian government crackdown on separatists that has lasted two months.

While world attention is focused on the postwar chaos in Iraq, Indonesia has launched an invasion of resource-rich Aceh (pronounced ah CHAY), in the country's biggest military assault since the 1975 invasion of East Timor.

Located on the tip of northern Sumatra, Aceh has a population of four million and is located at the western edge of the Indonesian archipelago, about 1,200 miles northwest of the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, on the island of Java.

In May this year, President Megawati Sukarnoputri put Aceh province under martial law and ordered over 40,000 soldiers and paramilitary police officers to put down the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), which comprises approximately 5,000 guerrillas who have been waging a war for independence in the dense, mountainous forests for the past 30 years.

Indonesia's military chief, General Endriatono Sutarto, has ordered his soldiers to hunt down the rebels and "destroy them to their roots." The problem with uprooting the guerrillas is that they enjoy the support of the vast majority of the Achenese. While the Achenese are mostly devout Muslims, this is not a war about religion, but about politics and economics.

According to a recent report from the Rand Corporation, a US Air Force think tank, "the perception is widespread that the Acehnese have not benefited from the province's enormous natural wealth and that industrial development projects have been introduced merely to provide employment opportunities to outsiders, especially from Java." "Given Indonesia's past abuses in Aceh," says Brad Adams, executive director of Human Rights Watch's Asia division, "there is tremendous potential for civilians to be targeted in the violence." The United Nations Children's Fund -- UNICEF -- warned of an impending crisis for the civilian population with the collapse of already weak health services.

In the first five days of the invasion, the United Nations reported the burning of more than 200 schools.

The counterinsurgency strategy being carried out by the Indonesian military is designed to separate the guerrillas from their popular base by forcibly moving villagers into secure compounds or so-called "strategic hamlets" reminiscent of the Vietnam War.

The government estimates that the number of internally displaced people in Aceh will increase to 100,000 from the current 5,000.

As in many other places in the world where ethnic minorities have revolted against state authority, there is an attempt to portray the separatists as terrorists who must be crushed miltarily. However, this characterisation flies in the face of the historical record.

The Acehnese resisted Dutch colonial domination during the 18th and 19th centuries and were at the forefront of Indonesia's fight for independence during the 1940s. When Indonesia declared independence in 1945, Aceh was promised autonomy but never received it.

One of the grievances fueling the rebellion in Aceh is the secret war waged against GAM in the 1990s under the Suharto military dictatorship, which lasted from 1965 to 1998.

From May 1990 to August 1998, Aceh was declared a Military Operations Area, during which the Indonesian armed forces carried out extensive counterinsurgency operations against the GAM. In this period, thousands of civilians were killed, disappeared or tortured. More than 12,000 Acehnese have been killed by Indonesian troops since the GAM demanded independence in 1976.

According to Carmel Budiardjo, the founder and director of TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign in London: "Human rights violations -- state terror -- and the failure to punish the perpetrators, have done more to make the Acehnese secessionists than their many other grievances." One of the first priorities for the invading soldiers was to secure the Exxon Mobil natural gas plant near the major city of Lhokseumawe, which exports to Japan and South Korea. The plant is one of the largest resource projects in Indonesia and generates more than $1 billion a year in government revenues that go directly to Jakarta.

The ongoing rebel attacks on oil and gas operations and staff led Exxon Mobil to temporarily shut down its operations in March 2001. When the plant reopened in July 2001, Indonesia sent more than 3,000 troops in what the country's top security minister called "the biggest security deployment in Indonesia ever to defend a vital installation." However, the people surrounding the plant complain that the Indonesian troops who have been hired by Exxon Mobil to provide security have systematically violated the human rights of Acehnese villagers.

In 2001, the US based International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) filed a lawsuit against Exxon Mobil on behalf of 11 villagers. It charges that the villagers were the victims of murder, torture and kidnapping by Indonesian soldiers paid to protect the plant. Exxon Mobil denies any involvement with the alleged abuses.

Although the insurgency in Aceh may be the most serious challenge to Indonesia's territorial integrity, it is not the only secessionist movement -- the example of East Timor's separation from Indonesia has encouraged ongoing separatist movements in economically strategic provinces such as Riau.

Riau produces half of Indonesia's oil and West Papua -- formerly known as Irian Jaya -- where the US based Freeport McMoRan mining company operates the world's largest and richest gold mine and provides about 15 percent of Indonesia's foreign exchange earnings.

While the United States does not believe the Aceh conflict can be solved by military force, the Bush administration is not willing to use its influence over the Indonesian military to demand a troop withdrawal and a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

This would not be the first time that the United States has looked the other way when US-trained and equipped Indonesian troops engaged in genocidal aggression.in the name of national security.

Aceh rebels kill woman in failed extortion bid

Jakarta Post - July 22, 2003

Jakarta -- Rebels trying to extort money from a family in Aceh have killed a woman and wounded her journalist husband and their daughter.

Three armed men visited Mr Idrus Jeumpa in Lhokseumawe town late on Sunday to demand that he pay 20 million rupiah in overdue "taxes" to the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), the Banda Aceh-based Serambi newspaper said.

When their demand was rejected, the rebels sprayed his house with bullets. They killed Mr Jeumpa's wife Saodah, an elementary school principal, and wounded him and their daughter Yusniar Oktavia, 31.

Mr Jeumpa's son Sumardi identified the attackers as GAM members. But GAM chief spokesman Sofyan Daud has denied responsibility.

The other side to Aceh's rebels

Asia Times - July 21, 2003

Kirsten E Schulze -- As Indonesia's military operation against the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakin Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) is entering its third month, it is becoming increasingly clear that an end to violence is not imminent. However, while casualties among soldiers, insurgents and above all civilians have steadily increased, there has been no significant shift in either Indonesian or international popular opinion. In fact, both have just become further entrenched -- at opposite poles.

Indonesian popular opinion swung behind its government early on amid a resurgence of nationalism. If anything, it has become more rather than less nationalistic over the past two months. Meanwhile international popular sympathy has remained largely, although not surprisingly, with the underdog.

GAM's struggle for independence has been cast as a fight for the noble ideal of liberty while Indonesia's efforts to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity have been widely condemned. But does GAM really warrant such romanticization? A closer look at GAM's ideology, its attitude toward the peace process, and its activities during the recent cessation of hostilities may suggest otherwise.

GAM was established in 1976 and has since been struggling for the liberation of Aceh from what it sees as Indonesian neo-colonial occupation. Yet while GAM leaders in exile have attempted to rewrite Acehnese history in pursuit of independence, the driving force on the ground is somewhat different. GAM guerrillas are motivated by parochial ethnic hatred. For them the war is about killing Javanese. As a result GAM forces have not only attacked the Indonesian security forces but have also systemically targeted, killed or forced out Javanese transmigrants.

Ethnic chauvinism is also evident in GAM's construction of Acehnese nationalism. While Indonesian identity is a civic nationalism which is inclusive, multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and multi-tribal, Acehnese nationalism is ethnic and exclusive. It is based upon the imposition of the identity of the Aceh tribe upon the other eight tribes in the region in order to create the Acehnese nation. This nation is defined by blood ties, tribalism, and Islam.

GAM's ethnic parochialism has been underscored by a narrow, hardline ideology that has defined the movement's attitude toward the peace process. GAM has made it very clear that it is neither interested in negotiating with the Indonesian government nor in a compromise solution. It sees the peace process as a way of internationalizing the conflict with the aim of forcing Indonesia to relinquish sovereignty under outside pressure. Thus it is not surprising that it was not interested in Jakarta's concession of special autonomy for Aceh and even actively worked to undermine its implementation by paralyzing the local administration through threat and intimidation.

In line with this attempt to internationalize the conflict, GAM's focus has been on ensuring that the venue for all of its meetings with the Indonesian government has been outside of Indonesia. It hailed the introduction of a foreign facilitator -- a Swiss-based non-governmental organization (NGO), the Henry Dunant Center. It embraced the subsequent inclusion of the foreign "wise men", including retired US Marine General Anthony Zinni and former Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuan, as advisers to the dialogue. It welcomed the entry of foreign monitors -- Thai and Filipino soldiers -- last December to oversee the cessation of hostilities. It also regularly appealed to the United Nations for intervention East Timor-style.

GAM's strategy of internationalization is also key to understanding why during the peace process since 2000 the movement increased rather than decreased its military capacity. The threat or use of force served the same function as the dialogue, namely to attract international attention. Arguably, the higher the profile of the targets such as ExxonMobil and the higher the civilian death toll, the greater the prospect of foreign intervention. GAM guerrilla tactics of striking from and retreating to residential areas thus served two purposes: to provide the ultimate cover and to ensure that the casualties of Indonesian retaliation were civilian.

As compromise with Indonesia was not the goal, there was no need for a reduction in violence other than tactical ceasefires to recruit, regroup, train and arm. This also held true for the recent cessation of hostilities from December until May during which GAM increased its active membership from 3,000 to 5,517 and its arsenal from 1,600 to 2,134 small arms.

It also used the space created by the so-called peace zones to spread its ideology, including rather imaginative claims that UN intervention and independence were imminent. Above all, however, it used this ceasefire to step up its extortion activities under the guise of an "Aceh state tax". This "tax" was levied on all elements of society, particularly targeting contractors, foreign corporations, and Indonesia's regional and local budget allocations. GAM even attempted to "tax" international humanitarian assistance money.

So does GAM warrant romanticization? As with most other national liberation movements, it would be better to it see for what it really is. It is an organization that has fed off local grievances but has provided no real alternative. Its vision is backward-looking, parochial, and steeped in ethnic hatred. It has maintained control through intimidation and has funded itself through kidnapping, the drug trade and extorting from the very people it claims to represent. And finally, its involvement in the peace process has shown GAM as fundamentally unrealistic.

It has wasted the opportunity provided by the negotiations, the special autonomy and the cessation of hostilities to improve the lives of the Acehnese in hope of an imagined grand salvation at the hands of the UN. This has not only resulted in the squandering of diplomatic goodwill but also demonstrates the extent of GAM's misreading of the international mood since September 11, 2001, which has endorsed the territorial integrity and rights of sovereign states, particularly in the face of Muslim liberation struggles and especially in Southeast Asia.

[Dr Kirsten E Schulze is senior lecturer at the London School of Economics. She has traveled extensively in Aceh and is writing a book on democratization and conflict in Indonesia.]

Indonesian military hems in press on Aceh

Asia Times - July 21, 2003

A Lin Neumann, Jakarta -- Using tactics inspired by the US military during the war in Iraq, the Indonesian military is keeping the domestic press under control and virtually barring foreign correspondents from covering the ongoing military offensive against separatist rebels in the northern province of Aceh.

The current military operation, which began on May 19 when a six-month ceasefire collapsed and martial law was declared, is the largest staged by Indonesia since it seized East Timor in 1975. With 50,000 troops on the ground to combat some 5,000 guerrillas, the offensive began in "shock and awe" fashion, with scripted parachute drops and fighter planes screaming across the skies for the television cameras.

The government confidently proclaimed that the rebels of the Free Aceh Movement (known by the Indonesian acronym GAM, for Gerakin Aceh Merdeka) would be defeated in six months, marking an end to an insurgency that began in the mid-1970s. But the war is dragging on and less information than ever is coming out of Aceh.

Journalists and diplomats complain that a policy of embedding local journalists with military units, combined with bans on reporting the rebel side of the conflict and official appeals to patriotism, have stifled coverage of the conflict.

The Indonesian military has introduced progressively tougher restrictions and has issued pointed suggestions aimed at ensuring compliant media. Local reporters are given a military training course before being embedded with combat units, just as reporters with US troops were before the Iraq war. The domestic media have also been told that it is their duty as Indonesians to support the military effort.

"The pressure is very strong to be pro-military," says Andreas Harsono, a veteran Indonesian journalist. "It's like a huge wave of nationalism and the media [are] swept up in it."

In another echo of the Iraq war, leaders openly appeal to reporters' patriotism. "In solving the Aceh case, public support plays a major role. If Indonesian media report news coming from GAM, we should question the depth of their nationalism," military chief General Endriartono Sutarto told reporters early in the conflict.

State Communications and Information Minister Syamsul Mu'arif told journalists recently that printing information from GAM rebels is unpatriotic. "We ask the media to be wise. Frankly, publishing statements from GAM will only hamper the [military] operation and alienate the TNI from the people."

Foreign reporters, meanwhile, in recent weeks, have scarcely been allowed into the province at all.

"These regulations were sent to us by the US Pacific Command. It is what they used in Iraq," Major-General Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, chief of information for the Indonesian Armed Forces (known by the Indonesian abbreviation TNI, for Tentera Nasional Indonesia), told foreign reporters at a press briefing on June 20 to unveil formally the tight regulations on foreign journalists trying to cover Aceh. "Of course, we have adapted them to our local environment."

Sjafrie said that foreign reporters are barred from being embedded with military units, and that the press must inform the military of all their movements in the province. In addition, reporters are prohibited from publishing "enemy propaganda". Asked for clarification, he defined enemy propaganda as "trying to improve the GAM's image in front of the public. That is not okay" in news reports, he said.

Before going to Aceh, foreign journalists must secure permission in writing from both the Foreign Affairs Department and the Justice Department. Only after journalists have these two documents can they fly to Aceh. Then, upon arrival, they must register with both the police and the military to receive further clearances. The process can take weeks and still lead nowhere, according to reporters who have been trying to get into Aceh unsuccessfully since the restrictions were announced.

Local military commanders have toughened the various regulations. Major-General Endang Suwarya, Aceh's martial-law administrator, issued a decree that all foreigners must enter and leave the province through Aceh's capital, Banda Aceh, making it illegal for foreigners to enter the province by road. Foreign visitors are also banned from traveling outside the provincial capital and other major cities.

The Jakarta Foreign Correspondents Club (JFCC) wrote a letter of complaint on June 26 to Indonesian officials about the mounting number of restrictions, stating that "a series of delays and constantly changing government and military rulings [are] in fact preventing foreign media access to Aceh".

The association noted that, despite numerous meetings with officials to try to work out a way to cover the story, regulations were making it extremely difficult. "We find it hard not to conclude that there is a concerted effort to permanently impose severe restrictions on foreign media from reporting on the integrated operation in Aceh," the letter stated.

Even diplomats must secure special permission to visit Aceh, so many embassies claim to have little direct information about what is happening with the war. "They aren't letting us up there and they don't tell us much," said one senior diplomat in Jakarta.

One reason things have gotten so tough may be military anger at US freelance journalist William Nessen, who traveled for several weeks with GAM guerrillas, infuriating commanders. The military ordered Nessen to surrender, claiming that he was a GAM sympathizer. Nessen, who was accredited to write from Indonesia for the San Francisco Chronicle, claimed to be writing a book about the Aceh conflict and gathering material for a documentary. Fearing for his life, however, Nessen turned himself over to Sjafrie and a US Embassy representative on June 24. He was arrested and is now detained in Aceh on alleged immigration violations.

But there is more to the restrictions than simple anger over a freelancer. At stake, some believe, is Indonesia's world image. The TNI already has a reputation for brutality. The more that public scrutiny can be kept away from the battlefield -- and away from potential human-rights abuses -- the less chance there is for widespread international condemnation of the current offensive.

The latest restrictions contrast with the very early days of the current conflict, when it was fairly easy for the foreign press to enter Aceh and move with relative freedom around the province, despite the inherent danger of working in a war zone. A number of critical stories were written about civilian casualties and apparent human-rights abuses, and access was shut off. "In practice, since these regulations came out, no one is getting into Aceh," says a Jakarta-based foreign correspondent. "So now covering the story is a hit-or-miss thing. You can't rely on what the TNI says, and you can't trust what GAM says either, and you can't see for yourself."

For Indonesian journalists, the dilemma is somewhat different but no less worrisome. Those covering the conflict as "embeds" get nearly all of their information from military sources. In exchange, they are given a seven-day military training course, and are allowed on limited military operations. Indonesian military officials say the policy has made the current Aceh war more transparent than any previous military operation.

The policy may be working. Many observers say the war in Aceh is popular with the Indonesian public, who fear the breakup of their country and may still be stung by the loss of East Timor in 1999. "It is important to safeguard the territorial integrity of the state. [Indonesians] really believe that," says Riza Primadi, the news director of TransTV. "So appeals to patriotism have an impact even on the media. A lot of [journalists] saw the occupation of East Timor as illegal, but Aceh has always been part of Indonesia. The Acehnese were leaders in our struggle against the Dutch. We do not want our country to disintegrate."

Journalists in Aceh are also caught between the two sides and are at great risk of attack or worse. In several instances early in the campaign, unidentified gunmen shot at journalists as they drove through the province. One journalist has been killed, others beaten and a TV crew from a local network taken hostage by GAM rebels.

The situation in Aceh looks set to be a protracted and messy guerrilla struggle. Recently the military announced that the campaign against the rebels will likely continue much longer than the originally projected six months, leaving open the prospect that Indonesia's fragile democracy may have a semi-permanent military regime acting within its borders for months, even years, to come.

With journalists subject to military pressure, and foreigners unable to travel in Aceh, learning anything of substance about the conflict is almost impossible.

"My religion is journalism, that is also my nationality," says Harsono. "I can be a good anak bangsa [son of the nation] if I can report both sides of the conflict. But right now they are not allowing that to happen."

[A Lin Neumann is the Asia consultant for the Committee to Protect Journalists.]

War in Aceh enters phase of lawlessness

Jakarta Post - July 22, 2003

Tertiani ZB Simanjuntak, Lhokseumawe -- After two months of martial law in war-ridden Aceh, the situation in the province turned more uncertain as pro-Jakarta groups of Acehnese took the law into their own hands .

Many groups of residents have held hostage relatives of several suspected members of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), in retaliation for the kidnap of family members under the nose of security authorities.

The latest incident took place over the weekend, when residents of Kuala district, West Aceh regency, arrested 36 people, said to be relatives of two rebels in Nagan Raya, who had earlier reportedly kidnapped four members of their families.

The local military regretted such retaliatory action but failed to bring the kidnappers to justice.

The hostages, who on Sunday were taken to the local military command headquarters, have now been handed over to the police for further investigation on their possible involvement in the movement, said spokesman for Aceh Military Operation Command Maj. Edi Sulistiadie on Monday.

"The law does not allow civilians to hold the relatives of GAM members as hostages, and cannot say that the relatives of GAM members are automatically GAM members. We cannot justify people's retaliatory action.

"However, the abductions should be seen as action to express their struggle in fighting against GAM, and loyalty to the government," he said in an evaluation of the two-month integrated operation aimed at restoring security and order in the resources-rich province.

Besides crushing the separatist movement, the integrated operation also aims to enforce the law and uphold the civil administration.

The martial law administration has so far arrested 383 suspected members of the separatist movement, who were not allowed to be accompanied by lawyers during their investigation. Only five former GAM negotiators were allowed to be represented by lawyers from the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) when they underwent police interrogation.

In a media statement released on Monday, the military operation command claimed that security authorities had succeeded in taking control of almost all territory in Aceh, suppressing rebels and enforcing the law.

It said that the military's targets were to destroy GAM strongholds, isolate rebels from civilians and increase the Acehnese people's acceptance of the Indonesian unitary state.

The media release also stated that all GAM strongholds identified during the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) had been occupied by the Indonesian Military (TNI) and that GAM members were now "besieged." As many as 1,082 GAM members had been killed or arrested, while 224 weapons had been confiscated, the release stated. The military also claimed that "territorial, information and psychological operations" had intensified residents' support for the operation to quell the movement.

"The separation, which was requested by residents, and the operations planned by the military command to take residents into refuge had met with success with the arrest of 17 GAM members in refugee shelters," the media release said.

Villagers take GAM relatives hostage

Jakarta Post - July 21, 2003

Jakarta -- Residents of Kuala district, Nagan Raya, took the law into their own hands over the weekend, taking hostage 36 family members of suspected members of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

According to military authorities, this is the second action of its kind since a military operation was launched against the separatist movement.

Residents of Krueng Ceukou, Saunangan district, took several family members of suspected GAM members hostage earlier in the month, hoping to force rebels to release two teachers they were believed to have kidnapped.

The hostage-takers in Kuala district demanded the release of four residents -- Indra, 19, Khaerul Efendi, 40, Zulkifli, 18, and Katiman, 44 -- who are believed to have been kidnapped by GAM members.

After holding the 36 for some time, the villagers then handed them over to local Army officers. It was not immediately clear whether any of the hostage-takers had been detained for questioning.

Meanwhile, four alleged GAM members opened fire on the house of Medan-based journalist Idris Jeumpa, 62, in Bangka Jaya, Krueng Geukeuh, near the Arun Gas plant, at about 7:30 p.m. on Sunday. Idris survived the shooting, but his wife, Saodah, 52, was killed on the spot. Their daughter, Yusnia Oktiviani, 31, was wounded in the arm. All of them were taken to the Pupuk ASEAN hospital. Idris, who is a former commander of the Gandapura Military, said on Sunday he believed the attackers were GAM members.

Earlier, three alleged members of GAM kidnapped M. Daud, 50, the village head of Blang Jambe, in Julok district. He was taken from his home in Seuneubok Tuha, East Aceh.

In Lhoksukon, North Aceh, GAM rebels conducted ID checks on civilians returning from working on irrigation canals for their farms in Bintang Hue district.

In Lapang village, Ganda Pura district, an attack by suspected GAM members on a store left the owner, Nurdin, 48, injured.

Separately, soldiers from Airborne Battalion 502 of the Army's Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) discovered a 50-meter high transmission tower believed to have been used by GAM in Aluee Mudik, North Aceh.

Although the military suspects the tower was used by GAM members in Aceh to communicate with members of the rebel group abroad, there are no immediate plans to bring the tower down given its strategic position for reconnaissance purposes.

In Kuta Baro, Aceh Besar district, Army infantry troops seized a car full of GAM communications equipment. Teuku Umar Military Command head Col. Gerhan Lantara said the seizure of the equipment dealt a severe blow to GAM, as it would hinder its ability to communicate.

In Are, Delima district, Pidie, a joint Army and police combat team shot dead a GAM member in an exchange of gunfire. And in Kuala Sikai, Serui district, Aceh Tamiang, two members of the rebel group were killed in battle with TNI members. The military also killed seven GAM rebels and seized six rifles and hundreds of rounds of ammunition in continuing action against the rebel group.

West Papua

Human rights investigation team formed in Papua

Kompas - July 21, 2003

Jakarta -- The National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) has formed a Human Rights Investigation Team in [West] Papua. The team, which made up four members, is headed Saafroeddin Bahar, will begin work next August to investigate a number of reports which have been received by Komnas HAM of suspected cases of human rights violations in Papua.

According to the vice-chairperson of Komnas HAM, Salahuddin Wahid, the reports received by Komnas HAM cannot be ignored. Komnas HAM has an obligation to study, investigate and seek out as much information as possible about the cases. "We do not want the many cases [of human rights violations] which have occurred in Papua to be ignored", explained Salahuddin last Thursday (17/7).

He explained that the investigation or study of the cases of human rights violations which have occurred in Aceh or Papua, does not mean that Komnas HAM supports separatism. Komnas HAM [only] wants to protect the upholding of human rights where ever [violations are occurring]. "We want to work professionally and impartially. We are also nationalists", he said.

Salahuddin agrees that separatist movements violate the law and action must be taken against them. However, in taking such action, it cannot violate human rights.

To date, Komnas HAM has received [reports of] a minimum of seven cases of suspected human rights violations in Papua. These reports were submitted by [the organisation] National Solidarity for Papua.

Checking with the military

The Papua cases which have been received by Komnas HAM include cases of violence against residents of Wasior (Manokwari), Kimaam (Merauke) and Wamena (Jayawijaya). Other cases include the murder of the chairperson of the Papua Presidium Council, Theys Hiyo Eluay, the shooting of the family of a human rights activist in Wutung (on the boarder between Indonesian and Papua New Guinea), the shooting in Timika (Mimika) which killed two American nationals and an Indonesian, and thousands of cases concerning Papua refugees in Vanimo Kiungga who have yet to obtain "refugee" status from the PNG government.

"These reports were received several months ago. The team will [begin by] studying the reports that have come in. Because they are from a non-government organisation, [we therefore] must also check with other parties, such as the TNI [Indonesian military], the national police and residents at the location where the [incidents] occurred", explained Salahuddin. (LAM)

[Translated by James Balowski.]

Labour issues

Children banned from certain jobs

Jakarta Post - July 23, 2003

Moch. N. Kurniawan, Jakarta -- The government has taken steps toward banning certain jobs for children in order to protect them from health and moral hazards and to ensure their safety, a senior government official said.

Director General for Manpower Supervision, MSM Simanihuruk, said on Tuesday, that jobs involving the production, operation and maintenance of power plants, heavy equipment like tractors, or other devices like sewing machines, would be on the list of jobs that endanger children.

The government also intends to ban children from working in underground factories and places that expose them to dust and radioactivity. They would be prevented from assisting in the production of dangerous chemical substances and viruses, animal husbandry, construction, logging activities and shipping, he said.

Jobs involving prostitution and working in discotheques, massage parlors, or the promotion of alcohol or sex enhancers, would also be illegal for children, on the grounds that they are morally hazardous, he added.

"We have been drafting a decree to ban those jobs for children and we hope it will be signed by the Minister of Manpower and Transmigration, Jacob Nuwa Wea, next month," he told The Jakarta Post, after a meeting to discuss the draft was held.

Officials from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of National Education, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and activists from nongovernmental organizations, trade unions and the Indonesian Employer Association (Apindo) attended the meeting.

Law No. 13/2003 on manpower, prohibits the employment of children involving slavery, pornography and drugs, and jobs that pose a hazard to children's health, safety and morality.

The law also stipulates the government issue a ministerial decree to determine the type of jobs that endanger children's health, safety and morality. It classifies children as people who have yet to reach the age of 18.

Under the law, a businessman is only allowed to employ children aged between 13 and 15 under strict guidelines -- including a maximum of three working hours per day, permission from their parents, and a daylight working period.

"All the banned jobs are in the formal sector, where companies are clearly identified. But we can not make a ruling that bans jobs in nonformal sectors to children, like begging or singing in the street, as that sector is out of our authority," Simanihuruk said.

Some 500,000 children are currently working in the formal sector in jobs that endanger their health, safety and morality, according to Simanihuruk's data. However, the number will extend to 2.5 million children if children who work in the informal sector are considered.

Simanihuruk said that violations of the ministerial decree would be considered as breaches of the Manpower Law. The law stipulates that any violation of the clause carries a maximum five year jail sentence or/and a maximum Rp 500 million (US$55,500) fine.

Simanihuruk, however, said that such a punishment would be the last resort in enforcing the decree and the law. "An educative approach will lead the campaign to ban those kind of jobs for children," he added.

PT Dirgantara Indonesia workers plan to sue director

Jakarta Post - July 22, 2003

Yuli Tri Suwarni, Bandung -- The labor union at PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PT DI) said on Monday it would sue the state-owned aircraft company's president director, Edwin Soedarmo, for has been called a "unilateral decision" to suspend more than 9,000 workers .

The legal threat comes despite the company's promise to allow around 3,000 workers to return to work in stages starting on Monday. However, only 150 employees, mostly managers and supervisors, did return to work on Monday. Officials said more would follow in about two weeks.

Cheppy Pamungkas, a lawyer for the Communication Forum for Employees (FKK), said the labor union would file lawsuits with the Bandung District Court and the local administrative court separately on Tuesday.

He said the legal action against Edwin was lawful, arguing that the FKK was treated unfairly when the decision to suspend the 9,643 workers was announced on July 11. "The suspension decision did not involve the workers and it therefore was procedurally illegal, because it was only agreed upon by only two of the five directors," he said.

The two directors were Edwin and business operations director Budi Waskito, while the three who were excluded from the decision-making were technical director Budi Setiawan, finance director Pudji Sulaksono and human resources director Sudarma.

Cheppy said the labor union had demanded that Edwin annul the suspension of all the workers, but it was ignored.

He spoke to journalists as around 2,000 workers continued their protest outside the company's compound on Jl. Padjajaran in Bandung. Businessman and singer Setiawan Djodi appeared to show his solidarity with the protesters.

Cheppy urged Edwin to delay the suspension, pending the outcome of the lawsuits. He argued that under Law 13/2003 on manpower, the decision to lay off workers should have been made by the board of directors after negotiations with employees.

The directors then should have notified the internal trade union and the provincial manpower office seven days before PT DI locked up the plant and suspended the workers, he added.

Apart from being charged with violating labor laws, Edwin is also being sued for deploying special Air Force (Paskhas) personnel to guard the plant after the lockout.

"Using the military to keep workers out has no legal basis... because it is a security task for the police," Cheppy said.

Edwin had said the suspension resulted from the chronic financial difficulties that had been plaguing the company for years.

Speaking to journalists on Wednesday, he said that around 3,000 employees would be reassigned to assemble CN-235 passenger planes and to produce spare parts for Airbus A-380 aircraft ordered by British Aerospace.

He said PT DI was currently working on two CN-235 planes ordered by the Royal Malaysian Air Force, which were scheduled to be delivered in September 2004 and March 2005 respectively. The company is also working on four CN-235s ordered by Pakistan, which should be delivered by the end of this year and in June 2004.

As for the remaining employees, Edwin said the company had yet to decide on what to do about them. "In the next six months, we will do a streamlining program in the company and concentrate on our core business. This will likely lead to a cut in our workforce," he said.

Sukhoigate

Thousands protest use of agency funds to buy fighters

Jakarta Post - July 22, 2003

Jakarta (Agencies) -- About 1,000 people protested Tuesday at the office of the national food agency Bulog over a deal which would see its funds used to buy Russian fighter aircraft. The Justice and Welfare Party called the demonstration to protest against the controversial aircraft deal and against rice imports which have pushed prices down for local farmers, said party president Hidayat Nurwahid.

"The funds should have been used to stabilise the price of foodstuffs as is the task of Bulog but they have instead been used for things that are outside the authority of Bulog," Nurwahid told Antara.

A Bulog spokesperson said agency executives are expected to meet protest leaders later on Tuesday. A security official at the agency estimated the crowd size at around 1,000.

A parliamentary committee is investigating the deal, which analysts say could embarrass President Megawati Sukarnoputri before elections next year.

Megawati signed the 197 million dollar agreement to purchase four Sukhoi jet fighters and two Mi-35 helicopters with President Vladimir Putin during her visit to Russia in April.

The deal apparently bypassed normal procedures because parliament and the defence ministry were not involved.

Funds for the down-payment were to come from Bulog, which has been at the centre of several previous scandals. Former president Abdurrahman Wahid was investigated for alleged misuse of Bulog funds.

Minister to face grilling over Sukhoigate next week

Straits Times - July 22, 2003

Robert Go, Jakarta -- Indonesian Trade and Industry Minister Rini Suwandi will answer legislators' summons next Tuesday and face parliamentary grilling over her involvement in Sukhoigate, a scandal involving Jakarta's purchase of combat aircraft and helicopters from Russia in April.

A source close to the minister said she was currently in Shanghai on official business but would be back in Jakarta by the weekend.

The source said: "She should be available that day. She will also clarify there has been no wrongdoing, that she simply facilitated improving trade relations with Russia."

The central issue here is the government's decision to buy four Sukhoi jets and two helicopters from Moscow. Indonesia made a down payment of US$26 million and will complete the US$197 million purchase using a barter mechanism involving more than 30 commodities.

Nobody complained when the deal was first announced in April, but the issue has become a hot topic in recent weeks, with a number of MPs questioning its specifics.

At stake is more than just Ms Rini's job. MPs' findings may have implications for President Megawati Sukarnoputri's chances of re-election and her PDI-P party's reputation with voters.

The special parliamentary commission tasked with looking into the matter has so far questioned at least four businessmen linked to the Sukhoi negotiations.

Next Tuesday, legislators want to know why it was Ms Rini, instead of Defence Minister Matori Abdul Djalil, who negotiated the purchase with the Russians.

MP Joko Susilo, a member of the Sukhoigate commission, said: "She had no right to buy the jets. The laws are clear. Such purchases must go through the Defence Ministry."

Critics, including former minister Dr Rizal Ramli, questioned the wisdom of buying only four jets instead of the customary squadron-strength of 12. Another complaint is that purchasing Sukhois would require Indonesia to revamp its entire defensive radar system at a huge cost and complicate its spare parts and weaponry caches.

Without reprogramming, Indonesia's French-made radar gear will identify Russian-built jets as enemy craft. The air force's fleet consists mainly of fighter jets made by the Americans and the British.

Dr Rizal, a former Cabinet member, said: "The specifications ... were not properly thought out. The jets don't constitute an effective fighting force. "This is a result of the fact that these negotiations were led by Minister of Industry and Trade Rini Suwandi, who does not have the authority, knowledge and understanding of aircraft and military equipment to undertake this task."

MPs are also keen to probe Ms Rini on side-allegations connected to the Sukhoi deal, including a claim that she acted illegally to bring financial benefits to Ms Megawati's party in the run-up to the next election. Allegations are surfacing in Jakarta that PDI-P or businessmen closely associated with the party stand to make millions of dollars on side-deals connected to the Sukhoi purchase.

Ms Megawati's aides, in defence, say her political opponents are looking to make an issue out of legitimate deals and trying to tarnish her image. Indeed, those who have pushed for the Sukhoi investigations belong mostly to rival parties to PDI-P, they said, blaming political bickering for the entire scandal.

But the government's critics said they have a point, and a nobler mission here. Mr Joko said: "We need to make sure the process of barter for the jets will be conducted in a transparent way. A possible scenario is that businessmen from whom the state would have to buy the commodities it would trade to Moscow mark up their prices."

'War on terrorism'

Megawati's top party leaders 'targeted by JI'

Agence France Presse - July 23, 2003

Jakarta -- A senior member of President Megawati Sukarnoputri's party said yesterday that he and three other top leaders have been targeted by suspected Jemaah Islamiah (JI) terrorists.

"I was target No 1," said Mr Roy B.B. Janis, executive board chairman of the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P). He said Jakarta police chief Makbul Padmanegara had told him that he headed a list found during raids on suspects early this month. Others named were PDI-P legislators Jacob Tobing and J.E. Sahetapy as well as the party's deputy secretary-general Pramono Anung.

The raids in the Jakarta area and at Semarang in Central Java led to the arrest of nine suspects. Police also found explosives, detonators, ammunition, rifles and other weapons; a booklet of church service schedules; and documents, CDs and cassettes on JI.

Among the items seized were 25 sacks of potassium chlorate -- enough to build several bombs of the size used in Bali -- and several shoulder-launched rockets.

National police spokesman Edward Aritonang said "about five" political leaders and high-profile individuals were named in the seized documents, which also listed several shopping centres as targets.

He declined to name the people or the places listed. "We are worried it will create panic," he said. "We have told the individuals involved to take precautions."

Tempo magazine named business tycoon Ciputra as one of the targets. Police, who said Ms Megawati was not on the list, added that they did not know why the other politicians were selected.

Mr Janis dismissed speculation that he and his colleagues were targeted because they rejected a move by small hardline Islamic parties to entrench Islamic law in the Constitution. He pointed out that the entire party had rejected the Jakarta Charter, which would have obliged Muslims to adhere to Islamic law. He said he is not worried by the news and that he has not asked police for special security.

Government & politics

Megawati wins Central Java chess game

Laksamana.Net - July 25, 2003

While reports from the battle for the governor's position in Central Java naturally tended to focus on the "split" in the ranks of President Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), a more interesting struggle was submerged as the losers burned portraits of the President and party leader in the streets of Semarang.

The election of the governor Thursday saw the return of incumbent retired Maj. Gen. Mardiyanto accompanied by Ali Mufiz, with PDI-P supported by the National Awakening Party (PKB).

The most prominent loser was Mardijo, chairman of the Central Java chapter until he was sacked for insisting on pushing his own nomination in defiance of the party central board decision to back the incumbent once more.

The result, however, showed that it was another retired major general, Slamet Kirbiantoro, who was the most serious contender to beat. Mardiyanto won with 62 of the 100 votes in the provincial assembly, while Kirbiantoro, a former Jakarta Regional Military Commander, came in with 22. Mardijo, who initially caused concern to the PDIP central executive board by threatening to split the party vote asunder, finally was able to mobilize only 8 PDI-P members and three additional votes for his nomination.

Analysis of the poll suggests that Mardijo's main mission was to create a split in the Central Java PDI-P ranks in order to leave the field open for Kirbiantoro. Mardiyanto and Kirbiantoro are classmates, both graduates of the Armed Forces Academy in 1970, but their political orientations are distant indeed.

Kirbiantoro was supported by the United Development Party (PPP) and the National Mandate Party (PAN). Assuming that the PPP-PAN coalition remained solid until the end, the 22 votes he received consisted of 12 votes from PPP, seven from PAN and an additional three from Golkar members.

The 62 votes received by Mardiyanto consisted of 34 from PDI-P, 16 from PKB, 10 from the military-police faction and an additional two votes from other parties, probably from Golkar deserters.

Mardijo's plan was to split the PDI-P vote and take 18 of its members into his camp, leaving Mardiyanto able to mobilize only 24 or 25 votes.

If this situation had occurred, Mardiyanto would have been in danger. The coalition with PKB would have gained just 41 votes. This would have given Mardijo and his faction a strong bargaining position against Kirbiantoro, who could rely only on a definite 22 votes from PPP and PAN.

Such a situation would have put Golkar and the military-police factions in the role of kingmaker.

While the latter would have toed whatever line Armed Forces headquarters laid down, Golkar would have been a more wily player.

Assuming that Golkar threw its support behind Kirbiantoro's camp, he would have won with 52 votes, even if the military-police faction had voted with PDI-P.

This scenario did not work out. A PDI-P source told Laksamana.Net that the covert operation was anticipated by Megawati's camp.

The mainstream party cause was assisted by the dispatch of a high-level team to Semarang and Solo. The team soon discovered that the pro-Mardijo group carried little weight.

Until the D-day of the race, solid supporters of Mardijo numbered just eight persons. The central executive board team easily persuaded the remaining 34 party delegates to support the duet of Mardiyanto-Ali Mufiz.

There is little doubt that the arrival of the heavyweight PDI- players helped to swing the tide. Figures such as deputy secretary general Pramono Anung are not lightly defied.

"The willingness of Pramono Anung to get involved in the PDI-P internal split must be read as a clear sign that Megawati was all out for Mardiyanto. Pramono is known as a party figure who is reluctant to get involved in party internal conflicts, " PDI-P functionary Dhea Perkasa Yudha told Laksamana.Net on Thursday (24/7/03).

That Megawati saw Kirbiantoro as a significant threat is clear from the retired officer's track record. Before taking over as Jakarta Regional Military Commander in August 2000 during the Abdurrahman Wahid presidency, Kirbiantoro was a member of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) under the Suharto regime in the period 1993-1997.

From 1999 until his new assignment in Jakarta, Kirbiantoro was the Sulawesi-based Wirabuana Regional Military Commander.

During this time, communal violence between Muslim-Christian militias in Poso, Central Sulawesi, entered a crucial phase. Despite his unclear role in the increasing communal violence, his authority as the highest military authority at regional level was exposed to special scrutiny.

When Kirbiantoro was replaced as Jakarta Regional Military Commander in January 2001, then Army Chief of Staff Gen. Endriartono Sutarto gave mixed signals in his statement regarding the replacement by former Central Java Military Commander Bibit Waluyo.

Sutarto did not deny the growing speculation that the replacement of Kirbiantoro was closely connected with his failure to prevent a series of bombings and security disturbances in Jakarta. Sutarto underlined that the appointment of Bibit Waluyo was linked to the need to anticipate the social-political situation in the Jakarta.

As the center of national activities, Sutarto added, any disturbances in Jakarta had impact both nationally and internationally. This statement implicitly blamed Kirbiantoro for being at least as incompetent in handling the security threat in Jakarta.

During his brief term, Jakarta was hit by a series of blasts including the Christmas Eve bombings of December 2000.

Kirbiantoro served only six months in the Jakarta posdt before being appointed deputy inspector general at the military headquarters.

The appointments of Bibit Waluyo and later of Ryamizard Ryacudu as Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) were interpreted at the time as representing a deal between then President Wahid and former Armed Forces Commander Wiranto to depose generals close to Megawati.

This interpretation was based on the assumption, since proved incorrect, that then Army Chief of Staff Endriartono Sutarto, Kostrad Commander Ryamizard Ryacudu and Waluyo were protigis of Wiranto.

In practice, at least Sutarto and Ryacudu were relatively independent of Wiranto, although they had previously owed him allegiance as the highest military authority under President Suharto until the dictator's downfall on 21 May 1998.

Their relatively independent stance suggests, in retrospect, that Sutarto, Ryacudu and Waluyo, now the Kostrad Commander, are more professional and less political as military figures.

As time passed and Megawati became president, Sutarto and Ryacudu have been increasingly seen as military professionals committed to the military chain of command and hierarchy under the president as the highest civilian authority.

Given the background to the nomination of Kirbiantoro, it is hardly surprising that the military-police faction were instructed to throw their votes behind Mardiyanto.

In Megawati's mind, going along with the military mainstream and its more professional track record, has meant that figures such as Mardiyanto, Imam Utomo in East Java and Sutiyoso in Jakarta carry far less risk than to take a chance with other figures who might harbor a hidden political agenda.

PDI Perjuangan strives to save unity

Jakarta Post - July 23, 2003

Suherdjoko, Semarang -- With the general election drawing near, the cracks within the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) are spreading following the dismissal of the party's Central Java chief Mardijo .

Mardijo, who is the speaker of the provincial legislature, was removed from the local chapter's helm for contesting the gubernatorial election without the consent of party chairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri. Also dismissed was his secretary Wuwuh Beno Nugroho.

Disciplinary action taken by Megawati had previously cost party councillors in Jakarta, Surabaya and Lampung their places in the party for defying her orders.

Mardijo now joins Tarmidi Suharjo in Jakarta and 13 councillors in Lampung as PDI Perjuangan politicians who have received their marching orders for insubordination in connection with gubernatorial elections in their respective provinces.

The next such move may be in Bali as PDI Perjuangan councillors in the province have defied Megawati's order to support the reelection of Governor Dewa Beratha.

The incidents of insubordination have been taking place in provinces known as PDI Perjuangan strongholds, putting the party on notice that it might need to work extra hard to maintain unity among its supporters and, on top of that, retain at least the 34 percent of the vote it won in the 1999 general election in next year's polls.

Megawati, who is also the President, has always recommended the renomination of the incumbents when it comes to gubernatorial elections for reasons that she has never publicly disclosed. But Imam Utomo reportedly promised to help the PDI Perjuangan in exchange for the party's full support for his reelection as East Java governor last week.

While other dissidents remained silent following their dismissals by the party, Mardijo announced on Tuesday he would challenge Megawati's decision in court. "The decision to fire me and my secretary is obviously in violation of the party statutes," Mardijo told a media conference in Semarang.

He has named lawyers from the Indonesian Defenders of Democracy Team (TPDI) to represent him in the legal fight in the Administrative Court in Jakarta. The TPDI comprises lawyers who represented the PDI Perjuangan in seeking justice during the time of the New Order regime.

"I was not elected by the party central board, so they cannot just dismiss me without holding a regional conference, which is the proper mechanism," Mardijo said.

Megawati has named party deputy chairman Gunawan Wirosarojo and deputy secretary-general Pramono Anung Wibowo to replace Mardijo and Wuwuh respectively.

Mardijo downplayed his dismissal as the number one in the party's provincial chapter as he braces himself for the gubernatorial election on Thursday.

"I'm committed to upholding democracy. In the event of a war, if the general refuses to make peace, it will be the corporal who goes into the battlefield," he said cryptically. Mardijo has been nominated by the PDI Perjuangan faction and picked Hisyam Ali of the United Development Party (PPP) as his running mate, although Hisyam is also teamed up with the PPP's gubernatorial candidate, Slamet Kirbiantoro.

Although supported by Megawati, incumbent governor Mardiyanto has been officially nominated by the National Awakening Party (PKB) along with Ali Mufis as his running mate. The National Mandate Party has nominated Hadi Pranoto and Djoko Wahyudi.

With 44 seats on the legislature, the PDI Perjuangan vote seems set to divide following Mardijo's dismissal, with 25 votes likely going to Mardiyanto, who will also enjoy the support of all 16 PKB councillors to secure his reelection.

Over 3,000 military and police personnel will be deployed to maintain order during the election on Thursday, with all 100 councillors being checked into the luxury Patra Jasa Hotel from Tuesday until the day of the vote, ostensibly for security reasons.

PDI-P to deal with Islam parties

Laksamana.Net - July 21, 2003

President Megawati Sukarnoputri and her Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) have finally recognized the importance of gaining support from the Islamic parties in the 2004 direct presidential election.

In an official statement presented by PDI-P deputy secretary general Pramono Anung to reporters on Friday (18/7/03), he signaled that the party intends to approach the Islamic parties. The statement also made it clear that PDI-P will also strive to accommodate the aspirations of eastern Indonesia.

Megawati and PDI-P have apparently realized that in the 1999 general election eastern Indonesia, and especially South Sulawesi, became the main power base of Islamic forces linked to Suharto's successor as president, B.J. Habibie.

It was through eastern Indonesia that the old ruling party, Golkar, was able to gain 22.46% of votes, making it the second largest party in the election.

Analysts say that PDI-P's recognition of the need to work with the Islamic parties represents an improvement in the party's strategy.

The PDI-P offer for a coalition with the Islamic parties may cause a splintering in their unity as they jostle for a share in power, the analysts believe.

The strategy recognizes that the Muslim parties are characterized more by a desire for a share in power than by any conception of a shared vision.

In the 1999 poll, rivalry among powerful individuals was a more important factor than the parties those individuals represented. Hence, powerful individuals rather than political parties are the key to winning support.

Prominent figures such as Abdurrahman Wahid of traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Amien Rais of the modernist Muhammaidyah, and leaders of the Crescent Star Party (PBB), appeared on the political scene more as power seekers rather than Islamic ideologues.

It was therefore little surprise that the 1999 election results made it clear that most Indonesian Muslims did not support Islamic parties, even though 85% of the 210 million Indonesians profess adherence to Islam.

In the 1999 election, 20 Islamic parties out of the total of 48 parties that took part in the election managed to secure only 37.1% of the vote. PDI-P and the old ruling party Golkar, both seen as secular nationalist parties, took 33.76% and 22.46% respectively. Of the Islamic parties, only four met the required minimum of votes to take parliamentary seats: the United Development Party (PPP), National Awakening Party (PKB), National Mandate Party (PAN) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB).

The analysts doubt whether the Islamic parties will perform any better in the coming poll.

So why does the majority of Muslims support nationalist and secular parties? Was the 1999 general election a clear signal that the Muslim majority is not attracted by Islamic symbolism, and is more concerned with substance?

Over the past 15 years, "cultural" Islam rather than political Islam has demonstrated more impressive development in Indonesia. Thus the lack of interest in political Islam was not because Muslims regarded politics as unimportant but, on the contrary, represented increasing religious awareness that transcended the appeal of mere symbols.

Muslims increasingly believe that Muslim interests are being championed more by politicians from outside of the Islamic political environment than by Muslim politicians from the Islamic parties.

Worse still, the Islamic forces themselves made a political blunder in 1999. Fearing that Megawati and PDI-P would emerge as the winner in the 1999 poll, the Indonesian Ulemas' Council (MUI) hurriedly reminded its followers that many PDI-P candidates were non-Muslims.

This warning signal was widely publicized, but the election results showed that this was mostly ignored as irrelevant.

Judging by the present state of affairs, all is not well with the Islamic parties and many are embroiled in conflict.

PKB has split into two groups: one under Matori Abdul Djalil and the other under Alwi Shihab. PPP has also split into the Hamzah Haz faction and the Zaennudedin MZ faction, who leads a new splinter group, the Reform United Development Party (PPP Reformasi). PAN, led by Amien Rais, was abandoned by its secretary general, Faisal Basri and his allies, who rejected the overt Muslim direction that Rais wanted to take.

Internal conflicts, struggles for power for personal or group interests, weakness in organization and a lack of influential leadership continues to dog the Islamic parties.

Given the crisis of legitimacy in the Islamic parties, it was natural for reporters to ask Pramono Anung which Islamic parties PDI-P was considering as partners in a strategic alliance. He was reluctant give a specific answer.

Two Islamic organizations deserve special attention: Muhammadiyah and NU. As grass-roots social organizations, both remain strong institutions with real following.

Muhammadiyah and NU each claim tens of millions of members. Although their leaders deny the two organizations will themselves become parties, activists within them are acting like parties in the run up to the election.

In their respective national conferences, NU and Muhammadiyah came to the conclusion that figures such as Wahid and Rais are less important than the strategic role of the two social organizations.

Thus NU and Muhammadiyah did not explicitly nominate Wahid or Rais as presidential candidates.

Since well before the Suharto years, NU and Muhammadiyah have been trapped in rivalry. This rivalry has been partly responsible for the impotence of political Islam in Indonesia to date. In just one recent example, animosity between Wahid and Rais contributed to the downfall of Wahid's presidency in July 2001.

Muhammadiyah, which is closely connected with Amien Rais, is often called "modernist". Broadly, it is urban and middle class. Like suburban Christian fundamentalists, members take their religion straight from the holy book. Thus, the description of Muhammadiyah as modernist Muslim is less correct than to term it puritanical Muslim.

Given their characteristic as urban and middle class Muslims, Muhammadiyah members tend to fear the 'anarchy' of the poor and tend to be conservative in political outlook.

The more rural NU, closely associated with Abdurrahman Wahid, is called 'traditionalist' because it is closer to Javanese mysticism. Curiously, NU today has more progressives in its ranks than does Muhammadiyah.

Through a network of religious schools throughout the country, young NU radicals are encouraging a new theology that puts the poor first. Their role models are several liberal intellectuals from the Islamic Middle East and North Africa.

The differences between NU and Muhammadiyah are deep. They are social, and not merely doctrinal. They pit urban against rural, better-off against worse-off, and perhaps even the outer islands against Java.

The Islamic community has enough shared ground to press its demands vigorously. Among these demands are the following:

- Affirmative action in favor of indigenous Islamic entrepreneurs and against the ethnic Chinese who dominate the economy. Malaysia's New Economic Policy could be the model.

- Redress for human rights abuse against Muslims in the past, especially the Tanjung Priok massacre of 1984.

- More emphasis on Islamic symbols in public life, including disapproval of gambling, abortion, and western consumerism.

The nomination of a Muslim figure as Megawati's running mate who is acceptable to both Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, and support from eastern Indonesia are emerging as prerequisites for a second term in government.

A source from PDI-P circle told Laksamana.Net that the only candidate who meets the criteria is Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare Yusuf Kalla. "If there is no extraordinary situation, I am sure that Megawati will nominate Kalla as the most proper choice as her running mate."

Double trouble for Mega

Straits Times - July 22, 2003

Derwin Pereira, Jakarta -- President Megawati Sukarnoputri is fighting a battle on two fronts as elections loom.

One is with an all-powerful Parliament that was nothing but a rubber-stamp body during the New Order regime -- and the other, ironically, is with members of her own Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P).

At the heart of her battle with feisty legislators in the House of Representatives (DPR) is power. Ms Megawati believes that as the Indonesian leader, she is entitled to call the shots in the country.

With Mr Suharto's fall in May 1998, the institution of the presidency has been anything but a portrait of authority with the creeping encroachment of, and periodic battles with, the DPR.

The 57-year-old leader made this clear last week when she highlighted concerns over the increasing power of the legislative body, warning that the country's political system was changing from a presidential to a parliamentary one.

"Cutting down the President's authority to produce legislation ... is an understandable thing,' she said in a speech. "However, behind all those steps, all of a sudden, we feel how everything has become blurred." Ms Megawati's emotional response to the DPR's growing powers is underscored by several factors.

At the ideological level, her orientation to the Sukarno legacy makes it almost anathema to veer away from the cardinal rules set out in the 1945 Constitution created by her father, the country's first president.

The Pancasila state doctrine, a unitary state and a presidential system are an integral part of Ms Megawati's world view, even if she is prepared to be flexible on other elements in the Indonesian Constitution.

Secondly, the concern stems from how little influence the President has over a parliamentary Bill. Take, for example, the one on broadcasting. It became law in just 30 days after it was endorsed by the DPR, despite the fact that it was not even signed by Ms Megawati.

Coupled with that is the attempt by Parliament to use its powers purely to serve narrow political interests.

The threat by legislators to get the national police to summon Trade and Industry Minister Rini Soewandi, a palace loyalist, if she did not turn up for a commission hearing on the Sukhoigate scandal next week, is instructive of such concerns.

Underlying all this is crude power politics by factions in Parliament such as Golkar and the Islamic parties to undermine the incumbent ahead of the all-important presidential election next year.

Interestingly, some of the most stinging criticism is emanating from within the PDI-P itself -- at the central board level and outside.

Party executives are miffed that Ms Megawati is drawing closer to a coterie of palace loyalists like Ms Rini and others like Mr Theo Syafei rather than backing their decisions.

At the lower level of the party, it has led to public outbursts, especially over issues like the appointment of provincial governors. This has forced the President to wield the axe on PDI-P dissenters.

Last week, 20 of them were sacked from the party, much to the chagrin of her critics who argued that such draconian measures were all too common during Mr Suharto's reign. Ms Megawati might consider them to be irritants, but she needs to watch her step. She is making more enemies these days. The DPR -- and within it, the likes of opposition party leaders with presidential aspirations -- is one of them.

Just as the presidential system is blurring under the weight of parliamentary pressures, she must also be careful not to blur the lines between her political enemies and friends within the ruling party. By sanctioning an increasing number of them, she risks having more people aligned against her at a time when she needs to cultivate the ground for support.

MPR set to revoke decrees

Jakarta Post - July 21, 2003

M. Taufiqurrahman, Jakarta -- A decree outlawing the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and one on the impeachment of founding president Sukarno are among 100 rulings that could be scrapped when the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) convenes next month for its Annual Session.

The rulings will be revoked under a draft decree to be proposed during the August 1 to August 10 Annual Session, a copy of which was obtained by The Jakarta Post. As for the ban on Marxism and Communism, which is mandated in Decree No. 25/1966 on the dissolution of the PKI, the MPR plans to maintain the ban in a new ruling.

Sukarno was impeached in 1967 for, among other things, his perceived political favoritism toward the PKI, which was blamed for the abortive coup in September 1965.

The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), the party of the current President and Sukarno's daughter, Megawati Soekarnoputri, has been seeking the revocation of both decrees.

Thousands of alleged PKI members and supporters were killed and arrested in the aftermath of the abortive coup. The New Order government screened all civil servants to prevent family members of alleged PKI members from entering the bureaucracy.

Since the reform movement began in 1998, a truth and reconciliation decree has been drafted to unravel the darker side of Indonesia's history, including the massacre in the wake of the September 1965 futile coup.

Currently, the MPR's ad hoc committee is deliberating a new decree either to annul or maintain the bulk of those obsolete decrees, enacted between 1960 and 2002.

The outcome of the deliberations will be taken to the MPR's working committee (BP MPR) for further discussion before being presented to the annual session, scheduled from August 1 through August 10.

However, only eight of the 100 outdated decrees will be scrapped unconditionally. The eight will include MPR Decree No. 6/1973 on the structure and composition of the highest law-making body and high state institutions and their relations, as well Decree No. 13/1998, which limits presidential terms.

Also revoked will be an MPR decree on the mechanism for the presidential and vice presidential election, following the recent enactment of law on a direct presidential election in 2004.

The MPR also plans to review some of its decrees after a new government is formed following the result of the 2004 general election. These include controversial Decree No. 4/2000 on regional autonomy and Decree No. 2/2002 on acceleration of the economic recovery.

Constitutional law expert Jimly Asshiddiqie from the University of Indonesia said that despite political bickering between factions in the MPR ad hoc committee, the move to revoke outdated decrees was needed to streamline the country's legal system.

"If the MPR agrees to revoke the obsolete decrees or change them into law, there will be no more discrepancies between the 1945 Constitution and the body of legislation. This means that it will eliminate contradictions within our legal system," he told the Post over the weekend.

Currently, the country's legal system still recognizes MPR decrees as binding regulations quite apart from the 1945 Constitution and laws, but the amended 1945 Constitution scrapped the MPR's authority to issue binding decrees, making them irrelevant for the present legal system.

If the MPR decided not to revoke a number of decrees, then they would be considered as law, with or without further regulations, Jimly said.

Asked if the closed-door deliberations of the draft decree by the ad hoc committee were merely aimed at protecting the political interest of legislators, he said, "I think that is common practice everywhere. What is more important is that we have taken an important step to improve our legal system."

2004 elections

Akbar under pressure to drop bid

Jakarta Post - July 26, 2003

A'an Suryana and La Remmy, Jakarta/Central Sulawesi -- The pressure was turned up another notch on Golkar Party Chairman Akbar Tandjung to quit his presidential candidacy as a former Golkar leader said it would just hurt the party.

Moestahid Astari, former deputy secretary general of Golkar Party, said that Akbar's candidacy would be fruitless as he was already convicted in a Rp 40 billion (US$8.8 million) corruption case.

That conviction will prevent Akbar from getting a letter of good conduct from the police, an administrative requirement set by the party for all party figures wanting to vie for the first-ever direct presidential election.

"The letter of good conduct will be one of stumbling blocks for Akbar. I am not sure whether the police will give him a letter of good conduct in the near future, on the grounds that he has already been convicted in the corruption case," said Moestahid.

Akbar is appealing to the Supreme Court to reject the decision of the Central Jakarta District Court, later upheld by the High Court, which sentenced him to three years imprisonment for his involvement in the misuse of National Logistic Agency (Bulog) funds worth 40 billion that was supposed to be disbursed to help the needy under the social safety net program (JPS) in 1998.

Activist Bambang Widjojanto shared a similar view with Moestahid and said that the police should have the courage to say no to Akbar if he requests the letter of good conduct.

"The police should uphold equality before the law. Akbar must be treated the same as other convicts, moreover he committed an extraordinary corruption crime," said Bambang in a reference to anyone who has tried to apply for a government job who were suspected of connections with the banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The relatives of suspected former PKI members have, for the past 35 years, been rejected by the police who refuse to authorize a letter of good conduct.

Golkar is inviting a group of well-know public figures to take part in a convention scheduled for February to choose one candidate to contend for the presidential election. Muslim intellectual Nurcholish Madjid and Surya Paloh, two of a number of figures proposed to take part, were of the same opinion that Akbar should quit his candidacy because it would not be good for the party's image. Nurcholish said recently that he would likely quit his candidacy if Akbar went ahead with his ambition.

Despite the legal verdict against him, a majority of Golkar chapters in the provinces and regencies have apparently supported Akbar's candidacy. The newly endorsed law on the presidential election states that anyone with a criminal record would be barred from running for president.

Separately, Yogyakarta governor Sultan Hamengkubuwono X said it was better for Akbar to leave his top post in the party to allow party supporters to assess all candidates fairly.

The race for president at the convention was getting tighter as more political figures expressed their interest to run. As of Friday, nine leading figures had picked up registration forms from the convention's organizing committee.

Rully Chairul Azwar, deputy secretary of the convention's committee, said the nine were Gen. (ret) Wiranto, former chief of the Indonesian military (TNI), Lt. Gen. (ret) Prabowo Subianto, Tuty Alawiyah, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, businessman Aburizal Bakrie, Hayono Suyono, Nurcholish Madjid, Jusuf Kalla and Marwah Daud Ibrahim.

The last candidate who took the registration form was Marwah Daud Ibrahim who was nominated by Golkar delegates from the country's eastern regions.

Prabowo woos Golkar members

Antara - July 21, 2003

Semarang -- Prabowo Subianto Djoyohadikusumo, a son-in-law of former president Soeharto, met with Golkar members in Semarang, Central Java, over the weekend as part of his campaign to win the party's presidential nomination.

"My participation in [the Golkar Party] convention is still a learning process. So please pray for me," he was quoted as saying by the chairman of Golkar's Central Java chapter, H.M. Hasbi.

Golkar, the former ruling party under Soeharto, is currently holding a convention to select a presidential candidate for 2004, when the country will hold its first direct presidential election.

During the meeting, which was closed to journalists, Prabowo discussed his vision and mission for the country, as one of 12 people trying to win the presidential nomination from Golkar.

A former chief of the Army's Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad), Prabowo reportedly said he would focus on empowering the people's economy, so the nation would no longer have to rely on the International Monetary Fund.

Corruption/collusion/nepotism

Suharto still not healthy enough to face trial

Agence France Presse - July 21, 2003

Former Indonesiam president Suharto is still too ill to face trial on corruption charges involving hundreds of millions of dollars, Attorney General M.A. Rahman said.

"We have obtained a second opinion, conducted medical examinations by other docters and the results remain like that ... therefore the trial cannot be continued as long as his health has not improved," Rahman told ElShinta radio Monday.

Suharto, 82, was accused of embezzling 571 million dollars in state funds during his 32-year rule which ended in May 1998, when he stepped down under pressure. But his trial has been postponed indefinitely on the grounds of poor health.

Suharto, who has suffered several minor strokes and other health problems, has largely stayed at his home in the smart Jakarta suburb of Menteng since stepping down.

Among his rare trips was a visit to his wife's tomb at Solo in Central Java last year and a brief visit in May to his son Tommy, who is serving a 15-year jail sentence for murder at an island prison.

Suharto's family and associates amassed billions of dollars through lucratrive monopolies or outright corruption during his rule. A 1999 investigation by Time magazine found that he and his six children still had assets at that time conservatively estimated at 15 billion dollars.

Doctors who examined Suharto in August last year to determine whether he was fit to stand trial said he was suffering from a condition called aphasia which left him barely able to speak.

Regional/communal conflicts

Years after Maluku conflict, 202,000 remain homeless

Jakarta Post - July 21, 2003

Azis Tunny, Maluku -- More than 202,000 people, or 39,000 families, continue to languish in Maluku refugee camps more than four years after fighting between Muslims and Christians first broke out, officials say .

The prolonged conflict displaced more than 350,000 people, who fled to various refugee camps in the province.

To date, 150,000 displaced people have been repatriated, leaving 202,000 others in the camps, said the secretary of the Maluku refugee repatriation task force, Rachman Soumena.

"In Ambon alone, we have managed to return at least 94,520 people or 9,431 families to their homes in Buru regency, Seram island in Central Maluku regency and Bacan island in North Maluku province," he announced over the weekend.

At least 6,000 people died in the Maluku islands in the three years of sectarian conflict that began in January 1999. Calm was restored after leading local Muslim and Christian figures signed a peace deal in February 2002.

Despite the truce brokered by the government, sporadic attacks continue to erupt occasionally, sometime claiming lives.

More than 80 percent of the country's 212 million population are Muslims, but in many eastern regions, including the Malukus, Christians make up about half of the population.

Rachman said the Maluku provincial administration faced a shortage of funds to continue with the repatriation of refugees. He denied reports that the central government had terminated its aid program for Maluku refugees in December 2002.

"The aid program should have ended in December last year, but because there is still a huge number of refugees living at camps, the program was extended," Rachman said.

Instead, the central government will cease all assistance for Maluku refugees by August, he said. "We still need great amounts of money to provide funds and other facilities for those wanting to leave refugee camps," he said.

Upon their departure, each displaced family with less than five members will receive Rp 500,000 to pay for transportation and food for three months. The government will also provide the returning families with Rp 10 million each with which to rebuild their houses, which were damaged or burned down during the conflict. The money will be used to buy construction materials and pay workers to rebuild the houses.

Rachman said the Maluku public works office in cooperation with the local social affairs office will rebuild around 2,000 homes in the area of Ahusen, Batumerah and Ahuru in Ambon.

Apart from financial problems, displaced people are still resentful of others of different faiths due to the long-standing conflict, he said. "They need to adapt to the new situation in the aftermath of the violent conflict," Rachman said.

To deal with this problem, a joint team of government officials and civilians will promote peace among the refugees, so that they will be able to live together in harmony, Rachman said.

Local & community issues

Police kill one, injure 25 in South Sulawesi protest

Jakarta Post - July 22, 2003

Andi Hajramurni, Makassar -- At least one person was killed and 25 others injured as police fired shots at more than 1,000 villagers in Makassar, South Sulawesi, who rioted on Monday in a protest against the alleged occupation of their land by a rubber plantation company.

One demonstrator was shot dead by police and at least four others sustained gunshot wounds, South Sulawesi Police chief Insp. Gen. Jusuf Manggabarani said.

However, local residents said 20 other villagers were also injured during the incident that broke out at Bonto Mangiring village in Bulukumba regency, some 210 kilometers from Makassar. Jusuf said at least 15 villagers were arrested and brought for interrogation to the Bulukumba police station.

He defended his men's move to open fire on the rioters as they had refused to end the violent protest, even though warning shots had been fired to disperse them.

The unrest started at around 8am when people from Bonto Mangiring and neighboring villages rampaged through a plantation belonging to PT London Sumatra (Lonsum), cutting down rubber trees and attacking the housing complex of its workers. The rioters, carrying saws, also occupied a company office.

The protesters accused the company of occupying their traditional land since 1967 in Bonto Mangiring, which led to the eviction of many villagers there.

In May, three villagers were arrested by local police for staging a protest against the company along with dozens of other residents. Similar demonstrations have taken place many times, but the local authorities have failed to heed to the local residents' grievances.

"Today's unrest was the culmination of our frustration over the authorities' inaction against the plantation company," local resident Armin Salasa said. Apart from that, he said, some houses belonging to locals had been set ablaze by workers from the firm when the locals refused to move away from the plantation.

Armin said many workers also carried firearms to protect themselves or intimidate the villagers, but added that when this was reported to police, no action was taken against them.

The area remained tense on Monday evening as hundreds of additional police personnel were deployed to the scene to prevent more attacks.

Human rights/law

TNI, Komnas HAM gripped in legal battle

Jakarta Post - July 26, 2003

Tiarma Siboro and Muninggar Sri Saraswati, Jakarta -- The Indonesian Military (TNI) is defending its stance in ignoring a subpoena by an inquiry of the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) into the deadly 1998 May riots, arguing that the investigation has no legal basis.

TNI's legal department head Maj. Gen. F.X. Sukiman says that its military officers are ready to testify if Komnas HAM employs the existing laws in the country as the legal basis for its inquiry.

"Go ahead with the inquiry. But we object to Komnas HAM's summoning of generals and former generals without prior approval from the House of Representatives," he told reporters in a press conference at the military headquarters on Friday.

Sukiman was referring to Article 43 of Law No. 26/2000 on human rights tribunal. Paragraph 1 of the article stipulates that a human rights tribunal is responsible for the prosecution of the perpetrators of human rights violations.

Paragraph 2 of the same article stipulates that the tribunal is conducted following a proposal from the House.

The military has frequently invoked the article to avoid Komnas HAM's inquiries into possible rights violations. They used the same argument to avoid the inquiry into the fatal shooting of students in the Trisakti and Semanggi incidents in 1998 and 1999.

Salahuddin Wahid, who heads the Komnas HAM team for the May riots, maintains they have the legal authority to summon victims, witnesses and other parties suspected of committing rights violations, and to ask the court's help to bring those people for questioning.

"They [TNI] have their legal argument, so do we. Therefore, we have asked the court to settle the dispute," he told reporters in his office.

The commission has asked the Central Jakarta District Court to subpoena some 20 former and active military and police officials over the case after the officials ignored Komnas HAM's summons twice. Those to be subpoenaed include former Armed Forces chief Gen. (ret) Wiranto, former Army's Strategic Reserves Command chief Lt. Gen. (ret) Prabowo Subianto and former Jakarta Military commander Maj. Gen. Sjafri Sjamsoeddin.

Salahuddin argued that "it is true that paragraph two of Article 43 requires that a tribunal is only made possible through a proposal from the House. But how can the House make the proposal without charges presented by the human rights tribunal? Charges can only be made after an inquiry." Salahuddin said the commission would resume their inquiry without testimonies from the military officers if the court rejected their request. The result would be submitted to the Attorney General's Office, he said.

Komnas HAM is seeking further evidence after concluding that the state had violated people's rights during the May 13 and May 14 riots, which took more than 1,200 lives across the country. No state security officers were around to stop the rioters and prevent the tragedy.

Komnas HAM is a state apparatus established under Law No. 39/1999 on human rights. It is mandated to examine legislation related to human rights, to educate the public about human rights, to observe and investigate human rights implementation and to mediate between disputing parties over human rights violations.

Rights body seeks to subpoena generals over 1998 riots

Agence France Presse - July 22, 2003

Jakarta -- The National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) has asked a court to order several serving or former generals to answer questions about the bloody May 1998 riots, a commission member said Tuesday.

"We have already repeatedly summonsed them to appear for questioning but they have refused to come, saying that according to them there is no legal basis for us to do so," said Salahuddin Wahid.

Wahid, who heads the commission's team on the riots, said it formally asked the Central Jakarta district court on Monday to subpoena the officers. He said court officials had promised to give their reply as soon as possible.

The commission wants to question the then military chief general Wiranto, the-then Jakarta military command chief major general Syafrie Syamsuddin, the former head of the Sumatra-based Bukit Barisan regional military command major general Tri Tamtomo and brigadier general Mazni Harun.

The five other officers the commission wants to quiz are Col. Amril Amir, Col. Iskandar Zulkarnaen and police sr. comr. Imam Haryatna, Yudi Sushariyanto and Puji Hertanto Iskandar.

News & issues

Prostitution still haunts Indonesian children

Jakarta Post - July 23, 2003

M. Taufiqurrahman, Jakarta -- Most children across the country would probably have nothing to cheer about when Indonesia commemorates National Children's Day on July 23, as their plight seems to be worsening over time.

A report issued by the Jakarta office of the International Labor Organization-International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (ILO-IPEC) said that a large number of children in the country were trapped in the worst forms of child labor, mainly prostitution.

The report revealed that children trafficked for prostitution were not only an urban phenomenon, but had also become common practice in rural and suburban areas. Child prostitution stands among the worst forms of child labor, which includes working in the footwear industry, offshore fishing and the sale, production and trafficking of drugs.

A report from the office of the State Minister for Women's Empowerment said that between three to six million children had been left without parental care to scratch out a living after the economic crisis in 1997.

According to the ILO, around 1.4 million people were working as domestic workers in 2001, with up to 23 percent being children under 15 years of age.

Despite the grim picture of child exploitation, there seem to be no efforts being made to ease their plight. The government makes no point to initiate preventive measures against such practices and to rehabilitate children who have plunged into the trap of prostitution. To make matters worse, no comprehensive data is available to measure how poorly Indonesian children had developed, the ILO-IPEC report said.

The report revealed that the condition of child prostitutes were deteriorating over the years. In Viaduct park, East Jakarta, of 109 sex workers hawking the area, 90 percent were children between the ages of 11 and 20, and had come from Indramayu, West Java. The remaining 10 percent originated from Cianjur, Bogor, Ciamis, Bandung, Subang, Banten, Karawang and Majalengka, all in West Java.

The children had come to the town and worked as prostitutes with the consent of their families.

In Bongas, Indramayu, West Java, parents play a large role in their children's entry to the underworld. Relatives or neighbors who were former sex workers persuade parents to let them take their daughters to the capital to engage in the trade.

"The parents are usually paid Rp 500,000 in advance, and after their daughters are brought to the city, they will be paid Rp 1,000,000 in cash... It's all a matter of business," the report said, adding that the parents earnestly tried to beautify their daughters prior to their departure.

The parents receive a regular installment of money from their daughters, with which they rebuild their homes or buy a new plot of land.

In the now-defunct sex worker haven of Kramat Tunggak, North Jakarta, five percent of around 4,000 sex workers are below 18 years of age. In brothels where local competition is tougher, child prostitutes are reportedly mired in deeper woes -- most of them have drinking problems and are illegal substance abusers.

Out of boredom and the perception of being treated unfairly by their customers, young prostitutes are often self-destructive. It is reported that they are also prone to murder and theft, which may arise from their being constantly under stress.

The same conditions befall child prostitutes in almost every location surveyed by the ILO-IPEC, who have been denied the chance of pursuing a normal life in their hometowns, the survey concludes.

Call me Emma, I come from a prostitution family Emma, as she prefers to be called, is 15 years old, but some say she is 17 or 18 years old, depending on the client. An elementary school graduate, she has spent her early teenage years in and out of brothels in Jakarta.

She has known about prostitution since her childhood in Bongas, Indramayu. "It is common in my home village for a girl of my age to become a prostitute," she said.

One of her aunts is a well-known sex worker in Mangga Besar, North Jakarta. "Her name is Santi, she is 18 years old, and has been in this business for five years. She has saved a lot of money," Emma said.

Becoming a prostitute was easy, she said, as many relatives, friends and family who had long been in the business showed her the ropes. Some of her neighbors from the village even owned brothels and were pimps.

"They have openly offered me a job as a prostitute, and I think the job is good enough for me. I don't have to work hard and the money comes easily," she said.

She aspired to be successful, just like her aunt. "I am very hopeful that someday, a rich man would be interested in me and marry me," Emma said.

Although her parents did not like the occupation, they did not prevent her from following in their footsteps. "There wasn't much choice for me, they said. If I didn't go to the city, the only option left was hard work on the farm."

MPRS decree which besmirches Sukarno needs to be revoked

Kompas - July 22, 2003

Jakarta -- There are only a few books which mention that [Indonesia's founding President] Sukarno was involved in the 30GS rebellion(1). Conversely, there are many more books which refer to the involvement of the Indonesian military and others. All of the decrees by the Provisional People's Consultative Council (MPRS) which besmirch the good name of Sukarno need therefore to be revoked.

Such was the view of Asvi Warman Adam, a researcher from the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) who also holds a doctorate in history from Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris.

"These decrees, if they are not revoked, [will continue] to slander the proclamator [of our nation] who has been promoted as a national hero. It is as if there is still hesitation about his teachings and commitment to the nation and state", he said at a seminar titled "Bung Karno a Man in the Midst of a Historical Crisis", in Jakarta on Monday (21/7).

With regard to the [views of] majority of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) who do not wish the withdrawal of the MPRS decrees, according to Asvi this indicates the success of the New Order regime's [of former President Suharto] brain washing. "The remnants of the New Order still have a strong [influence] in the MPR", he said.

During the seminar, Asvi also differentiated between Sukarno's speeches during the years 1965-1967, many of which have not been made public because at the time the press was tightly controlled. In one of these speeches, Sukarno is seen as not being a communist. Sukarno understood that particular individuals from the PKI [Indonesian Communist Party] were guilty, but if some cake in your house is eaten by a mouse, the house doesn't need to be burnt down.

Asvi was of the view that the MPRS decrees issued during the period 1965-1968 represent a systematic effort by Suharto to destroy Sukarno. He was of the view that it is no longer reasonable to maintain these MPR/MPRS decrees because according to amendments to the 1945 Constitution, MPR/MPRS decrees have no legal basis.

The MPRS decrees on the issue of Sukarno were made by an institution which was temporary, who's members were not elected by the people. Sukarnoists in the MPRS were dismissed by Suharto and replaced by Suhartoists. "So all of the MPRS decrees must be withdrawn", he explained.

For the sake of humanity

On the grounds of humanity, Asvi also hoped that the MPR will revoke MPRS decree Number XXV/MPRS/1966. This is because this MPRS decree has a significant impact on people who were involved or suspected of involvement in the PKI, this includes their stigmatisation.

These decrees flow through to a Ministry of Home Affairs decree which states that anyone involved with [the PKI], or their families, may not hold strategic positions, including as teachers. "It is not just thousands, but millions of people and their grandchildren [who are effected by this decree]", he explained.

This MPRS decree has also promoted the birth of undemocratic laws. Because of the existence of this MPRS decree, laws in the field of politics include a prohibition on parties from having communist ideology. (sut)

Notes:

1. G30S: The September 30 Movement. An acronym referring to the alleged coup attempt in 1965 which the New Order regime blamed on the PKI.

[Translated by James Balowski.]

Environment

124 more mining companies to operate in protected forest

Jakarta Post - July 22, 2003

Moch. N. Kurniawan, Jakarta -- The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources said on Monday that it would give 102 mining firms the chance to operate in protected forests, bringing the total number to 124 firms.

Earlier, the ministry granted 22 firms the right to mine in protected forests across the country. Their requests await final approval from the House of Representatives.

"All 124 mining companies that signed contracts before the implementation of Forestry Law No. 41/1999 have the same chance to operate in protected forest," said head of the mining environmental conservation subdivision at the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Soemarno Witoro.

"If we only allowed 22 firms, many would ask why the other companies were not allowed," said Soemarno, who was accompanied by director general for geology and mineral resources Wimpy S. Tjetjep.

Meanwhile, Wimpy said mining firms could be proposed to resume operations in protected forest as long as they could indicate that extensive reserves still remained for exploitation.

Soemarno agreed with Wimpy, adding that the government would also consider local support and the firms' location in allowing them to operate in protected forest. Under the forestry law, opencast mining is prohibited in protected forest.

Consequently, some 158 mining firms must cease activities as their concessions became protected forest.

The 158 firms later demanded that the government allow them to resume operations in protected forest, saying that soil structure in the country had made it almost impossible to carry out techniques other than opencast mining.

The figure then declined to 124 firms as a number of them canceled their intentions to operate in protected forest for financial reasons.

In June, the government, through the Office of the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, proposed to the House that 22 mining firms be allowed to operate in protected forests.

Among the 22 are PT Gag Nickel, PT Weda Bay, PT Nusa Halmahera Mineral, PT Meratus Sumber Mas (now PT Pelsart Tambang Kencana), PT Freeport Indonesia, PT Karimun Granite, PT Natarang Mining, PT Indominco Mandiri, PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara, PT INCO and PT Nabire Bhakti.

However, the number and names of proposed firms have undergone several revisions, with many new firms replacing a lesser number of old firms, many of which are small-scale operations.

This prompted several non-government organizations and State Minister of the Environment Nabiel Makarim to question the basis for selecting new firms for proposal to the House.

The mining industry has generated billion of dollars in revenue for the country, but conversely, it has also sparked serious environmental damage.

Soemarno also said the government was preparing a presidential decree to allow the 22 proposed firms to go ahead with exploration and possible exploitation in protected forests, combined with preservation of the environment.

Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi) executive director Longgena Ginting strongly criticized the government's statement for allowing all companies that had a contract in 1999 to resume operations in protected forest.

He said the government had no clear direction or criteria in its plan to allow mining firms to operate there.

Ginting said the environmental cost would be too high if the government allowed mining firms to operate in such locations.

Islam/religion

Moderates in Indonesia find their voices

Straits Times - July 26, 2003

Derwin Pereira, Jakarta -- The central message of a recent seminar here on Islamic extremism was clear and pointed: that moderate Muslims in Indonesia should stand up against radicalism.

There is nothing new in the message. The United States and other countries have periodically urged Indonesia's often-silent majority to take a stronger line against militant groups.

Probe deeper and there is a double significance. It is the first time Muslim moderate scholars are making such a call in a unified fashion. Secondly, and more importantly, it reflects how the ground has moved over the last year in the country with the moderates in the ascendant.

Before the October 12 Bali blasts and the dramatic arrests of nearly 70 Jemaah Islamiah (JI) members in Indonesia -- including its spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir -- the radicals came to the fore as a small but potent and noisy force. They were strong enough for major political players in the country to take notice of.

Religious zealots dominated discourse in Indonesian politics and grabbed the media spotlight by parading with swords and machine guns while calling for a "holy war" in Maluku islands or other restive spots. It was a classic case of the tail wagging the dog.

But the tide is slowly shifting the other way as the three-day conference on radicalism -- an event unthinkable in the past -- illustrated. Speaker after speaker extolled the virtues of moderation and religious plurality.

Ironically, the man who made the strongest pitch was Professor Azyumardi, head of the State Islamic University (UIN), who 18 months ago was one of the many who openly questioned whether there were terrorists in Indonesia. "It is time for moderate Muslim leaders to speak more clearly and loudly," he said.

Highlighting the dangers of misinterpreting and "abusing" the tenets of the Quran, he maintained that they should also explain to their followers that a literal interpretation of Islam "will lead to the type of extremism that is unacceptable to Islam".

His second point was equally important: that two of the largest Muslim groups in Indonesia -- the Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah -- work together to fight terrorism. It is no secret that the two, together with other moderate outfits, have held regular meetings since the Bali massacre to explore ways to counter extremism. But according to Prof Azyumardi, in most cases such talk never translated into "any systematic agenda of activities".

Symbolically, cooperation between the two groups, which together have 60 million members, could counter religious extremism.

There has been a marked increase in Islamic political activity across the country in recent years, especially in the major universities. One group to emerge in recent years is Hammas. It links students from more than 50 universities across Java and some of the larger state universities in Sumatra and Sulawesi.

"Purist" Islamic groups of Saudi Arabian origin are also making their presence felt in Indonesia. The Tarbiyah movement is popular with students in Hammas and Kammi and a feeder for the ultra-radical Justice Party. They too aspire to an Islamic state. Such views, several speakers noted, were unrepresentative of the large Muslim community in Indonesia. There is little to suggest that the country is heading towards an Islamic state.

Dr Rizal Sukma from the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies made it clear that the emergence of several Islamic parties campaigning for the imposition of Syariah laws should not be seen as a serious challenge. "Those who support the agenda of Syariah through constitutional means remain a tiny minority group," he said.

Public support for these groups and hardline political parties was very low, he noted. This was reflected in the results of the 1999 general election. The parties that advocated them -- the United Development Party, the Crescent Star Party and the Justice Party -- secured less than 15 per cent of the votes.

This electoral pattern is likely to continue for the 2004 polls with only the Justice Party improving on its past record, but at the expense of other Islamic parties like the Nation Awakening Party and the United Development Party. There is little chance of Muslim parties capturing power because of ideological and political differences.

Coalition governments in Indonesia, for at least the next decade, will be tactical alliances between the secular-nationalist and Muslim parties.

Creeping extremism, while having a strong religious and ideological subtext, has much more to do with domestic politics and the protection of elite interests than with Islamic issues -- which are used as symbols to rally support and stir emotions.

Golkar and PDI-P legislators also realise the value of using these symbols and cultivating militant Islam to win support for their respective parties. But that is as far as it will go. Said Mr Bachtiar Effendy of UIN: "As long as Islam is being used as a party symbol, then its impact on the country's politics is insignificant."

Another key point raised was that the growth of extremist discourse in Indonesia was not without a "counter-movement" from within the Muslim community. This included the establishment of the Liberal Islam Network by several young moderate Muslim thinkers led by Nadhlatul Ulama's Ulil Absar Abdalla.

The biggest obstacle to the radicals is of course the Indonesian armed forces. Participants noted that some generals might be using militant Islam as a means to a certain political end as is the case in the Maluku islands and elsewhere. But the military as an institution is in no way dreaming of establishing an Islamic state.

It is instructive that Indonesian intelligence agencies still keep close tabs on Muslim radicals in the country, with increasing intensity now following Bali.

Islam was left out of that equation for much of the Suharto era. Not any more. The country is now at that crucial intersection where religion is becoming more pronounced in public life than it ever was.

Will theocracy be the next likely destination? Judging from the reaction of the moderates in the seminar, there is little chance for the radicals to push the Islamic agenda even if some groups like JI continue to pose a significant terror threat.

The moderates are clearly emerging from the shadows of yesteryear to act as a bulwark against religious extremism.

Armed forces/police

Military personnel struggle to make both ends meet

Jakarta Post - July 26, 2003

Muninggar Sri Saraswati and Tiarma Siboro, Jakarta -- Having a side job is nothing new for members of the military. Just like other professionals, military personnel moonlight to contribute to their basic incomes in an attempt to cope with the soaring price of basic needs, particularly since the financial crisis of 1997.

Martono, (not his real name), is not an exception. The 27-year- old man has a wife and a three-year-old daughter. The family lives in a rented house rumah petak in Lenteng Agung, South Jakarta.

As a low-ranking marine personnel, Martono said his salary of around Rp 700,000 (US$90) per month is not enough to meet his family's monthly expenses. He says he pays Rp 225,000 monthly for house rental, Rp 75,000 for electricity and water, Rp 50,000 for his daughter's milk, Rp 600,000 for food, and Rp 100,000 for transportation.

"My salary was lower three years ago, but it was still enough for my wife and I. My wife could save at least Rp 50,000 or Rp 75,000 a month," he told The Jakarta Post proudly.

Martono was forced to take a side job after the birth of his daughter three years ago, and the arrival of his two nieces and brother-in-law from Aceh two years ago. "My nieces want to try to get a good education here and my brother-in-law wants to try his luck in Jakarta," Martono said, adding that his brother in law can earn an income as a tailor.

As a marine officer it was not difficult for Martono to get a side job. He was quickly hired as the security officer of a financial company in Mampang area, South Jakarta. "Most of my friends also have side jobs as security guards, either for companies or individuals. It is not prohibited as long as we do our formal job well," Martono said.

He goes to the office in the morning and guards the company in the afternoon. He does not wear his officer's uniform while working for the company. "Our salary is only enough to meet our basic needs. We must have side jobs if we want to send our children to schools and have a better life. Everything is expensive now," he said.

Martono gets Rp 600,000 per month from the company. His bosses gives him a bonus once a while, when he manages to prevent theft from the office, for example. He also gets a bonus for Idul Fitri.

Low salary has been cited as the main reason for military officers taking side jobs as security guards or bodyguards. It is also said to be the main reason for the military and police's involvement in illegal businesses.

President Megawati Soekarnoputri acknowledged last year the state's inability to meet the armed forces' wage requirements due to the prolonged economic crisis. The government disbursed Rp 13.9 trillion for this year's military budget.

Last week, a member of the Army Special Command's (Kopassus), was shot to death while guarding PT Asaba president director Boedyharto Angsana, who was also murdered.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu said that soldiers were not allowed to moonlight by becoming bodyguards or protecting private parties.

The same old story: Military in security business

Jakarta Post - July 26, 2003

Imanuddin Razak, Jakarta -- The July 19, 2003 shooting spree in a North Jakarta, in which a computer businessman and his military bodyguard were murdered, promptly made headlines in national media, although the motive for the murders seems to have been nothing new.

What the population found captivating about the news was that the businessman had been guarded, not by "an ordinary person," but by First Sgt. Edy Siyet, a member of the Army's Special Forces (Kopassus). Edy was shot once in the head while the businessman, Boedyharto Angsono, was shot six times in the head and back.

The incident was curious in that the assassin did not attempt to conceal his face by wearing a mask or sunglasses, making it easy for Boedyharto's driver Darjan, the only survivor, to identify or at least visualize the shooter's face before the police's sketch artist.

The Jakarta Police have been busy with the investigation, focusing mainly on possible vengeful acts by Boedyharto's former son-in-law Gunawan Santoso, who had been convicted to two years and seven months imprisonment after being found guilty in a Rp 25 billion (US$3.05 million) embezzlement case, while he was a supervisor in Boedyharto's business.

Police have been slow in providing alternative suspects nor have they identified the assassin, despite the optimum position of the key witness, Darjan. If the assassin's identity was revealed, the investigation would surely uncover the motives behind the murder.

The case once again reveals the Indonesian Military's (TNI) involvement in business, in this case the security business.

It hasn't been forgotten that business tycoon Liem Sioe Liong, who maintained a long and good relationship with then president Soeharto, also had some Kopassus members as his bodyguards, National Police Detective chief Comr. Gen. Erwin Mappaseng recently confirmed the existence of many assassins for hire in Indonesia, but claimed they were not organized and they were not commonly hired to kill. The general, however, failed to elaborate on the identities of the assassins, or the depth of their skill at using firearms or in martial arts.

Meanwhile, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu failed to indicate whether Army troops were moonlighting as hired assassins for extra money. "It has never been our policy to allow soldiers to work with other parties and receive payment for their services. Never. It is a violation of military discipline," Ryamizard said recently. The general claimed that Edy was a friend of Boedyharto's son and not his bodyguard. "And I can't prevent my troops from establishing relationship with others. They [the troops] are free to meet anyone and make friends."

The involvement in business -- as part of an attempt to finance its operations and its troops -- is not a new episode in the history of the Indonesian military. Books and publications indicate that this has been going on since the early years of Indonesia's independence.

The military's active involvement in business, in various forms, has continued until the present day. Obvious examples are units of the military and police, which have their "own quota" in the provision of security services at night spots and entertainment centers.

On a smaller scale, illegal parking activities -- at a number of locations in Jakarta at night -- are evidence of rampant "security protection services" in the capital city. Some of the operators of the "illegal parking" admit that officers in "green uniforms" and "brown uniforms" ask for protection money from them every evening.

On a larger scale, a statement by giant mining company PT Freeport Indonesia, in the restive Papua province, admitted to the payment of protection money to the military and police since 1996 and confirmed the military's involvement in the business. TNI spokesman Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin also acknowledged that the military had received money from giant US-based oil company ExxonMobile (operating in the strife-torn province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam).

An official written confirmation was provided by the Army Headquarters, which stipulated, in its 2002 paper on the "Restructuring of the [Army-owned] Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation and Its Business Units," that resulting from the limited budget provided by the government, Army leaders have established an institution to help provide for the necessities of the Army and its troops.

Meanwhile, research by Indria Samego from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), reveals that similar practice, i.e. establishing business units, have been exercised by the other two military forces -- the Navy and the Air Force -- and the National Police.

But Indria warned that such practices would cause internal friction in military and police institutions, which would in turn disrupt their ability to tend to state duties. "The practice could also cultivate collusion among soldiers and private companies or individuals," he added.

There have been many armed disputes between military units or between those of the military and the police, but despite the repeated conflicts the military's and police's rivalry in business remains unresolved. Analysts have provided a wide variety of solutions to the problem in response to the officers' classic answer -- concerning the moonlighting of their subordinates -- that they had to resort to such activities for additional money as the state failed to provide them with an adequate income.

And such off-duty activities are indeed problematic as they require no accountability and no audit. It remains unclear where the money from the moonlighting activities goes -- whether to the military institution or to the pockets of the officers themselves.

Military ties

US rewards Indonesian military as probe continues

Christian Science Monitor - July 22, 2003

Dan Murphy, Washington -- The Bush administration has decided to release to the Indonesian military money that was held up after a preliminary US investigation pointed toward Indonesian soldiers as the likely perpetrators of an ambush that left two Americans dead and eight wounded last August.

The killings have become a major stumbling block for a military relationship that many US officials, including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, are eager to get back on track.

The issue pivots on an age-old debate among American policy- makers: Does engagement with militaries that routinely tread upon human rights improve their long-term performance, or provide cover for their crimes?

Since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has tilted sharply in favor of engagement. It is eager to strengthen ties with foreign militaries as part of the war on terror, and senior officials have argued that the exigencies of the war on terror make it shortsighted to cut America off from any potential allies.

While Mr. Wolfowitz, a former ambassador to Indonesia, and other administration officials acknowledge that many problems remain, they argue that contact and training with America's armed forces is the best way to reform their behavior.

"I believe exposure of Indonesian officers to [the] US has been a way to promote reform efforts in the military, not to set them back," Mr. Wolfowitz told reporters last month.

Strained relations

US training of Indonesian soldiers had been suspended by Congress since September 1999, when Indonesian soldiers and military- linked militias carried out a scorched-earth policy following a United Nation's sponsored independence vote in the former Indonesian province of East Timor.

But administration officials have argued that it is foolhardy to remain cut off from the military of the world's most populous Muslim nation, which is making halting progress towards becoming a stable democracy.

Last year, those arguments won approval from Congress for $400,000 worth of training for the Indonesian military in the 2003 fiscal year. The money, for a program known as International Military Education and Training (IMET), would have allowed about 30 Indonesian soldiers and civilian defense officials to come to the US this year.

Then came the killings last August, and the administration voluntarily decided to hold up the program to send a message of concern to Indonesia.

The attack, which also killed an Indonesian man, occurred on a concession of Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold in Indonesia's remote Papua Province. All of the victims were contract employees of the New Orleans-based mine, most were teachers at Freeport- affiliated school returning from a day trip to the highlands near the mine.

FBI investigates

The Indonesian police found that Indonesian soldiers were the likely perpetrators. Matthew Daley, US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has also said that evidence indicates that Indonesian soldiers were involved. The US Federal Bureau of Investigations continues to look into the killings.

Last week, in a separate development, Congress voted through a restriction on military training for Indonesia for fiscal year 2004 that would require Indonesia "to criminally prosecute the individuals" responsible for the attack before funds could be made available.

But the money for this year can be spent at the administration's discretion, and the government has decided that working with the military is the best way to exert influence.

"In the short term, the Indonesian military is about the only nationwide institution that functions," says a senior US official. "We have an interest in an Indonesia -- as the world's most populous Muslim nation -- that is stable and democratic, and that isn't going to happen without reform in the military."

The decision comes over protests from human rights activists and survivors of the Papua attack.

"It may be a small amount of money but it's symbolic and very important," says Ed McWilliams, a retired US diplomat who now lobbies Washington on human rights issues in Asia. "Restoring training now sends the wrong message to the Indonesian military."

Patsy Spier, a survivor of the attack whose husband, Rick, was killed, has become a leading voice among those asking for the training to be suspended pending a full investigation and prosecution.

Congress to be consulted

"The release of the IMET funds now would only cause the Indonesian people to question America's values when it comes to their citizens' safety," Mrs. Spier wrote in a letter to Wolfowitz earlier this month. Spier and others still hold out hope that the government will be dissuaded.

When it decided to delay disbursement, the administration promised to consult Congress before the program was resumed, and those consultations will take place this week.

Though Congress does not have the power to block the program on its own, human rights activists and attack survivors hope that strong objections will change the administration's mind.

"Congress can persuade them that this is not the time to release the funds because the FBI is not finished with its investigation," Spier said.

Jakarta warns of sour ties with US

Jakarta Post - July 22, 2003

Tiarma Siboro, Jakarta -- The government warned on Monday that the US Congress decision to withhold military aid to Indonesia -- reportedly because of a failure to bring the perpetrators of last year's killing of two US teachers to justice -- could jeopardize bilateral ties.

Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono called the action by the US, "a dramatic decision" and questioned how the US House of Representatives could come to such a conclusion while investigation process was still going on.

"The FBI [Federal Bureau Investigation] is still working with us on the [Timika, Papua] shooting incident," he complained. "The investigation process is still underway for our mutual interests because we realize that two Americans were also killed. Such a dramatic step taken by the US House of Representatives could damage our bilateral relations," Susilo warned.

The attack in August last year also resulted in the death of an Indonesian teacher and injured a dozen other people including a six-year-old American girl. The dead were teachers working for the giant US gold and copper mining company, Freeport in Papua.

Relations between Jakarta and Washington had been put to another test earlier this month when five American F-18 Hornet jets were detected maneuvering over Bawean island in East Java while escorting a US aircraft carrier, two frigates and a tanker.

A dog fight almost ensued after the Indonesian Air Force, which had not been told of the F-18's permission to conduct maneuvers, dispatched a pair of F-16 jets to confront the US planes.

Jakarta expressed regret over the incident, but has never asked for an apology from Washington, after they reportedly submitted notification that the fighters would be engaged in maneuvers above the island.

The US is the largest market for Indonesian products after Japan. Washington is also very instrumental when it comes to multilateral financial institutions which have become Indonesia's sources of foreign assistance.

Susilo further said that there was no immediate explanation from the US government nor its embassy here over the decision by Congress. "There should be an explanation from the US government on the US stance in relation to the postponement of military aid, as well as the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, for Indonesia," he said.

The US House approved an amendment last week to deny the military assistance funds for Indonesia as part of a bill it passed on the State Department programs for the next two years, until "the Indonesian government decides to cooperate with US investigators and provide credible and honest answers about the August 31, 2002 shooting incident in Timika, Papua." The George W. Bush administration has opposed the amendment, which will bar it from disbursing US$400,000 in military aid for the IMET program -- the first effort taken by President Bush to restore military ties between the two countries after they were cut off by his predecessor following the 1999 East Timor rights abuses blamed on the Indonesian Military (TNI).

Besides conducting two investigations first the police, then the military, the Indonesian government has also bowed to US pressure to accommodate its own investigators to conduct an inquiry. A team of FBI special agents went home last week after visiting Papua and "taking evidence from last year's killing." It was the FBI's second visit to Indonesia in regard to the Timika incident and was held only days after a senior US official made a remark essentially blaming the Indonesian army for the attack on his countrymen.

The FBI team, nevertheless, refused to disclose their preliminary results to the authorities here.

Matthew P. Daley, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs said following the investigations that "the preponderance of evidence indicates to us that members of the Indonesian Army were responsible for the murders in Papua."

Earlier, TNI Chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto played down the US House decision, saying that "we have never asked for any assistance from the United States." Endriartono said that the TNI was proven innocent after its own investigation and blamed the incident on the separatist Free Papua Movement (OPM). The first investigation, by the police reportedly pointed to possible TNI elements, so the military took the reins of the investigation from there and pinned it on OPM, but has not officially charged anyone.

"The Timika case was purely an unfortunate incident and no one planned or organized it. If the investigation has yet to name a suspect, it is merely because we have yet to complete the process," Susilo asserted.

Indonesia has received other funds from the US According to an Asian Wall Street Journal report, since the Papua attack on August 31, 2002. The US Defense Department has given $4 million to the Indonesian military and police for counter-terrorism training.

Economy & investment

Indonesia's bitter mining endgame

Asia Times - July 24, 2003

Bill Guerin, Jakarta -- The forced sale of one of the world's biggest coal mines appears set once again to damage Indonesia's reputation severely as a destination for mining investment and is likely to leave investors with the knowledge that vested interests, manipulation and harsh government disputes leave them devoid of legal certainty when it comes to doing business.

The British-owned energy giant BP and Rio Tinto, through its Sangatta Holdings Ltd (Australia), announced this week that they have agreed to sell off their stakes in the country's most profitable coal-mining company, PT Kaltim Prima Coal (KPC), to Indonesian-owned PT Bumi Resources, controlled by the Bakrie Group.

The purchase price of US$500 million is a whopping $322 million less than the two were offered a year ago and only slightly more than the $450 million a year that the mining company contributes to Indonesia's export revenues. BP and Rio Tinto will get $250 million in cash and Bumi Resources will also take on KPC's debt. The sale appears to leave East Kalimantan's regional government, which had staged a bitter legal fight for the mine, out in the cold and still considering further strategy.

While the sale appears to bring to an end an astonishing and protracted saga of conflict of interest among KPC, the East Kalimantan regional administration and the central government in Jakarta, it is certain to discourage international investors who thought the fall of Suharto as Indonesia's dictator in 1999 after 23 years in power would create a more rational investment climate. It has not done so, nor has it helped the Indonesian Mining Association, which has been warning for months that the country's mining industry is bleeding to death.

The long-running dispute began 21 years ago when Rio Tinto, in partnership with BP, secured a contract to exploit coal in Sangatta, the capital of East Kutai regency and a jungle village with some 600 inhabitants on the island of Borneo. It cost $1 billion to build the mine and associated infrastructure and pay for the 7,900-square-kilometer concession. Ultimately KPC would become Indonesia's second-biggest coal producer, exporting some 17 million tonnes of coking coal from 10 open-cast mines last year. The mine, employing 4,000 people, ships its high-quality black gold to steel mills and power utilities in Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Hong Kong.

KPC makes an estimated $8 per ton, producing net profits of some Rp2.5 trillion (US$297 million) a year and pays the government 13.5 percent in royalties. Remaining reserves are estimated at 500 million tons, good enough for at least another 20 years of continuous extraction -- a veritable money machine.

Under the terms of the original contract, signed with what is now the state-owned mining company PT Tambang Butkit Asam, the mine was required to eventually revert to Indonesian control although the original contract did not specify details of the parties entitled to buy the shares other than a stipulation that part of the shares would be transferred to the "government".

As late as 1999, KPC had offered 30 percent of its shares to the government for $175 million. In December of that year, out of the blue, the East Kalimantan provincial administration offered to buy the 30 percent at the same price but nothing further was heard until July 2000 when the then-minister of finance, Rizal Ramli, announced that the government would not buy the KPC shares and KPC should sell to the East Kalimantan administration.

In December 2000 KPC offered 37 percent of its shares at $216 million. The government insisted on divestment in full and eventually, in March 2002, both parties settled on $822 million for 51 percent ownership.

Eventually, however, regional autonomy was hastily introduced in January 2001 and the East Kalimantan provincial administration suddenly gained clout, claiming the right to represent the government and demanded to be first in line to buy the shares. Led by Brigadier-General (retired) Suwarna Abdul Fatah, the governor of East Kalimantan, Kalimantan immediately sued the central government, BP Indonesia and Rio Tinto at the South Jakarta District Court. His administration is believed to have the financial backing of David Salim of the Salim Group of companies, owned by one of Indonesia's powerful political and business families.

The court duly issued an interim ruling freezing divestment and threatened to exercise garnishment over the 51 percent of shares due for divestment, confiscate KPC's movable goods and, astonishingly, ownership of the Rio Tinto and BP shares at KPC. Among assets put under the court's control were the working interests in the Tangguh liquefied natural gas project in Papua province owned by BP and the assets of BP's Tangguh partner, state-owned oil and gas firm Pertamina, in a tower block in South Jakarta.

Jakarta, in a move to attempt to end the dispute, allocated 31 percent to the administration of East Kalimantan and the remaining 20 percent to the state-owned Tambang Bukit Asam. However, neither of the parties could pay and they demanded that the price be renegotiated. The government quickly announced that it was extending the divestment date up to June 30, 2002, and the court revoked its interim rulings.

Last August, KPC offered 51 percent for $419.22 million and on October 31, two local companies, Perusda Melati Bhakti Satya and Perusda Pertambangan dan Energi Kutai Timur, were officially assigned by Jakarta to acquire 31 percent of the divested shares. However, PT Tambang Bukit Asam, which produces only 10 million tonnes per year from four open-cast mines, yet again could not raise the cash for the 20 percent share it had bid.

Last month Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro warned that KPC would be declared in default if proved to be in breach of the original contract calling for divestment.

The Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), run by Laksamana Sukardi, took over the KPC case from Yusgiantoro's ministry on April 21. Sukardi warned of "strict measures" against KPC if the company did not comply with Article 26 of the contract. This states that KPC must divest a total of 51 percent of the company to Indonesian entities by the end of 2002.

Bumi Resources, part of a conglomerate owned by the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce chairman, Aburizal Bakrie, started life as Bumi Modern in 1973 and became a major player in the hotel and tourism sector. In 1998, however, the company, citing adverse economic conditions, shifted its core business to oil, natural gas and mining and changed its name.

When BHP-Billiton became the first to meet its divestment obligation under Indonesian law by selling down its 80 percent interest in PT Arutmin, the fourth-largest coal-mining company in the world, Bumi Resources snapped it up in 2001. It was alleged that Bumi Resources had used funds from state-run workers' insurance firm Jamsostek on deposit in Bank Mandiri to pay for the $148 million deal. As PT Bakrie and Brothers Tbk already owned the remaining 20 percent equity in PT Arutmin, Indonesia's biggest coal mine was back in Indonesian hands.

The two Arutmin mines in South Kalimantan, Satui and Senakin produce about 11 million tons of coal a year, which is shipped to its Asia-Pacific markets. The coal goes straight out to barges in a deepwater port facility, North Pulau Laut Coal Terminal, owned by Arutmin, unlike the KPC operation, where coal is carried 24 kilometers on a wide open conveyor belt to the port.

In the meantime, the squabble went on for KPC. Only this week the provincial government (PEMDA) in East Kalimantan threatened to shut down the KPC operational site, alleging the company used state-owned coal deposits in East Kalimantan as collateral for a loan worth $73 million.

Clearly the two multinational resources companies were wearying of the continued squabble. Insiders say Bumi Resources approached BP with an offer that persuaded the British energy giant to get out of mining altogether. Rio Tinto, clearly averse to being left as the underdog in Indonesian hands, was quick to follow suit and agree to the deal.

Djoko Darmono, secretary general of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, on the same day announced that the divestment of 51 percent of KPC shares would proceed as planned despite the change in shareholders.

Sukardi claimed on Tuesday that the government was surprised by the announcement of the sale. "We will summon Rio Tinto and BP to explain why they suddenly decided to sell their stakes in KPC," he told the press.

Rupiah strengthens after BI inspects some banks

Jakarta Post - July 26, 2003

Jakarta -- The rupiah rebounded slightly on Friday amid market talks that Bank Indonesia had sent inspectors to foreign banks that were aggressively selling the local unit. Bank Indonesia confirmed that it had dispatched officials to some banks earlier in the day.

"We want to determine whether their dollar buying was backed by genuine underlying transactions or whether it was for speculative purposes," a central bank official was quoted by Dow Jones as saying. The rupiah closed slightly higher at Rp 8,520 per US dollar from 8,590 on Thursday.

After rising rapidly against the US dollar during the first six months of this year, the local unit started to weaken two weeks ago, and worsened over the past few days, prompting the central bank to intervene by selling dollars to reduce volatility. At one point, the rupiah fell to a three-month low of 8,730.

Top Bank Indonesia officials tried to calm the market by saying that the drop in the value of the rupiah would be temporary as the country's economic fundamentals remained sound, coupled with relatively stronger foreign exchange reserves of about US$35 billion, which should be enough to finance more than eight months of imports and defend the unit against the sudden outflow of "hot money".

Bank Indonesia senior deputy governor Anwar Nasution voiced confidence that the rupiah could rebound to the 8,200 level. He explained that fluctuation in the rupiah's exchange rate was a normal consequence of the floating exchange rate system, adopted by the country in 1997. He also said there was no reason for people to be wary about the Annual Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in August.

Some dealers previously said that rising political tension ahead of the MPR session, as well as other factors like dollar purchases by companies to repay foreign debts and a switch to dollar assets by those betting on a rebound in the US economy this year, would have a negative impact on the rupiah.

Citibank economist Anton Gunawan said that investors had been waiting to cash in their gains from the earlier surge in the rupiah, which became possible after positive remarks made by Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan last week about the US economy prompted the dollar to strengthen. The drop in the rupiah was accelerated by panic among domestic investors.

But Anton also opined that the drop in the rupiah would be short-lived, applauding the inspection measures taken by Bank Indonesia at some banks, particularly those that had been aggressive sellers of the rupiah.

"This [measure] should effectively guard the rupiah and deter speculation [against the rupiah]," he told The Jakarta Post. "Over the next month, the rupiah could recover to around 8,400," he said, pointing out that the upcoming privatization of state- owned enterprises would create capital inflow and help strengthen the local unit.

Meanwhile, shares on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX), which had weakened during the previous four days, ended 1 percent higher at 510.08 on Friday on the back of the strengthening rupiah.

The weakening of the rupiah is feared to impose heavier burden on companies saddled with huge foreign debts. Gainers led decliners 82 to 29, with 83 stocks unchanged. Bank Central Asia led gainers, rising 4.6 percent to Rp 2,825, on a rebound after falling 5.3 percent in the past four sessions.

Is it soon to be party time in Indonesia?

Jakarta Post - July 23, 2003

David J. Green -- In many circles in Indonesia there is a sense of confidence that has not been present in years. True, the economy is hardly booming at 3 percent-4 percent growth each year and unemployment is unlikely to go down.

But the stock market is one of the better performers in Asia, the rupiah has appreciated, inflation is under 10 percent, and money is coming back into the country after years of capital outflow. If this were an American TV situation comedy, someone would yell "party time" and we would fade into a commercial.

It is not quite party time, but there are some reasons for satisfaction -- reasons for looking forward and, in emotional terms at least, leaving some of the ugly experience of the Asian Crisis behind us.

Not convinced? Let's try what we called in school a thought experiment. Suppose we were sitting together 10 months ago and I told you that Indonesia would face a horrific terrorist bombing in Bali that would bring tourism to a halt (at least temporarily), a war in Iraq that would bring thousands of demonstrators to the streets of Jakarta, and an unknown disease that would sweep out of China to scare off travelers in Asia. You would have sold rupiah.

Indonesia has weathered these shocks without serious setback to macroeconomic stabilization. There are some very positive reasons why. The country has garnered a solid track record in fiscal policy. The Minister of Finance doesn't promise to spend more than he has, and usually doesn't even spend what he does have. Fiscal deficits have been smaller repeatedly than budgeted, with the difference easing the debt management problem.

Although the total public debt hasn't shrunk much; because of a growing economy, an appreciating currency, and lower interest rates, the burden of the debt is easier to bear. Monetary policy, after several years of uneven performance, finally appears to be keeping inflation in single digit terms.

Money is coming back, partly because the government is selling solid assets under its privatization program. Indonesia is divesting decades old holdings in plantations and firms as well as the banks and other assets accumulated during the late-1990s Crisis.

So, why not party? For one, life isn't a situation comedy -- there is no commercial break from long-term problems. More importantly, what we are seeing in Indonesia is as much a product of weakness as it is real strength.

Government actions helped insulate Indonesia from the recent shocks -- especially good police work after the terrorist attacks in Bali and astute political maneuvering during the Iraq war. But Indonesia was not buffeted by the recent shocks partly because it was not at risk of capital outflow. After several years of capital outflow there was little room for panic to move markets.

What is happening reflects some real accomplishments, but also a cyclical upturn after a long trough. The bounce in capital markets, in the foreign currency exchange, and in investment behavior is a bounce from the bottom and is not a solid indication that long-term trends are improving.

This is particularly important with respect to investment. Indonesia's growth over the last few years has been in the 3 percent-4 percent range. There is some reason to believe this underestimates real growth by failing to track an informal economy that may be more robust.

But there does not seem to be the level of growth needed to create jobs with wages significantly above the poverty level. Growth has been limited because real investment has been almost non-existent. In real terms last year, business spending on plant and equipment was less than 70 percent of the pre-Crisis peak.

It doesn't have to be this way. Indonesia needs to take advantage of this period of "market good will" and take the steps that would bring longer-term growth. Encourage investment by reforming the investment climate -- treat foreign and domestic firms equally, remove unnecessary licensing, minimize scope for corruption in investment incentives, and provide clarity in the business environment in the regions.

Aggressively continue to privatize banks and establish a credible financial sector regulatory agency. Most importantly, look for opportunities to diminish the perception that corruption is present.

I have been told that the agenda above is impossible in an election year. But I disagree. Reforms can be politically attractive. Over the last few years, Indonesia has managed to take difficult actions in difficult times. We are seeing some of the benefits. The key is to take credit for this and make the argument that the next steps are equally good. I think we'll see politicians recognize that good policy is a vote getter.

[David J. Green is the Country Director ADB Indonesia Resident Mission, Jakarta. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the ADB.]

Jakarta to stop seeking IMF loans

Straits Times - July 23, 2003

Robert Go, Jakarta -- Indonesia will not seek more loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in a decision that should signal clearly that the country is finally out of its crisis, say senior economic officials in the government.

They say Jakarta is likely to maintain a post-programme monitoring, or PPM, arrangement with the Washington-based lender. Doing so will allow Jakarta to pay its US$9.7 billion debt to the IMF in instalments through 2010.

Should it decide to do away with the PPM at the end of the year, the government will have to immediately repay around US$6 billion, or about one-fifth of its currency reserves, say officials.

President Megawati Sukarnoputri is expected to announce during her Independence Day speech on August 16 that Jakarta will not seek more IMF loans.

Analysts hailed the plan as a good compromise.

Jakarta's 'graduation' from the IMF crisis programme, they said, should please nationalistic-minded politicians who had argued for years that the lenders' reform prescriptions actually do not solve the country's problems.

At the same time, other international lenders like the World Bank and Indonesia's bilateral donors should also be relieved that some measure of IMF input would continue to be given on the progress of the economy and reforms here. This last bit is crucial, as Indonesia remains reliant on borrowing from lenders to finance its yearly state budget deficit and, in general, keep the ship afloat.

A key problem is the fact that Indonesia now has to present periodic letters of intent to the IMF, and the agency gets to grade Jakarta on how well its reforms are progressing.

With the current US$5-billion loan programme approaching its denouement this year, analysts, politicians and government officials have engaged in bitter debates over the past few months about the future of the country's ties with the IMF.

A source familiar with the government's deliberations said last week that a decision had been reached. 'This is a good option. Almost everybody agrees this is the safest option.' Many of Indonesia's top economists agreed, adding that the PPM choice is the best one at this time given the country's economic and political realities.

Dr M. Ikhsan of the University of Indonesia said: 'Politically, there is too much opposition to a continuation of this arrangement with the IMF. Economically, this is also safe and cheap enough for the country.' There are those who disagree, but they are in the minority.

For instance, Development Planning Minister Kwik Kian Gie has advocated that Indonesia pay off the loan in one go.

He said the country's reserves of around US$34 billion is more than enough to repay the agency.