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Indonesia News Digest No
18 - May 5-11, 2003
Green Left Weekly - May 7, 2003
Max Lane -- Following a meeting of the Indonesian cabinet
security committee on April 28, security minister Susilo Bambang
Yudotomo announced that Jakarta may consider resuming "security
operations" and abandon peace negotiations in Aceh.
Negotiations between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and Jakarta
were scheduled to resume on April 25 in Geneva. After GAM
indicated that visa and travel arrangements meant that its
representatives could only make it to the meeting by April 27,
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri ordered the Indonesian
delegation to return to Indonesia from Switzerland.
The collapse of the negotiations has followed a period of regular
press reports of armed clashes between GAM fighters and
government police and military forces, as well as violent attacks
by protesters against government offices in various Acehnese
towns. Megawati's recent statements have implied that Jakarta
would consider resuming the implementation of military operations
in Aceh.
Prospects of a renewal of a military approach or escalated war in
Aceh provoked a debate in the Jakarta press among a wide range of
commentators, with considerable opinion being expressed urging an
avoidance of a military escalation. It appears that the level of
criticism has resulted in the cabinet deciding to slow down the
move towards war.
Yudotomo announced that Megawati had issued orders for the
implementation of operations to restore "government
effectiveness", increase social welfare and improve "law
enforcement". These operations are to be implemented by the
ministers for home affairs, social affairs and the national
police respectively.
Orders to the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) to implement a
"security operation" have been postponed. TNI chief of staff
Ryamizard Ryacudu has also stated that no extra troops will be
sent to Aceh.
However, Yudotomo stated that the government would only continue
to withhold orders to the TNI to launch a "security operation" if
GAM met certain conditions within the next one to two weeks.
These conditions include the issuing of an "explicit statement"
accepting autonomy within Indonesia as a starting point for
negotiations and immediate disarmament of GAM guerrillas.
GAM has stated it is sticking to current written agreements which
mandate a ceasefire and the establishment of "zones of peace".
In Banda Aceh, police harassment of pro-democracy activists has
also continued. Human rights activist Mohammed Nazar has been in
detention since February. On April 25, intelligence agents of the
Indonesian police arrested seven members of the Democratic Youths
for Poor People and a member of the Aceh People's Democratic
Resistance. They were detained overnight and beaten before being
released the next morning.
British Observer - May 11, 2003
Antony Barnett -- The Observer Tomorrow is make-or-break day in
one of South-East Asia's bloodiest conflicts. Last week more than
2,000 Indonesian government troops sailed from the Javanese port
of Surabaya to reinforce a 26,000-strong force already in the
province of Aceh, where a 26-year struggle for independence has
already led to the deaths of more than 10,000 people.
Monday is the deadline laid down by the government for rebels
from the Free Aceh Movement (Gam) either to resume peace talks or
face an "all-out" military attack. The full force of that battle
will resonate in Britain, where much of the weaponry about to be
trained on the rebels was made. Among the equipment being
deployed to Aceh are Scorpion tanks made by Coventry-based Alvis,
which were rubber-stamped for export by a newly elected Labour
government just as it was promising to pursue an ethical foreign
policy.
On Wednesday, Indonesia's military chief General Sudarto said:
"We won't do it half-heartedly. We will fight them all out. The
TNI [Indonesian military] will provide the last resort in
settling the Aceh question. We already know what tactics to apply
in dealing with the Gam rebels, who are known often to lose
themselves among the civilian population."
The spectre of British-made tanks involved in the conflict is
acutely embarrassing for the Blair government, which came under
pressure to block the sale. In December 1996, the Conservative
Trade Secretary Ian Lang announced he had granted an export
licence for 50 Scorpions, all fitted with 90mm guns and two
machine guns. But the deal -- like the controversial sale of Hawk
jets -- was not complete when Labour won the 1997 election. Human
rights groups pleaded with then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook to
revoke the licences. Cook, who had promised that Labour would
introduce an ethical foreign policy insisted that the export was
permissible because the tanks would not be used for internal
repression.
Yet despite warnings from Indonesian human rights groups that
similar vehicles had already been used to suppress dissent, Cook
approved the export. In April 1996 it was reported that Scorpions
had been used on a campus at the Islamic University of Indonesia
at Ujung Padan, South Sulawesi, against students protesting at
bus fare increases. Three were killed and many more injured.
Since then there have been reports that the tanks were used in
1998 to suppress demonstrations in Jakarta, during which 18
students were killed in two separate incidents.
The deployment of British weapons to Aceh has outraged human
rights and anti-arms trade campaigners. This week, the Indonesian
Human Rights Campaign (Tapol) and the Campaign Against the Arms
Trade wrote to Foreign Office Minister Mike O'Brien urging him to
intervene. Tapol's Carmel Budiardjo said: "The Indonesian
military's decision to use British-made Scorpions in operations
in Aceh will implicate the UK in a conflict that contradicts this
country's oft-repeated support for the peace process. Labour
Ministers have only themselves to blame for allowing the export
of these tanks to go ahead in the first place. They were warned
that Scorpions would be used for internal repression, but chose
to ignore these warnings. They had better move fast to get these
tanks withdrawn."
Labour MP Jeremy Corbyn, a long-term critic of arms sales to
Indonesia, warned: "There is simply no excuse for Ministers who
were warned that British weapons would be used." The sentiments
were echoed by Richard Bingley, of the Campaign Against Arms
Trade. He said: "Yet again, clear national rules have been
systematically broken. It won't be Ministers in Whitehall who pay
the price, but people on the ground fac ing invasion from one of
the world's most notorious armed forces."
A Foreign Office spokes-man said the situation was being
monitored: "If British tanks are used, then this will breach the
conditions of the export and we will make our position known to
the Indonesian authorities."
The disclosure that British tanks were being deployed in Aceh
came after a report from the Indonesian News Agency on an
inspection of troops heading to the province. It reported that 12
Scorpions were among the equipment being used by 6,350 elite
troops from navy, army and air force units that were expected to
arrive in Aceh on Tuesday, a day after the expiry of the deadline
for the rebels to resume peace talks. Indonesia has 26,000 troops
stationed in Aceh at present.
In December, there was hope of a breakthrough when GAM and the
government agreed a peace deal, under which the rebels were
supposed to place their weapons in special arms dumps and the
Indonesian military was meant to withdraw to defensive positions.
Yet neither Jakarta nor GAM has so far fulfilled its side of the
bargain, and both sides continue to blame each other. Since then,
thousands of villagers have fled their homes and sought refuge in
local mosques and schools. Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Hassan
Wirayuda, defended a possible crackdown: "What we are doing or
will do in Aceh is much less than the American power that was
deployed in Iraq. We aren't violating anyone's sovereignty."
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Aceh
Aceh: Megawati repeats war threat
British-made tanks lined up against Aceh rebels
Military operations will never solve the Aceh conflict
Tapol Statement - May 10, 2003
Just five months after the Indonesian Government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) concluded a momentous accord on the Cessation of Hostilities (COHA) on 9 December 2002, which was enthusiatically welcomed by the Acehnese people, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) have started preparations for a major military offensive in Aceh aimed at crushing GAM. Warplanes and warships are being deployed, along with an additional six thousand men in a campaign which, TNI claims, will be completed within six months.
The key player on the Indonesian side during the talks in Geneva that led to the COHA accord was Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, (retired general) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, giving the talks significant political weight. The peace talks have the support of key western powers which strongly favour a peaceful solution to the Aceh crisis. An international group of donors composed of Japan, the US, the EU and the World Bank has pledged $40 million for reconstruction aid.
At the end of April, the Indonesian Government, in clear violation of the terms of COHA, issued a two-week ultimatum to GAM demanding that they formally renounce their long-term political aim of independence and accept Special Autonomy as the final solution for Aceh. The COHA agreement deals specifically with military matters and is aimed at creating a situation of peace; it does not deal with reaching a political solution. Special Autonomy was mentioned only as "the starting point" for the talks which led to COHA.
By issuing this ultimatum, Indonesia has acted unilaterally, displaying bad faith towards the undertakings it solemnly entered into as a signatory of COHA. The Indonesian Government has sought to shift the blame for the breakdown onto GAM because GAM rejected an Indonesian proposal to hold a meeting of the Joint Council -- the final arbiter in disputes betwen the two sides -- on 25 April and asked for a postponement of two days. Such a minor disagreement could easily have been resolved but Jakarta used this as the pretext to accuse GAM of an "act of humiliation" and issued its ultimatum.
For two months after COHA was signed, there was a marked improvement in Aceh. The level of armed conflict fell as did the number of casualties. Life began to return to normal in the cities and towns, economic activity was restored, markets began to function normally and the Acehnese people enjoyed a welcome period of peace and tranquillity.
But then conditions began to change. On 10 April, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono announced that the Indonesian armed forces were ready to launch new military operations and even suggested that 50,000 troops would be used to crush GAM. Within days, Susilo's statement was backed by the commander of the Army's Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad), Lt. Gen. Bibit Waluyo who said: "I'm ready to deploy hundreds more reinforcements to Aceh to crush GAM." He was speaking at a ceremony to mark the 51st anniversary of the Army's Special Forces (Kopassus). On the same occasion, the Kopassus Commander, Maj. Gen. Sriyanto, announced that two battalions of Kopassus troops, a total of about 1,600 men, had been sent to Aceh a few days earlier to reinforce the 21,000 military personnel in Aceh. Kopassus troops represent the biting edge of the army, well-trained in intelligence and past-masters at provocative actions. Susilo had clearly come under pressure from the military to change his tune and support their moves to sabotage COHA.
Meanwhile on the ground in Aceh, the monitoring mechanism set up by COHA had been unravelling. COHA provides for the creation of a Joint Security Committee (JSC) headed by a Thai general and composed of 150 personnel, fifty each from Indonesia and GAM and fifty military personnel from Thailand and the Philippines appointed by the Henry Dunant Centre, the Geneva-based conflict- resolution organisation which brokered the COHA deal. JSC offices were set up in districts throughout Aceh.
On 3 March, three JSC monitors in Takengon, Central Aceh, were injured in an unprovoked attack by a mob of men. Then on 3 April the Central Aceh office of the JSC was burnt down by hundreds of men, and three days later, the JSC office in Langsa, East Aceh was set upon by a large mob who arrived on trucks that bore no licence plates. This forced the HDC to order the withdrawal of all the monitors to Banda Aceh, making it impossible for the JSC to function. Witnesses of the attacks on the local JSC offices have testified that the mobs were composed of militia gangs trained by the army; some may even have been Kopassus soldiers wearing civilian dress.
Meanwhile civil society organisations in Aceh had come under attack. The COHA accord stipulates that an All-Inclusive Dialogue "involving all elements of Acehnese society" shall be held, to broaden the base of the dialogue. It also contains a clause (Para 2, f) which states: "Both parties will allow civil society to express without hindrance their democratic rights."
Despite these guarantees, NGO activists have been hounded and arrested or placed on the "wanted" list and forced to go into hiding. On 26 March, two activists from a humanitarian NGO were kidnapped by members of the SGI, a special unit of Kopassus, and have not been heard of since. On February 12, one of Aceh's foremost activists, Muhammad Nazar, chairman of the Council of SIRA, the Information Centre for a Referendum in Aceh, was arrested by the police. At the time it was said that he had been arrested for attending an unlicensed public rally. But he is now on trial for showing contempt for the Indonesian government and could get up to seven years in jail. The police have justified this crackdown by claiming that activists addressed public rallies to undermine COHA and to call for independence.
At the same time, it has become increasingly difficult for foreign observers to visit Aceh. Diplomats in Jakarta have been denied permission to visit the province on the grounds that their security cannot be guaranteed. Aceh is being closed off from outside scrutiny in an attempt to conceal from the world an intensification in the level of armed conflict, a crackdown on civil society and a growing threat to the lives and property of the Acehnese people.
Why has Indonesia changed its tune on COHA? In the lead-up to the talks last year in Geneva, the Indonesian government and its top minister, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, were keen to reach a peace accord. For Susilo, this projected him as a peace-maker and a player on the international scene, strengthening his profile as a leading politician in the months leading to next year's presidential election in Indonesia. However, Susilo does not speak for the military who see their main mission as being to crush "separatists" in Aceh and Papua and safeguard the Unitary State of Indonesia (NKRI).
There are several reasons for the TNI's opposition to COHA. They never agreed in the first place to the move by the Megawati Goverrnment to enter into dialogue with GAM. And perhaps even more importantly, they as well as many top-ranking nationalist politicians in Jakarta, fiercely resent the involvement of an international body, the HDC, in resolving the Aceh conflict. Moreover, they are terrified that this could ultimately lead to Aceh's secession from Indonesia and fear more than anything another "loss" to their prestige, following what they see as the debacle in East Timor.
Unable to learn from their own history of failures to subdue Indonesia's "troublesome" provinces, they have yet again decided to rely on the "security approach" and regard military operations are the only option. However, they recognise GAM as a major political and military force, which has always gained in popularity whenever the TNI has engaged in acts of violence, when the civilian population always take the brunt.
However many men and however much equipment the TNI throws into this latest military adventure, these military operations will not resolve the conflict. COHA is the only way forward and the quicker the TNI recognises this, the better it will be for the Acehnese, for the Indonesian people and government and indeed for the soldiers whose lives are being sacrificed in a misguided endeavour to maintain Indonesia's territorial integrity.
Tapol calls on the international community and in particular those governments which have already pledged support for the peace process and for reconstruction in Aceh:
1. To exert the strongest possible pressure on the Indonesian Government and military to halt the present build-up of troops and military equipment in Aceh and abandon plans for intensified military operations in Aceh.
2. To exert the strongest pressure on the Indonesian Government and GAM to resume talks within the framework of COHA, so as to bring about a reduction in the level of armed conflict in Aceh.
3. To put pressure on the Indonesian government to end its policy of isolating Aceh and allow foreign observers, including UN Special Rapporteurs, to visit the province.
Asia Times - May 10, 2003
Prangtip Daorueng, Jakarta -- As Aceh's peace effort lurches toward a possible collapse, fear has taken over the persistent, if increasingly uncertain, hope that many from that restive Indonesian province had over recent months.
"We can only hope that God will protect us. We have no weapons to fight with anybody. We have nothing but him," said Juanda, an Acehnese human-rights activist in the provincial capital Banda Aceh. Like most Acehnese in the conflict-torn province, where Islam is the main pillar of life, faith is the only comfort now for Juanda, who uses one name.
Hasballah Saad, a former human-rights minister who is now a member of Indonesian Human Rights Commission, says there is still time for both sides to reconsider dialogue because they know that a military approach has not -- and will not -- work to address the causes of the 27-year-old separatist war in Aceh.
On Wednesday, the Acehnese community sent 55 members to try to meet with Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri to urge her to keep the dialogue on track. The group, however, failed to meet with the president because of her tight schedule. Juanda said the group's message was clear -- stop the war and resume peace talks, based on the December 2002 ceasefire accord signed in Geneva between Jakarta and the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM).
The last round of talks was set for April, but was postponed. On Tuesday, Megawati repeated her instructions for the military to prepare to launch a campaign in Aceh given the lack of the progress in the peace efforts. This campaign, government officials said, would also be made up of humanitarian assistance, justice, and the restoration of local government services.
The desperation in Acehnese society is a far cry from the mood just a few months ago, when the ceasefire was signed in December. The agreement received strong support from foreign governments, including Japan which hosted an international meeting on Aceh's post-war development even before the accord was signed. At the time, all Acehnese celebrated with joy at the prospect of peace. But the ceasefire agreement now looks headed toward a short life.
Two months after the agreement, clashes between GAM and Indonesian troops resumed. Both sides have blamed each other for returning to violence since, and now the delay in the talks has driven the situation close to a deadlock.
The Indonesian government has now set a deadline for GAM to return to the negotiating table by Monday. The deadline came with the precondition that GAM, which has fought for independence from Indonesia since 1976, lay down its weapons and accept the special autonomy law and agree to remain a part of Indonesia. GAM, which pulled out of the meeting in Geneva on April 25, has rejected Jakarta's ultimatum but said it was prepared to meet with Jakarta again after Monday.
This intense political confrontation is quickly moving toward a resumption of armed struggle, which Acehnese civilians fear most. "Acehnese want to end this conflict through dialogue. We believe it is the only solution to the violence, but we now fear that there is a move toward an open war here," said Juanda.
The concern is such that early this month, the Japanese government, which has spent US$8 million on humanitarian aid to Aceh, sent a senior vice minister to Jakarta to discuss the progress of peace deal with the government.
There are other worrisome signs. Indonesian officials have been putting more emphasis on the issue of territorial integrity more than in the past and deploying more troops to Aceh.
Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono says the situation in Aceh has reached the point where it was threatening the Acehnese, as well as the territorial integrity of the Indonesian republic. He said Megawati would decide before Monday on the legal umbrella under which the combined government and military operations in Aceh would be launched. He said there are four possibilities: maintenance of law and order, a state of civil emergency, martial law, or war.
Susilo insisted that war and diplomacy could take place simultaneously, and that negotiations could still resume even when the military operation had started.
On Thursday, military chief General Endriartono Sutarto said 2,164 military personnel would be sent to Aceh the next day, to join some 26,000 troops and 14,000 police already stationed there. By next week, there are expected to be up to 50,000 military and police personnel in Aceh. Indonesian troops would be facing 8,000-10,000 GAM members who are believed to have some 8,000 weapons, including SS-1, AK-47 and AK-54 rifles, the English-language daily the Jakarta Post said.
GAM's forces operate under Muzakkir Manaf, who underwent Libyan special force training in 1980s. GAM is believed to have purchased weapons from groups in southern Thailand, Malaysia and low-ranking military officers in Aceh itself. It has also collected what are called nanggroe taxes from business people in Aceh to support their guerrilla activities. For its part, the armed forces has new heavy weapons from tanks to jet fighters, and the air force has undergone night-flight training specifically for operation in Aceh.
"We are not going to surrender even if Jakarta insists on sending military troops here. We are ready to face them," GAM spokesman Sofyan Dawood told the Jakarta Post recently.
In Aceh meanwhile, a source said some villagers, fearing a resumption of war, are storing weapons to protect themselves. "Be it knives or guns, they fear that the situation will be similar to [the] special-operations period, when nobody was safe under their own roofs," he said. This period was from 1987-98, during which virtual military rule under the Suharto government led to massive human-rights violations. At least 7,000 died people during that time and many went missing, activists say.
Stressed Hasballah: That period "is proof that military solution is not the right answer for Aceh because it did not stop the secessionist movement".
Reuters - May 8, 2003
Joanne Collins, Jakarta -- Seven navy vessels carrying some 3,000 marines sailed for troubled Aceh on Thursday, even as officials said there was time to talk with rebels and that the government would consult parliament on plans for the province.
The troops set sail for resource-rich Aceh on the northern tip of Sumatra island from the East Java city of Surabaya, where Indonesia's military chief told troops to brace for war.
General Endriartono Sutarto said Thursday there would be no halfway measures in any attack if Free Aceh Movement (GAM) rebels refuse to lay down their arms in the resource-rich province. "If then the government decides to solve Aceh through a military operation, then yes, we need to be all out because it will be the last way for the government to solve problems in Aceh. We cannot be fifty-fifty," Sutarto said.
But Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda said time remained for GAM to accept Jakarta's terms for peace talks, which include abandoning their independence goal and laying down their arms. "May 12 is still ahead. Thus, at this second, I would not say that resolution has failed," Wirajuda told reporters. The government has set a May 12 deadline for talks with GAM.
In a hint major military action could come later rather than sooner, chief security minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said the government would consult parliament about what it planned to do in Aceh after the May 12 deadline had passed. "The government plans to brief parliament in a consultative meeting after May 12 to explain its steps," he told reporters.
In a statement issued on Thursday, GAM military spokesman Sofyan Daud said all GAM troops had been ordered "to report as soon as possible to their posts". "We wait to see what the Indonesian government will do on May 12 and the days ahead," the statement said.
It also warned several major companies operating in Aceh, including Exxon Mobil, that they were considered military targets and should halt their activities "within 24 hours after the Indonesian government announces its war".
Any full-scale attack on GAM would effectively end a December peace deal aimed at halting a decades-long conflict that has killed at least 10,000 people, most of them civilians. Military sources say that before April 25, Indonesia had 26,000 troops in Aceh. Some 6,000 additional soldiers have already arrived or are on the way and another 3,350 are due to go, which would take the total to about 36,000. The number of police in the province is unclear but authorities are preparing to send an additional 12,000 if the peace deal falls through.
Jakarta has been seeking immediate peace talks inside Indonesia with GAM after a dispute over timing last month led to an eleventh-hour cancellation of a meeting in Geneva. GAM has so far rejected Jakarta's demands and also said any meeting would have to come after May 12.
Renewal of the conflict in Aceh would be bad publicity for Jakarta, struggling to lure investors after years of economic turmoil and damage to its image from October's Bali bombings, blamed on Islamic militants, that killed more than 200 people.
[With reporting by Telly Nathalia.]
Agence France Presse - May 10, 2003
Banda Aceh -- The United States, the European Union and Japan yesterday issued a joint statement urging Indonesia not to launch a military operation in Aceh province.
They expressed "deep concern" over the possible breakdown of a peace agreement with separatist rebels. "We hope both parties will put above other interests the clear wish of the Acehnese people to live in peace and security," they said.
More than 1,000 Indonesian troops arrived in Aceh on Wednesday to prepare for the expected operation. Six thousand more were on the way to supplement a reported force of 35,000 police and soldiers already in the province.
The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) said it had ordered guerillas to return to base and take up defensive positions. In a statement it also urged ExxonMobil to shut down its operations if fighting formally begins, to ensure the safety of employees.
The EU, US and Japan, who co-chaired a Tokyo conference last December on aid for Aceh, strongly urged GAM "without further delay" to declare unconditional support for a peaceful solution and respect for the terms of the five-month-old peace deal, "especially with regard to demilitarisation and an eventual political solution".
Radio Australia - May 9, 2003
Indonesian police have arrested four rebel members of a joint committee established to monitor a ceasefire in the province of Aceh.
The four members represented the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on the Joint Security Committee. The committee was set up to monitor the December 9 peace deal between the GAM and the Indonesian government.
GAM committee member, Nashiruddin Ahmed, says police arrested his four colleagues at the Banda Aceh airport as they prepared to fly to Jakarta. He says he does not know why the delegates have been detained. The committee also includes delegates from the Indonesian government and the European-based Henry Dunant Centre.
The truce is on the brink of collapse and the military is preparing for a possible offensive. The United States, European Union and Japan have urged Indonesia not to launch a military operation in Aceh, and have called on the GAM to declare unconditional support for a peaceful solution.
Agence France Presse - May 6, 2003
Separatist rebels in Aceh have accused the Indonesian government of violating an already fragile peace agreement by strengthening its troops in the province.
"It is deplorable that while people are considering how to settle the conflict of sovereignty between the state of Aceh and the colonialist Repbulic of Indonesia, Jakarta is reinforcing its fighting troops," said Free Aceh Movement (GAM) military spokesman Sofyan Dawod.
"On one side they say they continue to respect the COHA but the Republic of Indonesia is also very significantly reinforcing its troops, which of course runs against the COHA," Dawod said in a statement.
The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed in Geneva on December 9 but is close to collapse. Jakarta has given GAM until next week to accept its terms for a meeting aimed at saving the deal but the rebels say they will ignore the deadline.
The government says the rebels must abandon their push for independence and must start disarming. Otherwise it has threatened military action to settle the conflict, which has been going on since 1976 and has claimed an estimated 10,000 lives.
Indonesia has sent 1,200 servicemen to Aceh to take part in a "humanitarian operation" to repair public facilities. Thousands more troops and fighter aircraaft are being readied outside Aceh for any new offensive. Police have 12,000 men and the armed forces another 23,000 in the province already, according to media reports. Civilians rather than fighters have always borne the brunt of casualties.
Several analysts say elements in both the military and GAM have no interest in peace because they make too much money from illegal logging, marijuana, extorting money from travellers and "protecting" local businesses.
GAM has told the government it is willing to hold talks after May 12 in Switzerland. Jakarta has said any meeting must be inside Indonesia before then. Rebel spokesman Dawod said threats of military operations are nothing new for Acehnese.
"For the time being, even though Jakarta has already sounded the drums of war, the Acehnese National Forces and the people of Aceh do not yet feel the need to unsheath their rencong," Dawod said referring to the traditional Acehnese dagger.
Jakarta Post - May 5, 2003
Jakarta -- Some 50 Acehnese leaders are attempting to salvage the fragile peace in the province as the government deadline for Acehnese rebels to accept special autonomy and disarm draws near.
Ahmad Syafii Maarif, chairman of the country's second largest Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, said over the weekend that about 50 public figures from Aceh had requested a meeting with President Megawati Soekarnoputri to discuss possible peaceful solutions to the problems in Aceh.
"It is not certain [that the meeting will be] accepted but we have sent a letter asking for a meeting with Ibu President," Syafii was quoted by Antara as saying on Saturday. He did not give the names of the Acehnese leaders.
The opportunity for a peaceful solution in Aceh has been fading fast, especially after the government issued an ultimatum last Monday giving the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) two weeks to accept special autonomy and to lay down its arms.
The ultimatum came just days after the government pulled out of a Joint Council meeting to discuss violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement brokered by the Swiss-based Henry Dunant Centre (HDC).
Under the agreement, the government and GAM agreed to end all hostilities. GAM, which has been fighting for independence in the resource-rich Aceh since 1976, also accepted special status for Aceh and agreed to lay down arms in stages.
The government, for its part, promised to halt all military operations and redeploy troops from offensive to defensive positions. Both sides, however, have failed to live up to the agreement.
The breakdown of the deal has put into question the HDC's ability to facilitate the peace process in Aceh, with some calling for some other party to take over the role of the non-governmental organization in Aceh.
There also have been an increasing number of voices calling for peace talks with GAM to be led by a civilian. Indonesia's side in the talks with GAM has been led by Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a retired four-star Army general.
Syafii said over the weekend the 50 Acehnese leaders wanted to discuss with Megawati various possibilities in Aceh that would preclude the use of force to resolve the conflict in the province.
Syafii said his involvement in seeking a meeting with the President was a demonstration of his concern over the country's territorial integrity, adding that the dispute with GAM was not only a problem for Aceh but the entire country.
"Therefore, [the problems in Aceh] should be resolved wisely by the entire Indonesian nation, including Acehnese leaders who are clearly part of Aceh," Syafii said.
Meanwhile, analysts criticized on Sunday state officials who have blamed the HDC for the slow pace of the peace process in Aceh, saying such statements reflected a lack of understanding of the HDC's role in attempting to bring peace to the troubled province.
All of the analysts agreed that the HDC was a peace facilitator and had never pretended to take upon its shoulders the task of resolving the problems in Aceh. "They do not understand the role of the HDC. Putting all the blame on the peace facilitator is too much," rights activist Munir told The Jakarta Post on Sunday.
Mawardi Ismail, a lecturer at Syahkuala University in Banda Aceh, agreed with Munir, saying that the success of any peace agreement between the government and GAM depended on the commitment of the two sides signing the pact. "It is unfair to put the blame on the HDC," Mawardi told the Post.
Syamsuddin Haris of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences voiced a similar opinion, and suggested that state officials recognize the hard work the non-governmental organization has done rather than blaming it when the peace process did not go to their liking.
The analysts were commenting on remarks by some officials, including Vice President Hamzah Haz, People's Consultative Assembly Speaker Amien Rais and House of Representatives Deputy Speaker A.M. Fatwa, that the HDC could not be relied upon to resolve the Aceh issue.
Mawardi, an Acehnese intellectual, also called on the government to empower the Aceh provincial administration to take advantage of the relatively peaceful situation following the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.
He said the ineffectiveness of the agreement was partly due to a lack of initiative on the part of the local administration to use the agreement to jump-start development and rehabilitation programs in the province and to campaign for peace. "We need a strong, credible and clean administration to use this peaceful period in Aceh to build on the people's trust," Mawardi said.
Jakarta Post - May 5, 2003
Banda Aceh -- Police said on Monday they found three bombs allegedly planted by separatist rebels on a road often used by police patrols, AFP reported.
The bombs were discovered in Siem on the outskirts of the provincial capital Banda Aceh late Sunday and were safely detonated in a nearby ricefield, said provincial police spokesman Sayed Husaini. He said the bombs, equipped with timers, could be heard within a radius of seven kilometers when they were detonated in a controlled explosion.
A peace deal signed December 9 between the government and the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is close to breaking down amid an upsurge of violence.
Two motorcycle riders wounded two youths when they threw a hand grenade at a beach at Ujong Blang near Lhokseumawe town on Sunday, said military spokesman Eddy Fernandi, adding that the men, believed to GAM members, escaped. A soldier was also seriously wounded on Sunday when rebels attacked a military outpost at Kuta Fajar in South Aceh, Fernandi added.
The government has given the GAM until next week to accept its terms for a meeting aimed at saving the peace deal.
West Papua |
Radio Australia - May 8, 2003
Australian Parliamentarians have been told that Indonesia's troubled province of Papua is the most likely future cause of problems between Jakarta and Canberra. A group of experts has also told the MPs and Senators that the hardline tactics of the Indonesian military have made it impossible for Papuan moderates to cooperate with Indonesia.
Presenter/Interviewer: Graeme Dobell
Speakers: Professor Jamie Mackie and other experts from Australian National University, including Drs Chris Manning, Harold Crouch, Robert Cribb and Professor Andrew MacIntyre
Dobell: Australia's Indonesia-watchers say a dangerous polarisation seems inevitable in Papua. The hopeful period of dialogue started by president Abdurachman Wahid in 2000 when Irian Jaya was renamed Papua is long past. Indonesia has backed away from the special autonomy law enacted two years ago but never put into force. Doctor Chris Manning.
Manning: It's very clear now, I think that the Indonesian government is basically going to leave Papua as sort of a disturbance or a boil that they will not touch unless disturbances occur and then there will be heavy crackdowns, human rights abuse. There have been a number of decisions very recently, the most important one is to break Papua into three different provinces, it was taken whithout any consultation whatsoever with the Papuan council which Indonesian government was meant to have set up and hasn't formally constituted in a legal sense. The Governor was not consulted the parliament were not consulted, it's an example of the way in which Jakarta is now treating Papua that basically it's on the periphery.
Dobell: Doctor Harold Crouch says the Indonesian military bears much of the responsibility for the history of unrest in Papua.
Crouch: The standard operating procedures seem to be just go into a villiage beat up people burn their houses and all of that sort of thing. You might have read in the newspaper about several Kopassus people who where actually put on trial for murdering Theys Eluay who was the leader of the peaceful movement for independence in Papua. And when they were sentenced to over three years, or four years or something, the chief of staff of the army said "But they were heroes, they were performing duties for the nation," and that sort of thing. So I think as long as you have got the top army leader or the chief of staff for the army not the whole armed forces, the chief of staff of the army believing it's the duty of soldiers to murder peaceful people who are working for independence, then I can't see how we could justify having a close military relationship with Indonesia.
Dobell: Doctor Chris Manning says policy towards Papua is likely to become erratic particularly because of the cycle of military crackdowns.
Manning: My personal view is that Australia should be very clear and very strong on human rights abuse in Papua, while at the same time reaffirming Indonesia's ... the right for Papua to remain as, under current circumstances as part of Indonesia. I think those two issues shoud be clearly distinguished and we should monitor those issues, we should protest loudly where human rights abuses occur, we should be well-informed about them but at the same time recognising that it is an Indonesian issue for the current circumstances. And I think that will go on for about five years. I don't think we're anywhere close to a Timor situation and in five years may be it's going to begin to develop in that direction.
Dobell: The Canberra academics judge that Indonesia is most unlikely to concede Papua a right of secession as it did in East Timor in 1999 or even offer the levels of autonomy discussed with Aceh. The reluctance stems from both mineral riches in Papua and from Indonesian national pride. Doctor Robert Cribb says Jakarta will see international pressure over Papua as part of a plot to break up the country.
Cribb: Very many Indonesians are afraid that Indonesia will unravel easily in the way that Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union unravelled and they believe that if that happens it will be a result of outside intervention, malicious outside intervention which wants to break up Indonesian unity in order to be able to exploit Indonesia's natural resources. It's a widespread and rather deeply-felt fear across Indonesia. I think it's quite unlikely to happen now, if there was a moment when it might have happened, it was in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Suharto and there's was a lot of talk about that in Indonesians circles at the time but that kind of breakup needs a sharp shock in order to happen. The much more likely scenario in Indonesia is for Papua and perhaps Aceh to emerge as they have already emerged as special cases in the way that East Timor was a special case. But however much Papua is portrayed as a special case, it will be seen by very many Indonesians as a step, another step or first step in a concerted international campaign to break Indonesia up.
Dobell: For Australian policy-makers Papua is a lose-lose proposition according to Professor Andrew Maclntyre
MacLntyre : It really isn't a good option here. The cards are all in Indonesia's hands and they're probably going to be misplayed, they're probably going to be misplayed. This is going to take a decade or two to play out. There is not really a policy option for us here. The only slender hope is that with consolidation of democracy over a period of a decade or two in Indonesia, that that might change the way some of these dynamics play out inside Indonesia. But there's not much that Australia can do and whatever we do it's not going to yield fruit for us.
Dobell: And Professor Jamie Mackie says Australia must continue as it does now to pledge its support for Indonesia's territorial integrity but after East Timor he says Indonesian policy-makers will always suspect Australia's intentions.
Mackie: If we were ever to say anything but yes we support the maintenance of a unified Indonesia, if we were to say anything but that, we'd arouse a hornet's nest in that country. So you've got to keep saying that up till the day when the secession if it ever is a secession actually happens, ever though you may know it's going to happen, as we suspected over Timor. So any government in Australia is going to be caught between the pressure to do something, to say something to show their hand in some way, and yet the conventions of international diplomacy are that you've got to stand by national sovereignty.
Jakarta Post - May 9, 2003
Endy M. Bayuni, Jakarta -- Trouble has been brewing in Papua, located at the other extreme of the Indonesian archipelago from Aceh where war with separatist rebels is imminent, but a US-based organization believes that the government in Jakarta could reduce tension in Papua, and use it as a model for conflict prevention in other regions.
So what is the answer for easing tension in Papua, where, as in Aceh, there is an equally strong demand for independence? By accelerating the full implementation of a 2000 law that gives Papua a special autonomy status with widespread authority as well as responsibility in managing its own affairs, according to the Council for Foreign Relations, a New York-based independent organization.
The council, in its report posted on its website (www.cfr.org) on Wednesday, proposed that the international community, including Indonesia's main donor countries, take a greater interest in helping Jakarta resolve the challenges it faces in Papua. It proposes a "Preventive Development Program" linking assistance for social and economic development programs with conflict prevention measures by Jakarta.
The report was prepared by the council's Center for Preventive Action. Chairing the center's Indonesian commission is Adm. (ret) Dennis C. Blair, who as former commander-in-chief of the Honolulu-based US Pacific Command is familiar with Indonesia and its problems.
Papua, one of Indonesia's wealthiest provinces in terms of natural resources, is home to some of the country's most impoverished people. The 2001 UNDP Human Development Index ranked Papua as the second poorest province behind West Nusa Tenggara.
Papua is a former Dutch colony like the rest of Indonesia, but unlike the other territories, it only became part of the republic in 1969, under controversial circumstances, after a lengthy military campaign launched by Jakarta against the Netherlands. Jakarta has, from the beginning, had to deal with a low-level insurgency movement launched by tiny bands of armed rebels.
Along with the democratization process since the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998, popular expressions for an independent Papuan state have been made in the open. The Papuan Presidium Council, gathering scholars, politicians and activists, was formed in 2001 with the agenda of pushing for Papuan's independence by peaceful means.
Gross injustices, rampant human rights violations, and economic inequality between Papuans and migrants, who now made up about 40 percent of the province's 2.3 million population, have fueled resentment, which in turn, fires up aspirations for an independent Papuan state.
These problems were highlighted by the report, which agreed that these could be redressed by the full implementation of the Special Autonomy Law. "Unless the people of Papua are accorded greater self-governance and more benefit from the development of Papua's natural resources, continued conflict could cause a spiral of violence in Papua. "It could also have a destabilizing effect elsewhere in Indonesia by encouraging ethnic, religious and separatist violence across the vast archipelago," the report said.
Council president Leslie H. Gelb is more forceful in his foreword to the report, saying that "achieving sustainable peace in Papua would build momentum to address other conflicts across Indonesia, and that Papua could serve as a model for conflict prevention more broadly."
The report said the implementation of the special autonomy law had been hindered by competing priorities in Jakarta, a heritage of mutual distrust, and due to lack of training and experience, inadequate capacity in Papua to handle greater responsibilities.
The report criticized President Megawati Soekarnoputri's decision in January to split Papua intro three provinces, noting that this had exacerbated tensions, and increased the prospects for conflicts. It called on Jakarta to quickly help the establishment of the Papua's People Assembly (MRP), as required by the special autonomy law, and stressed that any reorganization of the province must have the consent of this assembly.
The council suggested that donor countries and agencies use the "carrot and stick" approach to encourage Jakarta to implement the reforms set out in the autonomy law. "To use scarce development resources most wisely, the commission believes that development assistance can be sharpened by linking conflict prevention goals with socio-economic development programs, or 'preventive development'. "This would enable stakeholders to better coordinate and work more effectively with Indonesian government and Papuan officials."
The European Commission should propose and secure adoption of this preventive development program at the next meeting of the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), noting the European Union's earlier conflict prevention mission in Indonesia, it said. Given Japan's role as the largest aid donor to Indonesia, the report said Tokyo should host a donor conference to discuss this new approach to development.
The report was highly critical of the Indonesian Military (TNI) performance in maintaining security in Papua and urged the phasing out of the practices of using TNI forces to protect companies operating the province, a job that should be carried out by local security organizations.
The council underlined the US policy of supporting Indonesia's efforts toward consolidating democratic reforms and enhancing national stability as necessary to protect America's economic interests in Indonesia. It noted the US$25 billion in investments made by American companies to date, including the huge operation of Freeport McMoran Copper and Gold Inc. in Papua, and the $3.3 billion in American exports to Indonesia in 2001.
Jakarta Post - May 7, 2003
Nethy Dharma Somba, Jayapura -- Papua Police named an alleged commander of the separatist Free Papua Movement (OPM) as a key suspect in last month's armed robbery at the Wamena military district arsenal which left three men dead and dozens of rifles missing.
Papua Police chief Insp. Gen. Budi Utomo said on Tuesday that alleged OPM commander Michael Haselo, 35, had likely planned the arms burglary. Michael was one of seven alleged OPM members arrested, along with nine Indonesian Military (TNI) soldiers in Wamena for the burglary. Police said they had moved Michael from the Wamena district police station to the Jayapura police station on April 29 for further questioning. "We moved only one [suspect] because we believe that he was the mastermind behind the attack," Budi told reporters.
Police suspect that OPM rebels were behind the arms raid, and possibly aided by a group of TNI soldiers. Michael, Budi said, had told the police that he was the OPM commander for Wamena, holding the rank of brigadier general. He added that Michael might have been involved in other OPM-related cases in Wamena, including a violent riot in 2000. "So there are many things that we want to find out from him, which is also why we moved him to police headquarters in Papua," he explained.
The raid against the Wamena arsenal on April 4, left two soldiers and one suspected OPM rebel dead. At least 13 M-16 rifles, 13 SP-1 rifles and three PM rifles along with thousands of rounds of ammunition were taken by the robbers. The police investigators, however, also suspected several members of the military stationed at Wamena, due to the ease with which the group had pulled off the raid.
The military police unit of the Trikora Military Command, which oversees Papua, has arrested nine soldiers. They said three soldiers might have helped directly in the theft, while the other six were charged with negligence. Twenty-one of the 29 stolen rifles have been recovered in an operation involving 144 soldiers from the Army's Special Forces (Kopassus) and the Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad). They were flown in from Jakarta to help the local military in the hunt for the weapons.
A lawyer representing Michael dismissed police claims that his client was the mastermind behind the attack. "How could he possibly have been the mastermind? I have witnesses who saw Michael Haselo sleeping at the time [of the attack]," said lawyer Iwan K.
Nidoen. He also refuted police claims that they had nabbed Michael, saying the alleged OPM commander actually turned himself in to show that he was innocent after he learned that the police were searching for him. Iwan added that, just because Michael claimed to be the Wamena commander of OPM did not mean that he masterminded the raid.
Sydney Morning Herald - May 8, 2003
Marian Wilkinson, Washington -- A group of United States senators has called on President Megawati Soekarnoputri of Indonesia to make the investigation into the killing of two Americans and the wounding of eight others near the Freeport mine in West Papua "a national priority".
Seventeen Republican and Democrat senators wrote to Ms Megawati this month as the Administration prepared to brief Congress on the first release of new military training funds to Indonesia since the East Timor conflict.
The release of funds was expected this week, but concerns over the lack of progress in the investigation into the shootings at the American-owned Freeport gold and copper mine last August could once again delay it.
In their letter, the senators say the initial Indonesian police investigation "implicated members of the Indonesian military (TNI) in the attack". But, they complain, a second joint Indonesian military and police inquiry involving the FBI has "stalled". The head of the TNI, Endriartono Sutarto, has consistently denied any TNI involvement in the shootings.
The senators told Ms Megawati: "We are deeply troubled that there has yet to be a full and complete investigation resulting in the prosecution of those responsible for this murderous attack on unarmed American civilians." A Democrat senator, Patrick Leahy, pushed for the original cutting of funds under the International Military and Education Training program (IMET) over the TNI's human rights abuses.
"The TNI has behaved more like a criminal enterprise than a professional military," Senator Leahy said. "IMET should be resumed but not until the TNI co-operates with investigations of the killings of the Americans and other civilians and the individuals responsible are punished."
Complicating the investigation were revelations in March by Freeport executives that they had paid the Indonesian military and police $US5.6 million to provide security at the mine last year. Since 1996 Freeport has also spent $US35 million on facilities for the TNI.
Jakarta Post - May 6, 2003
Why has the government information campaign basically failed in Papua? The answers may have to do as much with the low penetration of the media among the Papuan people as with the message itself.
The IFES polling survey of 3,450 respondents found that many people in the province have no access to any type of media at all, making them virtually isolated from the rest of the world, and not just the rest of Indonesia.
The survey found that 52 percent of Papuans own radio, 41 percent have television, 17 percent read newspapers and one percent read magazines. But as many as 34 percent of the population have no means of keeping them abreast of what is happening in their own vicinity, and in the rest of the world. The provincial figures conceal a darker reality about the disparity, not between rural and urban (which is heavily skewed towards the urban), but more disturbingly, between the eight major different tribes (Table 4).
Table 4: Which media do you have access to in your home?
Source |
Lani/Dani |
Yaly |
Asmat |
Marind |
Biak |
Sentani |
Moi |
Baham |
Radio |
49 |
39 |
8 |
26 |
63 |
84 |
58 |
68 |
TV |
15 |
10 |
4 |
2 |
61 |
71 |
42 |
47 |
Newspaper |
15 |
7 |
3 |
2 |
28 |
48 |
6 |
34 |
Magazine |
-- |
-- |
-- |
5 |
-- |
- |
- |
|
None |
42 |
58 |
92 |
73 |
18 |
7 |
28 |
23 |
Source: Public Opinion Survey Papua Indonesia, IFES
Newspapers are mainly read for news purposes (88 percent), while radio is mainly listened to for news purposes. Television is used to access both news (52 percent) and entertainment (46 percent). The survey found no significant difference in media usage between different tribes. Most television (88 percent) and radio (90 percent) owners watch and listen every day. Newspapers are read mostly on a weekly basis (55 percent) though 31 percent of respondents read them everyday.
While the low penetration may have to do with Papua's difficult terrain and poor infrastructure that makes distribution or access difficult, there is certainly a strong need for significant improvement. The onus is more on the government to try to reach out to all the Papuans if it wants to win their hearts and minds and keep the territory part of the republic.
Jakarta Post - May 6, 2003
That Papua is one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia is beyond dispute, but what is less known to date is the deep disparity that exists there.
The IFES public opinion survey found disparities not simply between people in urban and rural areas, which is not that unusual in Indonesia, but also between indigenous Papuans and migrants (which today make up more than 40 percent of the population), and also between the major tribes in the province.
The survey looked at various social and economic indicators in the province, from access to education and health, to the means of transportation and the economic conditions of the 2.3 million population. The disparities found are potential social time bombs that could explode, lest the government in Jakarta and the Papuan capital of Jayapura quickly move to redress them.
The gross inequalities in Papua found in the survey should also serve as a warning to Jakarta to rethink its plan on splitting Papua into three provinces. That is, unless the government in Jakarta has anything other than the well-being of the Papuan people in mind.
The Papuan problem is already a mess without the government complicating it by dividing the territory into three parts, which would only exacerbate the existing divisions revealed by the survey. At first glance, the state of education in Papua did not look all that bad. School participation, for example, is 85 percent on average. But of those attending school, one third misses class from time to time, according to the survey. The main reason for missing on school is lack of finances, but "need to help at home" and lack of transportation are other potentially major problems. (Table 5).
Three in four (74 percent) students walk to school, and for indigenous Papuans, the incidence of walking to school is even higher at 82 percent. Poverty, in other words, has a lot to do with the poor rate of school attendance among Papuan children. Ignorance about school extends to parents, many of whom are unaware that school fees for elementary and high school will soon be dropped. Again the disparity between tribes makes compelling study.
What is the main reason for not attending school?
Reason |
Lani/Dani |
Yaly |
Asmat |
Marind |
Biak |
Sentani |
Moi |
Baham |
Financial constraints |
65 |
83 |
99 |
76 |
43 |
39 |
39 |
67 |
Need to help out at home |
16 |
8 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
17 |
32 |
3 |
Lack of transport |
15 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
18 |
10 |
Too far away |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
13 |
17 |
0 |
7 |
Source: Public Opinion Survey Papua Indonesia, IFES
On health issues, the IFES survey found that for most Papuans, going to a puskesmas (community health center) is the only choice in seeking medical treatment in the apparent lack of hospital and doctor's services.
Malaria is widespread, but to a lesser extent in the mountainous areas around Wamena, according to the survey. On average, 77 percent of all Papuans have had at least one household member contract malaria in the last 12 months. For some indigenous tribes, the incidence is significantly higher, up to more than 90 percent in some cases. (Table 6)
Table 6: Have you or any member of your household suffered from any of these illnesses in the past 12 months?
Lani/Dani |
Yaly |
Asmat |
Marind |
Biak |
Sentani |
Moi |
Baham |
|
Malaria |
35 |
67 |
96 |
68 |
96 |
79 |
84 |
89 |
Digestive problems |
16 |
35 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
2 |
Respiratory problems |
5 |
15 |
10 |
13 |
2 |
5 |
15 |
5 |
Dengue |
7 |
8 |
19 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
0 |
Other illness |
0 |
3 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
4 |
3 |
1 |
Illness unknown |
33 |
26 |
3 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
Never been ill |
37 |
18 |
4 |
20 |
4 |
19 |
8 |
11 |
Source: Public Opinion Survey Papua, IFES
"The results on this survey indicate that many areas of Papua, especially rural areas, suffer from inadequate health facilities. While the diet of most respondents includes a good mix of nutrients, a significant percentage of respondents indicate that they need to boil their water before drinking in most areas," the survey said in its summary of the health condition. "As with education, there has been little investment in public health infrastructure in Papua over the last few years."
Jakarta Post - May 6, 2003
Endy M. Bayuni -- Anyone wondering why many Papuans are bent on seeking independence should read a newly published public opinion survey, which finds the province mired in poverty and inequality resulting from neglect and, to some extent, exploitation.
The survey by the International Foundation for Election System (IFES) Indonesia shows these elements to be present in varying degrees across the huge, but densely populated province. Combined with the government's own low public standing relative to other institutions, and its failure to communicate its policies effectively, it is easy to see why many Papuans have never heard of the special autonomy law that Jakarta has been pushing so hard these last few years, and why, at the same time, awareness about aspirations for independence is running high.
The IFES public opinion survey, the most comprehensive ever conducted in the province, confirms the widely held perception that Jakarta has, for far too long, ignored the well-being of the Papuans, to the point that one of the country's richest provinces in terms of natural resources also has one of the highest incidences of poverty.
The survey, held between September and November, looked into such questions as the people's access to education, health and the media, and the state of transportation facilities, the economy and the environment. In all these areas, the results were found wanting.
No less important, however, are the survey findings that Papuans are largely ignorant of the special autonomy deal that Jakarta had offered; that awareness of their own aspirations for independence is high; and that they have a low opinion about the role of their local governments. There is also a strong awareness among Papuans about the deteriorating state of their forests. The survey, unfortunately, did not seek to explain what caused this deterioration in the eyes of the Papuans.
The extractive industries, particularly mining and forestry, by large national and international companies, have largely been blamed for the rapid degradation of Papua's environment.
IFES, an organization funded by US Agency for International Development (USAID), conducted the survey in cooperation with a host of Papua-based, non-governmental organizations and educational institutes, as well as local government agencies. It interviewed 3,450 respondents from all 12 regencies, selected to reflect urban and rural as well gender and generation mixes; included is a group of 1,604 respondents randomly selected from eight major tribes in the province: Moi and Baham in the west, Biak in the North, Sentani in the northeast, Lani/Dani and Yali in the central highlands and Asmat and Marind in the south.
With non-Papuans making up more than 40 percent of the province's 2.3 million population, the survey found disparities in opinion between them, and between the eight major tribes. "The objective of the survey was to gather a broad selection of useful information that could assist various stakeholders with an interest in Papua and its future development," IFES said in the introduction to the report. "It is anticipated that this survey will form the benchmark for future research and developmental projects in Papua. It is further hoped that the findings of this important study will create a constructive debate that will help to further the development of Papua in the best interests of its people."
The survey has found that while the few people who had heard of special autonomy had different interpretations of its significance, there seems to be little doubt about what their aspirations for independence mean: that Papua will become an independent nation.
The government granted Papua in 2002 special autonomy status, a scheme that supposedly gave the province widespread authority in managing its own affairs and, most important of all, a larger share of the revenue from its own natural resources.
A former colony of the Netherlands, Papua only formally became part of Indonesia in 1969 -- and then, under controversial circumstances. Although the UN and most of the rest of the world have recognized Papua as an integral part of the republic, Jakarta has been fighting a low-intensity insurgency almost from the start.
Since the downfall of the Soeharto regime in 1998, the struggle for Papua's independence has been carried out more in the open. Going hand in hand with a sporadic, jungle guerrilla war carried on by tiny bands of armed rebels, a group of Papuan politicians, activists and scholars have formed the Papuan Presidium Council to further the independence cause through peaceful means.
While its presence has been largely tolerated by Jakarta, one of its leaders, Theys Hiyo Eluay was murdered by members of the Army's Special Forces (Kopassus) in 2001, reflecting Jakarta's unease about its activities and the growing public support it is enjoying.
Special autonomy status was also granted to Aceh, another natural resource-rich province at the other extremity of the archipelago, where Jakarta is fighting another armed insurgency. This special status was the furthest that Jakarta has been willing to go in meeting halfway Papuan and Acehnese demands for independence.
But the IFES survey found that 83 percent of all Papuans have never heard of anything called "autonomy law". And even among the 17 percent who said they had heard of the law, they had a different understanding of its impact (Table 1).
Table 1: What would happen if special autonomy law were introduced in Papua?
Papuans would be protected |
49% |
Opportunities for education would be improved |
43% |
People would be better off financially |
40% |
Native Papuans would have own political institution |
15% |
No change |
10% |
Source: Public Opinion Survey Papua Indonesia, IFES
In contrast, the survey finds awareness of aspirations for independence running at 62 percent among all respondents, and 75 percent among indigenous Papuan residents. Among those who are aware, the question put to them was what would be the outcome if independence were introduced to them (Table 2).
Table 2: What would happen if Papua were to achieve independence status?
Papua would become an independent nation |
66% |
Papuans would be free to manage themselves |
60% |
Everyone would receive equal treatment |
28% |
Security would improve |
16% |
No change |
7% |
Source: Public Opinion Survey Papua Indonesia, IFES
IFES has also found that the Papuans respect religious institutions more than their provincial and regency administrations, or their adat (local customs) institutions. While few institutions were found to be disrespected, the survey says that the military and police topped the list of institutions least respected, with 10 percent and 8 percent respectively. Tribes in Wamena, however, had a larger proportion of people that did not respect these institutions, with up to 28 percent saying they disrespected the police and up to 20 percent saying the same for the Military.
Table 3: Which institutions do you respect the most?
Religious institutions |
50% |
Regency administration |
15% |
Provincial administration |
73% |
Reuters - May 6, 2003
Michael Perry, Sydney -- Tens of thousands of Papuans who fled Indonesia into neighbouring Papua New Guinea fearing abuse by the military have become a forgotten people, living in a stateless limbo for two decades, according to a new report.
The report by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) said the bulk of Papuans who began fleeing in the mid-1980s remain unprocessed as refugees, living substandard lives in jungle camps, fearful of eventual repatriation.
Margaret Piper, executive director of the Refugee Council of Australia and one of the authors of the report, said on Tuesday the international community had forgotten the Papuans as attention shifted to refugees in places like Rwanda and Bosnia.
"For the best part of two decades people have crossed the border and been left in a state of legal limbo -- a state of not being able to enjoy their economic, social and cultural rights, their rights to a livelihood, education and proper health care," Piper said at the release of the third ICJ report on the Papuans.
Indonesia's resource-rich eastern province of Papua, formerly known as Irian Jaya, is a separatist hotspot, but Jakarta has ruled out independence, determined to keep the world's most populous Muslim nation united.
Amnesty International has accused Indonesian forces of grave human rights violations in Papua. Seven members of Indonesia's elite special forces were jailed in April for involvement in the killing of Papuan independence leader Theys Eluay in 2001.
Some 12,000 Papuans crossed into Papua New Guinea in the 1980s when separatists and the Indonesian military clashed and the flow of border crossings continues.
"The human rights situation in West Papua is such that this problem of West Papuans seeking refuge in Papua New Guinea will not go away for some time," said another author Elizabeth Evatt.
The ICJ report "Seeking Refuge: The Status of West Papuans in Papua New Guinea" said tens of thousands of Papuans now lived in scores of authorised and unauthorised jungle camps inside the Indonesian-PNG border. It said thousands of children had been born stateless in the camps since the first crossings.
Jakarta wants the Papuans repatriated, arguing many are separatists or rebel supporters, but PNG has so far refused.
"The most important recommendation of this ICJ report is to stress there should be no forced repatriations of any border crossers who may be at risks of human rights violations," Australian politician and ICJ member Duncan Kerr told reporters.
The ICJ said administrative problems in cash-strapped PNG, a South Pacific nation struggling with political and economic woes, had stalled the processing of Papuans seeking refuge.
The ICJ said 3,600 Papuans lived in one camp of 34 square kilometres, with the nearest hospital 13 hours away. Another 12,000 live in 11 settlements scattered from the Ok Tedi River to the Fly River, establishing small gardens on land made available by local PNG villagers who see them as "Melanesian brothers", but disputes frequently arose over land and pigs.
"The situation is fragile. The situation is potentially disastrous -- there is a lack of land, an economic base, and there is tension between local landowners...," said Kerr.
Labour issues |
Green Left Weekly - May 7, 2003
Susan Austin, Jakarta -- About 10,000 people marched on May 1 in a colourful display of opposition to the anti-worker policies of the Indonesian government. Organised by the May Day Action Committee, the demonstration drew together contingents from many unions.
Among those participating were contingents from the FSP LEM (Trade Union Federation of Steel, Electronic and Metal Workers) and the FNPBI (Indonesian National Front for Labour Struggles). A new union called the IMWU (Indonesian Migrant Workers Union) also participated. The unionists were joined outside the presidential palace by a contingent of students from various organisations.
The protesters raised four main issues -- removal of the new labour laws, reduction of prices on nine basic commodities, rejection of President Megawati Sukarnoputri's "puppet government of imperialism", and solidarity among the workers and the poor of the Third World.
Organisers believe that the action was bigger than last year and included a broader section of the student movement. Following the radicalisation over fuel and other price rises in January, the May Day Action Committee members this year agreed to raise direct political issues, not just economic/labour demands.
The Indonesian Workers Union (SPSI), the former government- sponsored trade union federation, held a separate action outside the parliament building in Jakarta and a section of the student movement, including the Muslim student organisation KAMI rallied outside Megawati's residence.
May Day actions were held in other cities throughout Indonesia. Seven activists were arrested for distributing leaflets in Bandung, but were later released after paying money to the police.
Jakarta Post - May 5, 2003
Leo Wahyudi S. -- Thousands of workers staged rallies to mark International Labor Day on May 1 in an attempt to voice their rights, which they said were often overlooked by employers.
The workers also protested the government's stance for not siding with them when it endorsed the new labor bill. Both employers and workers said they realize employee-employer relationships are susceptible to disputes. Some workers and an employer shared the real situation with The Jakarta Post.
Anang, 48, is an employee at a bicycle manufacturer in Tangerang, Banten. He lives in Tangerang with his wife and six children: I joined the rally not only to mark Labor Day but also to express the importance of workers' rights.
This is the only way to get across to the government how workers who earn a low wage have to live, since the government never cares about us. I'll make high-ranking officials see that there are a lot of other workers who are even worse off than me.
I have been working at the company for 12 years, but my life has not improved. How can I lead a decent life if I have to support my family with a salary of just Rp 700,000 a month? I find it difficult just to cover our daily needs with this wage.
That reminds me of the depressing fact that I had to ask my son to quit junior high school last month because I could no longer pay his tuition.
I really wonder why the management does not respect workers who have been with the company for a long time and have a lot of experience to offer it. In terms of salary, there is only a small difference between senior and junior employees.
However, I have no idea of what else I could do. I'm getting older now and there are less options for me. What's worse is the company I'm at has not allowed us to work any overtime for years due to sluggish business. So I have to try hard to earn a little extra from doing side jobs, otherwise my family would die of starvation.
Kasmah, 24, is an employee at a garment company in Cakung, East Jakarta. She lives in Cilincing, North Jakarta with her fellow workers: I am convinced the government neglects low-income earners as the labor bill has been endorsed. That's why we staged the rallies here -- to let the government know how hard life is for us. I don't know why the company forces female workers here to work until 9 p.m., and then pays out a low rate for the overtime. We are so tired from working all day long.
It is too bad that the company will not accept any excuse to take time off. Even a doctor's note is not acceptable because the company only takes those that are issued by a hospital. If we get sick and need to go to a hospital, then it is considered a day off and we do not get paid for it. It's unfair and depressing.
It is no use protesting the policy. I believe that the company seriously exploits its workers. Well, in some ways things have gotten somewhat better with the increase in the regional minimum wage. Nevertheless, our rights are still neglected and our aspirations are always overlooked.
M. Nurdin, 39, runs his own business recycling paper. The father of three children works with scavengers from his residence in Srengseng, West Jakarta: I employ several workers and dozens of scavengers who collect used paper. It's not easy managing them, particularly the scavengers since most of them are uneducated. I have to be patient with them, so they can understand the rules of the business.
The most important thing in my line of work is regarding all my employees as fellow humans and not merely workers who we can exploit. I have told my employees many times that they are my partners and they should work professionally.
By taking such a personal approach, I have seen that they can enjoy their job so that it creates a conducive work atmosphere. In this situation, they are given a moral responsibility so that they will have to contribute something to improve the business because they will be the ones to reap the benefits from it.
I do not oppress my employees. I'm flexible in terms of having a personal relationship with them. I usually pay their expenses if they get sick or have some other special occasion. Despite the fact that I work with scavengers, I try to provide them with a minimum wage to instill loyalty in them.
However, I realize that the relationship between workers and employers is prone to disputes and so I try to be flexible with them in many ways.
Government & politics |
Straits Times - May 7, 2003
Devi Asmarani, Jakarta -- Three tycoons, two former generals, a revered Javanese sultan and an icon for religious tolerance -- these are some of the men whose names are in circulation for the coveted post of the presidential nominee for Golkar, Indonesia's second-largest political party.
And they all have one thing in common: They are -- relatively speaking -- party outsiders. With Golkar chairman Akbar Tandjung sentenced to three years' jail for corruption, pending an appeal to the Supreme Court, the party is having to fall back on an outsider for the elections in April next year.
But the top nominees will first have to vie for support from Golkar's leadership at an unprecedented party convention in February. During the convention, 528 party officials will elect the candidate who will run for the country's first direct presidential elections.
Golkar officials say they will shortlist the nominees to five people in a "pre-convention" in October. But with only five months to go before the selection process begins, the presidential aspirants have started doing the rounds to win support.
With 95 per cent of the votes in the convention coming from party leaders at the provincial and township levels, they have been going on cross-country trips to court voters.
One of them is businessman Surya Paloh, who owns Media Indonesia daily, the all-news TV channel Metro TV and a string of hotels and industrial catering firms. Aside from his business success, he is capitalising on his being a native of Aceh, the devoutly Muslim province that has been torn apart by separatism, and is promising to persuade the Acehnese to remain a part of Indonesia.
Mr Surya has the resources as well as connections to bankroll his campaign, but so does business tycoon Aburizal Bakrie of the diversified group Bakrie and Brothers, who has promised to focus his campaign on economic recovery.
But businessman-turned- Cabinet Minister Yusuf Kalla has an edge over them with his relative success in brokering peace deals between warring Christian and Muslim groups in Maluku and Poso, Central Sulawesi. His biggest asset is his prominence in eastern Indonesia, Golkar's traditional stronghold, where his business group Bukaka is dominant.
But noted Muslim scholar Nurcholish Madjid is tipped as the leading candidate. Known for advocating religious tolerance and criticising the politicisation of Islam in the country, the United States-educated scholar is seen as the most pro-reform of all the candidates.
At least three parties -- Golkar, the Nation Awakening Party and the Islamic-based Justice Welfare Party -- have named him as their possible candidate.
Disgraced former military chief Wiranto, Transport Minister Agum Gumelar, also a retired general, and Yogyakarta Sultan Hamengkubuwono X have also been tipped as possible candidates.
Party insiders say it is too early to tell who is the likely winner.
Top five contenders:
Nurcholish Madjid: Muslim scholar.
Strength: Mr Clean track record; pro-reform; supported by mainstream Muslims and the minorities.
Weakness: Political leadership largely untested.
Yusuf Kalla: Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare.
Strength: Has been able to bring semblance of peace in the hot spots of Maluku and Poso.
Weakness: Political skills untested.
Surya Paloh: Media icon.
Strength: Owns leading Media Indonesia daily and the only all- news station Metro TV. Hails from the separatist province of Aceh.
Weakness: Had business links to the family of former president Suharto.
Agum Gumelar: Transport Minister, retired general.
Strength: Seen as a moderate figure and an effective worker.
Weakness: Military background may turn off voters.
Sultan Hamengkubuwono X: Yogyakarta Governor and King.
Strength: Charismatic leader.
Weakness: Has little support outside of Java.
Laksamana.Net - May 5, 2003
While President Megawati Sukarnoputri keeps silent in the choice of her running mate in the 2004 direct presidential election, her husband Taufik Kiemas has taken a provocative stand by signaling the readiness of the Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) to join forces with Golkar, the political vehicle of former dictator Suharto.
Asked by reporters on Saturday for his response to the presidential candidates proposed by Golkar in their national leadership meeting, Kiemas said the party had named the best people. "If I were a presidential candidate, I would be more than willing to be their running mate."
Kiemas' statement made it clear that the leading figure within Megawati's inner circle as well as within PDI-P thinks his party would be sensible to build a coalition with Golkar, the second largest vote-winner in 1999.
The political objective is to create an absolute majority in the parliament as well as in the executive. Kiemas justified his praise for Golkar's list of possible candidates and the move to a coalition by saying "the most important thing is we share a common nationalist platform with the party [Golkar]."
Unfortunately for Kiemas, this kind of reasoning is totally in contradiction with that of his wife, PDI-P chairwoman Megawati. Her view had already been voiced by House faction leader Roy B.B. Janis in a meeting with anti-New Order activists on Thursday.
In response to pressure on PDI-P to avoid building a coalition with Golkar because of its legacy from Suharto's days, Janis denied the party' had made a definite decision to work with Golkar.
Janis admitted that PDI-P needs to form coalitions with other parties, given the fact that a successful presidential candidate will need to win more than 50% of the popular vote to form a new government.
"In facing the 2004 general election, PDI-P has yet to decide build coalitions with certain parties." Janis went further in explaining party policy direction. "We are of the opinion that the coalition must not be limited to the political elites, but must be built among the grass root-based groups," he said.
Given Janis' role as Megawati's spokesman in counterbalancing Kiemas' political interference within PDI-P leadership circles, Megawati can be assumed to believe that sharing a common nationalist platform is not enough in building a strategic coalition.
Megawati's scheme to build a coalition on the basis of broad- based support would provide a more solid and stable working platform.
When she took the presidency in 2001 by replacing the charismatic but erratic Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati surprised the political actors within and outside the parliament by taking sides with the Hamzah Haz, chairman of the Muslim-based United Development Party (PPP), rather than with Golkar chairman Akbar Tanjung and prominent military figures such as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono or Agum Gumelar.
Little wonder that Janis once said that in the upcoming 2004 presidential election, Megawati would choose her running mate by using the arrangement with Hamzah and PPP as a model. This was interpreted as meaning that in choosing her running mate, popular support for a partner would be the main consideration.
Kiemas' signal that PDI-P and Golkar have reason to get together on the basis of sharing a nationalist platform sounds simplistic seen from the standpoint of Megawati's approach. Megawati has always taken care to avoid being trapped in a polarization between Islamic and Nationalist sentiment.
At the October 1999 National Assembly Session, amid growing attacks from the Muslim parties in blocking her as the president based on her gender, Megawati refused the temptation to offer a power-sharing deal, especially with the Muslim political parties united under the Center Axis led by Amien Rais, chairman of the National Mandate Party (PAN).
Megawati remained unmovable even when she should have seen the reality that the Muslim-based party coalition would combine with Golkar to support Abdurrahman Wahid as president-elect.
At the time, Megawati rejected political bargaining based on ideological antagonism between Islam and Nationalism, even at the cost of losing the presidency.
Assuming she remains true to this stance, Megawati is unlikely to be as keen as her husband on a nationalist platform with Golkar. To do so would be to smear the other parties as non- nationalistic, provoking ideological antagonism of just the kind that marred the 1999 general election.
The difference of opinion between husband and wife, while nothing new, has provided a picture of the different methods used within the PDI-P leadership in building a power base. Kiemas, influential among the conservative nationalists, has been keen to try to preserve Islamic-nationalist unity.
Megawati, perhaps with a far more simplistic understanding of politics, sees nationalism as a matter of the spirit, and not merely a political vehicle. As such, there is no essential difference between a secular nationalist or a devout Muslim: both can be considered nationalist.
First husband Kiemas, who was responsible for encouraging his wife to enter politics in the first place, is considered by many to be the de facto PDIP chairman and accused of an enthusiasm for capitalizing on his wife's position.
Megawati, herself no longer particularly close to her husband, has placed a number of people as a "safety net" to block interference from Kiemas. Deputy secretary general Pramono Anung keeps control of policy on national issues, for instance. Representing Megawati's party direction and tasked with uniting the party rank and file is Roy B.B. Janis.
Within the government, Kiemas is blocked by State Secretary Bambang Kesowo, ironically a former Suharto man. Government sources have told Laksamana.Net on many occasions that Kiemas has been regularly frustrated by Kesowo.
When Megawati went to the United States shortly after the September 11 attacks in 2001, Kesowo again played the delicate task of keeping Kiemas out of an informal lunch hosted by President George W. Bush and congressmen. At the time, says a source, Kiemas was furious with Kesowo. To his credit, Kesowo, Suharto man or not, played the role of the professional public servant and did what the elected president ordered.
Kiemas has damaged Megawati's image and that of the government in business circles by providing fuel to feed strong and growing public skepticism that the government is not serious about combating corruption and nepotism.
It is common knowledge that Kiemas represents a Palembang "mafia" of individuals who occupy strategic positions in state-owned enterprises, including wealthy state banks, pension funds and securities firms.
Although his fortune is small by the standards of the Indonesian elite, Kiemas is said to be worth around $10 million. His connections to some of the businessmen who profited from the Suharto regime have raised fears of a return to crony capitalism.
His relationship with Megawati has given him a natural role as a power broker. He is often to be seen juggling meetings with coalition members and a succession of fallen business leaders.
Over the past few months he has met with the heirs of the Salim group's founder Liem Sioe Liong, property developer Ciputra, timber king Prayogo Pangestu, Gajah Tunggal group's Sjamsul Nursalim and, last but not least, textile baron Marimutu Sinivasan.
These were businessmen who went bust in the 1997-98 financial crisis and saw their assets seized by government. Now it looks as though they see Kiemas as the means to get those assets back.
Corruption/collusion/nepotism |
Jakarta Post - May 10, 2003
Bambang Nurbianto, Jakarta -- The Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) has found financial irregularities worth about Rp 820 billion (US$97.62 million) in the selected city administration offices and city-owned companies (BUMD), but the City Audit Agency (Bawasda) seems to be taking the news lightly.
Bawasda's head Firman Hutajulu claimed that his office had found no indications of corruption related to the 138 BPK findings at four city-owned enterprises and eight institutions in the city administration.
"Don't think that the findings are always an indication of corruption ... So far, we've only found that there were mistakes in procedures and administrative things," Firman told the press after meeting with Governor Sutiyoso on Friday.
Firman, however, stressed that his office would make a further investigation into BPK's findings, case-by-case, to see who should take responsibility for each of the irregularities involving taxpayer money.
In its report to the House of Representatives's Commission II for legal and home affairs in February, BPK said there were 79 irregularities in the eight institutions worth Rp 140.26 billion and 59 findings at four city companies worth Rp 678 billion.
The findings were based on the BPK's audits of routine and development expenses from the 2001 and 2002 City Budgets at the eight institutions and the 2001 and 2002 books of the four city- owned companies.
The eight institutions comprised the Central Jakarta and the North Jakarta mayoralties, the city transportation agency, the city training office, the city tourism agency, the city population and civil registration agency, the city parks agency and a number of religion and education offices.
While the four city-owned companies audited were bank PT Bank DKI, PT Food Station Tjipinang Jaya (known as the Cipinang rice market), property company PT Jakarta Propertindo and the Ragunan Zoo. There were no details given about the amount of money allegedly misappropriated from each institution or company.
In his argument that the irregularities were only administrative mistakes, Firman cited a case in the population and civil registration agency on the purchase of computers for an on-line system from his office to each subdistrict in the city.
He said that all the computers had been purchased and the specification of the products had met the requirements. "The problem was that the computers had not been installed. The project leader should be responsible for the sluggish process of computer installment," he said.
According to Firman, the head of each working unit like the head of agencies and the head of bureaus should not be held responsible for the irregularities made by project leaders, whose letter of appointment was directly signed by the governor. But he said that starting this year, the head of each working unit should also be responsible for any project in the working unit.
Recent reports said that there were a number of corruption cases allegedly involving city officials. However, the settlement of most of them remained unclear. Almost none of them went to court. In a few cases, several low-ranking officials received administrative sanctions, but their supervisors were untouched.
Jakarta Post - May 10, 2003
Jakarta -- The speaker of the Bogor municipal council has admitted to receiving Rp 1.59 billion of taxpayer money in late February from Mayor Iswara Natanegara and distributed the money to council members -- Rp 30 million each. Mochamad Sahid, the council speaker, however, told reporters on Thursday that the money had nothing to do with their approval of the mayor's accountability speech last month, Antara reported.
The scandal was revealed to the public by Nelwan Zola, secretary general of the non-governmental organization, The Indonesian Reform Movement (GerIndo), earlier this week.
Zola said that an investigation conducted by GerIndo found that the mayor authorized the transfer of the government funds to Sahid through a letter -- No.931/464/RT/2003 -- dated February 28, 2003. GerIndo requested an explanation from both the mayor and the council speaker about the money. Sahid said he was busy, and the mayor refused to respond.
On April 30, Gerindo reported the case to the local prosecutor's office. A week later, after no response from the prosecutors, Nelwan revealed the scandal to the press.
Regional/communal conflicts |
Agence France Presse - May 5, 2003
Indonesian prosecutors will bring subversion charges against 129 separatist supporters arrested in Maluku province, a police officer said.
Maluku head of detectives Chief Commissioner Usman Nasution said Monday the suspects will be charged with plotting against the state, a charge carrying up to 20 years in jail.
"The group is detained at three separate facilities and we are still waiting for prosecutors to complete the court documents," Usman told AFP by telephone from the provincial capital Ambon.
The 129 were arrested in the runup to or on April 25, the 53rd anniversary of the declaration of a Republic of South Maluku. They are accused of having sewn or flown flags of the outlawed republic.
Following the end of Dutch colonial rule, separatists proclaimed the republic in 1950 and staged a revolt against newly independent Indonesia.
The rebellion was suppressed but activists, mainly in the Netherlands, pursued a failed campaign for international recognition. Supporters of the Maluku Sovereignty Front are mainly Christians.
Front chairman Alex Manuputty and another official were sentenced to three years in jail in January for subversion. They had been arrested in Ambon in April last year after encouraging their followers to hoist separatist flags.
The independence movement does not enjoy widespread support among Christians in Maluku.
But the government of the world's largest archipelago, which faces far more serious separatist unrest in Aceh and Papua, is determined to crack down on any independence moves.
Health & education |
Asia Times - May 10, 2003
Richel Langit, Jakarta -- The harmonious relations developed before and during the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies seem destined to be short-lived for Muslims and Christians in Indonesia, the world's biggest predominantly Muslim country.
A controversial national education-system bill, which the House of Representatives (DPR) plans to endorse on May 20, has once again put Muslims and Christians on a collision course, raising fears of renewed bloody religious conflicts that could lead to territorial disunity.
The bill requires both state and private schools to teach religion to their students. It also states that religious lessons have to be taught by teachers of the same religion as the students. If enacted, the bill basically will oblige Christian schools to hire Muslim religious teachers if they accept Muslim students or Muslim schools to provide Christian religious teachers if they have Christian students in their classes.
Although the bill recommends no punishment for non-complying schools, Christian schools and experts have strongly opposed the bill. Christian schools, which in Indonesia are known for their high standard of education and strong discipline, attract thousands of Muslim children every year. And in some places, including the capital Jakarta and other big cities across the archipelago, Christian schools -- both Catholic and Protestant -- have more Muslim students than Christians. These Muslim students usually come from well-to-do families in which one or both parents went to Christian schools for their primary or secondary education.
Under the pretext of carrying out a religious mission, Christian schools require all students -- be they Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, or Christians -- to attend religious classes, which means Catholicism for Catholic schools and Protestantism for Protestant schools. Usually, these schools require the parents of non- Christian children to sign a letter of consent -- stating that they have no objections to their children attending Christian classes -- when they enroll. Failing or refusing to sign the letter means their children cannot study in Christian schools.
Such a policy, however, is not a monopoly of Christian schools. Muslim schools also require Christian students to take Islamic classes, including the recital of the Koran. Non-Muslim parents are asked to sign a letter of consent if they enroll their children at Muslim schools. The chance of Christians enrolling at Muslim schools, however, is very slim, as most Muslim schools are not up to the standard of most Christian schools.
Given the situation, it is no wonder that the education bill has drawn two different, opposing reactions. Christians have rejected the bill, while Muslim communities have generally welcomed the draft and called for its early endorsement. Street rallies for and against the bill have become regular features of big cities across the country. In big cities such as Jakarta and Surabaya in East Java, Christians and Muslims take turns demonstrating in front of the DPR or local legislature, calling for either the scrapping or endorsement of the bill.
While the protests have generally been peaceful so far, suspicions are running high between Christian and Muslim communities. Christians suspect that the bill is targeted against Christian schools. Some legislators deliberating on the bill have admitted that proponents of the draft aimed at exerting influence over Christian schools, where children of most high-ranking government officials enroll. Muslim hardliners have long harbored the suspicion that those Christian schools are part of what they consider as Christianization of Indonesia. Christians also suspect that the bill is part of efforts by Muslim hardliners to turn Indonesia into an Islamic country after they failed to insert the word syariah or Islamic law in the amendment of the 1945 constitution last year. Indeed, major proponents of the bill are Muslim-based political parties, some of which have publicly declared that the controversial education bill was a tradeoff after they agreed not to include syariah in the amendment to the constitution.
The suspicions are so intense that some Christian-dominated provinces such as East Nusa Tenggara, North Sulawesi, Maluku, and Papua have threatened to wage wars for independence if the DPR goes ahead with its plan to endorse the bill on May 20. But so far, legislators have refused to change articles in the bill requiring religious classes in schools.
Indonesians in general are still nursing the wounds inflicted by prolonged religious conflicts that broke out almost immediately after the downfall of the dictator Suharto in 1998. In Maluku province, where more than 10,000 people have been killed after bloody conflicts between Christians and Muslims broke out in January 1999, security authorities are striving to restore order. Peace remains shaky, with conflicts and bombings still taking place in the archipelagic province. The government, however, is now facing new problems in the province, including a secessionist movement called the South Maluku Republic (RMS) that has intensified its campaign for independence.
The situation is pretty much the same in Poso, Central Sulawesi, another site of religious conflicts. More than 2,000 innocent people have been killed in Poso since bloody conflicts between Christians and Muslims started in late 2000. Peace and order had slowly returned to the area, but not until security authorities deployed thousands of troops there.
Against this background, some quarters in society, including moderate Muslim groups, are wondering why the DPR insists on endorsing the education bill. Two nationalist factions -- President Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) and House Speaker Akbar Tanjung's Golkar -- have unexpectedly thrown their support behind the controversial bill. PDI Perjuangan and Golkar account for more than 50 percent of seats in the House. Speculations are running high that the two factions have agreed to endorse the bill in order get the support of Muslim communities in next year's elections, when the country is to hold its first direct presidential election.
Whatever the political motive for endorsing the bill, the draft has in effect removed harmonious relations developed between Christians and Muslims that developed over their joint opposition to the Iraq war. Both sides now harbor suspicions against each other. With conflicts brewing in some Christian-dominated provinces, Indonesia is heading for more turbulence.
Radio Australia - May 6, 2003
Sonya De Masi -- Indonesia has a growing drug problem. Some research suggests there are up to a million intravenous drug users and the numbers are increasing daily. Now under a bilateral agreement between the Australian and Indonesian governments, a training program is underway towards the development of a national action plan.
Speakers: Dr Bimanesh Sutarjo, Indonesia's National Narcotics Board member; Enny Nuriyani, Indonesia's Department of Social Affairs; Dr Windhu Burnomo, Faculty of Public Health, Universitas Airlangga Surabaya; Dr Diah Setia Utami, psychiatrist, National Hospital for Drug Addiction, Jakarta.
De Masi: Independent research suggests Indonesia could have up to one million intravenous drug users. Dr Bimanesh Sutarjo is a member of Indonesia's National Narcotics Board. He acknowledges the historical connection between the authorities and drug trafficking has made it difficult to introduce a strong national policy. But he says things have been changing in Indonesia.
Sutarjo: "It is changing, we cannot be certain, I guess it's a matter of sensitive matter to implicate that the army and police are involved in trafficking. But nowadays the law is very strict. That issue was brought up in late 90's perhaps but now there is very strict law with very hard punishment for those involved in narcotics, especially army and police personnel."
De Masi: After a restructure in 2002, the National Narcotics Board now oversees all elements of drug policy from surveillance and law enforcement to education. But while the authorities are no longer denying the existence of drug use in Indonesia, the pace of change has been slow. Enny Nuriyani works for Indonesia's Department of Social Affairs in Jakarta.
Nuriyani: "In my mind, law enforcement is the first way to prevent ... the best way so the community will understand the impact of using drugs. We also work with the community, with NGO's in our country about the prevention about rehabilitation and so on."
De Masi: She says community opposition remains strong, and many parents are reluctant to acknowledge their children might have drug problem. Dr Windhu Burnomo is from the Faculty of Public Health at the Universitas Airlangga in Surabaya.
Burnomo: "There is a perception that drug use is a sin, not that this is the problem in my community. For example, harm minimisation is the most important to prevent the spread of HIV because of IDU, injecting drug use, but until now, harm minimisation is still controversial in Indonesia."
De Masi: Regardless of the approach, without a coherent system of data collection, Indonesia's policy-makers say they are working in a vacuum.
Sutarjo: "We have a lack of data which always makes it difficult for government institutions to make policies concerning drug prevention and so on. How many people are detained in drug rehabilitation, how many drug rehabilitation centres are there in Indonesia in various provinces, and what are their capabilties? How big is the drug problem? We always say there is a growing problem, big problem but the data, we don't have it."
De Masi: Narcotics Board member Dr Bimanesh Sutarjo is a mentor of a training program designed to develop a standardised system of data collection to evaluate the extent of Indonesia's drug problem.
With funding from AusAID, under the Indonesia Australia Specialist Training Project, eighteen Indonesian professionals are training with experts from Melbourne's Victoria University and Burnet Institute. They include academics, representatives of the military and police, health professionals and officials from the education, health and social affairs departments. Dr Diah Setia Utami is a psychiatrist from the National Hospital for Drug Addiction in Jakarta.
Utami: "In Indonesia, drug abuse has increased sharply since 1997, when our country had problems, especially political and economic problems, so at the moment the main problem is about harm impact related to drugs ... like HIV AIDS, Hepatitis C or B, sexually transmitted infections, they are the main problems."
De Masi: The participants in the Melbourne program appear enthusiastic about the skills and methods they will take back to their respective workplaces. Dr Diah Setia Utami hopes it won't be long before they can convince Indonesia's policy-makers.
Utami: "It is very difficult, especially to make aware politicians and decision-makers like the Ministry of Health and other related departments. For example, for our pilot project of methadone treatment, we needed more than two years to make decision-makers sure it is an important program and it could be a solution to handle drug-users. Decision-makers are beginning to open their minds that this should be implemented in Indonesia."
Art & popular culture |
Asia Times - May 10, 2003
Gary LaMoshi, Denpasar -- Some of the most contentious issues across Indonesia involve ngebor, drilling. In the far eastern province of Papua, the division of the wealth from gold mining and mitigating the ecological impacts of extraction figure prominently in the province's movement for independence.
In Aceh at the far northwest tip of the archipelago, where a ceasefire between separatists and the government teeters on the brink of collapse, economic and environmental concerns over oil and gas drilling combine with interpretations of Islam to create volatile, divisive passions that threaten national unity.
That description also fits dangdut singer Inul and her ngebor dance thrusting seismic rifts throughout Indonesian society.
Ainul Rokhimah was just another kid in East Java dreaming of escaping the grind of poverty through music. She traded her ambitions as a rock star for dangdut, Indonesia's popular folk music that mixes Indian, Middle Eastern, Malay and Portuguese rhythms with other influences ranging from jazz to Led Zeppelin. Like country music in the United States, dangdut has shaken off its low-class roots and gained mainstream appeal.
Saving her pennies from singing for Rp3,500 rupiah, she made her way to Jakarta, picking up a new name, Inul Daratista. More important, she picked up her trademark ngebor hip gyrations. Pirated video compact discs (VCDs) brought Inul nationwide exposure that has made her Indonesia's top-earning entertainer, commanding up to Rp20 million (more than US$423,000) per show, as well as the center of national controversy.
Elvis vs King Inul draws comparisons with a trend-setting, hip- swinging singer of another continent and era who also overcame humble roots to achieve fame so great he was identified by first name alone: Elvis. However, Elvis had it all over Inul in the looks and voice categories. Without those below-the-waist- drilling moves, nothing would distinguish Inul from thousands of skinny 25-year-old Indonesian females.
That made the outcome of Inul's meeting with Rhoma Irama particularly terrifying. The newcomer went to pay her respects to the singer popularly known as the King of Dangdut who introduced heavy metal to the genre's musical mix. In addition to those credentials, Rhoma is an Islamic cleric and head of the Association of Malay Music Artists, the dangdut trade group.
His highness reportedly lashed into Inul, characterizing her ngebor as "pornographic", and forbade her to sing any of his songs. He further accused Inul of "throwing dangdut music into the mud, tearing apart the nation's social fabric and encouraging illicit sex and rape". The Indonesia Council of Ulemas, the nation's second-largest Muslim organization, supported Rhoma's call for Inul to abandon drilling, as did the Alliance for Anti- Pornography Society.
Rhoma's comments triggered a swift backlash, the norm in Indonesia. Traditionally, the public has gone along with establishment figures, particularly venerable, successful ones and those with religious credentials. Rhoma wins the trifecta by those criteria.
Drilling rights controversy
However, the public reaction was decidedly for Inul, not against her. A poll in news weekly Tempo found nearly 80 percent opposition to banning Inul's performances. A majority of respondents contended that Rhoma overreacted out of jealousy to a new star threatening to eclipse his fame.
In addition to backing from the general public, more than 90 human-rights and civil-liberties groups declared their support for Inul's freedom of expression. So did President Megawati Sukarnoputri's husband and brother, along with former president Abdurrahman Wahid, who is also a former leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, the nation's largest Islamic organization. (Some wags noted that Wahid wouldn't see anything wrong with Inul's swaying since he's virtually blind.) Many readers will be able to judge for themselves when Inul's international tour swings throughout Asia, Australia, the Netherlands and the US.
Women's activists -- outraged at Rhoma's update of the hoary suggestion that rape is a consequence of titillation with women to blame -- and performers from the movie industry demonstrated their support for Inul last Friday in downtown Jakarta, presenting their interpretations of her ngebor dance from the back of a flatbed truck with Inul's music blaring. In West Java, several hundred dangdut artists held their own rally to back Inul's freedom of expression. Television stations continue to air Inul's snack-food and energy-drink commercials that include drilling.
It's fair to ask whether the controversy swirling around Inul and her twirling hips indicates Indonesia is growing up or dumbing down. With an estimated 40 million unemployed, no way out of an economic crisis in its sixth year, its first free direct presidential election ahead next year and no worthwhile candidates in sight, surely Indonesians have more pressing matters than an insignificant dangdut singer.
Questioning authority
Still, it's undeniable that Inul, like Elvis, indicates the times they are a-changin'. For example, it's a shift from the authoritarian days for public defiance of an old lion like Rhoma in favor of an underdog newcomer. While Rhoma may be yesterday's man, he still wields significant power behind the scenes in the music industry, where the real action in Indonesia remains.
Perhaps equally significant is the readiness to dismiss religious authorities' moral preaching. Inul found support in some Islamic circles, but that's beside the point. "This ought to tell people not to worry so much about the power of radical Islam here," one of my Muslim friends notes. "People don't follow everything they hear in the mosque".
Academics have seized on the defense of Inul's freedom of expression to demonstrate how much things have changed since the bad days of Suharto. However, support for Inul has been far from absolute. Some, like deposed president Wahid, contend that only the Indonesian Supreme Court can restrict expression. Others say that it's up to the community to set standards to replace those of Suharto's authoritarianism, warning of social and moral degradation without such standards.
It's interesting to note that defenses of Inul have been far more spirited and less qualified than those heard for journalists. You can dismiss that difference on simple grounds: watching a young woman sway her hips is far more appealing than anything you'd read in a newspaper. More cynical observers would add that whatever ripples Inul causes in Indonesia's moral fabric, there's little chance she'll upset the prevailing power structure beyond the music business.
Students of musical politics will note that Elvis pushed the boundaries in the US, but it took The Beatles, an injection of genius from overseas, to create a social revolution. Across the front page from Inul, news that Singapore's government investment company and Deutsche Bank bought the Indonesian government's stake in Bank Danamon is a reminder that such foreign inspiration is a long way off. Inul, her critics and supporters indicate that domestic genius is no more evident.
International relations |
Straits Times - May 5, 2003
Devi Asmarani, Jakarta -- Despite having opposed the United States' invasion of Iraq, Indonesia will probably not be among those countries that suffer trade punishment by the US, analysts here believe.
They say the US understands that support for the war by the world's largest Muslim nation, amid escalating anti-US sentiment, would have been tantamount to political suicide for the government of President Megawati Sukarnoputri. This would destabilise the country and possibly the region, where the US has strong interests.
Economist Umar Djuoro of the Habibie Centre think-tank said: "I think that the United States will tolerate Indonesia to a limit. As long as Indonesia does not do something to disrupt the stability of the region -- such as giving room for the escalation of terrorism -- the United States knows it cannot expect much from Indonesia because of our situation." And Indonesia kept its promise to safeguard US interests at the height of anti-American protests last month.
The much-anticipated protests proved to be more subdued than in other countries. The harsh anti-war and anti-US statements by Indonesian officials and politicians were directed largely at the domestic audience.
A political risk consultant said: "The US knows the psyche of Indonesian politics. They learnt it the hard way when three years ago their ambassador Robert Gelbard was talking tough to Indonesians, ending up alienating and angering the Indonesians. So now they treat Indonesia more delicately because they have such strong interests here." That is why Indonesia will get neither rewards nor punishments from the US.
Others believe the US offers of trade rewards for supporting its Iraq policy were not worth the risk to domestic support.
Economist Dradjat Wibowo of the Institute for Development Economic and Finance said: "I think that if Indonesia had supported the war on Iraq, the political and social cost to the country would be bigger than the possible reward from the United States. And even now, we hardly see any token of appreciation from the US for what Indonesia has done in the war against terrorism: the arrests of the Bali blast suspects, the trial of Abu Bakar Bashir. There's no reward of any kind despite all the kudos they have been giving us."
And any rewards, he said, probably would not have included the removal of some of the fundamental obstacles to Indonesian exports to the US.
The US is Indonesia's biggest export destination, especially for food products, forestry and textiles. Yet trade restrictions imposed by the US have limited access for Indonesian exporters and made them less competitive. These restrictions included the Bioterrorism Law and environmental laws on imports of products such as shrimp, said Mr Wibowo.
"There are a lot of regulations imposed by the US that are not conducive to our exports of biological products, food products and forestry," he said. "And I am not sure the US can give concessions to Indonesia on this because they have domestic politics to worry about." More attractive to Indonesia, he said, would be a reward in the form of a debt cut to help the country's fiscal sustainability, he said.
Mr Dradjat said a punishment on Indonesia by the US would be counterproductive because of US strategic interests. "The US should realise the limitation of Indonesia's domestic politics," he said.
Military ties |
British Observer - May 11, 2003
Richard Bingley -- Soon after Labour came to power in 1997, its approach to arms sales to Indonesia became the litmus test for the new ethical dimension to foreign policy expounded by a former anti-arms campaigner himself, the incoming foreign secretary Robin Cook.
Late in the 1970s, as an aspirant MP, Mr Cook had disgorged his contempt in the New Statesman magazine at Jim Callaghan's Labour government. They had continued to sell fighter jets and military equipment to President Suharto's barbaric, expansionist Indonesian regime, which was three years into its illegal, UN- condemned occupation of the former Portugese colonial beachhead East Timor which led to deaths of a third of its tiny population.
The indications were that Labour would be more sympathetic to those in the firing line of UK arms exports. During his first Mansion House speech as Prime Minister in 1997 Tony Blair said: "Human Rights may sometimes seem an abstraction in the comfort of the west, but when they are ignored, human misery and political instability follow. The same is true if we ignore the ethical dimension of the trade in arms."
But on entering power his new government was faced with an immediate Hobson's Choice. The departing Conservative government had just approved a hefty arms deal with their old South East Asian cold war ally in Jakarta for 16 Hawk Jets (worth 160 million Pounds) and 50 Scorpion armoured vehicles (worth 100 million Pounds) manufactured by Telford based engineering company Alvis. New Labour ministers faced a choice.
Should they revoke licenses for the deal agreed under the last- rites days John Major's administration? New Labour had the stark choice of either appearing principled in sticking to their ethical foreign policy pretensions, or "anti-business" by refusing hundreds of millions of pounds of investment. For fear of being seen as "anti-business" or "inexperienced" the new cabinet chose to back the deal, and allow the Hawk jets and Scorpion tanks to be shipped. Ministers explained the decision in practical business terms; namely that Britain wanted to sustain its global perception as a reliable military equipment provider and that officials didn't have the power to revoke existing licenses.
In response, public advocacy groups Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), Tapol -- the Indonesian Human Rights Campaign and the World Development Movement (WDM) joined forces and called for a judicial review on the decision. The request was flatly turned down. The campaigners had pointed to a 1994 DTI trade order which said: "A license granted by the Secretary of State ... may be varied or revoked by the Secretary of State at any time."
When they made the controversial decision, New Labour ministers were already aware of the notoriety attached to Scorpion vehicles in that part of the world. Scorpion Personnel carriers, kitted out with 90mm howitzers and two mounted machine guns apiece, snarled through a campus at the Islamic University of Indonesia at Ujung Padang, South Sulawesi in April 1996. Three students were killed and many more injured. Scorpion vehicles were later filmed in May 1998 at Trisakti University in Jakarta and then again later that year in Jakarta. Protesters were killed at both demonstrations, which turned into microcosms of China's Tianamen Square bloodbath.
Since the university crackdowns, UK government figures reveal that British arms supplies continue to pour into Indonesia's troubled archipelago. Some 97 individual export licenses worth 19.5 million Pounds and 38 open export licenses (with an incalculable value) for military equipment were approved by the UK DTI for transhipment to Indonesia between January 1999 and December 2001. Arms sales included armoured vehicles, military communications, missile technology and parts for the already-sold multi-role jets and a plethora of electronics and components to keep Indonesia's armed forces battle-ready -- even if it is against predominantly innocent civilians who didn't realise they were involved in a fight against anyone in the first place. Few people debate any state's right to defend itself in the face of aggression.
Even though Indonesia has disengaged from East Timor, the huge archipelago faces conflict and turmoil from a myriad of separatist groups. A few are quite simply nefarious, amorphous terrorist organisations such as those responsible for the car bombing of a Bali nightclub killing around 200 people in October 2002. But many so-called "separatist groups" represent those that have had their cultures and communities trashed in conflict with official TNI forces and intractable, vicious pro-government paramilitaries.
The unstinting sale of arms not just lends a blessing to Jakarta's Iron Rule, but undermines any need to negotiate or contemplate a sustainable political solution; the type we rightly hear so much about from government ministers with regards to Northern Ireland or the Israel/Palestinian conflict.
In November 2001, I questioned the UK Foreign Office about Information Centre for a Referendum in Aceh reports chronicling thirty male palm oil plantation workers being summarily executed by the West Java Siliwangi division of the TNI (Indonesia's armed forces). Days later, in Idi Tunong, another East Aceh district, nine males were executed by soldiers, including five boys aged between 13 and 16. The FCO official could not confirm the perpetrators, but verbally concluded to the best of his organisation's knowledge that the killings had taken place. He estimated that around 1,500 people -- the vast majority innocent civilians -- had already been "murdered" in Indonesia's range of conflicts in that year alone. Yet his department still tend to look leniently upon the sale of arms to many of these massacres' arch suspects -- government-backed Indonesian security forces.
As 6,000 Indonesian soldiers now head for Aceh from the Naval base of Ujung in East Java, supported by sophisticated British- made Scorpion personnel carriers, the reality of selling arms is beginning to bite for Labour ministers. These latest disclosures from Jakarta have blown a hole through the arms sellers' myth and the politicians' anodyne. Namely, that our country can ship arms to the world's most lethal armed forces and for some profoundly mystical reason they don't ever get used. Now this theory is finally debunked, surely the arms deals should follow suit.
Economy & investment |
Jakarta Post - May 10, 2003
Fitri Wulandari, Jakarta -- The business sector has demanded that the government continue working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through a post-program monitoring system, saying the fund's presence is still crucial to maintain international confidence in the country.
"We agree that the IMF program should not be extended [when it ends later this year], but we can't get rid of it [IMF] all at once because it lends credibility," Sofjan Wanandi, chairman of the National Committee for Economic Recovery (KPEN), said in a media briefing on Friday. Therefore, he said, the only alternative after the contract with the IMF expires at the end of this year is to proceed with post-program monitoring.
The IMF's presence, Sofjan said, not only brings financial support, but more importantly lends confidence. "Capital inflows are still good now because investors are confident that the government can carry out economic reforms under the IMF," he said.
Sofjan added that if the government chose to cut ties with the IMF altogether and repay its debt to the fund, amounting to around US$8 billion, investor confidence in Indonesia would likely drop as the country's foreign exchange reserves would also decrease from the current level of $33 billion. "It would raise Indonesia's country risk and this would make it more difficult for us to compete internationally. It would be more costly to do business," he said.
Post-program monitoring is a requirement for IMF members who complete its program. Under the arrangement, IMF would only monitor how the government carries out structural economic reforms. Severing ties with the IMF also means that Indonesia would likely lose access to the debt rescheduling facility from the Paris Club.
However, staunch critics of IMF say the government should completely cut ties with the fund to allow more room for maneuver for faster economic recovery. They contend that the IMF had failed to save Indonesia from the crisis in 1998 and its rigid, textbook economic policies had prolonged the crisis. They also argue that the IMF forced Indonesia to liberalize its market at a faster pace, which had victimized domestic producers.
Economist Sri Mulyani Indrawati, IMF executive director for the Southeast Asia region, said totally settling the IMF loan would send the wrong signal to the market, create panic and eventually threaten the economy. "When the market sees Indonesia's foreign exchange reserves drop, they would think there must be something wrong with our country," Sri said at a discussion on Friday.
It would unsettle the market. And when the market panics, it influences all economic indicators such as exchange rates, interest rates and inflation. Eventually, it would influence our balance of payment and deplete the already low foreign exchange reserves.
She said other Asian countries that were in a healthy economic condition were racing to increase their foreign exchange reserves to regain market confidence. "Don't force payment of the whole IMF loan just to get rid of it. Market confidence is important," Sri stressed.
Sofjan underlined that the IMF's presence was still crucial to monitor the government's budget discipline, particularly in the current uncertain political situation with the possibility of military action in Aceh and the legislative elections. "Political pressure could force the government to spend more money," he said.
As the end of IMF program nears, debate on how Indonesia should continue economic reform is increasing. Previously, the IMF gave three options for completion of the current arrangement. They are a "standby arrangement", a "precautionary standby arrangement" or completely ending the arrangement, which means Indonesia automatically will be put under post-program monitoring.
Both standby arrangement and precautionary standby arrangement would still give Indonesia access to special loans from the IMF upon approval of its reform programs. However, Indonesia would not have access to debt rescheduling facilities with the precautionary standby arrangement and post-program monitoring.
Jakarta Post - May 10, 2003
Jakarta -- Twenty companies in the Tangerang municipality have stopped operations due to the slow business over the past few years, causing 36,108 people to lose their jobs, an official said.
Adang Turwana, head of the municipality manpower office, was quoted by Antara as saying on Wednesday, that another 30 companies were experiencing financial difficulties and could also stop operating.
The 50 companies, producers mainly of items exported to foreign countries, had suffered greatly. The condition worsened because of the labor demonstrations that resulted in their low productivity and failure to compete in the free market, Adang said.
Currently, there are about 1,500 companies in the Tangerang municipality.
Book/film reviews |
Far Eastern Economic Review - May 8, 2003
[Indonesia's special forces have tarnished that country's human- rights record. Yet, they weren't always maligned, writes John McBeth KOPASSUS: Inside Indonesia's Special Forces, by Ken Conboy. Equinox Publishing. $14.99]
Prolific Jakarta-based author Ken Conboy probably wouldn't have had anyone to talk to in Indonesia if he had not elected to restrict his history of the Indonesian special forces to the period before 1988.
By ignoring the political manipulation, breakdown in discipline and outright criminality that has tarnished the secretive unit's reputation over the past decade, Conboy has ended up telling only half of the story.
Kopassus, the acronym by which Indonesia's special forces are known, has done considerable damage to Indonesia's human-rights image abroad. Yet, in earlier years Kopassus served as the wellspring for most of the military's top brass and was regarded by United States special forces instructors as arguably the best special operations unit in Asia.
Nevertheless, the seeds of its destruction were always inherent within Kopassus. Highly trained special forces soldiers have long been used by their superiors to protect gambling houses, brothels and other criminal enterprises -- the result of a budget shortfall that has forced the military to scrounge for spoils.
With funding drying up in the late 1990s, money-making began to take precedence over Kopassus' primary mission, with soldiers in the field becoming little more than hired guns in the pay of the powerful.
Being for years at the centre of political intrigue also had a corrupting influence. In the mid-1990s, when President Suharto was nearing the end of three decades in power and his then son-in-law, Maj.-Gen. Prabowo Subianto, was in charge of Kopassus, it became clear the special forces were used against Suharto's political foes to a degree that far outweighed the importance of those activists as a threat to the regime. The enigmatic Prabowo probably deserves a book of his own.
At the outset of his book, Conboy acknowledges the shortcoming of not going further into the present, pointing out that an objective assessment of Kopassus' performance through the 1990s would be "all but impossible given the existing vested interests and the lack of historical perspective." From 1997 onwards, he notes, "it often became impossible to say what was a bone fide operation sanctioned by the army chain of command, and which were missions with Kopassus personnel moonlighting on behalf of political interests."
As it is, Conboy takes a conventional approach favoured by military historians, tracing the life of Kopassus from its birth in 1952. He documents its role in putting down the Permesta rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi in 1958-61, its ill-fated attempts to infiltrate Dutch-held West Irian before the United Nations eventually transferred the territory to Indonesian rule, and its involvement in the orgy of bloodletting that occurred in the uprooting of the Indonesian Communist Party in the mid-1960s.
Other chapters review the role of special forces operations against British and Commonwealth troops in Borneo during the "Confrontation," the term coined by Indonesia's Foreign Minister Subandrio in January 1963, referring to Indonesia's efforts at that time to destabilize the new Federation of Malaysia.
Also, Conboy looks in detail at the part played by Kopassus in the invasion of East Timor and its subsequent efforts to track down pro-independence Fretlin leaders.
One little-known factoid the author reserves for the last few pages: the appearance in the late 1980s of "Arizona" -- the code name given to a rotund adviser from Israeli's Mossad intelligence service who instructed the special forces in the theory of intelligence-gathering.
On a positive note, Conboy sheds new light on Operation Woyla, in which Indonesian commandos stormed a hijacked Garuda DC-9 at Bangkok's Don Muang airport on March 31, 1981, freeing all 50 passengers. Led by Lt.-Col. Sintong Panjaitan -- whose career subsequently came to an end when he was held responsible for the 1991 Dili, East Timor, churchyard massacre -- the operation was accomplished with just three days of training.
Former defence chief Benny Murdani says that three of the terrorists were killed and the two others died later of their wounds. Conboy notes that when the aircraft carrying the troops left Bangkok on its flight home, only three of the five caskets aboard were filled. "Mysteriously," he says, "the remaining pair of hijackers -- who were very much alive when they departed Bangkok -- filled the remaining two boxes when they landed in Jakarta." Operation Woyla was successful, though Kopassus got little credit.
[John McBeth writes for the Review from Jakarta.]