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Indonesia News Digest No
49 - December 16-22, 2002
Jakarta Post - December 21, 2002
Jakarta -- The Supreme Court has ruled to favor of Shangri-La
Hotel in its termination of 75 former hotel employees who were
involved in a strike, illegal demonstrations and occupation of
the hotel in December 2000.
"The decision was taken on Thursday and it is final," hotel
senior manager Wastu Widanto told The Jakarta Post on Friday.
"The Supreme Court has backed the previous decision of the
Central Committee for the Settlement of Labor Disputes (P4P) on
the termination," he added.
Wastu also said the hotel management offered the 75 former
employees compensation packages far better than required
according to government regulations. "We, however, rule out any
possibility of reemploying them as the Supreme Court's decision
backed the termination," he said.
Agence France Presse - December 21, 2002
Peace monitors began work in Indonesia's Aceh province as fresh
violence erupted between troops and separatist rebels despite a
ceasefire pact this month.
Rebels blew up an army truck and opened fire at soldiers in an
ambush Thursday at Kuta Makmur in North Aceh, said military
spokesman Major Eddi Fernandi. The soldiers were on their way
back from picking up stores and were not in search of Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) rebels, Fernandi said.
"The GAM members had been expecting us and they fired from the
hill," he said on Friday. He said the army truck was badly
damaged when three bombs placed under a bridge which the vehicle
was passing exploded. A soldier was seriously wounded.
A local GAM spokesman, Tengku Jamaica, said the rebels had acted
in self-defense because the troops were out to hunt them. "It
would be foolish if we did not take any action. We don't want to
die in vain," he said.
The clash prompted hundreds of local residents to seek refuge at
a polytechnic in Lhokseumawe some 20 kilometers away, witnesses
said.
The Joint Security Committee, set up following the signing of the
peace pact on December 9, held its first meeting at a hotel in
this provincial capital to discuss a working agenda.
The committee is made up of representatives from the government,
the rebels and international mediators representing the Geneva-
based Henry Dunant Center (HDC). It is charged with monitoring
the implementation of the peace agreement, investigating
violations and setting up demilitarized zones.
The 15-member panel, whose top international member is a Thai
general, will be backed by about 150 monitors -- a third from the
Indonesian military or police, another third from the rebels and
an equal number from the Thai and Philippine military.
Aceh/West Papua
Corruption/collusion/nepotism
Regional/communal conflicts
Focus on Jakarta
News & issues
International relations
Labour issues
Shangri-La wins its court case
Aceh/West Papua
Rebels and troops clash again in Aceh despite peace pact
TNI considers dropping libel suit
Jakarta Post - December 18, 2002
Jakarta -- The Indonesian Military (TNI) is considering dropping its plan to sue US-based The Washington Post daily provided it writes a letter apologizing to TNI for the use of unverified intelligence reports by its reporters.
Speaking after a meeting with lawyers representing the Post on Tuesday, TNI lawyer Trimoelja D. Soerjadi said that TNI was now seeking a written apology from the Post should it object to demands to publish a front-page apology in several newspapers in the US and Indonesia.
"TNI objects that the Post used intelligence reports without carrying out further investigation. Nevertheless, should the Post object to TNI's demands, we [TNI] simply seek a letter expressing their apology," Trimoelja announced at a joint media conference.
TNI had threatened to file a US$1 billion lawsuit against the Post unless the daily ran a front-page apology in Indonesian and US newspapers over its report that TNI leadership was implicated in killings at Timika, Papua, in August, at which two Americans and one Indonesian were killed.
The story, published on November 3, was written, according to the Post, on information from a "highly reliable source -- a US official -- and an intercept held by Australian intelligence." According to the story, military top brass, including TNI Commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, held a meeting to discuss the attack in an attempt "to discredit the Free Papuan Movement [OPM]." "In Indonesia, the use of intelligence data in newspaper reports is unusual but in the U.S, which respects press freedom, it is common practice," lawyer representing the Post Todung Mulya Lubis said at the same conference.
Todung and Trimoelja said both parties, "will seek dialog to explore options for a peaceful solution" to the dispute.
Associated Press - December 16, 2002
Jakarta -- Around 30 suspected separatist rebels, some armed with automatic rifles, ambushed a group of government officials in Indonesia's Papua province on Monday. At least two of the attackers were injured, officials said.
The attack took place close to the province's border with Papua New Guinea, said Suryanto, who heads the border affairs office in Papua province. The group was traveling in a single car to the border to pick up Indonesian Ambassador to Papua New Guinea John Djopari, said Suryanto, who goes by a single name. None of the Indonesian officials were hurt, said Suryanto, who was traveling with the entourage when the attack occurred.
Soldiers traveling with the officials shot and injured at least two of the rebels. All the insurgents escaped, he said. The entourage returned to Papua's provincial capital, Jayapura, after the incident, Suryanto said.
A small group of rebels in Papua, a resource-rich province about 1,400 miles east of Jakarta, have been fighting for an independent state for the past 39 years. The Indonesian military has blamed separatists for a roadside ambush in August in which two American teachers and an Indonesian colleague were shot to death. The rebels have denied any involvement.
Radio Australia - December 16, 2002
Life appears to be returning to normal in Aceh, a week after an historic peace deal was signed in Geneva.
Previous deals between the Indonesian government and separtists from the troubled province at the northern tip of Sumatra have failed.
But this time there's been significant international involvement in the mediation process, with the first batch of international monitors arriving in Aceh as soon as the deal was signed. Kevin McQuillan compiled this report.
The Geneva talks involved Indonesia's local military chief General Djali Yusuf and his separatist counterpart, the Libyan- trained Muzakkir Manan from the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).
"During the talks, we both stated our commitment to restrain our respective soldiers so that they do not engage in offensive actions on the field," says General Yusuf.
"If there are any anomalies, we will contact each other." Possibly the last act in this part of the war saw 20,000 Indonesian troops and around 15,000 police paramilitaries try to set up another pitched battle against the GAM near the town of Cot Trieng, only for the enemy to once again dwindle away.
Not surprisingly given those tactics, the casualties have been worn by non-combatants -- in one of the region's dirtiest wars where rape, torture, extrajudicial killings and disappearances have become part of normal life.
Calm returns to everyday life
General Yusuf confirmed all but 100 soldiers have been pulled out of the Cot Trieng area, but they would stay to help with village projects.
In signs that life is returning to normal, many residents are out on the streets of the provincial capital, and travellers say road blocks previously mounted by security forces or rebels had vanished from main roads.
President Megawati Sukarnoputri is expected to visit Aceh this week, her third visit since becoming president.
Since the separatist war began in 1976, an estimated 10,000 Acehnese have been killed -- mainly civilians -- out of a population of just over four million. This year alone, nearly 1,500 people have been killed.
Civilian opposition forced peace deal
According to Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group in Jakarta, it was the price that the civilian population had paid that made the GAM rebels realise their military campaign was in danger of becoming almost as despised as the Indonesian security force's attempts to suppress it.
"Most Acehnese I have spoken with are incredibly tired of this war," says Ms Jones, "and they want it finished and they feel threatened and intimidated not just by the Army but by both sides now." The deal allows for an election in Aceh in 2004, with the GAM separatists for now basing their approach on Indonesia's offers of autonomy rather than independence.
The Indonesian forces will move to defensive positions almost immediately.
Keeping the peace will eventually be a full complement of 150 peace monitors -- one-third from overseas, one-third from the Indonesian military and one-third from the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM.
Keeping the peace
A joint security committee, comprising Indonesian and GAM officials and representatives of the Geneva-based Henri Dunant Centre (HDC), which played a mediation role, will keep the peace while talks proceed on the future of Aceh.
"The cessation of hostilities involved the cantonment or the placement or the storing of weapons at some stage," says Wiroyono Sastrohandojo, Indonesia's chief government negotiator in the Aceh peace process "At the end of two months then we can start storing the weapons," says Sastrohandojo. Only HDC and GAM officials will have keys to the arms dumps.
But with 22,000 Indonesian troops and 15,000 special paramilitary forces in Aceh, GAM's 2,000 fighters are heavily outnumbered.
The document doesn't spell out a timetable for the key issue of disarming the rebels, even though agreements are said to have been reached on the side.
Precarious deal
Sidney Jones says the deal is precarious at best. "There are a lot of people within GAM who still believe weapons are their only bargaining chip and if they give those weapons up they have nothing left. So there is resistance within GAM," she says.
"There is resistance within the Army as well because they believed, up until the last minute, that there was a possibility they would be able to finish this once and for all, militarily. "That means that there is a likelihood, not just a possibility but a likelihood, that people within both camps will try to sabotage this agreement," she says.
"Well you read the documents," says Sastrohandojo, " you will see that there is a quid pro quo agreed by both sides. And now of course the challenge is how to implement it. But if you see the situation in Aceh now, the people of Aceh are very enthusiastic, very happy, they are doing all kinds of thanks giving praise all over Aceh.
"And we hope that this will encourage both sides, both the government as well as the Free Aceh Movement to stick to the implementation, to strictly implement the agreement. That's the challenge and we must understand that the people welcome it."
Standing by the deal
Sastrohandojo says General Yusef has instructed his troops "and we are going to have a good compliance by the Indonesian side and we hope that the other side will also be doing the same thing."
While GAM has not given up its ambition of a free and independent state of Aceh, it has accepted the laws currently in place.
Sastrohandojo says there will be more talks before the proposed election in 2004. "So this is reformasi consistent," he says. "We want to settle the problems not by guns, by shooting, but by electoral ballots you see.
"So I think we need understanding and support from our neighbours including Australia. The return of Indonesia to a stable prosperous nation is in the interests of not only Indonesians of Acehanese, but also the region and of the world."
Reuters - December 17, 2002
Banda Aceh -- Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri said on Tuesday a landmark peace pact agreed with Aceh rebels was a dream come true, although both sides have started to accuse each other of violations.
After more than two decades of war that has killed thousands of people, most of them civilians, Megawati told Muslim worshippers that she believed Aceh could prosper within two years.
Megawati arrived in the capital Banda Aceh around dusk amid tight security, the same day rebels said government troops had killed 10 people since the deal was signed in Switzerland on December 9 to end one of Asia's longest running conflicts.
Military and police spokesmen denied the claims by a senior Free Aceh Movement (GAM) official. No independent confirmation was available, but the charges -- and counter claims by the military -- show how difficult it will be to implement the pact.
"What I dreamed about, and what the entire Indonesian people dreamed about, became a reality on December 9," said Megawati, wearing a white Muslim robe that covered her from head to foot and speaking in brief remarks at Banda Aceh's grand mosque.
Megawati added that she had brought many cabinet ministers with her. She said they would stay for several days to hear what needed to be done to develop Aceh, although she urged the province's four million people to join hands in rebuilding the war-shattered region on the northern tip of Sumatra island.
"With a situation like this, I am confident, truly convinced, that only within two years Aceh can thrive again," she said.
Desire for stability
Megawati is not expected to make major speeches on Aceh's future during her 24-hour visit, but the pact is key to her desire to stabilise the world's most populous Muslim nation and entice foreign investors back to troubled Indonesia.
In one minor incident, security forces took away a young man carrying a poster who entered the mosque just after she finished speaking. He was taken away before he could unfurl the poster.
Elsewhere, the military and GAM traded accusations. Senior GAM officer Amri bin Abdul Wahab said eight civilians had been found dead in the West Aceh region, and two more in other parts of the province.
Wahab said residents in West Aceh had told GAM that troops arrested a group of people on December 10, one day after the peace accord was signed. The bodies of eight, some of whom had been shot, were found the following day, he said.
Asked who killed the eight, Wahab said: "TNI," using the acronym for the military. Wahab offered no direct proof.
"But they were arrested by TNI. So it's clear who did this." Aceh military spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Firdaus Komarno denied the GAM accusations, adding the rebels had committed 24 violations of the peace pact, although he did not elaborate.
"I see in the media that GAM is being continually provocative, making false reports," Komarno said.
'No crocodile tears wanted'
Many Acehnese have welcomed the peace pact, and said they had at least begun to feel less fearful. owever, there was little warmth from ordinary Acehnese for Megawati, on her third visit since becoming president 18 months ago. Many said they were sceptical about any promises.
Megawati will hold a series of meetings on Wednesday in Banda Aceh, 1,700 km northwest of Jakarta.
"What is the purpose of her coming to Aceh if she only gives false promises and sheds crocodile tears? She has been here twice but her promises had never been implemented," said Nova Yanti, a 15-year-old high school student.
When Megawati visited Aceh not long after becoming president, she made an emotional apology for the suffering of the Acehnese people. On Tuesday, she showed no emotion.
"At least now we are brave enough to ride our becaks [ickshaws]during the night till 10 o'clock. We used to feel scared riding to the suburbs and villages, but not anymore," said Julkifli, 42, who drives a three-wheeled rickshaw.
The peace accord, the most wide-ranging ever signed by Jakarta and GAM, follows a series of failed ceasefires agreed since 2000. It follows international pressure on both sides to end the conflict and support from donors to aid reconstruction.
The accord calls for a ceasefire, for rebels to disarm over seven months, for Jakarta to withdraw some of its 22,000 troops and for elections and monitors to ensure the ceasefire holds.
But unresolved is a fundamental disagreement -- the rebels want independence while Jakarta will only grant special autonomy.
Jakarta Post - December 16, 2002
Nethy Dharma Somba, Jayapura -- Police here dispersed a separatist street parade at the Cendrawasih University compound, arrested three people and confiscated two flags representing the so-called state of Western Melanesia.
The detained separatists have been identified as Edison Waromi, 39, Yordan Ick, 46, and Herman Wanggai, 27, who presided over the parade attended by some 50 other separatists.
The three were rounded up while flying two separatist flags during a speech advocating a free Western Melanesia state at the event, which was meant to mark the 14th anniversary of the state on Saturday.
Abepura Police chief First Insp. Basman Saleh, who led the police operation, said the three detainees were undergoing a thorough interrogation.
The three are being interrogated on suspicion of trying to undermine the state by advocating separatism.
He said the police arrived at the site when Herman and Edison were making speeches and Yordan was about to hoist a Western Melanesia state flag.
Jayapura Police chief Adj. Sr. Comr. Totok Kasmiarto said the celebration was preceded by a meeting on Wednesday at Edison's house, which was attended by around 100 people. The meeting, he said, discussed plans for Saturday's pro-independence street parade.
"Such a celebration is unconstitutional and the police will not allow it to continue," Totok told journalists.
He elaborated that the suspects would be charged with violating Articles 106 and 108 of the Criminal Code, which carry a punishment of up to 20 years in jail or a life sentence.
The Melanesian separatist movement started in 1988 when its leader Thom Wapay Wainggai declared the independence of the province on Dec. 14.
Thom, along with Edison and Yordan, were jailed soon after the declaration at Manggala Stadium in Jayapura, Papua, but Thom died in 1996 while serving out his sentence in Jakarta. When his body was taken to Abepura for burial, the funeral procession sparked a riot around the city and a number of rioters were arrested for interrogation.
Although separatist rebels claim that Papua attained independence in 1961 when the Dutch withdrew, Indonesia won sovereignty over Papua, then known as West Irian, in 1969 after the United Nations allowed an integration referendum.
The government has offered special autonomy to Papua to appease the separatists, giving the troubled province a much greater share of oil and gas revenues along with other concessions.
President Megawati Soekarnoputri has stated that she would not tolerate any independence celebration other than the August 17 National Independence Day, and has ordered stern measures against all rebels and separatists.
Police in Papua have also arrested at least 21 people this month for raising the "Morning Star" flag in Manokwari in northwestern Papua.
Jakarta Post - December 16, 2002
Jakarta -- Indonesian Military (TNI) Chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto cautioned against demands for a trial on past human rights abuses in Aceh, saying Sunday it should not be pressed upon if it threatened the nascent peace process in the troubled province.
He said the TNI would agree to a human rights tribunal as long as it did not hamper the implementation of the recently signed peace accord with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). "But if it complicates things, why should we insist on choosing legal action. Can't we just do it at a more appropriate time?" he told reporters in Surabaya on Sunday.
Rights activities have called for a trial against all security personnel, arguing that ensuring justice was crucial to make the peace agreement work.
The government signed the cessation of hostilities agreement last week in what is the biggest breakthrough so far to end the war in the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam province. It has been negotiating with GAM for about two and a half years.
More than 10,000 Acehnese people, mostly civilians, have been killed since GAM began fighting for an independent state in 1976. Most of the human rights abuses occurred when the province was occupied by the military during an operation between 1989 and 1999.
Aceh politician Gazhali Abbas warned of a pseudo-peace without trials, and human rights activist Syaifuddin said the Acehnese people would likely seek the rights tribunal through the planned all-inclusive dialog.
The dialog is part of the peace agreement that allows Acehnese people, including independence supporters, to map out their future.
However, Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has said the government's first choice was that of reconciliation rather than the court process.
"There will be a mechanism to settle human rights abuses ... in the case of gross violations of human rights there will be a fair trial before reconciliation is achieved," he said last week.
Susilo said that waiving a rights tribunal would not be fair as GAM members who had violated human rights were not subject to criminal charges either.
He said the government would cooperate with the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) and other non-government organizations to determine the form of the settlement.
Reconciliation could be achieved under Acehnese traditional custom or the sharia law of Islam. Under the latter, soldiers may face capital punishment for murder unless the victims' families accept their pleas for forgiveness. These families would also be entitled to compensation.
A rights tribunal, on the other hand, could trace the military's chain of command to bring to justice everyone involved in the crimes, including senior military officers.
Several low-ranking soldiers were sentenced to jail for the killing of dozens of students at an Islamic Boarding School in Beutang Ateuh in 1999.
Indonesia's first human rights cases for the violence in East Timor in 1999, have ended with the acquittal of nearly all the military and police officers charged with crimes.
Jakarta Post - December 17, 2002
Lela E. Madjiah, Surabaya -- Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu dismissed on Monday the possibility of Army troops in Aceh laying down their arms following last week's signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement by the government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Geneva, Switzerland.
"Even here in Java or Surabaya [Army troops] carry weapons, let alone there [in Aceh]," he said here after a ceremony to commemorate the Army's anniversary.
Ryamizard also ruled out a troop withdrawal from Aceh, saying the Indonesian Military (TNI) was the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia and the presence of troops from Sabang to Merauke was legitimate.
"There should be no questions asked about the presence of a million troops in an area [of the country] because that's where they belong. On the other hand, the presence of one single soldier in another country is subject to question," he said.
Ryamizard was responding to questions about GAM's demand that the Indonesian Military withdraw from Aceh.
Last week Tengku Zainuri, field commander of GAM's military wing in Pasee district, said that while GAM appreciated the military's goodwill gesture of halting its military operations after the signing of the peace accord, "we are waiting for further steps from the military to withdraw from the province in the next seven months".
Ryamizard also said he had instructed his troops to honor and obey the government's decision on Aceh, including the Geneva agreement, despite alleged violations by GAM.
"I have seen many violations by the opposite side [GAM], but we don't want to make an issue of them. However, if the violations occur every day, then we will have to evaluate [the Aceh situation]. The most important thing is to carry out the policy of the government and of the TNI leadership while at the same time remaining cautious so as not to be caught off guard," he said, referring to GAM's misuse of a humanitarian pause in 2000 to build up its arms supply.
"We sincerely want peace, not only in Aceh, but all over Indonesia. On the other hand, we must remain cautious about the sincerity of other parties. If both sides want peace, there will be peace. The problem is when one party does not want peace or pretends it wants peace," he said.
Earlier in his speech, Ryamizard told his troops the only thing they had to keep in mind was how to prevent the nation from breaking up. "There is only one proclamation of independence, that of August 17, 1945," he said.
The Army chief also used the occasion to highlight the progress the Army had made in its reform efforts. "There has been some progress in the fields of security, intelligence, operations and personnel. We have, for example, established criteria for promotions and placements. We have also improved our logistics through the procurement of helicopters, weapons and artillery, although not much," he said.
Ryamizard stressed that the Army was not concerned by a US arms embargo. "America is not the only one who has weapons. Other countries have a lot of weapons and we only have to make our choice. Why must we limit our choice [to US weapons]?"
He stressed that even in modern warfare, Indonesia's best weapon was the unity of the people and the TNI. "That's why we must nurture this unity. We don't recognize the civil-military dichotomy, because since the beginning the people and the military have been one. Why must TNI return to the barracks? Whose barracks? The US may confine its troops to barracks, but the people are the TNI's barracks," he said.
"Therefore, despite advances in technology, human resources and weapons, the unity of the people and the military remains the basis of the Army's modern infantry warfare," said Ryamizard.
In this light, the Army will improve its territorial capabilities, he said. "We have been holding workshops to improve the capabilities of our territorial personnel so that they get it right. We have done this with only one thing in mind: to enable the Army to perform its core tasks well."
Straits Times - December 16, 2002
Derwin Pereira, Jakarta -- The peace deal between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) could go into a tailspin as the rebels still eye independence.
They want the 2004 election to be turned into what observers described as a "referendum" to decide whether Aceh should stay or break away from Jakarta.
GAM negotiator Teuku Kamaruzzama said that the idea of an election had been left open for further negotiation and that last Monday's peace agreement centred on ending hostilities on the ground, not resolving political differences.
For the rebels, negotiations with the Indonesian government still centres on an independent state for Aceh -- an aim that Jakarta and its hawkish military oppose.
The peace accord, the most promising breakthrough so far in the negotiations, does not clearly spell out such differences.
Indeed, as a starting point, it mentions special autonomy for the strife-torn province that implies GAM's acceptance that Aceh remain as part of Indonesia.
It mentions that Jakarta and GAM will work towards ending their hostilities to pave the way for an "all-inclusive dialogue".
This dialogue, it adds, will comprise a cross-section of Acehnese society and will eventually lead to "the election of a democratic government in Aceh, Indonesia". Aceh Governor Abdullah Puteh reinforced Jakarta's concerns by saying that polls in the region would be part of the national election process in which "GAM can take part as a political party".
The separatists, however, are seeing things differently. Underscoring continued differences with Jakarta on the matter, Mr Kamaruzzama referred to the upcoming election as where "the aspirations of the Acehnese will be accommodated under a political process".
"This deal is only the start of bringing two extreme poles of aspirations together; we must let this process go through its phases," The Jakarta Post quoted him as saying.
Analysts said that both parties were reluctant to address this "grey area" given immediate concerns to end hostilities on the ground.
Failing to do so presents problems in the long run, with some GAM factions spoiling for a fight with the Indonesian armed forces.
Political will displayed by Jakarta and some GAM elements flies in the face of local dynamics in Aceh.
GAM is highly fragmented, with its district-based chapters usually operating as autonomous entities. To expect all to comply with a ceasefire is probably unrealistic.
The military has never really been supportive of the civilian government's approach of resolving matters through dialogue.
Force is its only option. Even if the peace plan is implemented, there is no guarantee lower level commanders will follow it, given that dynamics on the ground sometimes take on a life of their own.
A one-star army general told The Straits Times: "Do you think GAM is just going to abandon their objective of independence? As long as they don't, no peace agreement is ever going to work."
Corruption/collusion/nepotism |
Asia Times - December 18, 2002
Tony Sitathan, Jakarta -- When Indonesia's national monument to independence, the Monas, underwent a major renovation project recently, another national hallmark -- bureaucratic corruption -- had no such overhaul. In fact, according to an official at Jakarta City Hall in an exclusive interview with Asia Times Online, half the contracted cost of the Monas project went into the pockets of bureaucrats.
When the coordinating minister for the economy, Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, revealed recently that the Indonesian government was facing budget constraints but promised continued improvement in price stability, infrastructure and security, it gave a clear signal to the investment community as well as local business people that the government was indeed concerned about the state of the economy.
The minister also pointed out that improving confidence in the economy was not only the job of the central government but also of regional government, business people and the general public. "All parties must do their best and work toward building up a good synergy so as to not hinder the country's efforts to continue to develop the economy," he said. He gave examples of the stable rupiah and low inflation rates as results of a successful macroeconomic stabilization policy.
He made this announcement just days before Singapore Technologies Telemedia (STT) won the final bid for the government's 41.9 percent stake in state-owned telecommunications company PT Indosat. This was seen as a positive signal that his macroeconomic pump-priming exercise was indeed creating stability in the economy.
Despite such promising results and optimism, the Indonesian bureaucracy and its self-serving public servants leave much to be desired. Indonesia has gained notoriety as one of the top five countries in the world when in comes to corruption. According to a recent report by International Corruption Watch, Indonesia's corruption level is still high despite the many overtures by the government of President Megawati Sukarnoputri to present itself as squeaky clean.
Budi Koesnanto (not his real name), a support staffer working with the Jakarta city council, braved the heat to give an exclusive account of the inner workings of city hall to Asia Times Online. Jakarta city council is responsible for the overall upkeep and maintenance of the capital city. Budi's department handles projects worth more than Rp5 billion (about US$568,000). He maintains that those in charge of these projects directly receive the customary "gift" of an envelope stuffed with Rp100,000 bills before the projects are given to the select few companies that win building or maintenance contracts. "It can range from Rp5 million to Rp25 million depending on the size of the contract awarded or the higher the hierarchy of the person," he revealed.
The most recent project was the one completed on Monas, the national symbol of independence of Indonesia. There was a complete facelift to the theme park that houses the Monas, with new fencing and a cleaner and greener park. There was also an increase in security personnel. The total project fee for the overhaul was estimated at close to half a trillion rupiah (more than $50 million). "Nearly half or more of that amount never actually reached the contractors or the people in charge of the actual program. Much of it was siphoned off or contractors were giving kickbacks after the normal procedure of over-invoicing on supplies," Budi said.
Even the building and maintenance of highways and roads, the granting of permits for food stalls and renewing the licenses of government certified contractors come under the office's auspices. Although Budi could not say the money trail goes all the way up to the newly elected Jakarta governor himself or the council members, he felt that almost nothing was done to stamp out such blatant corruption. "There is not one organized body for the prevention of white-collar crime. Although there are certain departments much like Internal Affairs within the Police Department, nothing ever gets reported or published in the papers," he said.
It is not a surprise that while one public servant within the department takes the Metro Mini, the public bus transportation system, to work, another drives his Honda Accord or Mitsubishi Spacewagon. Similarly one may take his family to have a meal in the roadside stalls on the outskirts of Block M Plaza while another tucks into Korean or Japanese food in the choice Kemang district dominated by foreigners.
Such social inequalities could be blamed on either the social injustice inherent in Indonesia or, more likely, on those who are enterprising enough to take the risks of being corrupt. But since there is hardly any risk at all in being caught for corruption, and since almost everyone in influence and power is already likely to be tainted with corruption, who can be counted to enforce the general standards of civil servants?
Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, in his most recent visit to Indonesia, suggested to his counterparts that there would be a kind of training program for selected Indonesian civil servants in Singapore that would eventually assist Indonesia once they return to their country. But such a program would be a small drop in the ocean when it comes to dealing with civil-service corruption.
Andre Sunardi, a social activist and sociology professor at the University of TriSakti, says it is almost impossible to eliminate corruption overnight. "Unless there are strict laws and punishment for crime is made more severe, only then will corruption be eliminated," he said. Sunardi said a good measure of the problem is not the amount of money being embezzled but the influence corrupt civil servants have on their fellow men and the community they serve. "But many failed to realize this especially in countries like Indonesia where wealth is equated with power and power equated with success. Anything that gets in the way of success is deemed immaterial," he said.
Unfortunately, however, civil servants like Budi Koesnanto, who are willing to speak the truth undaunted by the fear of being silenced or forced into early retirement, are rare indeed.
Regional/communal conflicts |
Jakarta Post - December 17, 2002
Jakarta -- Indigenous youth and migrants clashedin Kalimantan on Monday leaving at least one person dead, AP reported.
More than 20 houses were torched in the fighting between migrants from Madura island and local Malays in West Kalimantan province, about 800 kilometer north of Jakarta, said a military officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.
The military officer said the victim was Malay and he had been stabbed to death. He gave no other details. It was unclear whether the fighting in the remote district of Singkawang was continuing.
Last year, the conflict claimed at least 500 migrants, mostly Madurese, on the island. Around 70,000 people fled the island.
Focus on Jakarta |
Straits Times - December 21, 2002
Jakarta -- The draft budget proposal for regular perks for high- profile Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso, who was recently in the public eye over allegations of corruption, is raising eyebrows.
In the draft Budget, which is expected to be passed into law on Jan 14, the city administration has proposed about 9.5 billion rupiah for his allowances, besides his monthly salary which is still to be determined.
Mr Sutiyoso's salary in the current year is 200 million rupiah per month, according to the Public Servants' Wealth Audit Commission.
His allowances next year include 350 million rupiah for maintenance of his official residence, 92 million rupiah for the residence's electricity bills, 90 million rupiah for his morning coffee and a clothing allowance of 65 million rupiah.
Other items are 100 million rupiah for health insurance, 90 million rupiah for newspapers and magazines, 51 million rupiah for car maintenance and 887.7 million rupiah for operational activities and the drafting of his speeches.
Many legislators were reluctant to comment on the issue, saying that they had not read the Budget draft yet.
But the chairman of the Justice Party faction at the city council, Mr Achmad Heriyawan, said such expenditures could be reduced if there was political will from all parties, including executives and councillors.
"Frankly speaking, I cannot comment on that issue as we have had no detailed explanation on the draft Budget. But I can say there is still a lack of political will on behalf of the city administration to cut spending," he said.
News & issues |
Jakarta Post - December 19, 2002
Sidney Jones, Jakarta -- Since President Soeharto resigned in May 1998, violence and conflict seem to have become part of Indonesian life.
We have seen bitter sectarian strife, now on the wane, in Maluku and Poso and attempts to provoke it elsewhere. We have seen an escalation of violence in Papua and Aceh, and it's going to take enormous good will on all sides to make the new agreement on cessation of hostilities in Aceh hold.
We've seen horrendous outbreaks of violence between the Dayak and Madurese ethnic groups in West and Central Kalimantan. We've seen mob violence against suspected criminals; physical clashes between student groups, gangs, and in some cases, whole neighborhoods; and a proliferation of unofficial security organizations run by thugs who extort, intimidate, and provide protection in the name of political parties, religious organizations, and businesses.
Finally, we have Bali and likely links to international terrorism. It's no wonder that nostalgia for Soeharto is on the rise.
From Jakarta to Medan to Makassar, the man whose fall was so welcomed at home and around the world in 1998 is now seen as being tough and decisive: One man said Indonesia never would have had a terrorist problem under Jakarta -- Didor Saja! (He'd just shoot them!). "He was bad, but he was good," another person told me. At least we felt safe."
The worst thing people are willing to say about the man now is that he spoiled his children. But we need to remember that much of the turmoil we're seeing now has its roots in the authoritarianism and political controls of the Soeharto years.
We complain bitterly about the woeful lack of leadership in this country, but we have to remember that Soeharto deliberately emasculated political parties, nipped any threat to his leadership in the bud, and discouraged many of Indonesia's best and brightest from even thinking about going into government.
We have been shocked by some of the communal and ethnic violence that has erupted. But the tensions that fueled these outbreaks didn't just suddenly appear in 1998. They were simply kept out of sight by rigid insistence on acceptance of Pancasila, and controls on freedom of expression that prevented open discussion about the seriousness of the problem.
And they were exacerbated by some of the development policies that Soeharto pursued, particularly with respect to poorly thought -- through transmigration projects, allocation of land- use rights, and the granting of forest concessions, all of which took place with a colossal insensitivity to local cultures.
We bemoan, or we did until the Bali investigation, the poor performance of the police in maintaining law and order, and the lack of military accountability. But both are a direct consequence of the Soeharto government's use of the military as its internal security apparatus. It left the police with little to do except collect money. And it left a military trained to see its own compatriots as the major threat.
I was in Cambodia in late 1992 when an Indonesian battalion was stationed there with UN Peacekeeping Forces. They and the Bangladeshis were probably the most popular battalions with ordinary Cambodians. They didn't drink or womanize, they were extremely polite, and they went out of their way to help the local community. It was an ABRI Masuk Desa program that worked. Why? Because Cambodians weren't the enemy, and the soldiers didn't perceive them as such. One consequence of using the army in an internal security role is that the enemy becomes your own people.
Soeharto left the justice system in a shambles, and even if there were the political will to reform it now, which there isn't, it would take decades to build up a truly professional cadre of judges and prosecutors. The lack of credibility of the courts has several consequences for conflict resolution:
The press here has given much attention to the way in which some aspects of Islamic law are increasingly being applied across the country. But almost more worrisome is the growth in demand for application of hukum adat, customary law, by ethnic groups that are dominant in particular subdistricts or districts. By definition, hukum adat is exclusionary; it privileges members of one ethnic group against another.
On the one hand, it is seen by many in the Outer Islands as an instrument to redress the arbitrary land seizures of the Soeharto years. On the other, its application could serve to heighten inter-ethnic tensions or tensions between indigenous groups and migrants. If there were a credible national legal system for resolving disputes, the demand for adat law would not be so potent.
The proliferation of "civilian auxiliaries" to the security forces, quasi-official organizations that get very close to goon squads, and other organized but non-governmental armed groups is another worrisome legacy of the Soeharto years. The New Order made systematic use of civilian militias in East Timor and in Aceh, during the DOM period.
It may have been a standard counterinsurgency tactic, but the result was deeper polarization of society in troubled areas, and less accountability of the government. It created Pemuda Pancasila, Pemuda Karya, and other youth groups to mobilize on behalf of the ruling party, Golkar, against the political opposition at election time.
These groups added to the culture of violence in Indonesia and set a precedent for the proliferation of laskars and satgas after Soeharto fell. The problem was that before, they all answered to Cendana. Now they answer to a host of different officials and entities at all levels of society, making it all the more difficult for a weak central government to rein them in.
The notion of civilian auxiliaries to the security forces, whether it's called Pam Swakarsa (military backed militia) or Kamra or a host of other possible names, is so ingrained that in discussions of police reform, the most common suggestion for building a bridge to a particular community is to create a Pam Swakarsa.
Not only do these organizations act as buffers between the police and the people instead of bridges, but they also quickly degenerate into simple proxies of the police -- only with less training and no accountability. It's the police themselves, not their proxies, who should be bonding with communities.
Finally we come to terrorism. For a long time I resisted even the use of the word because I knew from my human rights background how easily it was misused, and how easily the term fit into sometimes dubious political agendas.
After Bali, I was more willing to use it here but I still think it's dangerously emotive. In any case, it's less easy to trace the development of some of the networks around Jamaah Islamiyah to specific policies of the New Order, but covert support to the revival of the Darul Islam movement in the mid-1970s laid the groundwork for some of what followed, and suppression of certain kinds of Muslim political discourse was probably a factor.
None of this is to let the post-Soeharto governments off the hook. It is too facile to say everything is the fault of the ancient regime. There have been more missed opportunities than one can count since May 1998 to bolster this country's political institutions and reduce conflict.
Jusuf Kalla deserves a lot of credit for putting together the Malino accords in Poso and Maluku and making them more or less stick, despite enormous obstacles. But if some of causes of violence are to be addressed, Indonesia will need more such risk-takers with a vision of Indonesia that goes beyond the city limits of Jakarta -- and fewer spoilers.
The factors that brought Soeharto down -- KKN or corruption, cronyism, and nepotism are alive and well as never before. The genuine post-Soeharto successes that Indonesia can point to, such as restoration of basic civil rights, constitutional changes leading to a direct election, the realignment of powers between executive and legislative branches of government, the big bang decentralization initiative -- a success despite all the obvious problems -- and popular excitement, once you get outside Jakarta, at the possibility of genuine political participation, should not be taken for granted.
These gains have to be protected and nurtured, and it's not happening. With all this in mind, let me turn to one success of this government that has been deservedly hailed as a major achievement-the agreement in Aceh on cessation of hostilities.
The roots of this conflict may lie in the distant past -- Hasan di Tiro, leader of the rebel movement GAM, inevitably comes up with a letter from US President Ulysses S. Grant from 1864 to the Sultan of Aceh to prove the US once acknowledged Aceh as an independent country. Elements of the conflict go back to the Indonesian revolution and to the Darul Islam rebellion of the 1950s.
But much of the problem, and certainly its seeming intractability up until now, had its origins during the Soeharto years, and in particular, as a result of the counterinsurgency operations conducted from 1990 to 1998. The operations were a response to a real security threat -- over a hundred GAM fighters had returned to Aceh from Libya and were making sporadic assaults on police and army posts.
But the heavy-handedness of the government response touched virtually everyone in Aceh, and led to a resentment against Jakarta that goes far beyond whatever support there is, and there's a lot, for independence.
I remember talking to one kyai in Uleeglee in 1991 who believed that it would be better for the guerrillas to surrender, and believed that if they did so, the government would make good on its offer of amnesty. He persuaded one young man from a family he was close to turn himself in. The man did so, and disappeared the next day. The kyai was anguished about the young man and felt thoroughly betrayed by the government.
After Soeharto fell, many Acehnese were convinced that some accounting for the DOM period would take place. Military and civilian officials apologized to the Acehnese for their suffering, promised justice, and nothing happened. And with newfound political freedoms, the anger and disappointment at the lack of concrete action led to organizing of proindependence groups, some of them close to GAM, in a way that we'd never seen before.
GAM also found the atmosphere more conducive and sent hundreds of fighters back from Malaysia. The military and police responded, and instead of the conflict easing, it worsened. Now, thanks to incredible persistence of the Henry Dunant Centre, the support of the international community, the work of Hassan Wirayuda, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono and their colleagues, and the general war- weariness of the Acehnese, there is a genuine chance for peace.
But it's only a chance, it's not guaranteed, and many of the factors that have contributed to conflict elsewhere in Indonesia will have to be overcome in Aceh. These include the many vested economic interests in the conflict, and those who are making the most profit from the war are unlikely to see the promised reconstruction aid as an incentive to make peace. Signatures on a peace of paper do not wipe out decades of distrust.
Many GAM members see their weapons as their only bargaining chip, and to turn them in is to lose that leverage; moreover, it remains very unclear what incentives the agreement gives GAM to participate in a political system that is as corrupt as the one in Aceh.
The huge concession made by the Indonesian government to allow international monitors is absolutely vital to the plan's success, and the Thai and Filipino soldiers will be warmly welcomed. (In East Timor, the Thai soldiers were a huge hit, not only because they provided medical services and ran a wonderful canteen, but because they taught kick-boxing to local youths!)
But the agreement is unclear on what ultimately happens if a serious violation is reported to the monitors, and what kind of efforts will be made to bring violators to justice.
The first few months of this agreement are going to be critical, as the implementing institutions are being set up. Expectations will be at their highest, and could fall the furthest if disgruntled parties make efforts, as they surely will, to undermine this accord. It is going to take an enormous amount of goodwill, attention, skill, resources, and leadership, on the part of all parties involved, to ensure that hostilities really do cease so that a process of peace-building can take place.]
The issue of accountability for past human rights abuses has been rightly deferred for the moment; the priority has got to be on ending the violence. But it can't be deferred forever. As we know from one conflict after another, if these issues are pushed to the side or buried, sooner or later they will come back to haunt us.
In closing, let me return to the issue of nostalgia for the Soeharto era. Indonesia is beset by more problems than any country in the world deserves, and it would take a miracle worker to solve them. But the biggest tragedy this country could face would be to turn its back on political and military reform.
Democracy is not the culprit here, and freedom is not the cause of conflict. The best strategy to protect this country from more sectarian strife, rebellions, and vigilante violence is to get reform back on track.
[Sidney Jones is the Indonesia Project Director or the International Crisis Group. This article was as speech presented on Tuesday at the 2002 Panglaykim Memorial Lecture in Jakarta.]
Straits Times - December 21, 2002
Jakarta -- A long-time golfing partner of former Indonesian dictator Suharto has been frequently absent from the island prison where he is serving time for corruption.
Former forestry magnate Bob Hasan is serving six years for corruption at Batu prison on Nusa Kambangan island, off the south coast of Central Java.
The Kompas daily, Indonesia's largest, cited police records as showing Hasan had been out once or twice a month for health checks or "other needs". The paper said the absences lasted one or two days.
Mr Hasan's latest absence began on Tuesday when he travelled to Jakarta for a heart check-up at a hospital, prison chief Sumantri was quoted by Kompas as saying. He said Hasan, guarded by six police officers, was to return to the prison on Thursday.
But the newspaper quoted Central Java police chief Inspector General Didi Widayadi as saying police were worried about the absences because Mr Sumantri has often failed to co-ordinate with police when Hasan was released.
Insp Widayadi said police were considering calling Mr Sumantri to police headquarters to improve co-ordination. Mr Sumantri later told the media that the high-profile prisoner did indeed return on Thursday evening.
He cited Article 14 of Law/No. 12/1995 on correctional institutions, which allows a prisoner to have external medical treatment if prison doctors cannot provide it.
"What I have done is not odd in any way. Doctors here are not capable of handling his disease. He has therefore been allowed to receive medical treatment outside the prison," he said.
Hasan was sentenced in 2000 by a Jakarta court to six years in prison for a high-profile graft case. He is the only close associate of Mr Suharto ever to be jailed for graft.
Batu Prison is also home to Mr Suharto's youngest son, Hutomo "Tommy" Mandala Putra, who is serving a 15-year sentence for murder and other crimes. There have been widespread rumours that Tommy, too, has either received special treatment or been frequently absent from the prison.
Mr Sumantri denied Insp Widayadi's charges. He said he always coordinated with police in the nearby port city of Cilacap to guard Hasan while he was absent from the prison.
Cilacap city's police chief Cmdr Arif Wahyunadi said his office had received numerous requests from the prison chief to escort Hasan when he left the prison.
"How frequently he [Bob Hasan] has left the prison, I don't recall," he said. Cmdr Arif said he could not refuse to provide a police guard for Hasan because legal procedures were in order.
"His health records are complete, so we have to be prepared to provide a guard for him," he said.
International relations |
Sydney Morning Herald - December 20, 2002
Craig Skehan -- Australia's Foreign Minister has cautioned Vanuatu that any change to Indonesia's boundaries to provide for independence for the province of Papua would result in bloodshed.
Alexander Downer's comments followed strong expressions of support by members of Vanuatu's Government for separatists in Papua, formerly known as Irian Jaya, who are trying to end rule from Jakarta. Vanuatu recently announced that it would allow the Papuan independence movement to open an office in Vanuatu.
At a media conference in Port Vila yesterday, Mr Downer said Vanuatu's Foreign Minister, Serge Vohor, had raised the subject of Australia's opposition to Papuan independence. Mr Downer said he had responded that Australia supported Indonesia's territorial integrity and that the reopening of former colonial borders would "end up with a gigantic bloodbath". Mr Downer said the Australian Government feared this could happen in Papua if there were outside aid for the independence cause, adding that it was important that other nations encourage Papuans to try to make an Indonesian autonomy package work.
"I think that is a good position for Vanuatu and Australia to take on this issue," Mr Downer said. Mr Vohor has made clear his support for Papuan independence but Canberra hopes other views within the Vanuatu Government will prevail.
Critics of the so-called "Act of Free Choice" staged in Papua in 1969 say it was a farce in which Indonesia was able to manipulate and intimidate a carefully selected group of 1025 indigenous people who were asked to decide whether the province should become independent. The senior United Nations official who monitored the vote later described it as a "sham". A spokesman for the Papua People's Office being established in Port Vila criticised Mr Downer's remarks last night, saying there had already been a bloodbath in Papua, with thousands of people killed under Indonesian rule.