Aceh/West Papua

Aceh rebels say Indonesian troops violate pact

Agence France Presse - December 15, 2002

As many as six people have been killed in Aceh by Indonesian troops hunting separatist rebels despite the signing of a peace pact December 9, a resident and a rebel commander said.

A spokesman for the rebel Free Aceh Movement (GAM) said despite the signing of a cessation of hostility agreement in Geneva, troops were reportedly continuing their anti-rebel operations in West and East Aceh districts.

"I do not know their intentions but whenever they enter villages, villagers flee to the forests. GAM guerrillas have been instructed not to attack them and to avoid such operations or patrols by security personnel," said Sofyan Dawod.

Dawod also said troops arrested 20 civilians in the interior of West Aceh December 10, one day after the peace pact. "Five of them were later found dead while the whereabouts of the remaining 15 remain unknown," Dawod said.

The Indonesian military could not be immediately reached for comment.

The gunshot-marked body of another man, missing since Tuesday, was found Friday face down in the Seugayam river in Southwest Aceh, a local humanitarian activist said. His was the third body found since the pact was signed.

Dawod insisted GAM was honoring the terms of the agreement and that rebel forces have returned to their respective bases or home villages.

Speaking by satellite telephone to AFP, Dawod claimed GAM had 289,000 personnel but was armed with fewer than 2,000 firearms.

"All troops of the GAM are no longer going around carrying their weapons. Some of them have even gone home to see their families and live among the local population," Dawod said.

His statement came as the troubled state on the northernmost tip of Sumatra was to mark the first-week anniversary of the peace pact, which was to end hostilities between the Indonesian government and GAM, locked in a separatist struggle since 1976 that has killed more than 10,000 people.

Many rebels who have chosen to return to their homes across the state have done so in secret "because the GAM guerrillas do not trust [the peace pact] entirely, even more so since the monitoring team has not yet been deployed," Dawod said.

But Dawod was still hopeful peace could be maintained in Aceh and said GAM has prepared a list of military officers to represent the rebels on a joint security committee (JSC) and monitoring team, conditions of the peace agreement.

"We have a lot of hope that the government of Indonesia, especially the armed forces and the police, will really abide by the agreement so that there will no longer be violence against the Aceh people," he said.

"Let us maintain this peaceful situation by restraining ourselves to no longer engage in actions that will only bring suffering to the people."

Plan to split Papua into three provinces shelved

Jakarta Post - December 14, 2002

Nethy Darma Somba and Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, Jakarta/Jayapura -- The government has for the time being shelved plans to create three new provinces from the country's easternmost province of Papua after Papua Governor J.P. Salossa strongly argued against the move.

Meeting President Megawati Soekarnoputri on Friday, the governor contended that infrastructure and human resources in the province were not yet ready for the establishment of new provinces.

"It takes five to ten years of preparations for the new provinces and we have to consider people's readiness for such actions," Salossa said after the meeting.

Former president B.J. Habibie enacted a law splitting the province into three in 1999 to speed up development in the territory.

The law, however, was strongly opposed by Papuans who suspected the move as an attempt by the central government to weaken their struggle for independence, prompting the Habibie administration to delay its implementation.

But until Habibie was replaced by Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid in 1999, the law had not been implemented.

Since Megawati assumed the presidential post in July 2001, demands for the establishment of new provinces in Papua resurfaced and the government has given a strong signal that it would soon implement the law by Habibie.

Salossa said Friday that President Megawati emphasized the importance of sufficient preparations and that the central government would not push for the establishment of new provinces there.

"The President said that such action should be carefully assessed and it does not have to be conducted immediately," the governor said. Sources at the State Palace told The Jakarta Post earlier that Megawati planned to announce the new provinces when she visited Papua on December 25.

Earlier, Minister of Home Affairs Hari Sabarno said that as long as the law was not revoked, it would be implemented as soon as possible.

Salossa also said Friday that President Megawati would visit Papua province on December 25.

"The President will attend Christmas celebrations in the province and inaugurate the opening of Tangguh Liquid Natural Gas (LNG)," Salossa said.

Deputy Papua Governor Constant Karma said the President would attend Christmas celebrations at Cendrawasih sports complex on December 25 to be attended by thousands of Papuan Christians.

The President, who will be accompanied by husband Taufik Kiemas, is slated to receive the highest customary merit of Papuan traditional tribes, Constant Karma maintained.

On the next day, Megawati will be flying to Biak regency to officially mark the beginning of Tangguh LNG projects reconstruction.

Deputy Governor Karma said that the visit would be very meaningful for Papuan people as it could help heal last year's disappointment when Megawati suddenly canceled her planned visit there.

Megawati's predecessor Abdurrahman Wahid also celebrated Christmas in Papua in 2000 and in 1999 and spent New Year's Eve at the Jayawijaya mountain top.

"It is good if the President will celebrate Christmas with us, hopefully it would not be like last year when the visit was canceled," a housewife Mama Salomina told the Post Friday.

Papua, where a separatist movement has been struggling for independence since the 1960s, was granted special autonomy status on January 1, 2002 in a bid to appease the rebels there.

Peace accord: Acehnese grasp at hope

Asia Times - December 12, 2002

Prangtip Daorueng, Jakarta -- Tuesday's peace accord signed between the Indonesian government and Acehnese rebels is not the first attempt at peace, but many Acehnese who are gathering and praying together, many in tears, after hearing news of the pact hope it will be the last.

For many, the December 9 agreement signed in Geneva, consisting of nine articles, is the beginning of the end for the 26 year old separatist conflict between Jakarta and the restive Indonesian province that has claimed over 10,000 Acehnese lives.

It is the first peace accord to involve an international monitoring presence, a factor that many hope raises the chances of its success.

Villagers in Aceh, the resource-rich province at the northern tip of Sumatra island, welcomed with joy news of the accord that allows autonomy and elections in 2004 for a government, which would be allowed to keep up to 70 percent of the province's oil and gas revenues.

"They strongly hope for the quick implementation of the agreement from both sides so that there will be no more troops or gunfights in the village from now on," Juanda, a member of Acehnese Civil Society Task Force in the capital, Banda Aceh, who uses one name. "What they want is to get back to their normal life without fear for violence as before."

But the optimism in the wake of the agreement, brokered by the Switzerland-based Henry Dunant Center, is also tempered with pragmatism.

"Acehnese are very happy with the agreement, but we are also aware that there is a difficult job ahead," said Hasballah Saad, an Acehnese member of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission and a former human-rights minister.

On Tuesday, activists in Aceh met to analyze the nine points in the agreement, which began with a ceasefire.

"The atmosphere that we see here is a transformation period from armed conflict to a non-violence atmosphere," said Juanda. "The first thing civil society here want to see is an atmosphere in which people are free to express their opinions without fear."

For many in Banda Aceh, who have lived through a tense atmosphere as rebels and soldiers fought each other, a period marked by kidnapping, torture and murder, the first dividend of the peace accord should be security in their daily lives.

Just a few days before the peace agreement was signed, a student leader in Banda Aceh was kidnapped and killed by a group of unknown men. Such an atmosphere had weakened people's participation in conflict solving process.

The Free Aceh Movement separatist rebels, formally known by their Indonesian acronym GAM, have been fighting for an independent state since 1976, chafing under Jakarta's siphoning off of huge revenues from its oil and gas resources and rights violations by the military in its efforts to quell the secessionist movement.

The content of the agreement shows that both Jakarta and GAM have softened their earlier stances, which had driven the peace process to a near deadlock a few months ago.

One of the nine points is an agreement on both sides to accept the Jakarta-proposed Special Autonomy Law as a starting point. GAM has not shown their clear acceptance of the law as it goes against its stand for Aceh's independence from Indonesia. The agreement, however, provides a chance for the review of the law to accommodate people's aspirations after the elections set for 2004 in Aceh.

For its part, Jakarta, which had insisted that the Aceh conflict was a domestic one and rejected any foreign interference in it, for the first time allowed a foreign monitoring team in the province.

The Geneva agreement provides for the activation of a Joint Monitoring Force Command comprising 150 soldiers from the Indonesian army, local Aceh forces, the Philippines and Thailand, starting this Sunday. The team, to be headed by a senior Thai military official, will be supervised by the Henry Dunant Center. The first 12 international peace monitors from the center arrived in Aceh on Wednesday.

To prevent armed clashes, troops from both sides, especially the much-feared Indonesian Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob), are to relocate to defensive positions during the two-month grace period. No additional troops will be allowed during this period.

Both sides agreed to demilitarize certain areas and to determine a peace zone in two months. GAM also agreed to place its weapons in cantonment sites under international supervision. GAM, Jakarta and the Henry Dunant Center will form a joint council to resolve disputes arising from the implementation of the agreement. The center will also facilitate an all-inclusive dialogue on the future of Aceh.

Serious international pressure on Indonesia to end the Aceh conflict helped lead to this week's agreement, and will provide incentives for staying on the peace track.

Prior to the Geneva meeting, the first-ever multi-government conference on Aceh was held in Tokyo on December 3. There, representatives from 23 countries plus international financial institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank gave pledges of financial support for the reconstruction of Aceh.

Meantime, Hasballah said many details in the agreement must be ironed out. "Decisions to allocate reconciliation funds from abroad should not be done by the government only. Instead it should be done from Aceh through a committee established there," he said. "This is to guarantee transparency."

The Geneva agreement also does not make clear how past human- rights abuses will be handled. It only states that it could lead to compensation and investigation of abuses since 1976, the start of the conflict. Both Hasballah and Juanda said this is among the most important issues that need to be resolved in the near future.

History is not encouraging on this point. The Jakarta government has attempted to suppress reports of human-rights abuses by its military and pro-Jakarta militias. The September arrests of two Western women, including an Asia Times Online contributor, have been linked by some to the official effort to cover up the truth.

Lesley McCulloch, a Scottish-born academic who had been researching the Acehnese conflict, and Joy Lee Sadler, an American nurse who was working with refugees in Aceh, were put on trial last week in Banda Aceh. The trial has been adjourned to December 19. They were charged with the relatively minor offense of violating their tourist visa, but instead of being deported -- normally the most severe punishment -- they were held for trial, and have been told they face up to five years in jail.

Juanda cited the need for a human-rights tribunal for Aceh, while Hasballah proposed a study on different approaches in countries such as South Africa or South Korea to reach closure after conflict.

"Bringing the suspects to court is not the only way to deal with the problem," Hasballah said.

Violence claims another life despite peace pact in Aceh

Agence France Presse - December 13, 2002

Another person has been shot dead in Aceh province where a ceasefire between Indonesian troops and separatist rebels is in force, humanitarian workers said.

Bulhaqki bin Abdul Rahman, 27, was shot Thursday at his house at Teupin Paku village in Bireuen district, apparently by two unidentified men. "Soon after they arrived, the sound of three gunshots was heard from the house," one worker told AFP on Friday.

Rahman, who died from bullet wounds in his back and a fractured skull, is the second confirmed victim of violence since Monday's peace agreement after unknown attackers shot dead a 30-year-old woman in South Aceh on Tuesday.

Such killings, which are seldom if ever solved, have been a common feature of the 26-year separatist revolt. Of more than 10,000 killed since 1976, the majority have been civilians.

There were no reports Friday of ceasefire violations by security forces or the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), four days after the peace pact was signed in Geneva.

In addition to monitors from GAM and the security forces, the deal provides for foreign truce monitors -- a provision seen as crucial to the success of this agreement after earlier ceasefires broke down.

Some 50 foreign monitors from the Thai and Philippine military have yet to arrive in the province on the tip of Sumatra island.

But a team of Swedish logistical experts and temporary monitors left Friday morning for the North Aceh town of Lhokseumawe to prepare for the arrival of permanent monitors next week, said Fahmi Yunus.

Yunus is a spokesman for the Swiss-based Henry Dunant Centre, which mediated the peace deal and is helping to oversee the ceasefire.

Another Swedish logistical team and British temporary monitors left Thursday for the West Aceh town of Meulaboh.

Temporary monitors have already conducted two investigations in Aceh Besar district but found no ceasefire violations, Yunus said.

Thai Major General Thanongsak Tuwinan has been appointed as the HDC's senior envoy on the key Joint Security Committee, which will monitor the truce, investigate violations and apply sanctions.

The committee will be backed up by the 150 ceasefire monitors on the ground in six-member joint teams.

Police and TNI raid Papua rebel group

Jakarta Post - December 9, 2002

Jakarta -- A joint team of police and Indonesian Military (TNI) personnel stormed the headquarters of the armed wing of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) over the weekend, arresting one rebel fighter, Julius, and confiscating seven homemade firearms and several documents.

Papua Police deputy chief Brig. Gen. Raziman Tarigan said on Saturday that the raid had been carried out on Friday afternoon acting on information extracted from a captured rebel, 17-year- old Kornelis Pica. Raziman said the joint team also found ammunition, knives, axes, logistic equipment, a set of military fatigues, a TNI bag, medicine and medical equipment, clothes and cooking utensils, Antara reported on Sunday.

Irian Jaya police resort chief Adj. Comm. Totok Kusmiarto said the two rebels were currently in detention at Jayapura police headquarters and would face further interrogation about their activities.

Kornelis was arrested earlier by members of 122 Rajawali Task Force who suspected him of being a rebel fighter. Security personnel initially detained him for questioning, but Kornelis, who was just getting off a passenger ship at the provincial capital of Jayapura, refused to answer questions, saying that he was too tired to do so. Kornelis soon got into a quarrel with security personnel, prompting a member of the 122 Rajawali Task Force to fire a warning shot.

But instead of answering the questions of the military personnel, Kornelis ran to his house. Security personnel chased after him to his house, where the officers found homemade firearms. Kornelis was arrested immediately.

During his interrogation, Kornelis told security personnel about the rebels' headquarters in Irian Jaya regency, which, according to police investigators, also served as a place where the rebels manufactured homemade firearms and ammunition. Kornelis' information led to the December 6 raid.

A low-level secessionist movement has been fighting for an independent Papua since the 1960s, resulting in the loss of thousands of lives, mostly innocent civilians.

Aceh peace agreement a significant step

Radio Australia - December 10, 2002

[International monitors have arrived in Indonesia's troubled province of Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra island, to help enforce a landmark peace agreement. Eventually, there'll be a full complement of 150 peace monitors -- one-third from overseas, one-third from the Indonesian military and one-third from the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM. A joint security committee, comprising Indonesian and GAM officials and representatives of the Geneva-based Henri Dunant Centre, which played a mediation role, will keep the peace while talks proceed on the future of Aceh.]

Presenter/Interviewer: Sen Lam

Speakers: Wiroyono Sastrohandojo, Indonesia's chief government negotiator in the Aceh peace process

Sastrohandojo: The cessation of hostilities involved the cantonment or the placement or the storing of weapons at some stage. It's not just not using the gun, but it's collecting the guns and the purpose of the whole process is actually to take the guns out of politics so that the people of Aceh can administer themselves you know later on. And it is time to move the situation from the bullet situation, which is not prevailing or hopefully now stopping, to a balanced situation whereby the people of Aceh would be able to vote for their own leaders and so on.

Lam: And as you mentioned, under the agreement GAM will surrender its weapons to be cantoned under international supervision, can you elaborate a little bit for us how this will work?

Sastrohandojo: Well I think you have to think in terms of the first two months and the five following months, meaning that the first two months what we are trying to do as the first one month is for the joint security committee to be operational, and after things are kind of established there's a disengagement process in which the TNI, that is the Indonesian army and the police, would relocate to a defensive position and not anymore in an offensive position. This is also done by the same way for the Free Aceh Movement troops are the same. After that then we will establish peace zones, meaning the area where we have conflict situations we change it or we turn it into a peace zones. At the end of two months then we can start storing the weapons.

Lam: Some analysts have pointed out that there is a presence of some 22,000 Indonesian troops and 15,000 special paramilitary forces in Aceh as opposed to 2,000 GAM fighters on the ground. And GAM sees its weapons as in a way an insurance policy of sorts. What is the Indonesian side bringing to the party, how do you reassure GAM that you're serious about this peace deal?

Sastrohandojo: Well you read the documents, you will see that there is a quid pro quo agreed by both sides. So we need to be given some time, the two months plus five months period finally agreed upon by both sides. And now of course the challenge is how to implement it. But if you see the situation in Aceh now, the people of Aceh are very enthusiastic, very happy, they are doing all kinds of thanks giving praise all over Aceh. And we hope that this will encourage both sides, both the government as well as the Free Aceh Movement to stick to the implementation, to strictly implement the agreement. That's the challenge and we must understand that the people welcome it. It's not going to be easy. Actually what has been done is probably only one-third of the problem.

Lam: And what undertaking is there on the Indonesian side? Has the military been instructed on the ground to observe the ceasefire and will there be a gradual pullout from Aceh?

sastrohandojo: Immediately after we sign, even before we sign it we have been in communication with our commander of the armed forces who is in Aceh right now. He is controlling his troops and he is instructing his troops and we are going to have a good compliance by the Indonesian side and we hope that the other side will also be doing the same thing.

Lam: You mentioned earlier that all this is to really pave the way for free and fair elections. A senior GAM official has said to let the Acehnese decide for themselves and GAM will follow. From your reading of the situation do you think the Acehnese people are content with the current autonomy plan?

Sastrohandojo: Well I think there is a provision, you know after the cessation of hostilities we will hope when the situation is already secured and peaceful that we will have what we call the all inclusive dialogue, meaning that all political elements within Aceh can sit together and review matters. So at that time the people will decide whether they like it or they will review the whole thing and decide if they want to change certain things or amend certain things and the government is open for that kind of suggestion.

Lam: How meaningful is this truce given that GAM has not given up its ambition of a free and independent state of Aceh, something which Jakarta has so far not agreed to?

Sastrohandojo: Well of course our realise it as I said this is not an easy thing but they have signed the agreement and I think the important thing is that both sides not implement the agreement and that we follow the roadmap that we have agreed also. We have the agreement of May 10 in which the GAM has accepted the laws currently in place, as a starting point, and the next step is what we have done yesterday, signing the cessation of hostilities agreement. After that we will go to the all inclusive dialogue and finally in 2004 we will hope that we will have an election in Aceh. So this is reformasi consistent, we want to settle the problems not by guns, by shooting, but by electoral ballots you see. So I think we need understanding and support from our neighbours including Australia, the return of Indonesia to a stable prosperous nation in the interests of not only Indonesians of Acehanese, but also the region and of the world.

Important first step towards lasting peace in Aceh

Tapol Press Release - December 10, 2002

Tapol warmly welcomes the agreement on the cessation of hostilities signed today in Geneva by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

Tapol regards this agreement as the first, fundamental step towards resolving the conflict in Aceh which has been going on for more than two decades. Tapol recognises that the peace process can only be sustainable if a number of burning issues in Aceh are properly addressed.

Our first concern is that the issue of justice must be properly addressed. Recent figures published by the human rights organisation Kontras provide an alarming account of victims of human rights violations. From January till November 2002, almost five thousand cases were recorded, including killings, disappearances, torture and arbitrary detention, perpetrated by the Indonesian security forces.

From 1989 till 1998, when special military operations were underway in Aceh, tens of thousands of Acehnese were victims of military brutality. None of the perpetrators have been brought to justice.

The other worrying issue is the declining economy of Aceh. The many years of war have brought the economy to a standstill. Illegal activities are widespread in Aceh, including illegal logging, smuggling, extortion, illegal taxes and drugs dealing. The security forces, both the army and the police, are responsible for these highly damaging activities.

Unless these root causes of the conflict are addressed properly, the peace process will fail to take hold. The peace deal has been achieved thanks to efforts from many quarters. There has been strong pressure from the international community which strongly favours an end to the violence in Aceh. The internationalisation of the Aceh issue has been a helpful tool for those within the Indonesian government who firmly believe that conflicts can only be solved through negotiations.

On the other hand, top-ranking officers in the Indonesian military have pursued a disastrous policy of seeking to resolve the conflict by military means.

Tapol also welcomes the agreement's advocacy of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the region, the commencement of all- inclusive dialogue including civil society of Aceh and the holding of fair and democratic elections in 2004. We sincerely hope that this will eventually lead to the solution of the political roots of the conflict in line with the wishes of the majority of the Acehnese people.

US pressure to wrap up Papua probe

Far Eastern Economic Review - December 12, 2002

Washington wants Jakarta to quickly wrap up its investigation of an ambush near the world's largest copper and gold mine that left two Americans and an Indonesian dead some three months ago.

"A great deal rides on the outcome" of the investigation, United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Daley told a conference in Washington on November 26 in a clear signal that the US administration is running out of patience.

Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz and other senior US officials met in Washington in late November to discuss ways to increase pressure on Jakarta to complete its probe into the August 31 attack near the Freeport McMoRan mine in remote Papua province, say US officials.

According to intelligence reports received by the US, several senior Indonesian military officials had discussed using the attack to discredit the Free Papua Movement, a separatist group.

Confirmation of these reports could hamper efforts by the US administration to get Congress to resume aid to the Indonesian military. This was suspended in response to the involvement of Indonesian troops in atrocities against pro- independence supporters in East Timor in 1999.

'War on terrorism'

Fertile ground for terror

Los Angeles Times - December 10, 2002

By Richard C. Paddock, Binjai -- It was the kind of rescue the Indonesian army was trained to carry out. Hundreds of soldiers from the 100th Airborne Battalion, wearing war paint and armed with bazookas, grenade launchers, mortars, tanks and a mobile antiaircraft gun, attacked in the dead of night.

Their targets were two police stations. Their mission was to rescue a friend named Marwan who had been arrested for allegedly selling the drug Ecstasy. The battle was one-sided. The soldiers killed seven police officers and two civilians and wounded 37 officers. One station was destroyed and the other heavily damaged. A soldier died in the fighting.

The army freed Marwan and 60 other prisoners, including accused murderers, rapists and thieves. None has been recaptured. "How can the military attack a police station?" asked a 28-year-old police sergeant who was hit in the leg by shrapnel during the attack. "I don't understand. It was brutal. It was coldblooded."

The September 29 attack highlights the lawlessness that has plagued Indonesia since 1998, when the military dictatorship of President Suharto collapsed. Despite Indonesians' desire for democracy, disorder has reigned. With three presidents in four years, the country of 231 million people has suffered from chronic corruption, feeble leadership and ineffective law enforcement.

The military, still the most powerful institution, finances most of its activities through a business empire that operates inside and outside the law. Its enterprises include hotels, oil refineries and insurance. They also include drug dealing, gambling, prostitution and illegal logging, says former Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono. The police, independent of the military only in recent years, are widely perceived to be as corrupt as the army.

Across the sprawling archipelago of more than 17,000 islands, economic crime is rampant. Indonesia's borders are poorly protected and its seas suffer the highest rate of piracy in the world, according to a report in October by the International Chamber of Commerce. Illegal logging is so widespread that the country's once-vast rain forests will vanish in five to seven years, says Environment Minister Nabiel Makarim.

In the courts, justice is for sale. More than 90% of the country's judges and police officers are on the take and graft reaches to the highest levels of government, according to a federal anti-corruption commission that monitors officials' assets. In a recent worldwide survey by the advocacy group Transparency International, only five countries ranked as more corrupt than Indonesia.

The nation's lawlessness has created an ideal climate for terrorists. Western officials believe that Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network is well established in Indonesia and has used the country as a base to launch terror attacks in the region, including the October 12 nightclub bombings in Bali that killed 191 people.

"With the deadly rivalry between the army and police and the level of corruption in both, you simply can't trust anybody in the security forces to be what they say they are or to do what they say they're doing," said Sidney Jones, head of the Indonesia office of the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think tank. "A government that is not serious about fighting corruption is not serious about fighting terror."

Indonesia's instability endangers Americans as never before in its five-decade history since independence. Seven Americans died in the Bali bombing. Two American teachers were killed August 31 when gunmen ambushed their car on a mountain road in the province of Papua, and police are investigating whether soldiers carried out the attack. The State Department has withdrawn all embassy family members and nonessential staff from the country.

Indonesia has the world's largest Muslim population, with extremists very much a minority. As a moderate, democratic country, it could be a model for the Islamic world. But few expect the nation to pull out of its post-dictatorship chaos any time soon. Its fundamental problems, diplomats and analysts say, will be left for the next generation of leaders to solve.

"It is a society where there is total impunity and lack of accountability," said a senior US diplomat who asked not to be identified. "The way out is slow water torture of the democratic variety. But it really isn't going to pay off in most of our lifetimes."

The corruption and lack of law and order add to the hardship of everyday life. Vigilante justice is common. Government funds are siphoned into the pockets of officials, and spending on health care, education and other public services is woefully deficient. Major cities are shrouded in unrestrained pollution. Few drivers obey the rules of the road, and traffic often comes to a standstill. Public transportation is so crowded that some children ride home from school on the roofs of their school buses.

Though rich in resources, Indonesia is handicapped by the slow pace of its recovery from the economic crisis that struck Asia in 1997. The government estimates that about 38 million people are unemployed. Few foreign investors are willing to put their money here.

Also hampering the country's progress is a legal system in which fairness is a foreign concept and verdicts often go to the highest bidder. One striking example was a decision by a three- judge panel this year to declare the Indonesian unit of Canada's Manulife Financial Corp. bankrupt -- though the insurance company was unquestionably solvent. Manulife said the ruling was an attempt by a disgruntled Indonesian ex-partner to ruin its business. The verdict touched off an international outcry and was later overturned by the Supreme Court. The lower court judges are under investigation for allegedly accepting bribes, but that probe is unusual.

Judges are rarely held accountable for their decisions. "In almost all cases, especially in Jakarta and other big cities, every verdict that the judge is going to make there will always be a transaction," said Petrus Selestinus of Indonesia's anti- corruption commission. "If you want to win, you have to pay."

In government, top officials brazenly hang on to power even when their questionable dealings are well known. Parliament Speaker Akbar Tanjung, who was convicted September 4 of stealing $4.5 million intended for the poor and using it in a political campaign, remains in his post pending appeal.

Atty. Gen. Mohammed Abdul Rahman, the top law enforcement officer, failed to report his ownership of a house valued at about $300,000 and bank deposits of about $80,000, as required by an anti-corruption law, Selestinus said. The attorney general refuses to step down.

Businessman Mahfudz Djaelani -- who ran unsuccessfully for the post of Jakarta governor in September against incumbent Gov. Sutiyoso, who like many Indonesians goes by one name -- has complained loudly that he was out-bribed. The city's 84-member parliament elects the governor, and Djaelani thought he had the race sewn up because of his generous donations to a majority of members. But a few days before the election, he learned that the going rate for each vote had jumped to $50,000 -- far more than he had expected to pay. After he lost, Djaelani publicly demanded the return of thousands of dollars he had doled out. "I am a businessman," Djaelani explained in an interview. "If I make a down payment and I don't get elected, I want the money back."

Under Indonesia's justice system, some people even appear to get away with murder. No one from the military, for instance, has been convicted for the well-publicized slaughter of 1,000 civilians carried out by army-backed militias in East Timor in 1999.

Accused people smuggler Abu Quassey, who police say had organized a refugee boat that sank off Indonesia last year, killing 373 asylum-seekers headed for Australia, was never charged in the deaths. Instead, the Egyptian was sentenced to six months in jail for violating his visa.

Police investigators concluded that at least nine special forces soldiers took part in the kidnapping and killing of Papuan separatist leader Theys Eluay last year, but no one has been tried for the slaying.

The army's conduct has called into question the Bush administration's policy of restoring ties with the Indonesian military. But Washington sees its choice as either helping the armed forces become more democracy-minded, or someday facing a conservative Islamic government here.

Under Suharto, the main responsibility of the armed forces was to maintain order within the country. The military, which included the police, was often brutal but succeeded in suppressing many of the ethnic, religious and separatist conflicts that afflict the country. A year after Suharto fell, the police force and military were separated in the hope that a more democratic system would be created. Instead, the new arrangement created two rival armed camps.

Since January 2001, soldiers and police have engaged in at least 12 shootouts in which participants or bystanders were killed or wounded. Even by these standards, the Binjai battle was extreme. Police officials say the loss of seven officers was the highest death toll the department has suffered in a single engagement.

Binjai is a bustling city of 220,000 just west of Medan, the largest city on the island of Sumatra. Marwan, 32, was arrested September 28 and taken to the Langkat police station on the outskirts of Binjai. According to police, three soldiers arrived a few hours later and asked the detective handling the case to release him. Marwan, they said, was their friend. The detective refused, saying Marwan was still under investigation. Without warning, one of the soldiers pulled out a knife and cut the detective's ear, nearly slicing it off. As the soldiers ran, police fired, wounding at least one of them.

Police and army officers met that evening and negotiated a truce. But the next night, the army began preparing for war. Officials are uncertain how many of the 100th Airborne Battalion's 600 soldiers were involved, but witnesses say the attackers numbered in the hundreds. The assault was so well organized that it seems unlikely it was carried out without the participation of officers.

According to the police account, soldiers went to the power station about 11 p.m. and cut the city's electricity. Moments later, troops attacked the station where Marwan was being held. The soldiers fired grenades and mortars, destroying one small building and setting the main building on fire. Most of the police fled.

The soldiers went to the jail and used a hammer to break the locks on the cell doors, freeing the prisoners. "They wanted to free Marwan, but they freed all of them," said a police officer. The soldiers also took Marwan's police file and about 1.5 tons of marijuana stored at the station. From there, the soldiers moved across town and advanced on the Binjai headquarters of the police Mobile Brigade unit, a tough, battle-hardened police corps. They fired on the buildings and set them ablaze. When police reinforcements arrived by truck, the soldiers fired an anti- aircraft gun at the vehicle, killing the driver, according to a police sergeant in the truck.

Five days after the battle, Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard Ryacudu discharged 20 soldiers. In a ceremony broadcast on national television, he stripped them of their uniform shirts and hats. The 20 are on trial in a military court in connection with the attack but face only token sentences ranging from 10 months to 3 1/2 years. No other soldiers have been charged.

Despite a police investigation, North Sumatra police spokesman Amrin Karim said it was still unclear why the military went to such lengths to win Marwan's release. "We feel deeply sad," Karim said, "because we still have a long way to go to uphold the law."

Fears over Indonesia's TNT stocks

Far Eastern Economic Review - December 12, 2002

The Indonesian army has ordered an inventory of its TNT stocks after quantities of the explosive were found in two of six plastic pipes buried close to the East Java home of a key suspect in the October 12 Bali bomb attacks.

The authorities still maintain that the pipes-found near the village of detained suspect Amrozi-only contained assault rifles, pistols and ammunition. But security sources, citing army demolition experts, say TNT was found. They add that the explosives are believed to have been distributed by PT Dahana, a sister company of state-owned arms manufacturer PT Pindad. It is not known if the TNT was from the same batch used in the bomb attacks.

A freeze and inventory of the army's explosives stocks came to light after the military said it had to delay the detonation of 45 unexploded bombs found under a World War II Japanese airstrip at Babo in Papua province. The runway is being lengthened to accommodate larger aircraft needed for British Petroleum's Tanguh natural-as project.

Human rights/law

Beware of anti-terrorism measures eroding civil liberties

South China Morning Post - December 13, 2002

Sidney Jones -- The war on terror is well under way in Southeast Asia, leading to concern among many civil rights leaders. Over the last two decades, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia have removed authoritarian leaders, curbed the power of the politicised military and expanded civil liberties. Those gains cannot be easily reversed, but they can be eroded and there are fears the war on terror will do just that.

On November 3, in the wake of the Bali bombings which killed more than 190 people, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations issued a declaration on terrorism, saying: "We resolve to intensify our efforts, collectively and individually, to prevent, counter and suppress the activities of terrorist groups in the region." The Asean governments commended Indonesia and the Philippines for their determination to step up their efforts.

Just before the Asean summit, Malaysia announced it would host the Asean Regional Training Centre for Counter-Terrorism. Governments in the region are making political, legal and institutional commitments to fighting terror, but many non -governmental leaders remain concerned that terrorism is a poorly defined act, and anti-terror initiatives can be used to serve other political agendas. Human rights organisations, in particular, have been concerned since the September 11 attacks that the war on terror would bring restrictions on hard -won civil liberties.

To date, no government in the region has been as indifferent to international human rights standards in its pursuit of anti- terror goals as the United States. No government in the region has had Washington's inclination to round up suspects for minor immigration infractions or subject young men to lengthy interviews by internal security officials because of their national origin or Islamic background. And none, fortunately, has had the capacity to establish a Guantanamo-like detention centre where no national laws apply.

But Southeast Asians are right to feel uneasy. They fear, based on the experience of the recent past, that new anti-terrorism measures will lead to arbitrary detention; the military will be strengthened at the expense of civilian institutions; and that protection of the rights of migrants and asylum seekers will be undermined. In countries making the transition from authoritarian rule, the notion of giving more power to security forces is anathema.

Indonesian and Malaysian human rights activists are perhaps the most worried on this count. Many Indonesians fear a new anti- terrorism "decree in lieu of legislation" adopted last month will permit sweeping arrests of politically radical but non-violent Muslims or of supporters of independence in Aceh and Papua. The decree is considerably less draconian than the Internal Security Act in Malaysia or Singapore. Nevertheless, Indonesia has a troubled history of using broadly worded legislation to go after what an army officer once referred to as "the extreme left, the extreme right, and the extreme centre" -- or, respectively, communists, radical Muslims and non-governmental organisations.

Given the openness of post-Suharto Indonesia, a massive witch- hunt is probably not possible. At the same time, the new decree allows looser rules of evidence than the Indonesian criminal code, including the use of intelligence reports as a basis for arrests. While those reports have to be reviewed by a judge, the Indonesian court system is so weak and corrupt that judicial review hardly constitutes a meaningful safeguard.

In Malaysia, where Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has used the Internal Security Act against political opponents, there is concern that the war on terror has given the government new justification for a law that many reformers had hoped to see abolished. Brutality and injustice can also undermine the fight against terrorism.

In the bombings that Jemaah Islamiah were alleged to have carried out across Indonesia on Christmas Eve 2000, one group arrested in North Sumatra were badly tortured and confessed to whatever the police wanted.

No one questions the need for accurate intelligence and the need to take measures to prevent acts of terror. The problem is when extraordinary powers are given to institutions with a history of abuse.

There are also fears that civilian police will lose out to military and specialised intelligence agencies. The most visible manifestation of this was the US troop presence in the southern Philippines, "training" combat soldiers to fight the Abu Sayyaf in Mindanao.

The greatest concern about upsetting the delicate civilian- military balance, however, comes from Indonesia, where the police and military are engaged in a battle for turf, resources and influence. The Indonesian police are unquestionably poorly trained, corrupt and intensely disliked. But if Indonesians want civilians to be in charge of internal security, there is no choice other than to build up the police and keep nudging the military towards external defence.

With Washington seeking to reopen officer training programmes in the Indonesian military, and the Australian government wanting to restore ties with army special forces, the danger is that in the rush to find allies, the international community may ease the pressure on the Indonesian military to reform.

Another issue is the impact on migrant workers. In July, the world saw a humanitarian disaster unfold as Malaysia cracked down on undocumented migrants, most of them Indonesians and Filipinos. The crackdown may have been related in part to a well-founded fear of radical Muslim groups from the Philippines and Indonesia using Malaysia as a base of activities. A new amendment to the immigration law, passed in March, increased penalties for undocumented workers, but gave the migrants an amnesty from prosecution until August 1, so they could return home and get proper papers. In the disaster that followed, thousands of people returned to Indonesia with virtually no preparations having been made at transit points to house or feed them, let alone prepare the necessary documents. Dozens died and extortion of desperate migrants by unscrupulous officials was rampant.

Preventing infiltration by Muslim extremists was not the only reason for Malaysia's crackdown, but it suggests the war on terror has the potential to affect the well-being not just of political activists who may get caught up in security sweeps, but of a much larger section of the population.

In safeguards against terrorism, it is necessary to understand that draconian measures serve the interests of radicals, not moderates. In the long run, ending corruption and strengthening the courts are better weapons in this war than sweeping anti- terror decrees.

[Sidney Jones is the Indonesia project director of the International Crisis Group.]

Government slammed for poor rights record

Jakarta Post - December 11, 2002

Tiarma Siboro, Jakarta -- Indonesia's failure to uphold human rights this year was due to simultaneous policies of the executive, legislative and judicial institutions, the National Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) disclosed on Tuesday.

Usman Hamid, chairman of the Kontras working body, also said that the political phenomenon taking place during 2002 was evidence that "the power-minded among the governing authorities have failed to deal with humanitarian and justice issues." Usman referred to various political cases believed to have affected the sense of justice among people, such as the high profile case known as Buloggate II, that implicated Akbar Tandjung, chairman of the Golkar Party and also speaker of the House of Representatives as well as the legislators' cool reaction in dealing with the case.

"The lack of sensitivity among authorities over reform demands has only showed us that power is more important than anything for the political elite at the expense of justice and humanity," Usman said during the press conference that was held in an attempt to commemorate International Human Rights Day on December 10.

Usman also said that civil rights with regard to economic, social and cultural aspects have been affected during the year due to prolonged state violence in several conflict areas in the country, such as the Aceh, Papua, Maluku, Sulawesi and Kalimantan provinces. "The most compelling aspect of people's lives in the strife torn regions is their standard of living as thousands of people have been displaced. In Aceh alone, there are some 29,156 people who have been displaced due to violence, while 119,202 people in Maluku had to leave their homes following the sectarian conflict that has been taking place there," Usman said. The troubled Aceh province is on the top of the list of violations where 776 cases have occurred resulting in the killing of 1,771 civilians.

Usman further said that Megawati's administration had failed to provide justice for the victims of violence. "The ongoing ad hoc tribunal trying human rights violations in East Timor has again showed this."

"All the Acehnese ask from the government is justice. We have long been living in violent circumstances and we want peace more than anything ... more than our independence," Ruslan Razali, a student activist, said. On Tuesday, dozens of Acehnese students residing in Jakarta held a peace rally at the National Monument compound. "We support the peace agreement that has been signed between the Indonesian government and the representatives of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) yesterday (Monday) in Geneva. But I'm not sure that peace will soon be realized in the province if the government fails to withdraw thousands of military troops that are deployed there," Ruslan said.

Environment

Walhi to sue Perhutani over deadly landslide

Jakarta Post - December 14, 2002

Jakarta -- The country's green organization Walhi said on Friday they plan to sue state-owned forestry company Perhutani for alleged illegal logging above a hotspring resort in Mojokerto, East Java that was flattened by a massive landslide, AP reported.

Walhi would file a lawsuit against Perhutani on behalf of the victims of the accident.

Syafrudin Ngulma, who heads Walhi's East Java branch, accused Perhutani of illegally felling forests above the resort and planting pine, mahogany and teak for commercial use.

Ngulma claimed that deforestation was a major factor behind the disaster. "The forest should never have been cut down. They [Perhutani] are only thinking of the money that could be obtained from the trees," Ngulma said, adding that the forest surrounding the hotspring resort was protected.

Perhutani officials couldn't immediately be reached for comment. However, local Perhutani head F. Drijanto was quoted as saying by Antara that the company wasn't to blame. "I feel that no one bears ultimate responsibility [for the accident], it was brought about purely by the heavy volume of rain," Drijanto said.

Heavy rain had fallen for three days before the landslide. Rescuers fear more than 60 people were killed. So far, 32 bodies have been recovered following Wednesday's accident.

Religion/Islam

Moderate Muslims criticize President Megawati's rule

Radio Australia - December 9, 2002

[While the Indonesian government seems to be making progress in Aceh, moderate Muslims say President Megawati's denying them a role in determining the place of Islam in the country's political life. Nahdlatul Ulama, the moderate Islamic group previoulsy headed by former President Wahid feels it's being sidelined because of the poor relationship between Gus Dur and President Megawati, his former deputy. NU claims a membership of 40-million and has strongly opposed legislation -- at both the regional and national levels, to introduce the conservative islamic Sharia law.]

Presenter/Interviewer: Karon Snowdon

Speakers: Mohammad Fajrul Falaahk, deputy Chairman of Indonesia's largest Muslim group, Nahdlatul Ulama, Vice Dean of Gadja Mada University Law School and a member of Indonesia's National Law Commission

Falaahk: The military has more influence of her administration and many of these moderate Islamic organisations have also been critical of the military. So, including more moderate Islam it means a threat to the military who has had more influence on her administration.

Snowdon: So there's some major issues there that need to be dealt with at the top political level before Indonesia will move forward in its democracy?

Falaahk: She has to choose, she has to choose. I mean going forward together even with Islamic elements to democratise the country or being trapped with a military who has experience in the past 30 to 40 years of supporting an authoritarian regime.

Snowdon: Has President Megawati acted strongly enough in relation to Bali and other terrorist attacks within Indonesia?

Falaahk: She's not that clear enough. So for instance, right after the Bali bombing, two organisations, my organisation -- Nahdlatul Ulama -- then the Muhammadiyah, expressly condemned the Bali bombing, calling it an uncivilised act of terrorism. But she did not really make a clear response as to what she would want to do. She's really unclear about how to deal with Islam and I mean that's important because this is a predominantly Islamic country. So this is very political and practical, to garner political support from the wider population then you have to deal with many parties.

Snowdon: You've said that President Megawati has been somewhat ambivalent in her approach to things like the Bali bombing, perhaps in more general terms to the very radical rhetoric that's been coming out of Indonesia for some time from groups and people like Abu Bakar Bashir. Could the same be said of groups such as NU, such as your organisation? Has NU spoken out enough?

Falaahk: Oh yes, I mean you can enquire from the Union of Churches in Indonesia, from the Catholic bishop there and the Hindus or the Buddhist leaders, how an organisation like NU has been involved in the past ten years with minorities.

Snowdon: How can the relationship at the very top political level between Indonesia and Australia be improved, what will it take, assuming it needs improvement of course?

Falaahk: Of course I think this is a long, long issue.

Snowdon: Because ultimately it frames, doesn't it, much of the relationship between the two countries more generally?

Falaahk: Yeah, but this is some more exclusively elite political communication.

Snowdon: So it's very dependent on the individuals involved?

Falaahk: On the leaders, especially with regard to foreign relations.

Snowdon: How do we better understand Indonesia then, given in general the misunderstanding and fear of Islam that seems to be growing in Australia?

Falaahk: First less knowledge about your neighbour is a crucial source from which prejudices and misunderstanding could emerge. So I mean both societies, Indonesia and also the Australian public have to increase their knowledge. But as long as you have a willingness to increase your knowledge, trying to understand your neighbour then soon you were get along with your neighbour. Otherwise even if your neighbour comes from the same village you might not be able to have a good relationship.

International relations

US and Indonesia's military: Bedfellows again?

Asia Times - December 10, 2002

Tim Shorrock, Washington -- The killings last August of two Americans, allegedly at the hands of Indonesian soldiers with the apparent consent of the high command, haven't dampened enthusiasm within the Bush administration and the US business community for closer US ties with the Indonesian military.

Nearly three months after the contract teachers for Freeport- McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc died in an ambush near the world's largest gold mine in Papua, the administration of US President George W Bush has said very little about the incident beyond expressing an interest in finding the perpetrators of the deed.

Freeport itself -- which has had a long and close relationship with the Indonesia military -- has yet to comment publicly on the allegations about military involvement in the deaths of its own employees. And the largest business lobby in Washington for Indonesian investors, the US-ASEAN Business Council, continues to push for upgraded ties with the Indonesian military, which is widely known by its Indonesian abbreviation TNI.

Yet strong evidence from the Indonesian police, backed by reports from Papuan human-rights groups, indicates that the shooting was the work of Kopassus, the Indonesian Special Forces. It has been implicated in several other killings and disappearances, including the murder last year of Theys Eluay, a tribal chief who led Papua's independence movement.

In addition, intelligence intercepts provided by Australia to US officials in Jakarta reportedly indicate that senior Indonesian generals discussed the attack before it happened, according to information first reported by the Washington Post and the Sydney Morning Herald. The administration's leading expert on Indonesia, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, told the Post that the Freeport incident shouldn't be used as an excuse to retain the congressional ban on US training and aid for the TNI.

The ban was imposed in 1991 after an Indonesian military massacre in East Timor and severed completely after the military-led rampage in that nation in 1999.

While calling the reports of military involvement "disturbing", Wolfowitz told the Post that closer US ties with the TNI would give Indonesian officers "more contact with the West and with the United States". He added that "moving them in a positive direction is important both to support democracy in Indonesia and to support the fight against terrorism. Unfortunately we've been isolating them for a decade. It's not a policy that's working."

Opponents of increased US aid reject that logic. "They had that kind of relationship over three decades and we saw no move to reform," said Ed McWilliams, a former State Department official who served as a political counselor in the US Embassy in Indonesia during the 1990s. The Freeport killings "should be a quandary [for the administration] but I'm not sure it is." McWilliams said he was especially disturbed by the Indonesian military denials of involvement and its attempts to pin the killing on a Papuan separatist group. "What we're seeing is a coverup," he said.

An official with the US-ASEAN Business Council said US companies favored closer ties. "Engagement is good," John Fips, the council's point-man on Indonesia and Singapore, told Asia Times Online. "If we don't have good relations, how will we affect their actions?" But Fips added that reports about senior military involvement in the attack "would be extra troubling ... I think there's concern about the developments in Papua".

The US administration is certain to face a barrage of questions from Congress when it moves again next year to reinvigorate US ties with the Indonesian military.

For starters, lawmakers are going to want to know what the Federal Bureau of Investigation has learned about the Freeport killings. Shortly after the ambush, several FBI agents were dispatched to Jakarta to investigate the ambush. During their stay, they conducted extensive interviews, including a three-hour session with John Rumbiak, who runs the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy based in Papua and conducted the initial investigation of the Freeport incident. The FBI has also interviewed survivors of the Freeport attack who are back in the United States.

Rumbiak, who is now living in North America after receiving death threats in Indonesia, said he met with the FBI on September 25 after briefing the US Embassy on his findings. "I told them this is the military masterminding these attacks," he said. Rumbiak, who spent several weeks in Papua investigating the incident, said he believes Indonesian military officers ordered the attack so they could blame it on the guerrillas in the hopes that the United States would label the Papuan dissidents a terrorist group. "The idea was, that would speed up the discussions in Washington, DC, on US-TNI relations," he said.

Senator Patrick Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who wrote the 1991 amendment ending Indonesia's role in the US International Military and Educating Training program (IMET), recently signaled his interest in the Freeport case.

Last month, he told the Financial Times that any resumption of US military aid to Jakarta was contingent on solving the killings in Papua.

He called the TNI a "corrupt, abusive institution that has a long history of killing civilians and lying about it. The fact that they apparently believed they could murder two Americans in broad daylight and get away with it illustrates the extent of the impunity."

Human-rights groups also plan to draw attention to the upcoming trials of two women who were arrested in September in Aceh for violating their tourist visas by meeting with members of the Free Aceh separatist movement as well as the recent acquittals in Jakarta of four officials charged with crimes against humanity during the 1999 violence in East Timor.

The campaign to head off US aid comes on top of a string of terrorist attacks widely seen as the work of al-Qaeda sympathizers, including last week's bombings of a McDonald's in Sulawesi and the October attack in Bali that killed over 180 people.

The Bush administration, backed by US business groups with investments in Indonesia, have seized on the Bali bombings as justification for resuming the close military ties with Jakarta.

Last August, during a visit to Jakarta, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a US$50 million, three-year anti-terrorism assistance package to Indonesia. The administration won a partial victory a few weeks later, when both the House and Senate appropriations committees approved spending bills restoring IMET for Indonesia. But this year's session ended without a full vote on the measure, so the Leahy amendment remains in force.

Muslim leader warns against working with Kopassus

Sydney Morning Herald - December 10, 2002

Jennifer Hewett -- One of Indonesia's most influential moderate Muslim leaders has criticised the Australian Government's flirtation with the idea of working with the Indonesian special forces unit, Kopassus, to combat terrorism.

Mohammad Fajrul Falaakh, deputy chairman of the largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia, said this had sent "the wrong message" to moderate Muslims. "Many Kopassus soldiers have been involved with violence and torturing of pro-democracy activists," he said. "Yet only two to three years later Australia has changed its mind about Kopassus because of terrorism. "I understand we need an anti-terror squad, but we can't use that institution. It is the same Kopassus with a new name -- anti-terrorism."

Mr Falaakh said many Indonesians had been surprised and dismayed by the suggestion by the Minister for Defence, Robert Hill, that, after the Bali bombings, Australia had to debate the issue of co-operation with Kopassus seriously despite concerns about human rights abuses and possible links with Islamic terrorist groups.

This is a sensitive political issue; the ALP opposes any involvement with Kopassus and many members of federal cabinet are deeply sceptical about the risks. Mr Falaakh's comments offer a perspective from the moderate Muslim community that the government is keen to encourage as a counter to the appeal of radical islamic groups.

He said Australia's focus should be on helping the rest of the Indonesian military become more professional and on working with the police and military intelligence to build a better anti- terrorism capability. Mr Falaakh, an academic, is deputy chairman of Nahdatul Ulama, a Muslim organisation which the former president Abdurrahman Wahid used to chair. He was in Australia to deliver an annual lecture on religion and freedom organised by the Centre for Independent Studies.

Moderate and radical Muslim groups were in competition in Indonesia, and there was potential for radical islam to grow, he said. "They [radicals] now have more popularity and attention worldwide. But so far they have not stolen our constituency." But he pointed out that it had taken Western Christian societies hundreds of years to figure out the role of religion in politics and that it became easier to use religion to manipulate people when their lives were not going well.

He also criticised President Megawati Soekarnoputri for not doing more to reach out to moderates and show leadership on the issue of radical Islam after the Bali bombings. Many Indonesians, including educated people, still believed the recent bombings were part of a CIA conspiracy, he said.

Book/film reviews

Kopassus has a special place in Indonesia's history

Jakarta Post - December 15, 2002

[Inside Indonesia's Special Forces, By Ken Conboy, Equinox Publishing (Asia), 2002, 320pp.]

Endy M. Bayuni, Jakarta -- Some fear and hate them, others admire and hold them in high esteem. However one views Kopassus, no one can deny that the Indonesian Army's Special Forces (Kopassus) are special indeed. They are not necessarily special because of their skills or their performance; other countries have special forces too, and needless to say, some have performed better or are in much better shape.

Kopassus is special because it has played a pivotal role in Indonesia's modern history since its inception in 1952, and because, for better or for worse, Kopassus and its men have also helped to shape that history.

Ken Conboy's latest work is a brave attempt to look at Kopassus' place in Indonesian history. I say brave because in spite of its high profile in the history of the Indonesian Military, Kopassus is a complex subject that is not easy to comprehend. Given the often secretive and controversial nature of its work -- including special warfare and military intelligence -- few outsiders have had a chance to obtain a glimpse of how the Indonesian Army's Special Forces think and operate.

Conboy is one of those few outsiders privy to the inner workings and inner thinking of the command, and of its many commandants over all these years. As the title suggests, the book tries to tell the story of the Indonesian Military's most fearsome command from the inside.

Since many of the military campaigns in which Kopassus has been involved have been written about and are well documented, some might dismiss the likelihood of finding anything startling. But no one has ever attempted to write from the perspective of Kopassus, from the eyes of the people who made up the command.

Conboy combines his analytical skills (he is a military analyst by training) with the views and thinking of the dozens of Kopassus officers he interviewed in writing this book. The strength of the book therefore comes from giving both an outside-looking-in and an inside-looking-out view of all the national events in which Kopassus has been involved since 1952.

The author takes a look at Kopassus from 1952 to 1993, and with good reason: events after 1993 are too recent to write about objectively, and too recent for any of the people involved to speak openly and frankly about, the way their predecessors did in helping the author reconstruct history.

Still, this is a pity because Kopassus became more controversial and more involved in political power plays after 1993, right up to the end of the Soeharto regime in 1998. Widely discredited after that because of its close association with the authoritarian leader, Kopassus has been struggling ever since to repair its battered image and regain its public standing.

Inside Indonesia's Special Forces helps us understand Kopassus better. And understanding the evolution of Kopassus explains why the force is the way it is today. And we learn that this evolution cannot be separated from the individuals who led and gave the force the vision that charted its historical path.

The idea to set up the Special Forces, for example, came from Slamet Riyadi, the Central Java lieutenant colonel, while he was fighting the Dutch colonial forces in Maluku in 1949. He was so impressed with his adversaries' fighting skills that he told his colleague, Col. Alex Kawilarang, while they were ducking Dutch bullets, "I want some of those for myself."

Riyadi never lived to see his idea come to fruition as he was killed in a later battle, but Kawilarang picked it up three years later when he was chief of the Siliwangi Military Command in West Java in Bandung. Thus the Army's Special Forces were born.

It was not a smooth path, and typically, like any evolving organization, it was a hard struggle wrought with personal rivalries, competition from other services and ultimately politicking, within the military and national politics.

Political infighting aside, the Special Forces quickly made their mark by spearheading some of the government's military campaigns: putting down regional rebellions in the late 1950s, the Irian Jaya (Papua) campaign in 1960, the confrontation against British Malaya in 1964, the crushing of the communist forces in 1965, the East Timor military campaign in 1975, and the subsequent campaigns against terrorism, or anyone considered a threat to the Soeharto regime.

Kopassus' main role in shaping history came in 1965 when it became the backbone of the Army, then politically fractured between pro and anticommunist camps, to crush the abortive coup blamed on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The force paved the way for Soeharto's rise to power, and subsequently helped him stay in power for over three decades.

While Kopassus' contribution to Indonesian history has been significant, not everything was glory for the force. Conboy's book gives a sober account of both the failures and the successes, the ups and downs of Kopassus. The force's contributions were not limited to the military operations they were involved in.

Probably much more significant was its success in producing some of the finest and most disciplined Army men, who went on to become statesmen long after they retired from Kopassus and the military. A quick glance at the list of Kopassus men who appear in the book reads like a who's who of the Indonesian Military. Gen. Benny Murdani, although he never held the leadership baton, was one of the most prominent Kopassus alumni, having served in the command from its early years. Other figures to have come from the command include Sarwo Edhi Wibowo, Feisal Tandjung, Kentot Harseno, Hendropriyono, Luhut Pandjaitan, Sintong Pandjaitan and Yunus Yosfiah.

Although Conboy based his book largely on official documents, including declassified US intelligence reports, his lengthy interviews with many of the past Kopassus leaders allowed him to reconstruct history as seen from inside the command. The many anecdotes in the book help to sustain the reader's interest.

Conboy is not a stranger to Indonesia or the Indonesian Military. His background as a military analyst and his work in Jakarta for the last 10 years as a consultant allowed him to become acquainted with the people that he writes about.

Inside is a powerful narration of the history of the military's fearsome Special Forces. Reading the book, one gets the feeling that Kopassus is far from becoming history. It will continue to play a major role in shaping Indonesia's history for many more years. The sequel to this book, if there is one, will be just as interesting to read as this present volume.