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Indonesia News Digest No
45 - November 18-24, 2002
Jakarta Post - November 22, 2002
Bogor -- Nine companies have folded since the start of the year
in Bogor, West Java, leading to 5,585 workers losing their jobs,
Bogor's manpower agency chief Suherdis announced on Thursday.
He said that seven other companies employing 3,211 workers had
also sought leave from the agency to fire their workers as they
were facing bankruptcy.
Besides bankruptcy, there were also a number of companies that
had relocated their operations from Bogor to neighboring towns,
such as Cianjur and Sukabumi, where the minimum wage was much
lower than in Bogor.
The minimum wage in Bogor is Rp 576,000, while in Sukabumi it is
only Rp 281,000.
According to Suherdis, Bogor has 618 big companies, 742 medium-
sized firms, and about 570 small enterprises. "Some 141 of those
companies have made thousands of their workers redundant due to
the poor business climate.
He asked the minister of manpower to review the regulation on the
minimum wage per region as it was causing difficulties for Bogor
in attracting new investment.
Jakarta Post - November 18, 2002
Jakarta -- Two students from the Jakarta Theology School (STT
Jakarta) in Central Jakarta who have been on hunger strike since
last week were rushed to the hospital last Saturday.
Fasting student Hazel was brought to the privately owned Cikini
Hospital in Central Jakarta, while her colleague Willi was being
treated in the privately owned Pertamina Hospital in South
Jakarta. Hazel was released from the hospital late in the
evening.
Previously, four students from the same college had given up
their hunger strike due to their deteriorating health.
The STT Jakarta students' Kelompok Gumul Juang (Immense Struggle
Group) has been staging the hunger strike on their campus since
earlier this month in protest against what they say is police
oppression of the student movement.
It was a follow-up to a clash between the police and students
demanding the dissolution of the Golkar Party in front of the
party's Jakarta headquarters in Cikini on October 9.
A court later sentenced 84 students to three days in detention,
or Rp 25,000 each in fines, following their convictions on
charges of assault and trespass as they had attacked a man in the
waiting room of the St. Carolus Hospital, Central Jakarta, whom
they mistakenly took to be an intelligence officer. "We protest
the action of armed members of the security forces in entering
onto the campus and in abducting the students who were being
treated in the St. Carolus Hospital so they could be questioned,"
a leader of the group, Herman Nainggolan, told The Jakarta Post
last Saturday.
Students/youth
Aceh/West Papua
'War on terrorism'
Government & politics
Human rights/law
Focus on Jakarta
News & issues
Environment
Armed forces/Police
International relations
Economy & investment
Labour issues
5,585 workers fired in Bogor
Students/youth
Hunger-striking students hospitalized
Hundreds of Ba'asyir supporters stage a rally
Jakarta Post - November 18, 2002
Jakarta -- Hundreds of students of Ngruki Islamic boarding school staged a rally on Sunday outside the Surakarta Police in Central Java, demanding the police to release Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.
The students of the school, which was established by Ba'asyir, urged the government to revoke the recent emergency decrees on terrorism.
Muhammad Hasyim, who lead the rally, told El Shinta radio station that Ba'asyir arrest was not fair and that the government must release him soon.
B'asyir is currently being detained in Jakarta on charges of a series bombing in the country in 1999 and 2000. The police expected to sent Ba'asyir dossier to the prosecutor office this month.
| Aceh/West Papua |
Courier Mail - November 22, 2002
Greg Poulgrain -- Indonesia's feared Kopassus forces had been forced to free Papuan tourist guide Silas Yikwa when the news of his kidnapping reached the outside world, it was claimed last night.
Mr Yikwa, who was abducted by Kopassus troops on November 5, has said his captors let him go after The Courier-Mail ran the story on November 16 and it was picked up by websites in Papua. In an e-mail to friends in Brisbane yesterday he said Kopassus had contacted Papuan university students to arrange his freedom after the story broke.
Mr Yikwa was taking five Brisbane tourists for a trekking holiday in the Papuan highlands when he was abducted at Sentani airport, 40km from the capital city Jayapura. The abduction followed a rash of kidnapping and killings of prominent Papuans which have been blamed on Kopassus, Indonesia's notorious special forces. Twelve Kopassus personnel have been charged over the killing in November last year of independence leader Theys Eluay.
Mr Yikwa said there was no reason for Kopassus to suspect that the visit by the five tourists was politically motivated, but he was arrested nevertheless. The tourists were Richard de Simone, his three adult daughters and a fiance. Speaking from his Brisbane home yesterday, Mr de Simone explained that their group goes for trekking holidays every year.
Describing his ordeal, Mr Yikwa said that during interrogation at Kopassus headquarters, he was severely beaten. "I never get food from November 5 until November 19 and just drink salt water during the kidnap," he said in his e-mail. "Kopassus they put me [in] a special political place. Normally when they bring political people to that place, they kill [that person]. But Silas [had] safety because of the God."
Once in safe hands, Mr Yikwa was thankful he had survived. "Oh God thank you for help during kidnap [of] Silas," he said. "Give me my land with freedom ... Enough my people die everywhere all around West Papua."
The release of Mr Yikwa could indicate an increased sensitivity on the part of Kopassus to accusations of rights violations. This has occurred in the wake of Indonesian police accusations that Kopassus was involved in the Eluay killing as well as the deaths of an Indonesian and two Americans in a shooting ambush at the Freeport mine in Papua on August 31 this year.
Radio Australia - November 24, 2002
Indonesian police say three workers of US oil and gas giant ExxonMobil who had been abducted in Aceh province have been freed.
An Aceh police spokesman said the hostages were unharmed and probably with their families by now. Police were still investigating the details of their release and whether any ransom had been paid.
The workers were abducted on Thursday on their way home from work. Police blamed the abduction on Aceh separatist rebels.
The incident comes before the expected signing of a peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the rebels on December 9.
Jakarta Post - November 22, 2002
Tiarma Siboro, Jakarta -- Lawyers representing the Indonesian Military (TNI) rejected on Thursday a peaceful solution to their client's dispute with The Washington Post over a report of the military's alleged involvement in an ambush against employees of a gold and copper mining firm in August.
The lawyers sent legal notification on Thursday to the Post and its representatives in Indonesia, Alan Sipress and Allen Nakashima, demanding that the newspaper apologize for its report. Calling the report libelous, attorney Trimoelja D. Soerjadi said his client demanded that the apology appear in five foreign newspapers, including the Post, and five newspapers in Indonesia as well as on the Post's website, which had published the report. "If they refuse to meet the demand within 14 days, we will take the newspaper to court," he said.
The Post ran a story reporting that senior military officers may have planned the ambush against employees of PT Freeport Indonesia in Timika, Papua, on August 31. Two Americans and an Indonesian were killed in the attack. Citing "highly reliable" sources and other information, the newspaper said that prior to the ambush, several officers, including TNI chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, allegedly discussed an operation against Freeport with the ultimate aim of discrediting the separatist Free Papua Movement (OPM).
Todung Mulya Lubis, the lawyer representing the Post, said that his client followed the principle of covering both sides of the story according to the journalists' code of ethics, by including the military spokesman's denial of the incident. But Trimoelja said that its claim of providing balanced reporting could not justify the media to print a false story.
Agence France Presse - November 22, 2002
Jakarta -- Indonesia's military announced yesterday it has halted attacks on Aceh separatist rebels and a senior minister said the two sides in one of South-east Asia's longest wars are on course to sign a peace deal next month.
"What is happening is a shift from offensive moves into defensive ... a shift from search, find and destroy to providing a defensive corridor," military spokesman Syafrie Syamsuddin told a press conference.
"Should skirmishes occur, it is only for defensive purposes." But violence continued in the province despite the peace moves, with four policeman injured in a grenade attack and a man shot dead yesterday afternoon on the outskirts of Banda Aceh.
International mediators from the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) announced on Tuesday that the signing of a peace agreement is planned for Dec 9 even though "a few issues need to be resolved" between the government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).
Top security minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono told reporters the date is still valid despite a statement to the contrary from chief GAM negotiator Zaini Abdullah.
On Wednesday, the Swedish-based exiled rebel leadership said in a press release signed by Dr Abdullah that it had not agreed to a signing on Dec 9 and that no deal had yet been reached to end the war.
But GAM's military spokesman Sofyan Dawod said the same day its leaders throughout Aceh had received the announcement about the December 9 signing and would respect the decision.
"That statement is the personal attitude and statement of Dr Zaini Abdullah, not an official statement of the GAM leadership in Sweden," Mr Yudhoyono said.
He said he had raised Dr Abdullah's statement with HDC representatives who communicated with Stockholm. "Therefore we still hold as valid the commitment of an agreement on December 9." GAM's war for independence has killed an estimated 10,000 people since 1976.
Associated Press - November 23, 2002
Jakarta -- Unidentified gunmen have abducted three men working for ExxonMobil Oil Indonesia in the country's troubled Aceh province, military and company officials said yesterday.
Major Eddi Fernandi said the three men -- all Indonesians -- were forced from their car by armed men as they returned home from work on Thursday at the giant Arun gas field.
ExxonMobil Oil Indonesia is partly owned by Texas-based energy giant Exxon Mobil.
Major Fernandi blamed separatist rebels for the abduction -- a charge immediately denied by the insurgents.
"I have checked with all our networks," said rebel spokesman Isnandar Alpase. "They are not involved in the abduction." The abduction comes as the separatist rebels of the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government are preparing to sign a peace deal to end decades of hostilities next month in Switzerland.
In Jakarta, the company confirmed that three employees were missing. However, they did not specify who the abductors were.
Last year, the company was forced to temporarily cease production at its natural gas fields in the province when it came under attack from separatists.
Rebels have been fighting since 1976 for the independence of the province, which lies about 1,800 km north-west of Jakarta.
Laksamana.Net - November 22, 2002
The Indonesian Defense Forces (TNI) promises to end its offensive against separatist rebels in Aceh province but warns of harsh reprisals if a planned peace agreement fails.
"What is happening is a shift from offensives into defensive strategies. Should skirmishes occur they will only be for defensive purposes," military spokesman Major General Sjafrie Sjamsuddin was quoted as saying on Thursday by German press agency DPA.
He rejected claims that TNI has been intensifying its operations in Aceh prior to the peace agreement scheduled to be signed by government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on December 9.
Commenting on the ongoing military siege on a separatist stronghold at Cot Trieng village in North Aceh, he said the military would only open fire to prevent the rebels from escaping.
"You know, there are armed separatists in the area. If TNI does not encircle those armed rebels, they might go out and disturb the surrounding people," he was quoted as saying by state news agency Antara.
More than 1,000 troops have surrounded dozens of rebels in Cot Trieng since October 31 as part of the government's strategy to persuade GAM to sign the truce, which is being brokered by the Swiss-based Henry Dunant Center (HDC).
The besieged rebels have refused to surrender and say they will go down fighting.
Sjamsuddin said TNI no longer aims to crush GAM but is giving the rebels an opportunity to surrender and return to the Republic of Indonesia.
He claimed that in the context of restoring security and stability in Aceh, TNI is merely assisting police and not acting to serve its vested interests.
"The task of TNI in Aceh is to implement the policy of the government. However, TNI hopes that the conflict will be resolved through the peace agreement."
He said the rebels would face a severe crackdown if the truce is not a success. "If plan A, which means peaceful solution, fails, there will be plan B, which is to seek out and crush GAM elements," he asserted.
"If the peace agreement fails, I am sure the government will make the other decision and TNI will be committed to implementing that program," he added.
Denial
Vice President Hamzah Haz said Thursday the government is determined to sign the agreement with GAM leaders in Geneva next month.
But GAM spokesman Zaini Abdullah, who represents the movement's exiled leaders based in Sweden, denied the rebels had agreed to a date for the signing of the accord.
He said GAM had not agreed to accept the government's offer of a special autonomy package for Aceh and will continue fighting for independence.
The autonomy package came into effect at the beginning of this year and would be significantly bolstered by the peace agreement, which gives the province free and fair local elections, international monitoring for a disarmament process, and a greater share of the revenue from its vast natural resources.
About 10,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed since GAM began fighting for an independent state in 1976. So far this year at least 1,200 people have died as a result of the conflict.
Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono denied the planned signing of the peace agreement had been cancelled.
"I checked with the Henry Dunant Center this morning ... I physically met with HDC officials and the HDC had also communicated it to Stockholm. The statement of Zaini Abdullah was not an official statement of GAM or GAM leaders in Sweden," he said. "Therefore we continue to adhere to our commitment, so the agreement to sign the peace deal on December 9 remains valid," he added.
Yudhoyono urged observers, community figures and politicians to refrain from commenting on developments in Aceh unless they are extremely well informed. "Immediately telling the public about knowledge of a little information will only confuse them. Frankly speaking, it will disturb the [peace] process."
'Destroy them'
TNI commander General Endriartono Sutarto said Thursday the military will maintain its present stance on GAM until there is a "real change of heart" on the part of the rebel leadership.
"We will keep moving as we do now," he said after a meeting at the presidential palace. "If they [GAM] continue to disturb security, well, [we will] destroy them."
He said TNI will only change its stance after GAM signs the peace accord. "The signing of the peace agreement will constitute a real change of heart at the upper level of the rebel hierarchy," he said.
"So until there is certainty [we will] let the field operations continue as they do now," he added.
Asked about "Plan B", Sutarto expressed hope there would be no need for the government to resort to the use of military force. The plan would only become operational if GAM refuses to sign the peace deal, he said.
Donor meeting
Meanwhile, the US Embassy in Jakarta announced Thursday that America, Japan and the World Bank will cosponsor a meeting of donors on rebuilding Aceh.
A press release from the embassy said the Preparatory Conference on Peace and Reconstruction in Aceh will be held in Tokyo on December 3 and attended by "like-minded countries" and international organizations that support a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Representatives of the Indonesian government and Acehnese civil society will also attend.
"The conference will provide an opportunity for participants to discuss ways they might contribute to the social and physical reconstruction of Aceh once there is an end to hostilities," said the press release.
Radio Australia - November 20, 2002
[One of the details of the peace deal, which is yet to be negotiated, is the inclusion of international monitors. It's an idea which has never before been accepted by the Indonesian Government. Outside monitors are a crucial ingredient because neither side trusts the other.]
Presenter/Interviewer: Graeme Dobell, Canberra
Speakers: Professor Anthony Reid, director of the Asia Research Institute at Singapore University
Reid: "The key obstacle is certainly the Indonesian army, I don't believe the Indonesian army is ready to withdraw from Aceh, I'm not sure that many Indonesians expect that to be the outcome, but for Acehanese that will be the central issue. Will they continue to be under the boot as it were, or the arbitrary danger of arrest and intimidation from the army, or will there be some alternative peacekeeping body? And I think this is always going to be critical, one shouldn't exaggerate it, one shouldn't say I mean obviously everybody knows that that is there and in signing an agreement they plan to work with it. But it is a major problem there's no doubt."
Dobell: What lessons has Indonesia taken from East Timor? Is Indonesia able to avoid the Timor mistakes in Aceh?
Reid: "It depends which Indonesians we're talking about. There's no doubt that some Indonesians have taken a lesson from Timor that you cannot rule by force alone, that it simply isn't worth the price of what it does to Indonesian freedoms to persevere with an occupation by force of an unwilling part of your country. Some people certainly have taken that lesson but others, including many in the military have taken the lesson that you shouldn't ease up, you shouldn't be soft or you know you lose it. So I think you'd have to say there is much division and on the whole I mean I'd like to say that Indonesian opinion is deeply divided, I mean at least to say that, but I think probably Indonesian opinion is more united in wanting to hang on to Aceh than it ever was and wanted to hang on to it."
Dobell: Why?
Reid: "Because Aceh is central to the myth of Indonesian unity and Indonesian identity, which was created initially by the nationalist movement and then perpetuated in fact embedded very deeply in the education system under Suharto."
Dobell: Is your caution, your scepticism about a settlement driven by this reality that history and the world looks so different from Aceh to what it does from Jakarta?
Reid: "Yeah that's definitely the case, I mean at least with my own perception of things. I'm I guess you could say a historian of Aceh I have never had much sympathy for this kind of Aceh Merdeka ideas, which seem disruptive and so forth. But the last time I was in Aceh I mean one could not ignore the extraordinary extent to which opinion had shifted, to which people really had bought the essential message of Hasand tiro, that Aceh had its own history and that being part of Indonesia was not a fulfillment of that history but rather a travesty of it and a demeaning of it. So I mean that, there's a lot that's crazy about Hasand tiro and extremely eccentric from a Acehanese point of view, and he's a very westernised man. But that message that this isn't destiny that you're part of Indonesia, it's rather the opposite on destiny, but you know you're Acehanese and you have a history and you should be proud of it. That seemed to have become very widespread. Through the years of an open press in 99, 2000, 2001 when these things could be widely said, things that had previously been I suppose whispered and carried by the guerillas, but they started to be openly said by everybody and to my astonishment they were very widely felt. I don't think they will go away."
Dobell: How many Acehanese then, how many Acehanese in the street see the military as an occupying force and not their national army?
Reid: "How can I know, but I my very limited experience says there's many, that this is the basic perception even though many would see GAM, the Aceh independence movement as bad or worse."
Radio Australia - November 20, 2002
[There are hopes of an end to hostilities in one of Southeast Asia's longest running wars. The Indonesian government and international mediators say they will sign a deal with separatist rebels in the province of Aceh on December 9, after the end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan. The Free Aceh Movement has been waging an armed struggle for an independent state since 1976 in a conflict that is thought to have claimed some ten thousand lives. However, rebel forces have not confirmed the signing date and crucial details of the peace deal are still to be negotiated.]
Presenter/Interviewer: Peter Mares
Speakers: William Dowell, spokesman Henri Dunant Centre; Dr Ed Aspinall, Australian National University
Mares: The apparent breakthrough in negotiations between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement has been achieved by the patient work of the Henri Dunant Centre, a Geneva-based, non-government organisation that specialises in conflict resolution.
The Henri Dunant Centre has been mediating between the two sides for more than two years. It is now so confident of a deal to halt hostilities that it has sent a small advance team of international staff to Aceh, to prepare the ground for the creation of a 150-member ceasefire monitoring committee.
William Dowell is the Centre's official spokesman in Aceh. He admits that some details of the "cessation of hostilties" agreement are yet to be worked out:
Dowell: Most of the points of the agreement have been reached. There are a few areas that still need clarification but in principle both sides have agreed that they will sign and we're planning on having the signing on December 9 at this point. Many things could come up to delay it but at this point the plan is to do it on December 9.
Mares: The leadership of the Free Aceh Movement is based in Sweden, and goes under the official name of the Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front. A statement on its official website describes recent talks as 'fruitful' but does not commit to signing a peace deal on December 9. Instead, the statement says the movement's negotiators will meet with international mediators on that day to determine whether outstanding questions have been resolved and set a definite date for the signing.
However, William Dowell says the Henri Dunant Centre is proceeding on the basis that the signing will go ahead:
Dowell: There are many different opinions within each of the parties and what we are going through now is kind of a process of trying to digest the idea of going ahead and signing on December 9 and trying to get everybody on the same wavelength. So at this point it's really both sides are trying to line up their own forces and make sure everybody is reading from the same program.
Mares: Indonesia's security minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono told reporters in Jakarta that there was still disagreement between the government and the Free Aceh Movement on two points, the mechanism for disarmament and the role of the police and army will under a ceasefire.
Dr Ed Aspinall is a research fellow at the Australian National University who specialises on Aceh. He is encouraged by talk of a deal to end hostilities, but remains cautious.
Aspinall: Previous experience should caution us to be rather careful when viewing the progress of these peace talks. They have been dragging on now for getting on towards three years. There was an earlier agreement of course in 2000 which was honoured much more in the breach than in anything else, so we need to still be cautious. But yes, it is certainly a better sign than we've had for a long period, we can say that at least.
Mares: The Indonesian government says the deal with the Free Aceh Movement is based on acceptance of the special autonomy package for Aceh that was passed into law last year. But Ed Aspinall says there is no sign that the Free Aceh Movement is willing to give up its long term aim of an independent state.
Aspinall: What they have said in the past however is that they would accept the special autonomy law as an entry point into further negotiations. There's never been any very clear statement of their position. But what they seem to have in mind is that they would accept the autonomy law as a kind of interim position so long as they could be guaranteed means to continue to struggle for Acehnese indepedence through other means, that is peacefully, through the ballot box and so on. So there is a really very major problem there because we have had repeated statements from the Indonesian side, in particular many of the hardliners associated not only with the Indonesian military but in the national parliament and so on, suggesting that peace is only viable if the Free Aceh Movement accepts the autonomy law full stop. By which they mean, accepts that Aceh will always remain part of Indonesia.
Mares: Under the draft peace proposal released by Henri Dunant Centre the cessation of hostilities will be followed by "a free and fair election process, designed to ensure the broadest participation of all elements of Acehnese society." But, as Ed Aspinall explains, this could present further problems: ASPINALL: For that to occur there would be have to be amendments, not only to the autonomy law but also to Indonesia's election laws. As it stands political parties that can participate in elections in Indonesia have to be essentially national. They have to be represented in a large proportion of provinces throughout the country, so as it stands a Free Aceh Party for instance would not be able to register simply within Aceh. Now the problem is for those laws to be amended, the only body which can amend them of course is the national parliament.
Mares: But any elections that were held that did not involve the Free Aceh Movement would fail to resolve the tensions in the province.
Aspinall: That's right. It would simply dramatise that an important body of opinion and in fact the main armed group in Aceh remain excluded from the political process.The key to success will be somehow involving that large body of Achenese, who still have the goal of an independent Aceh at some point.
Irish Times - November 21, 2002
Joe Humphreys -- Evidence of United Nations collusion in the violent takeover of West Papua by Indonesia 40 years ago is revealed in a new book on the subject, which was launched in Dublin this week.
The book, which draws upon recently declassified UN, British and Australian documents, claims the UN Secretariat deliberately "washed its hands" of the Papua issue by minimising criticism of the 1969 Act of Free Choice, under which 1,022 natives, hand- picked by the Indonesian government voted against independence.
As part of this "campaign", senior UN officials "deliberately misrepresented the extent of Papuan hostility to Indonesian: rule," according to the book's author, Dr John Saltford.
He says the UN Secretariat also misled UN member-states by claiming the early withdrawal of peacekeeping troops from West Papua in May 1963 was in accordance with "the wishes of the people".
Speaking to The Irish Times, Dr Saltford, who works as a South- east Asian specialist in the UK Public Record Office, said he had never heard of West Papua until he began research for a PhD thesis. "The more I looked into it the more I was amazed," he said.
"The Papuans had a great deal of trust in the UN, and the UN betrayed them, and it continues to betray them because, so far, it has refused to review its position on the issue." Up to 30,000 West Papuans were killed in the Indonesian take-over that followed the UN's withdrawal from the territory. A further 70,000 died violently under Indonesian occupation in a conflict which mirrors that of East Timor prior to its recent liberation.
Dr Saltford cites evidence to suggest the UN-sponsored New York Agreement, signed in August 1962 between Indonesia and West Papua's former colonisers, the Netherlands, was a fraud. The three parties pledged to protect the political rights and freedoms of the Papuans but they failed and deliberately so, he says, "because genuine Papuan self-determination was never considered as a serious option by any of them".
When the process became exposed following the shambolic 1969 vote, the UN Secretariat focused its attention "on collaborating with Jakarta in its mission to prevent any international criticism of the Act emerging", Dr Saltford states.
In this regard, he cites a report from the British Embassy in Jakarta, in September 1969, advising that avoiding raising "any awkward questions, would help to gain us Indonesian support over Ireland". Dr Saltford said Australia, as a close ally of Indonesia, remained a major stumbling block on the issue.
However, "there are movements towards a resolution, and I hope this book would make a contribution to that. I know some senior UN officials are aware of the book and are due to study it as it's the first time some of this information has been made public.
"It really was a betrayal," he added. "I think the UN needs to address that if it wants to keep its status, and I say that as a supporter of the UN."
[The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969: The Anatomy of Betrayal, by Dr John Saltford.]
Asia Times - November 19, 2002
Richel Langit, Jakarta -- The news that the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) will soon sign a peace agreement with the Indonesian government came as a pleasant surprise to Indonesians who had long wanted to see the bloody conflict there to come to an end.
Nevertheless, it also invites curiosity as to why the rebels suddenly agreed to enter into a peace agreement with the government. The secessionist movement, which has been fighting for independence since 1976, had always refused to settle for anything less than a nation separated from the Republic of Indonesia. Over 10,000 people, mostly innocent civilians, have been killed in the conflict.
A source familiar with the rebel group said the GAM leadership overseas was now fragmented, while field commanders in Aceh suffered a severe lack of "independence ideology".
Rebel leaders in Switzerland and Malaysia, according to the source, are divided as to whether they should pursue independence or accept the special autonomy status introduced by the central government on January 1, 2001. Under the special autonomy status, Aceh would be allowed to implement Islamic laws, or syariah, and organize direct elections for heads of provincial and regency administrations. The rebels would be allowed to field their own candidates.
Most GAM leaders overseas support the special autonomy status because they see it as minimizing the number of victims among innocent civilians. GAM first hinted at accepting the special autonomy scheme during peace talks in Geneva in May when it agreed to use the special status as the sole basis for future peace talks.
Commanders of the rebels' armed wing in Aceh do not see eye to eye with the overseas leadership. The reason is that many of them entered the movement for the wrong reason. According to the source, many GAM fighters holding key positions in Aceh were wanted criminals who joined the movement between 1988 and 1998 when the province was put under a military operation status, just to avoid prosecution.
These "wayward" GAM leaders now often go around terrorizing local people to extort money, particularly after the death of respected GAM commander Tengku Syafi'ie Abdullah, who was killed in a shootout with a joint military-police operation team early this year.
The attitude of these rogue fighters is proving very costly to the movement. Local Acehnese people, and especially local religious leaders who were previously sympathetic to the movement, are growing antipathetic toward the rebels, whom they see as no better than government troops. Local people have also been giving information to security personnel about the whereabouts of rebels -- something that never happened in the early 1990s.
Still, no potential commanders are emerging from the rebels' rank and file, which means there is no end in sight for the current political disorientation among GAM fighters. When six religious leaders and public figures from the troubled province were invited by the Switzerland-based Henry Dunant Center to meet with GAM heavyweights in late October, they prodded the GAM leaders to sign without delay a government-authored peace accord, despite strong oppositions from the rebels on two issues of the draft. GAM leaders are reportedly reluctant to accept the demand by the Indonesian government that they hand over their weapons, and the unclear definition of the role of Mobile Brigade police in Aceh.
If the Indonesian government is now literally dictating to GAM on the peace accord, it is because the government knows very well that GAM is at its weakest point. Indeed, the movement had unilaterally decided to delay the signing of a peace agreement until after the Muslim post-fasting Idul Fitri celebrations that fall on December 6 and 7. But judging by the reaction of Acehnese people, the GAM decision is seen as merely designed to create the impression that they are still calling the shots.
On Thursday, religious leaders, youth organizations, students, and business people in Aceh urged the rebels to sign the government-prepared peace deal.
The government has set a new date, November 23, for GAM to sign. Clearly, the government does not want to give the rebels time to consolidate. From the government side, it is now or never. If GAM refuses to sign the deal, government troops will go all out to finish off the rebels. That explains why the military continues besieging a suspected rebel headquarters in a swampy area in Cot Trieng village in Nisam district, north Aceh. Military leaders have openly said that the siege is aimed at forcing GAM to sign the peace accord.
A GAM spokesman in Banda Aceh said last week that the siege might force the rebels to reconsider signing the peace agreement. "If they keep up this siege, it will be hard for us to sign a peace agreement," GAM spokesman Tengku Kamaruzzaman said on Saturday. So far there has been no official communication from GAM leaders in Switzerland.
Support for GAM from the international community seems to have also weakened. Most foreign governments, including the United States and European countries, have pledged to help Indonesia maintain its territorial integrity. This is clearly the outcome of numerous whirlwind foreign trips by incumbent President Megawati Sukarnoputri and her predecessor Abdurrahman Wahid.
Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have also tightened their borders and sea security to prevent arms smuggling to Acehnese rebels. GAM's weapons were previously believed to have arrived from southern Thailand and Mindanao in the Philippines.
Clearly, the rebels have lost both the battle and war in Aceh. The options left for them now are ending the war with dignity by signing a peace agreement with the government, or with crashing humiliation by refusing to ink the accord.
Reuters - November 19, 2002
Banda Aceh -- Indonesia and separatist rebels in Aceh province are expected to sign a landmark peace pact early next month, international mediators said on Tuesday.
It was hoped the deal, which would include international monitors and a fresh provincial election, would end a decades-long conflict that has claimed thousands of lives in the oil and gas rich province on the island of Sumatra.
"We are confident that the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement are very much committed to reach an agreement," Bill Dowell, a spokesman for the Geneva- based Henry Dunant Centre, told reporters in Banda Aceh in Indonesia.
"A few issues need to be resolved but we are planning for a signing of the peace agreement on December 9, 2002," he added. The centre has been mediating in the dispute since 2000.
In Jakarta, chief security minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono confirmed the December 9 signing while noting some of the sticking points that remained to be resolved.
"God willing, the peace agreement, which is also the agreement to end hostility, will be signed on December 9 in Geneva," he told reporters.
"The unfinished issue is on how, when and in what way the surrender of arms can be conducted, where will the peace zone be located and how would the police and soldiers adapt to this. All of that should be formulated in one package so there will be a certainty."
Zaini Abdullah, a Free Aceh Movement (GAM) representative in the Swedish capital Stockholm, said that besides the question of weapons, the key problems to be solved were the role of the police in Aceh and the issue of special autonomy.
Jakarta has ruled out independence, saying the best it could offer was last year's autonomy package that gives the Acehnese more control over their affairs.
"There is an Indonesian announcement that the Acehnese people have already accepted special autonomy. We do not accept it," Abdullah told Reuters.
But he said that after involving the international community and the Henry Dunant Centre in solving the conflict, the GAM had to grasp the opportunity it was being offered and considered a ceasefire a necessary step.
Independence still goal
But the rebels still demand full independence and talks on that should continue as soon as fighting ends, he said. "That cannot be done until we get ceasefire. Then we can go on talking about political issues," Abdullah said.
Jakarta had wanted to sign the deal before the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan but GAM sought a delay until after that period. Ramadan in Indonesia ends on December 7.
The proposed agreement was unveiled last Friday in Banda Aceh, the province's capital on the northern tip of Sumatra island, about 1,700 km northwest of Jakarta.
The Henry Dunant Centre has said free and fair local elections would be held as part of the pact but details, including how GAM might be involved, had yet to be fleshed out.
Another key component was the formation of a joint security committee, which would investigate violations and set up 25 monitoring teams of six people with equal representation from GAM, the government and the Henry Dunant Centre.
While high hopes are pinned on the deal, more than two years of peace talks in Switzerland have done little to halt the bloodshed and clashes between troops and GAM rebels occur on an almost daily basis.
The latest peace negotiations come as up to 1,000 Indonesian troops surround a group of rebels in a North Aceh village. The troops have encircled the group for more than two weeks and recently fired mortars at them.
Many of Aceh's four million people want independence but analysts say most just long for peace and an accounting of abuses carried out during decades of military operations under the iron rule of former President Suharto, who stepped down in 1998 amid social chaos.
| 'War on terrorism' |
Straits Times - November 23, 2002
Robert Go, Jakarta -- Detained terror suspect Imam Samudra has confessed to masterminding the October 12 deadly attacks on Bali, as well as a series of church bombings two years ago across the country, senior security officials said yesterday.
Samudra -- nabbed on Thursday evening in West Java as he was making his way to Palembang in South Sumatra -- is the man who made the bombs that killed 191 people in the Legian tourist belt. He is also known as Dulmatin, alias Joko Pitono.
National Police Chief General Da'i Bachtiar told reporters that Samudra confessed to the bombings and said he was "intent on conducting a jihad".
Other bombings claimed by the suspect were directed at churches in Jakarta, Batam and elsewhere on Christmas eve, 2000. Those attacks killed as many as 19 people.
With Samudra's arrest, the authorities possess at least two men in custody who have admitted to direct participation in the Bali attacks, and are seeking at least 10 others. Senior officials are confident that the current manhunt will net the remaining suspects.
Top officials said Samudra's arrest would help track down alleged senior Al-Qaeda operative Hambali and possibly shed some light on the involvement in terrorism of detained cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, said to be the Jemmah Islamiah's spiritual leader.
National Intelligence Agency (BIN) head A.M. Hendropriyono: "I am confident that the others will be arrested soon. Through him, we can get Hambali."
Police sources said that Samudra communicated regularly with "his superiors" using the Internet. Officers are now seeking a laptop belonging to the suspect, who is said to be a computer expert, in the hope of tracking down other suspects. The detainee is also said to have "coughed up" two new names, which have been added to the police's wanted list.
Furthermore, some of his confessions seem to contradict widely held assumptions. For instance, Gen Da'i said, Samudra had "acquired" the money used to fund the Bali plot by robbing a jewellery store in his hometown of Serang, West Java.
But earlier intelligence information said the Bali money came from foreign sources, possibly from Al-Qaeda itself.
Sydney Morning Herald - November 22, 2002
Matthew Moore in Jakarta and agencies -- Indonesian police last night arrested Imam Samudra, alleged mastermind of the Bali bombing which killed nearly 200 people.
The national police chief, Da'i Bachtiar, announced: "I just have received reports from the investigation team ... it has arrested three people and Imam Samudra was one of them." Samudra, 35, an Afghan-trained militant with alleged links to the Jemaah Islamiah terror group, was detained in the port town of Merak in Banten province near the capital, Jakarta.
He is said to have planned the October 12 attack and helped build the bombs that blew up outside the Sari Club and Paddy's bar. Samudra's arrest comes more than two weeks after police arrested Amrozi, the so-called smiling assassin, who has named the other suspects and detailed the bombing plot.
Police believe Samudra's arrest could give them much-needed clues into the workings of Jemaah Islamiah, which has planned a series of attacks against Western interests in South-East Asia.
They say Samudra, described as the calm intellectual of the group, had remained in Bali for four days after the bombings in a chilling exercise to watch the investigators.
He is described as a highly mobile person who was always seen wearing a red hat and carrying a laptop computer.
Police are still seeking a further seven suspects. Samudra, whose birth name is Abdul Aziz, is the only one of the group with a university degree.
Last Sunday police released sketches of six of the suspects and raided Islamic boarding schools and swept rural villages where they were believed to be hiding.
Police say Samudra learnt bomb-making in Afghanistan and is believed also to be responsible for a series of church blasts in Indonesia in 2000.
It remains unclear what role he has had in Jemaah Islamiah, and authorities know little about him. In his home town of Serang, relatives said they had not seen him for years.
Samudra taught at a religious school in southern Malaysia in the early 1990s run by the suspected leaders of Jemaah Islamiah -- Abu Bakar Bashir, the group's spiritual leader, and Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali.
The head of the Indonesian police team, General I Made Mangku Pastika, says Samudra, who fought in Afghanistan with the Taliban, had engineered the Bali attacks after meeting Amrozi and another fugitive, Idris, in Solo, Java, on August 2. He had ordered the bombings and identified the targets.
Samudra is also allegedly responsible for bombings in Riau, Jabar and the Christmas Eve 2000 attacks in Jakarta, for which Abu Bakar is being detained.
Samudra's mother, Embay Badriyah, has denied in an article in the Jawa Pos newspaper that her son was the brains behind the bombings.
His older sister, Aliyah, claims police fabricated his involvement, saying: "He studies a lot, is very calm, and prays every day. But when he was a child, he easily got upset and cried a lot." Meanwhile, police revealed that a live grenade, bullets and gas cylinders had been discovered outside Bali's major court which is almost certain to be used for the trial of Amrozi.
In Australia, the Immigration Department said a search had begun for four Indonesians who claimed links to Abu Bakar and hardline Islamic factions in support of applications for asylum.
Sydney Morning Herald - November 23, 2002
Tom Allard -- Kopassus, the Indonesian special forces unit, which the Government wants to re-engage in the hunt for terrorists, has links to terrorist groups and activities itself, a senior official admitted yesterday.
Appearing before a Senate estimates hearing, the Foreign Affairs first assistant secretary for South and South-East Asia, Jennifer Rawson, said there was evidence that members of Kopassus had links with radical Islamic groups such as Laskar Jihad. While she said there were no "formal" links between the organisations, the remarks put pressure on the Government to abandon its push to reintroduce relations between Kopassus and the Australian military and law enforcement agencies. Australia cut ties with Kopassus after it was linked with scores of human rights abuses. It has been judged responsible for much of the militia violence in East Timor following its independence vote.
But the Defence Minister, Robert Hill, believes the war on terrorism makes it imperative that serious consideration is given to re-establishing links with Kopassus, to assist their key role in the detection of terrorists.
Jakarta Post - November 20, 2002
Matthew Moore, Jakarta -- Indonesian authorities say they granted the alleged mastermind of the Bali bombings, Imam Samudra, two new identity cards in the last three years because they "forgot" police were searching him for his involvement in bomb attacks.
Two officials in Serang, which is near Samudra's family home, said they issued the cards to Samudra in 1999 and again in 2000 even though Jakarta police had told them he was wanted.
Administration chief Agus M. Arief said that in 1999 three plain-clothes police officers from Jakarta "on a secret mission" visited him in his office in the West Java town. Mr Agus said he asked police what they meant by "secret mission" because Samudra was a member of his community and as the civil officer responsible, he was entitled to know why police wanted him.
Police told him Samudra, who was known by his birth name, Abdul Azis, was "connected to several explosions in the country".
They did not say which explosions or whether they included the bomb at Jakarta's main mosque in April 1999 where bombers used TNT and chlorate, the same ingredients used in Bali.
They were unable to find him on that visit. Mr Agus said that some time later that year, his office issued Samudra an identity card to enable him to obtain a passport to go to Malaysia.
Asked why they had not informed police Samudra was back in town, Mr Agus said they "forgot". He said they "forgot" again to inform the police the following year when Samudra returned to town to get a new identity card, having lost his old one. Another officer, Sodri, said he grew up next door to Samudra and knew him and his family well. When Samudra needed a new ID card, he gave 100,000 rupiah ($19.78) to Sodri to get it for him.
Mr Sodri said Samudra did not come into the office on either occasion to pick up his card. Instead Mr Sodri "gave the card to his mother at her home".
When pressed for details, Mr Agus said it was difficult to be precise because community records were destroyed last year when their old office had flooded.
Such are the problems for Indonesian authorities struggling to locate terrorists. With no electronic database, they often have to rely on memory. The Herald asked if it was possible Mr Agus was confused and had the dates wrong.
"Yes," he said. Mr Agus then conceded it was possible the police visit from Jakarta was after Samudra had first been issued with his ID card in 1999. If that was the case, was it also possible he was completely confused and that police came looking for Samudra in late 2000 after Mr Agus's office had already issued two ID cards, one in 1999 and one in 2000? "Yes," that too was possible, Mr Agus said.
The one thing he was certain about was that Imam Samudra was "like an eel". "He knows when is the right time to return and when it is time to flee," he said. And he certainly knows how to work the Indonesian bureaucracy.
Sydney Morning Herald - November 20, 2002
Darren Goodsir in Kuta and Wayne Miller in Surabaya -- Sumarno, the stepbrother of the confessed Bali bomber, Amrozi, will be quizzed repeatedly in the next few days by Indonesian detectives for leads on the possible whereabouts of the six fugitives wanted over the October 12 attacks.
After surrendering to police on Monday morning, Sumarno told investigators that, after the blasts, he drove a van, which contained explosive ingredients, guns and heavy weapons.
He did this on the instructions of Ali Imron, a weapons supplier and the so-called quartermaster for the Bali bombers. The weapons had been used for fighting in the Indonesian province of Ambon, but there was no information on the terrorists' plans for them.
However, it was not correct that Sumarno drove the van from Java to Bali, the head of the Indonesian police team, General I Made Mangku Pastika, said yesterday, despite initial reports on Monday night from a duty inspector at Ngami police station, where Sumarno was first interrogated.
Contrary to the inspector's assurance that Sumarno had confessed to a broader role in the attacks, police were still unsure who parked the bomb vehicle outside the Sari Club. "He made a mistake ... there is not yet any link ... [between Sumarno] and the bombings in Bali," General Pastika said.
Sumarno was being treated as an accessory after the fact -- but still had major relevance in the inquiries into the attacks outside Paddy's Irish pub and the Sari Club, which killed more than 180 people.
Police believe that Ali Imron and Amrozi drove the L300 Mitsubishi van from Java to Bali on October 5, liaising with the alleged mastermind, Imam Samudra, in the detailed plotting.
General Pastika said Indonesian officers were in Malaysia, believing it to be a possible refuge for the fugitives; not least because Samudra, Amrozi and Ali Imron had all met each other there in the 1980s working as labourers. He said he expected to interview soon Abu Bakar Bashir, the detained spiritual leader of the banned terrorist network Jemaah Islamiah.
In the past few days, police have linked Samudra to bombings in Jakarta on Christmas Eve, 2000, the same offences for which Mr Bashir is being held.
In Surabaya, lawyers for the owner of a chemical factory which supplied goods to the store from which Amrozi got the bomb ingredients met police to plead for a two-week trading ban to be lifted.
| Government & politics |
Laksamana.Net - November 24, 2002
Everyone has the right to be rich. But in Indonesia, the source of many people's wealth has become a sensitive issue, especially when it happens to be the president or her husband who is under the spotlight.
That's why suspicion arose when the mass media reported that President Megawati Sukarnoputri owns at least three houses, when she had only listed one -- at Kabagusan, a leafy retreat behind the Jakarta zoo -- on her declaration to the Public Servants' Wealth Audit Commission (KPKPN).
A second house at Gunung Geulis in Bogor was not reported to KPKPN. It is said to be owned by Taufik Kiemas, though the title is in the name of Megawati's daughter, Puan Maharani.
The third, at Batu Tulis, also in Bogor regency, was not reported because Megawati believes that since it had belonged to her father, Sukarno, it would be of no interest to the commission.
The house had been confiscated by Suharto and it was only with the accession of Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidency that it was returned to the family.
So far so good. Then came the revelations that Megawati had taken up weekend residence at another mansion, in the Sentul hills south of Jakarta. Newspaper reports quoted locals describing what the President did when she visited, with fishing in the mansion's well-stocked pond a favorite pursuit.
The house, located in the Babakan Madang district of Bogor on about 6000 square meters of land by having five main bedrooms and a swimming pool, spurred KPKPN to further investigate.
When the clamor showed no signs of receding, Megawati's party and cabinet colleague, National Development Minister Kwik Kian Gie owned up that it was really his family's house and that Megawati was only visiting. The story raised more eyebrows about the behavior of the first family.
Most attention has focused on presidential husband Taufik Kiemas, who got mighty upset to the press coverage, blaming the media for acting like terrorists.
Megawati herself drew public attention to the potential for swilling at the sty by members of her family soon after she took office. In July 2001, Megawati publicly warned her family not to duplicate the Suharto family. As president, she said, she was committed to rooting out corruption at all levels of government.
The early days of her presidency offered promise that she meant what she said. She pushed through the case against Golkar chairman Akbar Tanjung over his now-proven misuse of Rp40 billion of National Logistics Agency (Bulog) funds meant for the stomachs of the poor.
And, she brought Suharto's most beloved son, Hutomo "Tommy" Mandala Putra, to court for ordering the murder of the judge who refused his appeal on an earlier corruption charge.
Almost directly opposed, at least in the public's eye, to Megawati's stand against corruption is her own husband.
Kiemas emerged for the first time as a significant figure in January 2002 when he handed over 21 cars to Jakarta's police force for use in escorting visiting diplomatic delegations.
He explained that he had been embarrassed to see the battered fleet of patrol cars that were being used and felt compelled to donate 17 new Hyundai cars. As a personal donation, the gift unavidably provoked criticism from the public and the parliament.
Anti-graft groups condemned the gift, complaining that it looked like an effort by Kiemas to ingratiate himself and his friends with the police, perhaps as an inducement to look the other way if they ever got into trouble.
Kiemas himself insisted he had no reason to feel guilty. "I am aware that people would perceive that," Kiemas told reporters. "The return I expect for this gift is that these cars will be available to guard the President and Vice President, They will be on time and no longer late. [In a way, it's for] my personal safety."
Kiemas is also believed to see State Secretary Bambang Kesowo as guilty of having been used by Megawati to block business delegations. These delegations, palace sources state, have won Kiemas' ear in seeking protection for their operations.
Kiemas therefore started to push his wife to sack the experienced State Secretary. Backed by his faction in the Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Kiemas lobbied to have Kesowo replaced with his own political protigi and ex Golkar party cadre, Tjahyo Kumolo.
There is no argument that Kesowo's past easily places him as a Suharto left-over -- he used to write much of Suharto's law and was closely linked to the State Secretary of the time, Moerdiono. And for Kiemas, there was no doubt that he was an obstructing factor in gaining access to the president.
Kiemas has long-standing ties to several businessmen who are still in negotiations with the government over the repayment of billions of dollars they owe stemming from the 1997 financial crisis.
Many of these businessmen amassed their fortunes in part by exploiting their links to the Suharto's family, and some government officials fear they are trying to exert the same sway over Megawati through Kiemas.
Chinese tycoon Syamsul Nursalim is a case in point. Kiemas has made no secret of a close friendship with Jakob Nursalim, a nephew of the failed banker, who is now in Singapore.
A long-time associate of Suharto, Nursalim is locked in a battle with the government through the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), over his failure to repay the government about $2.7 billion. As a four-year repayment deadline was about to expire, IBRA, at the time still under Putu Ari Suta, proposed extending the term of the debt six more years rather than take legal action to recover the money.
The plan generated a damaging political backlash, with critics shouting that it was a sweetheart deal for Nursalim. Under strong pressure from the public, the plan was scrapped by Megawati.
Kiemas's business operations and his network to businessmen like Nursalim raises the potential for conflict of interest. Jakob Nursalim has accompanied Kiemas on officials trips to the US and China, including a visit by Megawati to Washington immediately after the September 11 attacks.
In December 2001, just four months after Megawati became president, Kiemas also provoked critical public reaction when Indonesia sent a diplomatic mission to China to lobby for a crucial natural gas supply contract. Instead of the energy or trade ministers, it was Kiemas who led the delegation as "government envoy".
Critics saw Kiemas as entirely suited, and without any authority, to head a mission whose main task was to hold talks with Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji to negotiate a $13 billion liquefied natural gas (LNG) deal between the two countries.
The presence of the man known as RI3 at the head of the delegation undermined the credibility of Megawati at home and abroad. The move was also miscalculated, as the Chinese government indicated it saw his presence as undiplomatic.
It is impossible to state what effect the slip had on the final result, but Indonesia lost the 25-year contract to Australia.
Small wonder that many political analysts continue to predict that the man known by cynics as Indonesia's Mr. Bhutto -- after the former Pakistan Prime Minister's husband -- remains a major liability for the remainder of the presidency.
Jakarta Post - November 22, 2002
Kurniawan Hari, Jakarta -- The House of Representatives (DPR) once again showed its lack of professionalism to the public on Thursday when its steering committee (Bamus) failed to form teams to deliberate the much-debated bills on antiterrorism due to low attendance.
The meeting of the steering committee was delayed until next Tuesday because it failed to make a quorum. Of the committee's 76 members, only 27 showed up.
The meeting was also supposed to discuss a petition signed by more than 150 legislators to unseat House Speaker Akbar Tandjung, who was convicted by the Central Jakarta District Court of corrupting Rp 40 billion (US$4.6 million) in state funds.
Deputy House Speaker A.M. Fatwa who was supposed to head the meeting confirmed that the delay was due to poor attendance.
To reach a quorum, at least half of the 76 members must attend the meeting. "Well, we cannot reach the mandatory quorum. We can't do anything," Fatwa simply said.
With the failure of the House of Representatives (DPR) to set up teams to deliberate the bills on antiterrorism, it is unlikely that the bills will be ready by the end of this year.
Previously, all factions at the House pledged to finish the deliberation on the antiterrorism bills in this session which will end on November 29. With only one week left, it will be impossible for legislators to meet the targeted deadline.
Likewise, the legislators will not be able to finish the deliberation of the much-awaited general elections bill during this session. The bill is still being deliberated.
When asked if this situation indicated that the House had no commitment to meet its legislative duties, Fatwa simply replied: "Well, you can see for yourself." Fatwa denied speculations that the poor attendance in the meeting of the steering committee was designed to stop a move by legislators to unseat Akbar.
In addition to the bills and the petition against Akbar, the steering committee was supposed to discuss other issues, including a bill on the formation of a new province of West Sulawesi and a bill on the protection of Indonesian workers abroad. Poor attendance was also shown in two separate sessions on Thursday: one to deliberate the controversial broadcasting bill and the second to endorse the bill on building construction.
Of the 50 members of a special committee deliberating the broadcasting bill, only about 12 legislators were present.
Poor attendance was also shown by legislators earlier in the day at a plenary meeting on the endorsement of the bill on building construction.
The plenary meeting was delayed for one hour apparently to wait for the arrival of legislators. Only 150 legislators of the total 500 House members were registered on the attendance list when the plenary meeting was opened.
Based on Article 189 of the House Standing Orders, a meeting in the House can make a decision only if the meeting is attended by more than half of the meeting's members representing more than half of the factions.
Fatwa, who also presided over the plenary meeting, was not bothered by the poor attendance and quickly banged the gavel to authorize the endorsement of the bill.
The bill on building construction was submitted to the House on March 12 last year. Legislators took almost two years to finish the bill. The bill on building construction consists of 10 chapters and 49 articles.
In his acceptance speech, Minister for Settlement and Infrastructure Soenarno revealed that the bill required four government regulations to make it effective. He pledged that the government would finish the four regulations within one year.
| Human rights/law |
Jakarta Post - November 18, 2002
Jakarta -- The Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) condemned the military in Cianjur, West Java, for getting involved in the street vendor problem in the regency.
Kontras coordinator Ori Rahman said in a press release on Saturday that the military's interference had led to violence against the vendors.
"We demand that all military personnel in the field stop their interference in the handling of the street vendor problem because street vendors pose no threat to security," he said.
Ori also said military personnel should avoid any actions that violate legal procedures, in a bid to reestablish the professionalism of the military.
He said the military should work professionally and in accordance with its function as a defensive force.
Kontras received a report detailing the military's raid on street vendors in Cianjur on November 13. According to the report, soldiers from Brawijaya Battalion 327 and Cianjur Battalion V chased and beat street vendors operating illegally in the city.
Two vendors, identified as Iwir Wiharta, 25, and Agus, 30, were seriously injured in the raid, while another vendor, Asep, received some bruises on his face. The report also said the soldiers destroyed goods and merchandise belonging to a number of street vendors.
Kostras also condemned the Cianjur administration for involving the military in the raid, saying Cianjur Regent Wasidi Swastono should have know better than to bring in the military to deal with street vendors.
Ori said the Cianjur administration should remain committed to empowering small-scale entrepreneurs, including street vendors, in the regency. "The regent should take human values into consideration in taking necessary measures against street vendors," he said.
He called on the regent to set aside areas of the city for the street vendors to work, to prevent them from clogging up the streets and sidewalks.
| Focus on Jakarta |
Jakarta Post - November 18, 2002
Tertiani ZB Simanjuntak, Jakarta -- Intensive crackdowns on beggars and other people living on the street during Ramadhan has done little to restore order in the city. Instead, the raids are apparently worsening the administration's fading credibility, activists said.
Azas Tigor Nainggolan of Jakarta Residents Forum (Fakta) and Tubagus Haryo Karbyanto of Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH Jakarta) said the administration under Governor Sutiyoso had failed to address the real problems.
"It is not the presence of the beggars and others who earn their living from the street which becomes a problem to the city. But the city has to find out what brought these people to the street and how to provide a way out," Tigor told The Jakarta Post last weekend.
He argued that the prolonged economic crisis had increased the number of low-income people, not only in Jakarta, but all over the country. A large portion of Jakartans migrated to the capital from other areas for economic reasons.
Since the beginning of Ramadhan on November 6, the Public Order officers have rounded up hundreds of beggars, prostitutes, transvestites, lepers and street singers -- whom the government labeled as people with community and social problems (PMKS).
Almost 500 people have been put in the jail-like Kedoya rehabilitation center in West Jakarta, a transitory shelter, where they are held before being sent either back to their home villages or to an alternate institution.
In Kedoya, the "detainees" get little help or rehabilitiation, and eventually most will end up back on the streets. Worse, people who do not fall under the PMKS category may be arrested if they do not have a valid Jakarta resident's ID card.
"Such raids without a follow up or controlling measures are pointless, and only create an opportunity for violence when people are sent to Kedoya or being deported home," Tubagus remarked in a separate interview with the Post.
Tubagus and Tigor suspected the raids were nothing more than a lucrative project as there is a huge amount of money allocated for the operations. Last year, the city budget set aside Rp 40 billion for the City Public Order Agency while this year, it increased to Rp 63.55 billion.
Tigor suggested that the agency should instead spend most of that budget to provide real help for the urban poor and to empower them as a humane approach to resolve the poverty problems in the capital, a condition which makes the city prone to crime.
While Tubagus added that instead of using the money to crackdown the poor, it would be better to spend it to campaign on how to be good, productive Jakarta residents and help them lead a decent life. He referred to the fact that the city administration refused to legally recognize the rights of people who do not have a Jakarta ID card despite the fact that some have been here for years.
The city administration conducts the raids based on the city Bylaw No. 11/1988. According to the law, the violator could face a maximum of three months imprisonment or maximum fine of Rp 50,000. But legal processes rarely occur following the raids. In many cases, the people are released after paying bribes.
Fakta submitted an alternative draft to the council last May, but there has not been a response to it as yet.
Bylaw No. 11/1988 on Public Order in Jakarta Article 22: Any individual/body is banned from asking for aid or contribution using any means and any excuse, either individually or collectively on the street, in public transportation, at houses, offices or other public places without written permission from the Governor.
Article 23: Any person who suffers from a disease which annoys city scenery and causes uneasiness in the community are forbidden to be on the street, green belts of the city, parks and public area.
| News & issues |
Jakarta Post - November 18, 2002
Affiliated with the Indonesian Military (TNI)
Organisasi Pagar Desa: Founded in the 1950s by A.H. Nasution to help TNI eliminate Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) separatist rebels; militaristic, co-opted by the government.
Angkatan Muda Siliwangi/Angkatan Muda Diponegoro: Founded in the 1970s by Ali Murtopo to support Golkar's victory and to fight against student demonstrations; militaristic, co-opted by the government.
Makikit: Founded in 1976 by the Army's Special Force (Kopassus) to help TNI deal with Fretilin/East Timor pro-independence fighters; militaristic, co-opted by the government.
Baladi Karya: Founded in 1963 by Soksi to help TNI eliminate the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI); militaristic, co-opted by the government.
Pam Swakarsa: Founded in 1998 by Abdul Gafur to secure the General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR); militaristic, co-opted by the government.
Front Pembela Islam (FPI): Founded in 1998 by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab to secure the MPR's General Session and combat drugs and immoral acts; militaristic, co-opted by the government.
Affiliated with B.J. Habibie
Front Bersama Umat Islam: Founded by Eggy Sujana in 1999 to secure the MPR's General Session and fight against pro- Megawati/critical students; political Islamic-based, co-opted by the government.
Affiliated with Soeharto
Satgas (Task Force) Tebas: Founded in 1998 by Dion Adikusumah to secure the MPR's General Session and handle pro-Megawati/critical students; militaristic, co-opted by the government.
Affiliated with Muhammadiyah
Kokam: Founded in 1965 by Muhammadiyah to eliminate the PKI; modernist Islamic-based, co-opted by the government.
Affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
Pelopor Banser/Corps Disipliner Banser (CDB): Founded by KH Muhyiddin Abdusshomad to protect kyai (Muslim clerics) while campaigning; traditional Islamic-based, autonomous.
Pagar Nusa: Founded by Lora Cholil to secure NU events/activities, traditional Islamic-based, autonomous.
Affiliated with the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI Perjuangan)
Satgas Wirapati: Founded in 1997 by Soesilo Muslim to secure PDI Perjuangan's events/activities and secure Megawati's way to the presidential post; secular nationalist-based, autonomous.
Banteng Tengkorak: Founded in 1998 by Krismas Irmono to secure Megawati's way to the presidential post; secular nationalist- based, autonomous.
Affiliated with the United Development Party (PPP)
Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah: Founded in 1998 by A.M. Saefuddin to secure Habibie's way to the presidential post; political Islamic-based, co-opted by the government.
Definitions of militia, paramilitary groups Paramilitary groups are civilian organizations which may or may not adopt military symbols but all assume or have tasks similar to those of the police or military forces. (Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, researcher with LIPI)
Semi-military groups are groups of civilians undergoing military-style exercises, usually carrying weapons such as clubs or swords, and performing tasks similar to that of the police or military forces. (Bambang Purnomo, professor of law at Gadjah Mada University)
Militia is a quasi-professional military. (Premanisme Politik, a book published by ISAI). Militia is a military organization of citizens with limited military training, which is available for emergency service, usually for local defense. (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1995)
Paramilitary forces include a growing number of diverse organizations that have adopted a military structure, follow military indoctrination and training methods, and largely perform ancillary military functions that approximate, but rarely duplicate, all of the tasks carried out by regular or professional military forces. (International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, 1993) -- Sri Wahyuni
Jakarta Post - November 18, 2002
Sri Wahyuni and Emmy Fitri, Jakarta -- Experts are at one over the idea to disband paramilitary groups in the country but are at odds on the mechanism that should be used to dissolve these groups, which often assume the roles of defense and security forces.
University of Indonesia law lecturer Harkristuti Harkrisnowo said last week the National Police must act to disband such groups and convince the public that security affairs is their domain. Harkristuti referred to Law No. 2/2002 on the National Police, which states that the police serve functions such as enforcing the law, maintaining security and order as well as serving the public. A decree issued by the national police chief would be sufficient to disband the civilian groups, she added. "My question then is, are the police willing to assert their role and issue the decree?
The consequences for those who ignore or deny the decree should also be made clear, to justify legal measures against them," Harkristuti said. "It's urgent [for the police] to issue the decree because of the upcoming political party campaigns in the runup to the 2004 general election. The police must prepare measures to prevent possible outbreaks of violence caused by these paramilitary groups," she said.
Almost all political parties in the country have their own security units, locally called satgas (task forces). Party members always claim that the units serve internal/protocol functions to safeguard events held by the parties.
Another expert said that the government did not need a new law or regulation to deal with paramilitary groups, providing that the police applied the so-termed discretion policy in dealing with the matter. Speaking to The Jakarta Post here last week, law expert Bambang Purnomo of Gadjah Mada University said the international consensus on order and security recognizes the use of the discretion policy by the police to deal with problems related to order and security in the community.
"The discretion policy acknowledges the police's right to act beyond the law to maintain order and security in the community," Bambang said. Giving an assurance that the discretion policy was universally applicable, Bambang said that in a fire incident, for example, the police could build a road block without prior warning, despite the absence of a regulation on the matter.
The same policy was also applied when the police set up a blockade to prevent protesters from entering, for example, the House of Representatives, for the sake of maintaining order and security. "In both cases, you cannot question which law allows the police to do so. It's a discretionary policy," he said. The police, in this case, could also apply the same policy to deal with paramilitary groups, including those affiliated to political parties or religious organizations, and turn them into non- military-style ones.
"The groups may continue to exist, but they have to abandon their military-style attributes and names," said Bambang, adding that in so doing the police would avoid being accused of violating the law on freedom to form organizations. "Instead of using the name satgas [task force] or laskar [militia group], they could call themselves the committee of congress security or the election- winning committee," he said.
Earlier this month Indonesian Military Chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto called for all military-style groups, including those affiliated to political parties and religious organizations, to disband. The call has triggered a debate on whether the law on national defense could serve as a legal basis for the disbandment of paramilitary groups.
Bambang, however, said that although the law could be used to disband paramilitary groups it is not appropriate. He argued that the law could only be applied under circumstances such as when the state was under a military invasion or was the victim of aggression. He therefore suggested that the police use the discretionary policy to deal with the problem. "There is no need to produce new laws whenever we're dealing with new problems like this. A discretionary policy will do," he said.
Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) researcher Ikrar Nusa Bhakti said to disband the militias the government could first issue a regulation while the law was being established. Basically, all mass mobilization or demobilization efforts must be controlled by a law to prevent violations, he added. Ikrar stressed that defense and security functions were the responsibility of the Indonesian Military and the National Police.
The paramilitary groups, said Ikrar, were born out of "a miscalculation by the military and the police, who initially believed that the groups were part of active public participation in maintaining security and order." The Indonesian Military and Police always said the militia groups, under their supervision, could be used as a kekuatan bela negara -- national defense force. However, some of the groups have instead undermined national security, as demonstrated by the Papuan Task Force in Papua and the Red-and-White Task Force (in East Timor), Ikrar said. "They have backfired on the founders and financial backers."
Active public participation is allowed in emergency situations as defined in Law No. 20/1982 on Points of Defense and Security. However, it must be in the form of wajib militer or military conscription, Ikrar said. "TNI always says it cannot afford the program that is carried out in Singapore, Israel and Malaysia as well," he said. Ikrar stressed that limited resources and personnel should not be made an excuse by either TNI or the police to permit any civilian groups to assume their security or defense roles.
However, security supporting units, like satpam (security guards) or hansip (civilian guards), are often misquoted as paramilitary groups. Under police law, such groups are allowed to exist because they are still under police control and work in limited areas with clear, specific functions. Satpam are usually set up by companies and tasked to safeguard the company's compound and assets. The members are trained by the police and allowed to use a baton as their weapon. Hansip are a smaller security unit, which is tasked with safeguarding residential areas and is subordinate to the local district or subdistrict administration.
| Environment |
Agence France Presse - November 24, 2002
Sixteen protestors are under arrest and around 500 have fled a town in the Indonesian province of North Sumatra amid controversial plans to reopen a polluting pulp plant, police and a human rights lawyer said.
Police arrested 21 people and are still holding 16 after a protest on Thursday against the reopening of the plant, which was closed in 1999 following years of often violent protests that it was damaging the environment.
"There are still 16 people detained and two others have already been released," a duty officer of the North Tapanuli district police force in Tarutung, North Sumatra, said on Sunday.
The policeman, who identified himself only as Barus, said the men were arrested following a protest in front of the Porsea sub- district administration on Thursday which lead to the office being damaged. He declined to give more details.
Lawyer and human rights activist Johnson Panjaitan said hundreds of people had fled Porsea for the district town of Tarutung because the police, backed by the elite Brimob unit and soldiers, were terrorizing locals who oppose the reopening.
"What is taking place in Porsea smacks of the New Order [former president Suharto's rule] with state terrorism returning to the stage," Panjaitan, of the Jakarta-based Indonesian Association for Legal Aid and Human Rights, told AFP.
The protest on Thursday followed news that the government wanted to reopen PT Inti Indorayon (IIU), closed down in 1999 following increasingly violent protests, under a new name, PT Toba Lestari Indah. IIU was closed down after years of protest and violence, often deadly, with the local population accusing the plant of damaging the environment.
"The people of Porsea have already suffered for more than 10 years from the pollution caused by IIU. Now that they are just begining to enjoy a pollution-free environment, the central government is planning to end all that again," said the lawyer.
He told AFP by telephone from Medan that 21 protesters arrested face charges of incitement to violence, damaging property and disturbing public order.
Panjaitan had visited Porsea for a few days before going to Medan. The police, he said, had also guarded places of worship in Porsea which had been gathering points for locals when problems arose.
"At the local level, we will form a crisis center and provide help for the refugees, including setting up soup kitchens," Panjaitan said.
He said lawyers and rights activists in Jakarta will compile a report on the incident to alert the authorities, including President Megawati Sukarnoputri.
Jakarta Post - November 22, 2002
Moch. N. Kurniawan, Jakarta -- An alliance of non-governmental organizations says it will file a judicial review with the Supreme Court against a controversial government regulation allowing mining in protected forests.
"We'll file our judicial review request with the Supreme Court on Tuesday, demanding the regulation be revoked," People Forestry Communication Forum (FKKM) member Sulaiman N. Sembiring said at a meeting with senior officials from the Ministry of Forestry here on Thursday.
The planned judicial review request is the second major public action taken against the regulation, which was issued in June. Action by the All Indonesia Regencies Administration Association (Apkasi) is still ongoing. Sulaiman, who is also the executive director of the Natural Resources Law Institute (IHSA), said Regulation No. 34/2002 incorporated a number of articles that recentralize authority to manage forests from the regional administration.
"It violates the spirit of Law No. 22/1999 on regional autonomy and it contradicts government Regulation No. 25/2000 on the authority of central government and regional governments," he said.
Article 72 of Regulation No. 34/2002 allows mining activities in protected forests, thus giving a chance for firms to carry out open pit mining in the area, he said.
"This article violates Law No. 41/1999 on forestry which clearly bans open pit mining in protected forests," he said.
Under the regulation, forest utilization for mining activities is granted by the president, while under Law No. 41/1999 such a decision must be approved by the House of Representatives.
Sulaiman said the regulation also encouraged the exploitation of forests, hastening their already rapid decline.
The government should instead issue a policy to conserve the country's forests rather than exploit them, he said.
"We find a number of conflicting points here and expect the Supreme Court to rule in favor of us," he said.
FKKM groups NGOs concerned with forest conservation. They include Forest Watch Indonesia, the Alliance of Adat Societies of Indonesia (AMAN), and IHSA.
Ministry of Forestry secretary general Wahjudi Wardojo welcomed the planned action by NGOs, saying it was part of the democracy process.
"We want to show that we are still committed to regional autonomy, but we have no intention to allow open pit mining in protected forests," he said. He said a move to review the controversial regulation would delay the government's plan to revoke the licenses of forest management companies found guilty of harming the environment.
Jakarta Post - November 20, 2002
Moch. N. Kurniawan, Jakarta -- Residents of Lhoksukon and Pasai districts in North Aceh have accused ExxonMobil Indonesia Inc., the Indonesian unit of the US-based Exxon Mobil Corp., of polluting the environment with hazardous waste for the past two years.
Mawardy Nurdin, head of the Aceh Environment Impact Assessment Agency (Bapedalda), said here on Tuesday his office had received reports of ExxonMobil Indonesia polluting the environment but had not been able to verify the allegations due to unfavorable security conditions there.
"The people there have been complaining about itchy skin, trees dying, hazardous waste polluting their rivers. We will check those reports as soon as the security condition there allows," Mawardy said in an environment workshop in Jakarta Tuesday.
Armed conflict between the Indonesian military (TNI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), which has been fighting for an independent Aceh since 1976, has limited people's movement in the country's westernmost province, which is rich in natural resources. More than 10,000 people have been killed in the insurgence, mostly innocent civilians.
Mawardy said his agency had not yet received ExxonMobil Indonesia's waste report from the hazardous waste center PT Prasadha Pamunah Limbah Industri (PPLI) in Cileungsi, Bogor, West Java for six months.
Toxic waste emitted by companies in the country must be sent to PPLI for further treatment before it is released to nature. "We will go to PPLI on Wednesday to see the toxic waste report. Afterward we will check the waste location in Lhoksukon," he said.
Mawardy said similar reports had surfaced in the past but ExxonMobil denied the allegations, saying the company had contracted its hazardous waste management to a third party, namely PT Lamarindo, who frequently delivered the waste to PPLI.
ExxonMobil spokeswoman Deva Rahman said it was company policy to manage and minimize all waste products. She said the company was not aware of problems with waste management in Aceh but it would investigate the concern expressed by the Aceh environment Agency.
Aside from ExxonMobil, Mawardy said local people had also complained about environmental pollution by liquefied natural gas producer PT Arun NGL in Lhokseumawe, East Aceh.
| Armed forces/Police |
Laksamana.Net - November 21, 2002
The naming of Special Forces (Kopassus) Commander Maj. Gen. Sriyanto and the alleged involvement of 11 Kopassus soldiers in the ambush which killed two Americans and an Indonesian at the Freeport gold and copper mining site August 31, have brought the elite Red Beret corps back into the spotlight.
The corps developed a reputation since 1966 as the killing machine of deposed President Suharto.
Initially, Kopassus consisted of three groups. Groups 1 and 2 are predominantly combat troops, similar to their counterparts anywhere in the world.
Group 3, which was set up in 1963, features additional training on counter insurgency, including interrogation techniques and torture methods.
Under Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, Group 3 became notorious for its role in state-sponsored terrorism by operations involving the murder, torture and kidnapping of potential and influential opposition figures.
In the run-up to the Consultative Assembly (MPR) session on 11 March 1998 which reappointed Suharto as president for his seventh consecutive term, at least 23 government critics disappeared. Nine of them later resurfaced and told stories of solitary confinement, interrogation and physical abuse. The remainder are presumed to have been murdered.
Under Prabowo's command, Kopassus increased its strength to 7000 troops by 1998, almost double its earlier size. This led to criticism that Kopassus under Prabowo had lost its character as a special forces unit.
Under the pretext of dealing with growing social unrest, Prabowo established Groups 4 and 5, most of whose members were recruited from Group 3. Group 4 and 5 members were trained in German anti- terrorist methods, following the lead of their commander, himself was one of the few Indonesian officers to train with the prestigious CSG anti-terrorist squad in Germany.
One distinctive feature of Groups 4 and 5 are that their members do not wear uniforms. It was not surprising that Groups 4 and 5 were blamed for doing dirty work during the Suharto era.
In August 1998, Prabowo admitted to a military investigation team that he was responsible for a number of kidnappings and disappearances. He and two other senior Kopassus officers were removed from their posts. Eleven Kopassus Group 5 members, known as Tim Mawar (Rose Team), were tried and given minor sentences.
Group 4, which is based in Cijantung, East Jakarta, focuses on infiltrating opposition groups and acts as provocateurs. They grow their hair long, dress shabbily, set up secret cells and have been known to carry out assassinations.
Simply put, terror and violence are their stock in trade and they frequently recruit criminals as auxiliaries. Group 5, meanwhile, was set up to kidnap or kill influential opposition figures in the closing years of Suharto's rule.
Groups 4 and 5 are widely suspected by several military observers to have contributed to the intelligence operation-style terror that swept the country since B.J. Habibie took over the presidency in 1998.
In an interview with Metro TV after the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002, Col. (ret.) Djuanda, who works in the office of Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, said that the perpetrators of Bali bombing must have been well-trained in demolition, thus strengthening the speculation that the Kopassus network was implicated in one way or another in the terrorist attack.
Group 4 is known as the covert-combat unit within the battalion, but because of its character as an anti-terrorist unit (similar to detachment 81, established in 1979), it and Group 5 remain shrouded in mystery. After Prabowo's dismissal, several platoons from the two groups were reported to have defected.
Rumors spread that there had been "phantom troops" operating in troubled areas such as Aceh, Maluku and Papua, which suggesting that the "missing" Kopassus platoons may still be operating, through no one knows who is commanding them.
Accordingly, when police sources stated that they believed that all of the six suspects wanted for the Bali bombing named by the police on Sunday to be at a number of Islamic boarding schools in Banten, Central Java and East Java, the logical question arose whether they were really under the protection of Kopassus elements.
The suspicion arises partly because of the position of the headquarters of Group 2 at Menjangan Kertasura in Central Java. Current commander Sriyanto spent much of his military career in the area around Solo, as commander of Group 2 in 1996, later as regional military commander in 1998.
In 2001, a prominent intelligence officer from the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) told Detak tabloid that some Rp 4 trillion of money controlled by Suharto was hidden at Group 2 headquarters. While there is no confirmation of the allegation, there is no doubt that the area around Solo is firmly under the control of Kopassus.
Another fact that raised suspicion of a link between Kopassus and the Bali suspects is the past connection between Kopassus and several militia groups.
Since the command of Prabowo, it was commonly believed that Kopassus recruited civilian militias, including those committed to pressing the cause of Islam in Indonesian political life.
Members of these militias mostly came from gangs, or were criminals released from prison. The militias were under the direction of Groups 4 and 5.
Habibie's decision in January 1999 to hold a referendum in East Timor demonstrated a tangible link between Kopassus and the militias. Most of the 11,000 militiamen were trained in West Timor by Group 4 and 5 Kopassus members. Many of the militiamen were non-Timorese from other parts of Indonesia.
These new militia gangs or death squads included Besi Merah Putih (red-and-white steel) in Liquisa; Aitarak (thorn) in Dili; Dadurus in Maliana and Mahidi (dead or alive with integration) in Ainaro. These are the thugs who, with their Kopassus masters, were responsible for the killings and devastation that grew in intensity during 1999 and came to a terrifying climax in September 1999.
The connection with the organized crime is also clear, since Kopassus soldiers have often been used by major underworld figures as bodyguards. This created a natural link with a number of existing paramilitary groups that were cover organizations for thug elements, such as Pemuda Pancasila, who were used for more distasteful political jobs.
The collusion between Kopassus members and the civilian militias as shown in East Timor is believed to be similar in other regions, including those with elements committed to Islamic fundamentalism, including Aceh, Maluku and Poso.
| International relations |
Melbourne Age - November 19, 2002
Ian Bostock -- Few issues continue to dominate Australia's security outlook more than our angst-ridden relationship with Indonesia.
In some quarters this is understandable given the recent events of East Timor and the Bali bombing. Unfortunately, the forecast for relations between the countries is for more stormy seas ahead, with separatist issues in Aceh and West Papua looming and the threat of terrorism now seemingly omnipresent.
Still, we hear consistent analysis suggesting that the closer the ties with Indonesia, the tighter our guarantee of security, both from external threats emanating from the north and within the archipelago. Policymakers on both sides of Australian politics propose that by furthering our diplomatic, political, economic and military links with Indonesia, we can stave off any range of future crises; that Australia's security is somehow interwoven with that of its biggest and nearest northern neighbour.
But it's a view held by those not wishing to see the fire through the smoke; one built on crumbling foundations. Indonesia is a nation in decline; a failing state on a slippery slope towards disintegration. Alexander Downer's warning about the "Balkanisation of Indonesia" has come to bear. The process is not close at hand -- it has already begun.
In a sense, Canberra is stuck between a rock and a hard place. To step too far back and allow events in Indonesia to take their course may leave Australia exposed and unprepared to deal with the consequences. Conversely, there is little evidence to suggest that Australia holds any sway in Jakarta. It may be that Canberra can do little to alter Indonesia's current course, only attempt to contain its ramifications.
Indonesia, by its very nature, is always going to be a dangerous player; an unpredictable and unreliable partner in achieving common security objectives. Recent events have rammed that home. Indonesia's internal problems are enormous. Politically, the country is fractured, factionalised, inept and corrupt, while the economy continues its slow but evident downward spiral. Any notion that Canberra is dealing with a stable, rational and transparent counterpart in Jakarta now the Suharto days are over is based more on wishful thinking than reality.
Indonesia's stonewalling during the Tampa incident and its apparent lethargy and self-interest post-Bali underline the problems. Such examples also flag the residual resentment and animosity that linger in Indonesia towards Australia. On a military level, relations have improved slightly since departing Indonesian troops pointed their guns and hurled insults at Australian peacekeepers in East Timor during September, 1999, the only factors averting a catastrophic flashpoint being the professionalism and discipline of our forces.
Indonesia's special forces (Kopassus) outfit has been implicated in the assassination of West Papuan independence leader Theys Eluay a year ago, and now the Freeport mine murders. Kopassus is just one part of an Indonesian military that is largely under- resourced, poorly trained and led, and largely incompetent -- not the sort of attributes Australia might seek in a partner to support it in regional coalition operations.
Regardless of the fluctuating degrees of ill-feeling between the two countries, Indonesia does not fear Australia militarily, nor should it. Jakarta appears more concerned at the emergence of China and India as regional hegemonies. For its part, Canberra understands, better than the Australian populace it would seem, that Indonesia poses no direct threat. It can hurt us in other ways -- such as attacking or supporting attacks on Australian sea-borne trade passing through the region's confined littoral waters -- but it simply does not have the capabilities required to launch and sustain an attack on Australia.
Despite the apparent early success in apprehending the Bali bombing suspects (thanks in large part to the forensic efforts of Australian police), there is little prospect for close cooperation in combating terrorism in our region over the medium and long term. Australia may well make good use of its extensive surveillance and intelligence-collection assets in learning more about regional terrorists activities, but one has not countered or eliminated a threat simply because one becomes aware of it. In the world of counter-terrorism, knowledge is powerful only when backed up by the timely and decisive use of force. Unfortunately for Australia, should operations against such threats be accessible only from within Indonesia, our efforts to cut regional terrorism off at the knees will be hamstrung due to Jakarta's refusal to allow Australian counter-terrorism forces on Indonesian soil.
The operational record of Kopassus -- Indonesia's main counter- terrorism force -- does not encourage hope that Indonesia would assume responsibility. While Canberra should try to offer advice and assistance where it is either sought or warranted to help Indonesia control its domestic situation, we perhaps need to acknowledge that the majority of Australia's efforts to foster closer cooperation, understanding and across-the-board efficiencies in that country are likely to be met with only a modicum of success and at times outright failure.
Until Indonesia has completed its transition into a modern, progressive and prosperous society and is willing to pick up the ball to achieve those ends, its potential will remain untapped and Australia's regional difficulties continue.
The apologists among Australia's foreign and security policy elite will no doubt wring their hands at the thought, but we should accept that for the next decade at least, Indonesia is going to be a rowdy, troublesome neighbour. We don't have to be best mates with it, nor appease it. Judging by recent precedents, we may not be able to influence her in any significant way, let alone shape the outcomes that may enhance our own security. But Australia must be capable of dealing with whatever challenges Indonesia might -- directly or indirectly -- throw at us. Needless to say, our security outlook and defence capabilities should reflect this uncomfortable reality.
[an independent defence analyst and Australian correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly]
| Economy & investment |
Asia Times - November 22, 2002
Jakarta -- The number of foreign tourist arrivals in Indonesia in 2002 is estimated at only 20 percent of its target figure of 4.3 million to 5.4 million, the country's top tourism official said.
"The number of foreign tourist arrivals in 2002 will be the lowest since the economic crisis hit our tourist industry in 1998," Minister of Culture and Tourism I Gede Ardhika said in a hearing with the House of Representatives' Commission VI on tourist, postal and telecommunication affairs.
In 1998, Indonesia was visited by as many as 4,606,416 foreign tourists. Ardhika said the October 12 Bali bombing tragedy was the main cause of the drastic decline in foreign tourist arrivals. After the devastating bomb blasts in Bali, hotel occupancy rates dropped, international events were cancelled and foreign travel operators unilaterally aborted travel programs, he said.
With the 80 percent shortfall in the number of expected tourist arrivals, Indonesia's tourism industry would suffer a negative growth of 16.56 percent in 2002, the minister said.
Asia Times - November 22, 2002
Bill Guerin, Jakarta -- A new initiative to boost prospects for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in eastern Indonesia has been launched by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank's private sector development arm.
Although aimed at poorer provinces far removed from Jakarta, the news will be encouraging for a vital sector that has fought against bureaucratic red tape, conflicts over funds by different ministries in their local areas, and downright fraud.
Eastern Indonesia sweeps all the way from Bali in the west, up north to Kalimantan and Sulawesi, and through to the eastern-most provinces of Maluku and Irian Jaya. With a total population of over 40 million people, the region is richly endowed with resources such as oil, gas, minerals, agricultural land, forests and fish. The downside is that not only is it one of the lowest income regions of the country, it is also affected by the same fundamental problems of security, environmental degradation, and inadequate laws as the rest of the country.
The region was left far behind during most of the New Order rule of Suharto, but he finally focused on the area in his 1990 budget speech and from then till the regional financial crisis in 1997, increased central government transfers and capital spending went east.
The new Indonesia Enterprise Development Facility will use Dutch and other donor nations' money to improve access to capital for the eastern region's small businesses, help them improve their business performance, and improve the business environment.
IFC will provide US$5 million over the next five years, with the remainder coming from the Netherlands and other donors, but the facility will be commercially oriented, seeking to recover up to 30 percent of its operating costs from fees charged for its services.
Enterprises that fall into the SME category are defined by Bank Indonesia as those with a maximum income of Rp 50 million a year, maximum assets of Rp 200 million excluding land and property, and debts amounting to less than Rp 10 billion. Though each has 100 employees or less, they make up an enormous 99.9 percent of all registered companies and employ more than 80 percent of the workforce. Sixty percent of all SMEs operate in the agricultural sector, and 23 percent in retailing, restaurant and hotel businesses.
Not only do the estimated 37 million SMEs collectively absorb a huge part of the work force, last year they contributed 54.59 percent of the country's GDP. The actual and potential contributions the companies make to the overall economy account for the unabated interest of politicians, post 1997, in what was a brand new and fertile arena for corrupt practices.
During President B J Habibie's watch, the highly popular Adi Sasono, when he was Minister for Cooperatives and Small Businesses, was able to launch no less than 17 separate credit schemes for the benefit of cooperatives, small businesses and farmers, funded largely by central bank credits. The initiative, however, was stalled by imprecise targeting and lack of publicity, as well as downright chicanery. Many businesses happily borrowed the money and deposited it in the bank.
Many SMEs now owe a lot of money. A grand total of 414,700 SMEs owes some Rp 39 trillion (US$3.75 billion) in bad debts to the banking sector and to the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency, though this is small by comparison with the US$10.5 billion owed by the "Top 21" largest debtors alone.
Earlier this year, SMEs were thought to be in line for a massive trim of more than 50 percent on their debts -- championed by no less a figure than Vice President Hamzah Haz. Haz had been instrumental in pushing for the relief, amid charges of political patronage and a hidden agenda aimed at improving the image of his United Development Party (PPP) among the SMEs. Discussions about ways to support SME development were sidelined by the furor over Haz's proposed economic revival program, with both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank expressing strong reservations about its implications for the state budget.
Quite simply, the controversial Haz had wanted the government's sacred and vital asset sales and privatization program to be bled dry by using hard-earned receipts from the program to raise capital for what he dubbed "value creation". The sudden initiative followed an equally sudden move by President Megawati Sukarnoputri to insist that her vice president control the direction of the country's economic planning, much to the chagrin of the economic team of ministers, the IMF and the World Bank.
The banking industry, still struggling to survive the 1997 banking crisis, was also against such generosity and fought back doggedly. Bankers were concerned that over-lenient debt- restructuring terms to SMEs would threaten the liquidity of the many weak banks and also be seen as unfair to those SMEs that had been conscientious in repaying their debts.
The World Bank criticized Haz's proposal as misplaced, saying it was wrong to focus on providing relief to the 2 percent of SMEs with non-performing loans, while ignoring the 98 percent that have survived and even thrived through the crisis. Such a policy would have a negative impact on future bank lending to all SMEs, the bank said.
State Minister of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises H Alimarwan Hanan, from Hamzah Haz's PPP party, slammed the IMF for opposing the debt reduction scheme. "Outsiders need not intervene into our domestic affairs because the [SME restructuring] does not cause others to bear burdens," he told journalists in March.
In any event, Minister of Finance Budiono and Minister of State Enterprises Laksamana Sukardi won the day. SMEs with bad debts now enjoy a 25 percent debt reduction if they make a one-time cash settlement.
Local economists had earlier warned that the SME restructuring scheme might be used by politicians to gain popularity ahead of the 2004 general election. This was all taking place at a time when the government was acutely aware of the urgent need to set aside 40 percent of budget expenditure to service a whopping US$129.7 billion in sovereign debt.
Constraints or barriers to successful investment in the East and every other region have increased as local governments scramble for more political power and control over the country's natural resources, since regional autonomy was implemented last year and the country's 180-plus districts need to survive on their own revenues.
These constraints hit local investors just as much as foreign investors, and SMEs in the Eastern regions were thwarted and spooked for the some of the same reasons as mega-sized enterprises, such as Kalta Prima Coal, Freeport McMoRan and BP.
The Wahid administration had allocated funds to empower SMEs and programs dedicated to SMEs were distributed among several government bodies, namely the newly established Ministry of SMEs and Cooperatives, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Laksamana Sukardi's State Owned Enterprises Ministry.
The idea was that these bodies would give cross-subsides to SMEs, but implementation across the regions varied from poor to none at all and businesses slammed them as being little more than a formality, with the funds allocated for the programs being fought over by the ministries concerned.
In July this year, after a year of political wrangling, Megawati finally gave the green light for the restructuring of SME debts when she signed off Presidential Decree No 56/2002.
This restructuring will be a vital element of any plan to get the banks to woo SMEs seeking working capital to expand their businesses. There are indications that domestic banks may once again be turning their attention to SMEs. Central bank figures were released recently showing a 10.9 growth in bank lending to the sector in the first five months of this year against the same period last year, which saw only a 3.3 percent hike.
The banks handed over Rp 11.4 trillion, or 35 percent of their total amount of lending commitment, to SMEs from January to May this year.
"SME friendly" programs such as these should spur the small companies to greater heights and enable them to absorb more and more of the country's vast numbers of unemployed. After all, while the larger industries collapsed in the midst of turmoil in the banking sector and massive currency falls, the SMEs carried on, seemingly able to adjust well to the rapidly deteriorating business climate of the time. One great advantage has been their low level of dependency on imported materials.
One proposal said to be being mooted in the corridors of power is a new draft banking bill, which would make it mandatory for commercial banks to allocate 40 percent -- twice as much as currently -- of their total loan portfolio to SMEs. That's one extreme. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the crying need for SMEs to have access to capital for growth and expansion.
The problem for the targeted SMEs in the Eastern regions is even more acute, located as they are in rural areas where incomes and access to business services lag way behind other wealthier regions. Access to any information at all is difficult, and the owners are unlikely to have had any business education or training and they generally have poor management skills.
The new program should impact positively on the willingness of banks to lend to these SMEs and, in the words of the IFC, is designed to create a healthy and fair business environment, to build local capacity for SME development, to promote market-based business development services, and to develop the capacity of banks to lend to SMEs.
The needs of SMEs across the nation, however, are the same as those who will benefit from the IFC initiative. Banks must be given more incentives to invest in SMEs and SMEs in turn need the long promised empowerment and training in the ways to qualify for commercial bank credits.
Insufficient capital, low collateral and thus limited access to bank loans, means they cannot expand and increase their efficiency or the quality of their products.
An earlier Asia Foundation survey found that only 17 percent of SMEs had ever received a bank loan in Indonesia, mainly because they had very little, if any, information about credit programs or they were unable to qualify for a loan with banks that typically ask for collateral of up to 90 percent of the value of the loan.
A new government initiative now would square with the recent drive by the country to woo locals into investing in their country on the assumption that they have a better tolerance for the recent security fears than the ever-elusive foreign investor.