• The taming of the general - Asiaweek
• Wiranto goes on TV to defend allegations - Agence France-Presse
• Wahid 'bowed to international pressure on Wiranto' - Sydney Morning Herald
• High-wire act leaves them guessing - South China Morning Post
• Wahid achieves delicate balance - South China Morning Post
• Wiranto goes out with a whimper - Sydney Morning Herald
• Amien Rais reelected PAN chairman - Jakarta Post

• Death toll in Aceh tumult reaches 179 this year - Jakarta Post
• 9 policemen, 3 civilians wounded in Irian Jaya riot - Agence France-Presse
• `Suspect went missing to thwart investigation' - Jakarta Post
• Irianese's life expectancy only 40 years - Jakarta Post
• Police, military chiefs among 3 dead in Aceh - Agence France-Presse

• Workers demand better working conditions - Green Left Weekly

• Missing persons' reports flood rights office - Jakarta Post

• Protest rally at Jakarta airport - Jakarta Post
• Annan winds up a protest-peppered visit - Agence France-Presse
• Wiranto turns radio DJ day after suspension - Associated Press
• Probe on PDI HQs attack to take 3 months - Jakarta Post
• Victor is a victim in liberty's triumph - New York Times

• Big names probed over forestry funds - Jakarta Post

• US resumes training army officers - Washington Post
• Military's role in economy will be hard to reduce - Asia Pulse
• Under attack at home, military reels - New York Times

• Total of 72 banks suffered losses in 1999 - Asia Pulse
• Indonesia economy records growth - Associated Press
• Astra sell-off pilot role in debt war - Reuters

Troops fire in the air to halt fighting

Mota'ain -- Indonesian troops fired in the air yesterday to halt fighting that broke out among East Timorese refugees and residents at an informal reunion at this border crossing point between East and West Timor, witnesses said.

No one was injured in the shooting, which triggered panic among some 13,000 refugees and residents crowded onto a beach in a neutral zone on the border.

But an AFP photographer said at least four people were hurt by rocks thrown in the 20-minute brawl, which involved people identified as members of the pro-Jakarta militia.

"People were just kind of running in all directions, and during the mayhem some families got split up," said Christopher Lom, press officer of the International Office of Migration (IOM), which arranges the reunions.

"TNI (Indonesian army troops) let off a sustained burst of fire for about 15 seconds," and although they were clearly firing in the air, people dived into the sand at the sound, fearing they were being shot at.

Mr Lom, who was on the Indonesian side of the border when the fighting broke out at 1pm, said he believed the disturbance was premeditated and designed to disrupt the reunion program.

"Our feeling is that it was something orchestrated by militia. It was premeditated. Obviously the militia's intention to disrupt the thing," Mr Lom said. "The last thing they need is reconciliation. I didn't see what actually triggered it, we could see pretty big rocks flying through the air through the gate on the western side."

World Bank denies funds abuse

Vaudine England, Jakarta -- The World Bank says it knew of allegations concerning misuse of its money to fund East Timor militias but found no evidence when it checked the claims last June. Indonesian bureaucrats named in an Australian television documentary broadcast on Wednesday have, so far, remained silent.

"The allegations made in the programme are serious -- but they are not new," said Mark Baird, country director for the World Bank in Indonesia. "We heard the same allegations and saw the same documents in June last year.

"We investigated the allegations immediately -- as did the Government of Indonesia -- and found no evidence that World Bank funds were used in East Timor for political campaigning or by the militias," he said.

The bank's deputy director, Ben Fisher, said on the programme: "My specific reaction and the reaction of my colleagues in government is that we were very upset."

The Dateline documentary showed civil servants finding key documents in the rubble of their offices in Dili, East Timor, but the bank claims some of the translations of the documents, referring specifically to World Bank funds, were false.

"Nor have we seen any evidence to suggest that the US$500 million disbursed by the World Bank in June of last year was in any way linked to spending on government programmes in East Timor," Mr Baird said in Jakarta. He said the Indonesian Government fund was running a cash surplus for the fiscal year at the time and "had substantial cash on hand to fund its own programmes without World Bank support".

However, the documentary's claim that Indonesian government money was used to fund the establishment and operations of the militias which wreaked havoc in East Timor remains unanswered.

In the programme, Indonesia's then foreign minister, Ali Alatas, denied the charges. "We ... got to know about this and we stopped it immediately," he said.

But the Finance Ministry official interviewed was emphatic that cheques kept arriving and that special procedures were ordered to get the money to militia bosses quickly.

The ties that bind

[Andrew Fowler reports on the story behind the East Timor crisis and how it plunged Australian-Indonesian relations to an all-time low.]

Andrew Fowler: It was a relationship built on Realpolitik. But Realpolitik ended with the carnage in East Timor. And Australia's 30-year foreign policy investment with Indonesia was in tatters.

Professor Des Ball: They fooled themselves.

Andrew Fowler: There's also the, until now, unexplored death of an Australian spy in Washington amidst murky evidence of secret Timor intelligence.

On Four Corners tonight, what was really known about the explosive situation in East Timor while Australia's foreign policy makers became captive to the ties that bind.

Towns devastated. 400,000 people -- half the population -- forced to flee in terror. Thousands more either dead or missing. The East Timorese had paid a high price for their decision to vote for independence. There were other casualties too -- Australia's relationship with Indonesia and the reputations of those who nurtured it.

Scott Burchell, International Relations, Deakin University: The analogy is equivalent to a surgeon, if you like, who sews up his patient on the operating table with all the instruments still left inside.

I mean, the surgeon would simply be banned and, you know, would be found guilty of professional misconduct, and would never get within 10 kilometres of a surgery again. Well, that's the equivalent in the mistake that the policy of advice was made to Government on East Timor and Indonesia.

Andrew Fowler: Just what went wrong with the way Australia handled its biggest foreign policy crisis since the Vietnam War?

Bob Lowry, Australian Defence Studies Centre: What we hear from the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, of course, is that they would've done the same over again. Um -- but, uh -- I would be surprised if the bureaucracy would take that attitude, because the outcome has shown that the policy didn't succeed, and they should be really looking to see why.

Andrew Fowler: Australia's special relationship with Indonesia -- a developing nation of more than 200 million people -- has been largely driven by fear -- originally, the fear of Cold War communism spreading down through Asia in the 1960s. Later, the concern was about stability in the region.

Professor Des Ball, Strategic Studies, ANU: It's really been a quite critical relationship. Any security threat to Australia has, in practice, got to either come from Indonesia or through Indonesia. So -- so long as Indonesia remained stable and we had good relations with it then our security was almost guaranteed.

Andrew Fowler: The Foreign Affairs Department's Christmas party last year was host to some of the key men and women responsible for Australia's national security. Circulating among the diplomats and ambassadors, the elite of the Australian Government's Foreign Affairs bureaucracy -- the best and the brightest. One who used to be among them -- Scott Burchell.

Scott Burchell: Well, when you're recruited to Foreign Affairs, you are told immediately that you're the elite of the elite. So you were told if you actually made it through into the department in a recruitment year that you were the cream of the cream, and that you, in fact, were there to, you know, to reach the very lofty heights of bureaucratic and, ultimately, diplomatic practice.

Andrew Fowler: In the Foreign Affairs establishment, there's a group of officials devoted to Australia's most sensitive relationship. They're members of what's known, unofficially, as the Jakarta Lobby. Leading members are the Head of Foreign Affairs, Ashton Calvert, and former Ambassador to Indonesia, Richard Woolcott.

Richard Woolcott, former ambassador to Indonesia: There is a group of people who spent a lot of time working on South-East Asia and Indonesia who believe that the relationship is fundamentally important. Now, I don't think it's fair to say that the Jakarta Lobby, so-called, are apologists for Indonesia. That is not the case at all.

Scott Burchell: The Jakarta Lobby has kept a very tight reign on foreign policy towards Jakarta and, therefore, by definition, on East Timor. And these are people who believe that Indonesia was a special case -- had to be handled very carefully by "experts", in inverted commas, with the right views, and that the relationship should be preserved and run by this group, rather than by popular input.

Andrew Fowler: This is the only known picture of Dili burning during the Indonesian invasion in 1975. Accepting the East Timor invasion was part of the price Australia paid for its special relationship with Indonesia.

A policy was developed to train Indonesian military here in an attempt to professionalise them and instill more democratic values. A deal was signed to get access to oil from the Timor Gap. And a security pact negotiated that would take the pressure off defence spending. It was the art of Realpolitik being played out.

Ali Alatas, Indonesian Foreign Minister 1988-99: We determined that we would do something drastic about that relationship -- namely, to build more substance, more diversity, to that relations. In the words of Gareth Evans, to put more "ballast" on the overall relationship, so that East Timor, on which we differ from time to time, would not loom so disproportionately large in that relationship anymore.

Gareth Evans, Foreign Affairs Minister 1988-96: You can shut your minds and turn away from any kind of direct relationship with people who you are troubled about, who have a bad track record, or you can try and engage them, embrace them, and move them towards a better regime of behaviour. That's what the Australian military guys tried to do.

Professor Des Ball: I think that there's a, um -- an atmosphere within Foreign Affairs and within the Department of Defence that they had things under control.

Andrew Fowler: That sense of control began to break down in 1998. The fall of President Suharto gave new hope for democracy in Indonesia. But it also created uncertainties for the Canberra analysts. Would they read the changes right? One of Australia's most experienced diplomats was Ambassador in Jakarta.

John McCarthy, Ambassador to Indonesia: Nobody would suggest that dealing with Indonesia last year was anything but complicated, and so you have to try and figure out where decisions are being made, how high up the line, to what degree the civilians are influencing decisions and so on.

Andrew Fowler: The information the embassy was unscrambling had to be gathered from a host of sources. Foreign policy makers in Canberra were hoping the special relationship would survive. What would unsettle them was any evidence of the military further destabilising East Timor. But evidence of military misbehaviour there was already coming from an aid contractor who'd been recruited as an embassy informant.

Lance Taudevin, former East Timor aid contractor: When I first arrived there, I was a protagonist for our line and a protagonist for the Indonesian Government.

Andrew Fowler: For three years, Lance Taudevin's job of bringing clean water to remote villages provided him and the embassy in Jakarta with an extraordinary information network.

John McCarthy: It's perfectly natural when you have employees in the field and you visit them, you ask them what is happening around them. I think you need to know that, partly, in order to make sure that the work that they are doing is being conducted properly and in the sort of environment that you want it to be conducted in.

Andrew Fowler: He was conducting, he was sending back reports -- daily reports at times -- with very detailed information about military movements.

John McCarthy: I'm, uh -- not aware of that, but I'm sure that's something that he's said to you.

You know, I'm glad to hear that. Thank you.

Lance Taudevin: What he's saying -- there are three of four villages around here which were totally destroyed -- including the people.

Reporter: By the Indonesians?

Lance Taudevin: Yes.

Andrew Fowler: Taudevin says his earlier reports on the security situation in East Timor were welcomed by the embassy. But as the violence increased, his dispatches on the connections between the militias and the military met resistance.

Lance Taudevin: I said that there is a link between the militia -- the whole program is being orchestrated. ABRI is recruiting, it is training, it is supporting, it is providing logistical support to the operations of the militia.

That the attacks are being done in the presence of or supported by or by the militia -- that kind of thing. They said, "You cannot be sure of that." And it was almost as if the directions were that I cannot report that that was happening.

Andrew Fowler: Taudevin says the embassy told him to change his reports.

Lance Taudevin: I would say, "No, if what I'm saying is -- is wrong, what should I be doing?" And they were saying, "Just tone it down," and you've got to remember "that what you report has to fit into the big picture." And I remember that particular conversation very clearly because I responded, "What big picture?"

Andrew Fowler: Lance Taudevin says that as long ago as November 1998, when his reports started revealing the links between the military and the militias he was called alarmist and told to keep his eye on the big picture -- by the embassy. What's your response to that?

John McCarthy: Well, I don't recall that having taken place.

Andrew Fowler: He says he got a call, at one stage, saying that the Ambassador -- and that's you -- was very unhappy with what he'd said and what he was doing, and that he was getting too close to the Timorese people.

John McCarthy: I don't recall having any exchange about his getting too close to the Timorese people. I would very much doubt that I had any objection to any aid expert getting too close to the people. That's what they're supposed to do.

Andrew Fowler: An early indication of whether the military was changing in line with Indonesia's emerging democracy came with a very public withdrawal of troops from Dili. It was aimed at showing the world that the military was easing its grip on East Timor. But Intelligence said otherwise.

Lance Taudevin: 20th August 1998 -- report to Jakarta.

"The military build-up of late here is horrific. The public posturing of ABRI is just that -- posturing. Troop withdrawal? No way. Just over 600 left as part of a normal rotation."

John McCarthy: There was evidence that some were being withdrawn and others were being put back. The evidence was conflicting at the time.

Andrew Fowler: But eyewitnesses didn't provide the only reason for scepticism. Within hours of the troop withdrawal, Australia's Defence Signals Directorate intercepted crucial radio messages.

A senior intelligence and policy official in Canberra told us, "On the day of the supposed withdrawal, "a number of radio transmissions were picked up "from the Indonesian naval craft. "They were chatting to each other "about how the landing craft had just gone around the island "and dropped the troops off again."

Even though the radio intercepts revealed Indonesia's subterfuge, the Australian Government welcomed the troop withdrawal. Information about the intercept came from a series of intelligence briefings and documents given to Four Corners. They provide an insight into how Canberra's long-held views on the special relationship with Indonesia coloured its response to hard intelligence on a growing crisis.

Professor Des Ball: I believe that we're now witness to the greatest failures in Australian defence policy since the 1960s.

Andrew Fowler: Professor Des Ball is a specialist in military intelligence. He believes the Government was uncomfortable with what some of its own intelligence was revealing.

Professor Des Ball: Raw intelligence reports which suggested growing violence, which suggested that there were preparations and planning going on between the Indonesian military and the militia groups and which suggested in fact that the Indonesian Army at the highest levels were behind some of this violence was inconsistent with the political position, the policy position, which the Howard Government was maintaining. And from their point of view, that intelligence was unwelcome.

Andrew Fowler: In the months after Suharto fell, Australia continued to confront an unpredictable situation in Jakarta. The uncertainties were magnified after Prime Minister John Howard wrote to the new president, B.J. Habibie, suggesting the East Timorese eventually get a vote on their future. Habibie circulated the letter to his cabinet colleagues.

Dewi Fortuna Anwar, former presidential adviser: President Habibie had scribbled on the cover letter that was sent by Howard this following question.

Isn't it democratic, isn't it just, isn't it right that if East Timorese after 20 or whatever years, you know, 25 years of being part of Indonesia and being treated as being a full part of Indonesia, still feel that they cannot be fully integrated in Indonesia, isn't it fair, isn't it just, etc, that we should separate in peace?

Ali Alatas: It was rather drastic and quite radical and it shocked many people.

Andrew Fowler: Did it shock you?

Ali Alatas: Well, I was surprised when it came, of course, because, don't forget, we were the ones, the foreign ministry and I personally were the ones who proposed this solution of wide- ranging autonomy and a special status for East Timor as an end solution though, as a compromise solution between those who wanted independence and those who accepted integration as it is now with all its faults and we thought we had a better proposal.

Andrew Fowler: In cabinet, Habibie persuaded a reluctant Alatas to agree.

Dewi Fortuna Anwar: And then everybody clapped and then the President knocked on the table, so it was all done very proper. And then he turned around at the back and because, as you know, cabinet meetings are always recorded, and he said, "Make sure that it is all recorded and later transcribed "because this is a very historic decision."

Andrew Fowler: Habibie's timetable was far faster than Howard had expected. It set off a flurry of meetings around the world.

A key figure in the Jakarta Lobby, Australia's Foreign Affairs head, Ashton Calvert, flew to Washington to meet Stanley Roth, who ran US Foreign policy in South-East Asia. Roth was pessimistic.

"A full-scale peacekeeping operation would be an unavoidable aspect to the transition to independence", he said. "Without it, East Timor is likely to collapse." Ashton Calvert replied that: "Canberra would be prepared, if necessary, to send military personnel, but not into a bloodbath. Australia's preferred approach was designed to avoid a military option by the use of adept diplomacy."

Alexander Downer, Foreign Affairs Minister: I very much hope that through appropriate diplomacy, through also the use of democratic processes, it'll be possible to get through to the end of the transition without, you know, full scale violence as you put it.

Andrew Fowler: But while the Federal Government staked all on diplomacy, Roth called "Australia's position of keeping peacekeeping at arms length essentially defeatist".

Professor Des Ball: The Government through the course of February through to the middle of the year was arguing with the United States to the affect that a peacekeeping force at that time was unnecessary and that the Indonesian Army WERE on top of things and that through our relationship with Indonesia, we could keep things to the point where any external intervention was unnecessary.

Andrew Fowler: Despite some US misgivings, the United Nations, with Australia's backing, accepted Indonesia's assurances that it would keep the peace in East Timor in the lead-up to the vote. But by now, media reports were emerging suggesting the military were in fact behind the militias.

Four Corners filmed this incident in which an independence supporter was shot dead outside a Dili police barracks.

Australian intelligence was also making the connection. Australia's Defence Intelligence Organisation, the DIO, had already reported "the military decision to arm local militias "has drawn its first blood. As long as the military continues to contract out some of its security responsibilities, more clashes are likely."

More importantly, a few weeks later, another defence intelligence report named the armed forces chief, General Wiranto. It said Wiranto's views on the military's involvement with militias were not known, but "he is at least turning a blind eye."

But the Australian Foreign Minister, on a course that was difficult to reverse, defended Wiranto three days later.

Alexander Downer: If it is happening at all, it certainly isn't official Indonesian Government policy, it certainly isn't something that's being condoned by General Wiranto, the head of the armed forces, but there may be some rogue elements within the armed forces who are providing arms of one kind or another to pro-integrationists who have been fighting the cause for Indonesia.

Professor Des Ball: Beyond March, there was further detailed intelligence which came in through the course of April and May coming from both our external intelligence service, ASIS, and the Defence Signals Directorate responsible for monitoring communications, which provided very detailed evidence firstly of particular working relationships between units of the Indonesian Army and particular militia elements and militia leaders, but also provided even more direct and explicit evidence of Wiranto's direct involvement in the arming and supporting of the militia.

Andrew Fowler: In April, four months before the poll, the militias killed again. In the town of Liquica, more than 50 people were slaughtered at a church.

An intelligence brief circulated at senior levels in the Australian Government again implicated the Indonesian forces. The military had fired tear gas into the church and apparently did not intervene when pro-independence activists were attacked. Downer was again in a difficult position.

Alexander Downer: They clearly didn't themselves kill people but there is an argument about whether they did try to stop the fighting or they didn't do enough to try to stop the fighting and the trouble is it's very hard given we ourselves had no eyewitnesses there to be able to prove the case either way.

The military give one story, others give another story, still others give a different story again.

Andrew Fowler: Four days after Downer's interview, the militias attacked this house in Dili. The people here were refugees fleeing militia violence in outlying villages. Thirty men, women and children were killed here and elsewhere in Dili that day. Three days after that, the Australian Government shifted ground slightly, publicly expressing impatience with the military.

Alexander Downer: Anybody can see that the Liquica incident and there have been other incidents as well, simply demonstrate that the Indonesian security forces don't have the situation sufficiently under control.

Andrew Fowler: On April 20, Australia's Defence Intelligence Organisation stepped up its criticism of General Wiranto.

This document, never made public before, reported "Indonesian military officers are actively supporting pro-Indonesian militants in East Timor. Wiranto has failed to restrain these officers."

Less than a week later in late April, John Howard and senior ministers arrived in Bali for a hastily convened summit on East Timor. Australian intelligence reports have made dealing with the Indonesians that much more difficult. Still, the Prime Minister refrained from publicly criticising Wiranto.

John Howard, Prime Minister: The President and I discussed the events in Timor over the past few weeks. I underlined to him the importance of the steps that had been taken by General Wiranto which I very strongly support -- the commitment made to winding down violence, the commitment made to greater peace and greater stability within the province of Timor.

Andrew Fowler: Behind closed doors, the Australian Government was getting jumpy. In a one-on-one meeting with President Habibie, John Howard proposed a peacekeeping force, something his government had warned the Americans against just two months earlier.

Dewi Fortuna Anwar: John Howard pressed a number of times, and during the Bali meeting, in fact, asked explicitly, "Can I ask you, President, will you accept police -- uh -- international keeping force?" And President said, "You can ask, but the answer is no." And Howard asked again. "You can still ask, but the answer is still no."

Ali Alatas: And that was raised actually in a personal meeting before the plenary meeting.

Andrew Fowler: How strong was the demand from the Australian Prime Minister?

Ali Alatas: Not very strong. I didn't have the impression that it was. He raised it because probably he needed to raise it. He felt that he needed to raise the question.

Andrew Fowler: With that rebuff, the Australian Government was locked into Indonesia maintaining security. Australia was hoping for the best.

But within days in Macau, at the Mandarin Oriental Hotel, one of East Timor's most senior militia leaders revealed a military plot to wipe out the independence movement.

Four Corners can reveal that he passed his detailed knowledge to one of Australia's senior intelligence agents. Tomas Goncalves told the chief of the Hong Kong office of ASIS, Australia's Secret Intelligence Service, the names of senior Indonesia military behind the plan.

Tomas Goncalves, former militia leader: The order came from the regional commander, Adam Damiri, to the East Timor commander and the special force commander, Yayat Sudrajat -- liquidate all the CNRT, all the pro-independence people, parents, sons, daughters and grandchildren. Commander Sudrajat promised a payment of 200,000 rupiah to anyone wanting to serve in the militia.

Andrew Fowler: Over a series of meetings, Goncalves poured out what he knew about the plans to destroy the independence movement.

Tomas Goncalves: On March 26, I went to a meeting run by the East Timor governor. He said to kill the priests and nuns because it was they who were defending the people of East Timor.

Andrew Fowler: Goncalves drew the line at killing priests and nuns and fled the country. But there was reason to believe his evidence.

Jose Ramos-Horta, independence campaigner: If you know the background of Tomas Goncalves, then you'd have to believe him, because you cannot find someone closer to the Indonesian military for almost 20 years or more than Tomas Concalves. So he knows the whole situation from the very beginning.

Andrew Fowler: So, the quality of his intelligence that he passed on would've been what -- first-grade?

Jose Ramos-Horta: Yes, I would say first-grade.

Andrew Fowler: As ASIS reported on the Concalves disclosures, a defence intelligence organisation document obtained by Four Corners and written three months before the independence ballot sounded a grim warning.

"Should the autonomy proposal be rejected convincingly, violence by those supporting integration is likely as soon as the ballot outcome is known. Indonesia will seek a quick departure to rid itself of the financial and political burden. Any deployment of forces is unlikely to be prompt enough to prevent conflict."

This was exactly the kind of warning that Stanley Roth had given the Australians three months before. The Americans remained worried about East Timor in the lead-up to the vote.

As the tragedy unfolded in East Timor, a personal and secret tragedy unfolded in Washington as the US suspected Australia was withholding crucial intelligence.

The man caught in the middle was Australia's Senior Defence Intelligence Liaison Officer in Washington. His name -- Merv Jenkins. Australia gives the US intelligence, but gets far more back in return.

Merv Jenkins, Four Corners, May 1970: "Honour, loyalty, integrity":

Andrew Fowler: From his days at Duntroon, Jenkins was described as a brilliant and dedicated officer, a man contemporaries called a 'patriot'.

Four Corners Jounalist, 1970: What does honour, for instance, mean for you?

Merv Jenkins, 1970: Um -- pride within myself, for what I'm doing.

Andrew Fowler: But questions of honour aren't always simple. It's rare that there's a large gap between Australia and the US on Asia policy. But one had opened up over East Timor.

As Liaison Officer, it was Jenkins's job to keep his American counterparts informed without compromising his primary loyalty to Australia. During 1998, Jenkins believed he had the authority to pass "Australian Eyes Only" or "AUSTEO" material to the Americans, with discretion.

A colleague he'd fallen out with intercepted this material, including three Department of Foreign Affairs cables, and informed defence bosses back in Canberra. In May last year, in the midst of the Timor intelligence confusion, Jenkins received an email from the Defence Intelligence Security Office warning him about passing intelligence.

But it was hardly a severe reprimand. It said that "issues are becoming extremely sensitive as there are foreign policy implications". It didn't tell him to stop giving information to the Americans, but pointed out, "it is imperative that extra care is taken with the passing of material to the US and Canada".

Professor Des Ball: That would've placed him in a very, very uncomfortable position. On the one hand, uh -- the Americans would've detected immediately that there had been cuts in the flow. Yet they were continuing to pass to him really valuable high-level and expensive intelligence.

In return, he must've thought that he couldn't do anything but, at least unofficially, let them see material that he had whether it was classified AUSTEO or not, because in the case of the intelligence liaison arrangements with the Americans, it's common practice to give them intelligence which is AUSTEO.

Andrew Fowler: Jenkins would later tell his superiors that: "The pressure on me to pass on information has been intense and is building."

In late May, Jenkins attempted to pass further information to American contacts. We can't be sure of the exact content of any of the documents Jenkins handed over, but the warning email he got from Defence Intelligence was headlined "Timor Issues". Australia's former defence secretary confirms the subject was Timor.

Paul Barratt, former Defence Secretary: As Secretary of the Department of Defence, I was responsible for the integrity and security of the system, and I did not give permission for any Australian Eyes Only documents to be passed to anybody at any stage.

Andrew Fowler: Did these documents relate, at least in part, to East Timor?

Paul Barratt: Uh, I believe so.

Andrew Fowler: The Defence Intelligence Organisation had warned Merv Jenkins to take care. But the Foreign Affairs Department had apparently been kept in the dark about the allegations of unauthorised disclosure of intelligence.

When it found out, for Merv Jenkins, events suddenly took a turn for the worse. Foreign Affairs immediately sought a "please explain" from Defence. An investigation was launched and Jenkins was hauled in for questioning. He was asked specifically about the East Timor correspondence.

After the questioning, Jenkins emailed his superior in Canberra. He said he was "experiencing a range of emotions from frustration to anger to remorse". He said he'd been "as discreet as possible". Jenkins ended his email with an apology for the trouble caused and a request to talk in "August '99, if you are free." But Merv Jenkins would never make the appointment. Two days later, the man to whom honour meant so much was found hanged in the garage of his Arlington, Virginia, home.

He'd left a suicide note. It was his 48th birthday. The Australian Government was at great pains to emphasise the personal tragedy and avoid speculation about any political ramifications.

Alexander Downer: You know, the central point here ... the central point here is this is a terrible human tragedy. The central point here is that there is a widow and there are three sons.

Andrew Fowler: After his death, those who had been investigating Jenkins reported that he'd broken the rules but he'd not intended to harm Australia's national interests.

We may never know exactly why Merv Jenkins took his own life, but it appears that the Department of Foreign Affairs was edgy about the flow of intelligence possibly compromising its position on East Timor. There will be an inquiry into the Merv Jenkins tragedy. The Australian Government wants it to be secret. The Jenkins family want it to be public.

Enid Jenkins, mother of Merv Jenkins: I want to be told what happened. What happened to change him from happily talking to me about coming home in two or three weeks, taking his family round Canada and coming home, back to his son in Canberra, back to his dog. I want to know what happened to make him decide that he had no other course but to take his own life.

Andrew Fowler: Whatever Merv Jenkins was or was not telling the United States, by now the flow of information out of East Timor left no room for doubt about what was happening there.

With the independence referendum two months away, the United Nations monitors had arrived, including unarmed Australian Federal Police. They began putting together a virtual library of evidence establishing the conspiracy between the military and the militias. One Indonesian military document revealed a covert plan.

Wayne Sievers, Federal Police Intelligence Officer: A decision was taken where the Denrin and the Colpola, that is, the head of the Indonesian military and the head of the Indonesian police in East Timor would each supply five intelligence officers to work for the Aitarak.

The Aitarak -- it means 'thorn' -- were the local militia in the Dili region. And those five intelligence officers would monitor, initiate and monitor, on a date to be determined, terrorist attacks on pro-independence supporters in the Dili region.

Andrew Fowler: Sievers says he volunteered this evidence to the Australian Consulate in Dili.

Wayne Sievers: I offered it to the appropriate people and they had a look at one document and agreed it was probably genuine and then weren't interested in collecting the rest of the documents because they said to me, "Yes, we know all about these kinds of documents." It seemed to be one more headache for them.

Andrew Fowler: Three days after the East Timorese voted four to one for independence, the long-feared carnage started. Prime Minister John Howard moved quickly to stitch together an international force for East Timor.

John Howard: What we've seen over the last few weeks, and particularly over the last week or two, is a significant change in the direction of Australian foreign policy and the abandonment of a generation of what I might call, loosely, "acquiescence".

Andrew Fowler: In an extraordinary about-face, the Australian Government now found itself closer to Timor liberationists than to Jakarta.

Jose Ramos-Horta: We will remember John Howard as the man who brought in the multinational force. And as far as Paul Keating and the others, no resentment, you know. We harbour no resentment, no anger, no hatred towards anyone.

But they will be remembered only as the ones who betrayed us all these years. And still we don't hate them, we don't resent them. They will be part of history, they will be pushed into the dustbin of history, and John Howard will be the one who will be remembered.

Andrew Fowler: But the Foreign Affairs establishment still has much to explain. Australia's long-term policy objectives have failed.

Indonesia's soldiers may look the part, but there's little evidence from their behaviour in East Timor that they've benefited from Australia's assistance to become a more professional army.

The celebrated Timor Gap oil deal was frozen by a newly independent East Timor. And the collapse of a security pact with Indonesia means a complete rethink of defence spending. Even those who'd invested careers in the special relationship are left a little rueful.

Gareth Evans: I, for one, am prepared to acknowledge that I was overconfident about the Indonesian military's capacity for redemption for a number of previous years. They've behaved badly over a long period and they behaved abominably in the present environment.

Ali Alatas: I was -- as someone who has worked so hard on putting Indonesian-Australian relations on a strong basis of friendship -- I was very sad. I was very sad that at the end of my tenure, we were back to square one and that we were again at loggerheads precisely because of East Timor. And that again there was this atmosphere of mutual suspicion.

Andrew Fowler: Australia's special relationship with Indonesia clearly hasn't paid off. The long-term failures were compounded in the months before the Timor poll when Australia was blinded to information it was getting through its extensive intelligence network.

Juwono Sudarsono, Indonesian Defence Minister: I think it's good technologically. I don't know whether good in interpreting the data on the ground.

Bob Lowry: I think one of the major problems was that defence was not brought in to the diplomatic process earlier in terms of bringing pressure to bear on the Indonesian military. And then having discovered that that wasn't sufficient, mobilising external support principally from the Americans to help with that process.

Professor Des Ball: I think it comes from the arrogance which pervades a lot of the senior decision-making circles and national security affairs in Canberra. I think those who held those views fooled themselves.

Andrew Fowler: Australia Day at the Ambassador's residence in Jakarta. The job of building a new relationship with Indonesia is under way. But there's still great sensitivity.

The Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Defence Minister and the Head of Foreign Affairs all declined to be interviewed for this program.

While they've argued that there were conflicting intelligence signals throughout the Timor crisis, one message came through clearly -- the Indonesian military couldn't be trusted.

The Australian Government needs to examine what went wrong if the same mistakes aren't to be made again. There were, after all, no winners. Not in Canberra, where the Government relied heavily on its flawed special relationship with Indonesia. Nor, more importantly, in East Timor where the people might have their freedom but little else.

Militia funding traced to government

Mark Davis -- In a forest West of Dili, Filomena Amaral is about to learn the details of how her husband, a village schoolteacher and church leader, was tortured and killed.

Filomena: "Why was he killed? Was he a thief? Did he steal people's things or did he kill people like they killed him? No he died without fault."

Photographs of her husbands shattered bones are needed as evidence in the event that his killers are ever brought to trial. The forensic team will piece together the final moments of her husband's life ... but the real evidence concerning his death isn't buried here; It's buried in filing cabinets, government memos and bank records . Buried in the minds of elegant men in suits who incited approved of and paid for this execution and who, it would appear, are going to get away with murder...

Alatas: "I don't know what you are talking about, because you are talking about things as if we are in the business of funding the militias."

Mark: "Yes, exactly."

Alatas: "Exactly. Which is not. Which is not. How can I talk about things which we did not do?"

A suspected militiamen has been found hiding in a house in Dili. As the crowd grows it is probably the suspects good fortune that he is arrested but given the hundreds, possibly thousands of people that were killed here, there has been remarkably few arrests such as this and all of them have been relatively minor figures.

There is now little doubt that if justice were to be served it would be Indonesian Generals being dragged from their houses today but even their involvement only tells half of the real story.

The handiwork of the Indonesian Army is fairly plain to see and their involvement has been the focus of most inquiries to date. But were Indonesia's generals acting as rogue elements in East Timor or under orders? Were the war criminals in the government itself.

So far, Indonesian intelligence and Military figures have all stuck together in recounting their version of events in East Timor, but they never dreamt that this man would turn and give evidence against them.

Thomas Gonsalves was Indonesia's closest friend in East Timor for 24 years. Gonsalves was the leader of the pro-Indonesian forces that led the invasion of East Timor at Balibo in 1975. He is a veteran pro-indonesian soldier, intelligence figure and politician. When the pro-indonesian militia and intelligence groups were reactivated in 1998, Thomas accepted the army's invitation to take a leadership role. He was a natural choice.

Thomas: "Oh, yes, many times since last year. I attended many meetings. Almost every week we had meetings."

Mark: "That was with Suratman?"

At two preliminary inquiries into Human rights abuses in East Timor Thomas's evidence has proved devastating to the Indonesian army but in this his first television interview he implicates not just generals but remarkably Senior ministers of the Indonesian government.

Thomas: "I met with four of them. Generals Adam Damiri, Kiki Shyanakri, Amirud and the Minister for Transmigration, Hendro Priyono. The point they made was if we continued to defend the white and red flag, they were ready to provide any funds, and all sorts of guns and all the troops here could help us."

According to Thomas and others Hendro Priyono's enthusiasm to create and incite a militia force was so extreme that he even offered to don camouflage and fire the guns himself, but in the end he just provided the money for others to do it.

Thomas: "We went to his office. That's when he told Governor Abilio's brother, Chiquito, the chief of the Transmigration Department in Timor, to devote the whole departmental budget for the use of the militias."

The implications of a government departments directly diverting money to militias are enormous -- it exposes ministers to possible criminal prosecution and the State to massive compensation claims.

And as I was to learn Transmigration was by no means the only Department to contribute funds and all of those contributions were recorded in some way by the bureaucracy

All the government buildings and most of the documents they contained have been destroyed by soldiers but the people who wrote those documents, copied them and filed them are still in Dili. but to date there's been little interest in finding the local bureaucrats who administered the flow of money from the government to the militias.

Xanana Gusmao and his CNRT leadership have been particularly singular in who they blame for the destruction of their country. The only accusations they make are against the Indonesian army. Xanana has said little that would implicate any Indonesian government figures with whom he is trying to reestablish relation.

Sebastion: "We need to continue gathering evidence of the violence in East Timor. Whereas you, the President and CNRT are promoting reconciliation amongst the East Timorese."

Like many young people in East Timor, former student leader Sebastion Gutteres believes that the pursuit of reconciliation, of fence mending with the Indonesian government is clouding the search for the truth.

Sebastion: "there is only interest in providing eye witness for the killings. But for searching for deeper evidence, documents, how they operated, no one is doing this."

Mark: "and who was paying them."

Sebastion: "yeah, who gave the orders, nothing so far has happened on this."

Both Sebastion and former Independence activist, Jose Apparitio had friends and relatives killed in the violence last year. They're been looking for answers of their own and they agree to help me follow the paper and money trail across Dili.

Sebastion: "these guys are civil servants, one from finance the other police" or "there going to get some documents".

The Department of Finance in Dili was the clearing house for all government funds that entered East Timor...

This building was destroyed and looted by Indonesian soldiers but by a stroke of luck the upper floor didn't catch fire. As head of the budget section in the Department of Finance Jao Da Silva had intimate access to all departments in the public service. His job was to oversee and monitor where government money was going and from this room it was going to the militias.

Jao: "With regard to the militia, my boss put me in charge of the money. Because they used to go to the Governor who'd have our boss tell us to get the money quickly for their activities."

Jao confirms money from the transmigration department was given to militia groups. But they weren't the only department to contribute for the "Socialisation of Autonomy" -- a term which had become open code in the public service for propaganda and militia activities to ensure the victory of the pro Indonesian autonomy groups at the upcoming referendum.

Jao: "All departments must donate. Transmigration, Agriculture, Forestry, all must give for the "socialisation of autonomy."

The intimate connections between ministries and the militias began in Jakarta in February 1999 at a dinner at the home of the Minister for Information, Yunus Yosfiah. Thomas Gonsalves was there and by coincidence so was I.

Mark in English: "Was that in Feb? I was there, standing outside!"

Thomas: "He wouldn't want to see journalists. Yunus said that journalists should go to his office." At the time of the dinner in February in February 99, the militias were still a very small and largely unknown group. A handful of individuals had come to prominence after admitting to the murder and mutilation of people in remote villages.

In February I was following one of these killers through Jakarta, expecting him to be arrested, not to visit the home of a minister. I watched as the cream of the then tiny militia movement walked into Yunus Yosfiah's home.

Mark: "So Yunus Yosfia said he would provide you with guns if you needed them?"

Thomas: "Yes."

Yunus Yosfiah's connection with guns and East Timor go back some time. In 1975 he was in charge of a front-line Indonesian unit involved in the initial invasion of East Timor. And it has been alleged that he was the officer who ordered the execution of five western journalists in the town of Balibo.

According to Thomas, Yosfiah believed the army in East Timor had become too soft under the command of Colonel Tono Suratman, an extraordinary proposition given that dozens of people had been recently shot and mutilated by Suratman's soldiers and militias. Yosfiah offered to make introductions so the militias could obtain direct government support.

Thomas: "In his conversation on preparing the militia he even called Tono Suratman a coward because he was taking too long to act. We should act now because we're ready to support you with guns or anything else."

Within a fortnight of the dinner more than two million Australian dollars arrived from a source in Jakarta to launch the militias as a formal movement in every corner of East Timor. The money came through the militias newly formed political front the FPDK, or the Forum for Unity, Democracy and Justice. Forced recruitment began immediately. A bunch of obscure thugs now had the imprimatur of figures in Jakarta and the cash to back it. Thomas Gonsalves and his colleague Rui Lopez were asked to formally lead the new militia movement.

Rui Lopez was another figure with intimate connections with Indonesian military and intelligence. Although they remained in the network, Thomas and Rui declined to become the official leaders of the militia even though the money that was being offered was coming from and impeccable source.

Rui & Thomas: "What I know is that the first money given out went to the FPDK. FPDK was the first pro-autonomy organisation. It was set up by the army but the money came from the Foreign Affairs department from Mr Ali Alatas because it was Chico Lopes who lobbied for the money together with Domingos Coli."

Thomas: "17 Billion Rupiah provided by Ali Alatas for FPDK."

Rui: "Billions."

According to Thomas and Rui and another key witness the bagman for the Foreign Affairs money was Francisco Lopez da Cruz ... the Department's 'Special Envoy to East Timor' who arrived with a first installment of 9 billion Rupiah.

"Mark: "Was it your Department Sir?"

Alatas: "Our department was engaged in diplomacy, in diplomacy abroad, you know and negotiating with the UN."

Mark: "Was it your department that gave 9 Billion Rupiah to the FPDK, which was the main militia umbrella group?"

Alatas: "No, No, we are not, how do you call it, involved in internal things, you know."

Mark: "Cico Lopes Da Cruz -- he is part of your department?"

Alatas: "He is, he was. Well, he is still perhaps, how do you call it, special envoy on East Timor, yes."

Mark: "Lopes da Cruz gave them 9 Billion rupiah. He works for your department he says it came with your authority."

Alatas: "Yes but that was not for militia. That was for general information perhaps."

Perhaps more than anyone else in East Timor, Rui Da Costa knows what the information campaigns of the FPDK and their militias entailed...

Rui: "Without any reason they killed two boys here"

As the militia network expanded across East Timor, Rui risked his own life to voluntarily investigate and document the deaths of 200 others. Rui's list contains 200 people who had ignored the political message of the FPDK and their militias.

And the distinguishing feature of the killings that occurred before the referendum was that nearly all them were mutilated as a gruesome warning to others. This was the most effective education campaign in the first half of 99.

"it says 'Assassinated by the barbarities of the monstrous militias.' "

Rui: "They cut his throat and cut out his tongue."

Mark: "They cut his tongue! Why?"

Rui: "I don't know why. This is the question."

Highly placed witnesses in Dili are prepared to testify that the Foreign Affairs money went directly to the FPDK and their militias. Ali Alatas maintains that his dept may have contributed to "socialisation teams" -- quasi government bodies designed to explain the processes of the referendum to the population. Alatas

Alatas: "There was money of course for the efforts towards spreading of information, of information. We agreed there would be a socialisation period, we agreed with the UN that there would be a socialisation period."

This is a budget that has been found from one the 'socialisation teams.' Although it has made every attempt to be relatively discreet it's fairly clear how this money was spent. It includes wages and uniforms for 150 people, money for instructors and training Costs for the local Military Commander and Police Chief for their assistance in explaining the democratic processes. And grants to the BRTT, a senior pro-integration group with links to the militias, the FPDK, the forum for Unity Democracy and Justice and specifically by name the known militia group ABLAI an acronym of "I will fight to preserve integration". All of them doing there best to explain the electoral system.

As Ali Alatas began negotiating with the UN over the processes of the referendum, international attention was starting to focus on the growing terror campaign in East Timor. A direct connection with his department would have been terminal for Indonesia's bargaining position. The second installments promised to the FPDK was canceled.

Adelino Gutteres: "Alatas ordered it blocked because instead of funding socialisation the money had gone on the militia and buying guns. The militia had started killing people. As the situation deteriorated Ali Alatas ordered the next 9 billion stopped. "Don't give them the 9 billion." But militia activities had begun and now there was no money to pay them."

Adelino Gutteres worked for the head of the FPDK, Domingos Koli Soares who by March was having trouble paying his militiamen. But Domingo Koli Soares had excellent government contacts -- he was also the Bupati or the Mayor of Dili.

Adelino: "The Bupati ordered me to get the money. He said `whatever you have to do, just get it.'"

March was a difficult time to be seeking money from government departments. It was the end of the Indonesian financial year and they were all broke. To ease the cash crisis the army provided militia leader Eureka Gutteres with a suitcase of counterfeit bills. But they were clumsy reproductions, many with the same serial numbers and the banks, very politely, declined to accept them.

From his government office in Dili, the leader of the FPDK cooked up scheme with the Governor of East Timor and the co-operation of ministries in Jakarta that would permanently solve the militia's liquidity problems. A scheme to plunder development and welfare funds that had been established to help the poor. A scheme where militia murderers could be put on the books as charity workers. And best of all, of it would be largely paid for by International donors.

Jao has found one of the documents he was looking for. It is a memo from the Governor of East Timor to each of his district heads instructing them to use their development and welfare budgets for the "socialisation of autonomy". The kindest interpretation that could be given to this document is that it was an order to misappropriate funds for referendum propaganda.

But the Governor was not too coy to make specific reference to payments for militia and in practice this is exactly what it was for. "They're militia security guards. Then penggalangan, which means militia activities."

This document is the blueprint for how the militias would be funded from May until the final killing spree in September when the Indonesians lost the referendum. The scheme was delayed because the development and welfare money hadn't yet arrived from Jakarta but it soon would. Jao was told courtesy of the World Bank.

The World Bank, the IMF and the Asia Development Bank had all made huge contributions to the Indonesian budget but at the exact time of the militia's financial crisis in March and April, a World Bank loan was the pot of gold that the Indonesian government was waiting for.

Although the deal wasn't finalised the money was as good as in the bank for the bureaucracy in Dili. In fact a loan was taken out against it to keep the militia machine rolling. The Department of Political Affairs arranged the loan and Jao's department had to guarantee that they'd repay it out of the first development and welfare funds to arrive.

Jao: "Yes because they were waiting for this money to be able to start their activities. It was delayed. Activities such as the second attack on Santa Cruz, Quintal Kiik, Bemori, Becora, Comoro ... For instance, Jaqquim was killed in Becora. All of that was funded by this money."

As the bureaucracy made the necessary financial arrangements the militias were preparing themselves for their biggest bloodbath to date. A plan so chilling that the stakes were becoming too high for Thomas Gonsalves.

Thomas: "On March 26, the Governor told us that from May 1, throughout the territory, we were to liquidate all the CNRT members, down to their grandchildren. If the people sought help from priests, nuns or the bishop, these too should be killed. That's why I decided to leave."

After 24 years of being East Timor's most prominent integrationist Thomas Gonsalves had to begun to leak information to independence leader Xanana Gusmao. And as Thomas fled East Timor in April the mass executions began.

120 people were taking refuge in this house in Dili. They'd already had their own houses destroyed, they'd been stabbed and beaten, the women had been raped.

In April, a large group of militiamen were given drugs and money to come and attack them again. Dozens of refugees were shot and macheted as they tried to scramble away, at least 12 of them died here. Others were chased through the streets of Dili and their fate unknown.

In the same month 60 people were massacred in church at Liquica. And at least another 15 killed in other parts of East Timor. And those killers who weren't paid with the money that had been borrowed were paid with IOU's against the expected arrival of World Bank funds.

Adelino "They were on credit, on credit."

Mark: "They were on credit!"

Adelino: "They were out of control when they didn't get their money. They even came and threatened us, as well as Mateus Maia (FPDK) their own commander." And just as things were turning ugly the World Bank released the loan and the development and welfare money began to flow.

Ben Fisher: "Our major objective is to alleviate poverty, this is the major purpose of the world bank in both the long and short term All of the World Bank loans have something to do with that."

Ben Fisher is second in charge of the World Bank in Jakarta. In the early months of last year relations between the bank and the Indonesian government were tense. Sources inside the bank report that the bank discovered that development funds were being stolen and used for political purposes including specific examples in East Timor.

Because of proven corruption the World Bank put on hold a billion dollars worth of specific development funds that the Indonesian government was expecting to receive in May, but the government wasn't left empty handed. The World Bank advanced a general budget loan of 500 million US dollars to the government in May -- the second such loan in 3 months. It now appears ironic that one of the major purposes of the loan was to assist the Indonesian government in its efforts to reduce corruption and increase the transparency of it public service.

Ben Fisher: "We were very pleased with the governments response at the time and we disbursed that loan."

The loan would "provide the cushion for a fiscal stimulus while protecting the poor and the vulnerable".

The World Bank was particularly impressed by the government's commitment to "restore growth, reduce poverty and shield the poor". In fact, it was now cashed up to kill them.

Jao: "This is the first 5 billion, issued on 14 May 1999."

Amongst the rubble, Joao has found some of the cheques that he was ordered to draw from the Provincial development budget and give directly to integration and militia groups.

Jao: "This money wasn't meant for militia activities, it was for aid. Aid. For example this one was for social welfare project."

This first cheque drawn from the development budget is for more than a million dollars. It is written directly to a government official, Radjakarina, who was able to cash the cheque or deposit directly to his personal account. Radjakarina, was the Governors secretary. He was also a Senior member of the BRTT, one of the most prominent pro integration groups, and he was broadly regarded as its defacto treasurer. The cheque specifically states that it is for the purposes of a Socialisation team.

Joao had to ensure that Radjakarina used part of this money to repay the blood debts from April, and the balance was for the use of integration groups and their militias

Mark: "So was any money used for development?"

Adelino: "No money was spent on development after we gave the 3 billion to the militia. There was nothing left to spend. No projects went ahead."

Adelino was in charge of planning and development for the district of Dili. There were 13 districts in East Timor, each of them receiving more than 3 billion rupiah for general development and welfare.

Mark: "So they turned your department into a bank for the militias?"

Adelino: "It was all for the militia. The whole 1999 budget was for the militia alone." The World Bank may not be responsible for frauds enacted without its knowledge. But remarkably the World Bank discovered this fraud in the first month that it began. A copy of the governors decree ordering the abuse of development and welfare funds landed in their lap.

Ben: "oh yeah, I think we've seen this yeah."

The World Bank became aware of the plan to steal the money for the militias just weeks after finalising their 500 million US 'anti corruption' loan. In the past 5 months they'd handed a total of almost a billion US dollars to the government.

"Mark: This must have been very disturbing to you.

A: Certainly

Mark: Well what was your specific reaction?

Alatas: "Well my specific reaction and the reaction of my colleagues in government is that we were very upset. We got told and we got to know about this and we stopped it immediately and we said no this is not to be ... In last May and June when we received these very serious allegations and we investigated them we felt that the response of the central government was as strong as possible."

Mark: "Which was to do nothing."

Alatas: "It wasn't to do nothing. The decrees were rescinded."

If Jakarta issued a piece of paper rescinding the decrees to steal development and welfare for the militias apparently only the World Bank took it seriously. The scam continued without so much as a blip with the Co-operation of a host of Indonesian ministries. And the cheques kept flowing

"This is the first payment. After that money was used, they asked for more. And this is the second payment, issued on the fourth of June..."

These cheques continue throughout May, June and July and there's more to be found. They should have been made out to other departments or businesses providing services to the government. They are all made out directly to individuals who were openly or covertly linked with the militias including the leader of the FPDK -- the Bupati of Dili.

Some openly declare they are for "socialisation" others are supposedly welfare for the poor but in case Joao was told the money was needed for integration and militia groups and was told to ignore standard procedures.

"We have a very rigid administration in the Bupanas and so on. I doubt it. It's inconceivable that funds that are allocated for something can so easily be switched for something else. Impossible."

Ali Alatas is right -- it would be impossible to conduct a barely disguised fraud such as this without the consent of Senior department officials and ministers.

Both Joao from the provincial government and Adelino at the district level maintain that communication with their ministries in Jakarta regarding this scam was constant as was the flow of money to the militias.

Adelino: "We prepared the papers and issued 600 million. That turned out not to be enough. Then we issued another 300 million. That wasn't enough. After we'd paid a total of 2.6 billion, they came back and forced us to pay more."

Mark: "You must have had concerns for the money you had given to Jakarta that it was being used through the development budget for the militia."

Alatas: "Sure"

Mark: "And you became aware of this in May?"

Alatas: "Absolutely. Mark we had very strong concerns that the development budget was being used to keep kids in school, to buy medicines, build roads."

Mark: "But it wasn't!"

Alatas: "Outside of East Timor..."

This fraud did not involve specific World Bank projects or staff and the World Bank weren't the only international donor. But the World Bank knew that the scheme had begun and they had a billion dollar stick to wield to ensure it finished.

Mark: "What I am suggesting is that did you take this seriously enough?"

Alatas: "Well that's for history to decide Should we penalise School children in Sulawesi because of what is happening in another part of Indonesia."

For a week Jose and I tracked down public servants from the development and welfare sections from Dili to small towns all of them had similar stories.

Maliana man: "The housing didn't go ahead. The road building didn't go ahead, nor the water supply for the people. So all of that was diverted to those various activities."

Benjamin Barreto was given a job as the Secretary of the Development Department in Maliana. But he was left in no doubt as to what his real job was, to fund the pro integration groups referendum and pay the militias blood money.

"For each person you killed, you got 3 million rupiah. That was the district military commander's plan. He received 800 million Rupiah for the militias. He used it for bounty payments. He used it for that."

As the referendum approached it became absolutely apparent that millions were being spent on the militias, thousands were on the payroll, transport and communications provided, tonnes of rice and oil given away to buy votes, leaders becoming rich.

It was been broadly assumed that it was the military pouring the money in but if you were familiar with the workings of the Indonesian government, if you'd seen the plan, you might have had pause for thought.

Alatas: "Our understanding was that those would be stopped and to the best of our knowledge it was stopped. The order was retracted."

And what wasn't apparent to the world bank would have been known or blatantly obvious to anyone in the government.

Mark: "Who did you imagine was paying them"

Alatas: "I don't know."

Mark: "Well you must have had some suspicions? Who did you imagine was paying them?"

Alatas: "Why should I have suspicions? We are a government."

Mark: "Because people are dying and you have made pledges to the International community."

Alatas: "People are dying and we were against it."

"All the documents were kept here. That's why they burnt it down. All the documents concerning money for the militia were issued from here."

By July of last year, virtually all of the resources of the Dili administration were at the disposal of the militias and there expenses were now running out of control. In just 6 months they'd spent probably 12 million dollars of development and welfare funds, 2 million from Foreign Affairs, the entire Transmigration budget for East Timor and contributions from other departments and the referendum was still more than a month away.

Adelino: "The militias came and kicked in the secretary's door, abusing and threatening everyone."

Even more creative accounting by the Indonesian bureaucracy was required.

"We held a meeting here with the departments of Public Works, Water Supply, Road and so on, to take 75% of their budgets for the militia and give 25% to the contractors."

The time had now come to dip into major projects and for a cut the construction contractors agreed to sign documents saying that ghost projects were complete and Indonesia won more brownie points with the international donor community for all of the roads, bridges, irrigation systems it was apparently building in East Timor. Everyone was a winner. The frenzy that followed the referendum in September was a logical conclusion to the madness that had gone before it.

A madness incited and paid for not just by the Military but by the Departments of Information, Transmigration, Foreign Affairs, Planning & Development, Forestry, Agriculture, Political Affairs and the Department of Finance.

The Indonesian government may yet be prepared to sacrifice what they are referring to as 'rogue elements' of the army, but if the rogue elements are taken to court they are likely to take large sections of the government down with them.

Alatas: "We have gone as far as saying that perhaps you know certain rogue elements were involved, yes. But I don't know..."

Mark: "Well these rogue elements go right up the command of TNI and now clearly they cross into the Cabinet. Is Lopez Da Cruz a rogue element?"

Alatas: "No of course not. But he is not involved in the killing. let's put the blame where the blame resides."

Mark: "Well were should the blame reside?"

Alatas: "Probably those who are wielding the machetes and who are wielding the guns and so on."

Some of the people who were wielding the machetes and the guns are being kept here at this Falintil camp behind Dili. These men have been accused of being militia members. None of them are militia leaders but they may still be the only ones who will face the justice system. Not their military commanders or their ministerial paymasters.

"We are not educated people who write in offices. We're illiterate, working in farms and paddy fields. They called us, took our names and said,` you've got to join this group.' We said, `What are we joining it for?'. They said, `If you refuse to join, you'll see what happens.' So we were scared and we joined."

"When we joined the militia, we thought it was a good thing. But they told us to do all these things. I knew nothing, but was forced to do all those things. We did it all against our will. They forced us to do it. I feel pain inside. We didn't know what was going on. The educated ones set this up for us to do terrible things to each other."

In a forest West of Dili Filomena's husband is unearthed. His wife and children now know how he was killed -- with his ears cut off and his head caved in. But in a ledger in the department of finance, this is not a grave it's a road project or a canal, not a murder but a public service.

[The original transcript was corrected and edited slightly to improve readability - James Balowski.]

Campaigning for human rights in East Timor

Dili -- The East Timor Human Rights Commission (ETHRC) was established on October 1 to conduct investigations and monitoring of human rights violations in East Timor, educate the East Timorese people about human rights issues and establish rehabilitation, education and advocacy programs.

ETHRC was formed by activists and students with a background in law, many of whom were formerly involved with Kontras, an East Timorese organisation which conducted investigations into human rights abuses and the whereabouts of persons detained by the Indonesian military before the August 30 referendum. The founder and general coordinator of ETHRC, ISABEL FERREIRA, spoke to Green Left Weekly's JON LAND about the work of ETHRC and its campaign for the creation of an international war crimes tribunal.

Ferreira said that the ETHRC has been concentrating on collating information about human rights violations carried out by the Indonesian military since September. The investigations are ongoing and it is hoped that the information will assist the activity of United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) commissions and other bodies investigating human rights violations in East Timor. The ETHRC's ultimate goal is that the information be used to prosecute criminals in an international war crimes tribunal.

Ferreira and others are deeply concerned, however, that, "There is no clear information about the status or creation of a war crimes tribunal. Often, the information we receive from UNTAET implies that an international tribunal is not possible ... and that there is little motivation to establish such a tribunal, which is very disappointing to us." ETHRC believes that this is because there is not enough pressure being placed on the UN, that the international campaign for a war crimes tribunal has been "very weak to date".

Another factor is the investigation by the Indonesian Human Rights Commission (Komnas-HAM) into the activity of the military in East Timor. Ferreira believes that, while Komnas-HAM's investigation shows the Indonesian people's desire to find out the truth about the military's role in East Timor, it may be used to block an international war crimes tribunal. "The Indonesian government and military say that their own investigations will be sufficient", Ferreira said.

ETHRC is calling for solidarity and human rights organisations to increase their campaigning for a war crimes tribunal. "Without such a campaign, the people of East Timor will be denied justice and the perpetrators of human rights violations will continue their activities", Ferreira told Green Left Weekly.

Over the coming months, ETHRC will continue its investigations into the killings and terror that occurred after the referendum. "This will assist not just in providing evidence for the prosecution of those responsible for human rights abuses but also in rehabilitating those affected by the violence. So many Timorese families have been traumatised and there are many problems", Ferreira explained.

ETHRC, through its education and advocacy programs, is helping to rebuild Timorese society, with the aim of assisting East Timorese people to become self-sufficient economically and fostering a better understanding of democracy, human rights and gender issues. "We hope that with a greater understanding of these issues, there will be no need in the future for the people to rely on non-government organisations or others to pressure and control the government, but that the people themselves will be able to do this", Ferreira said.

The work of ETHRC is hampered by many problems, such as limited finances and the lack of infrastructure in East Timor, from transport to communications. However, the members of ETHRC are committed to consolidating the work of the commission, and plan to establish offices in Maliana, Aileu and Baucau, building upon networks established in these centres and other districts.

Militia leader's confession

The commission investigating human rights violations in East Timor has finally completed the report of its findings. The evidence was so convincing that accusations of physical violence and threats to kill were included. After questioning dozens of witnesses who were civilian officials in East Timor, and militia, police and TNI [Indonesian National Military Forces] personnel of various ranks, the commission was convinced that serious human rights violations occurred in East Timor. The testimony of one witness [suspect] to the commission supports the view that they were aided and assisted with training, weapons and money by the Indonesian military. The following is the confession of a man suspected of involvement in human rights abuses as given to the commission.

Q. What important positions have you held?

A. In 1974-1976 I was the commander of a 216-strong group fighting for integration with Indonesia ... But up until East Timor separated from Indonesia, I was in the BRTT [East Timor People's Front] Security Council...

Q. At that stage were militia groups already being formed?

A. It's difficult for me to answer that question. I experienced 24 years of continuous war. Maybe ABRI [Indonesian Armed Forces] was tired of fighting Falintil or placed too much trust in us to do it. Basically they gave us weapons every year.

Q. Did you receive weapons at the end of 1998 or the beginning of 1999?

A. We received weapons directly from SGI [joint intelligence unit]. Each commander took delivery of his own quota of weapons, and some took them home to their own districts.

Q. What about 1999?

A. In the last few months, I also received weapons, but I was ordered to store them at the Military District Command. On 25th March, the SGI commander himself and Bambang plus six of their men delivered the weapons to my house in Ermera.

Q. How many weapons?

A. 300. But I couldn't take delivery of them all because there wasn't enough storage space. I told them to store them at the Military District commander's house. At the same time I was summoned by the East Timor governor.

Q. What kind of weapons?

A. Many different kinds. At that time they gave us SKs, AR-16, AK-47. Plus rifles. I think the rifles were made in Bandung. But the AK and SKs, they were Russian.

Q. How were they distributed?

A. The militia didn't need to write reports; we just used some from the Military District Command [MDC] because the SGI and Tribuana members who were from Kopassus [Army Special Forces] were based at the MDC. They wore plain clothes. If we needed money, we just asked.

Q. Was the militia free?

A. The militia was free -- we could burn, arrest, kill -- it was up to us...

Q. Were the weapons distributed in Ermera?

A. I had no militia forces in Ermera. But after I went to Jakarta on the 6th, on the 10th [as received] a regional assembly (DPRD) level II member Antonio Lima was murdered. Several days later two young children were also murdered. The people began to panic.

Q. Is it clear this was carried out by the militia?

A. It was militia. But it was militia from the Military District Command, not those from the hills or the villages.

Q. Were there military personnel who became militia?

A. Many. Those who were known as militia were in front while the ones behind were elite troops in Aitarak uniforms.

Q. Did you know of any plans to carry out massacres in East Timor after February such as the Liquica case?

A. It would be better if you asked Joao Tavares that question but I knew myself that this had been planned for us to carry out. The aim was to threaten and place pressure on those who wanted independence. Maybe this way we could have changed them but what happened instead was resentment among the people.

Q. Therefore who carried out these murders?

A. The murders in February 1999 were carried out by militia groups Besi Merah Putih [Red and White Iron] and Halilintar [Thunder] from Suai, Maliana and Liquica. Actually this problem and the issue of the 3,250 refugees had already been conveyed to those at the Muspida [Regional Leaders Conference] but they said, "It is the Security Disturbance Movement (GPK) they are against, whether they want to die or do something else, it's up to them," he said...

CNRT accused of violence

Canberra -- East Timor's main political organisation, the National Council for East Timorese Resistance (CNRT), was attacking some of the people it had fought to protect, it was reported today.

Evidence had also emerged that the CNRT was acting as a de facto government in defiance of the United Nations mandate to administer the former Indonesian territory's move to independence, according to an SBS TV report.

Jean Christian Cady, a spokesman for the UN's administrative force in East Timor (UNTAET), said the CNRT was playing a big role in how East Timor was being run. "We are in constant contact with the CNRT in order to make the measures that we are proposing approved by the largest majority of the East Timorese population," he told SBS.

But the CNRT had been accused of stand-over tactics and violence against its own people. Interfet chief of staff Colonel Bruce Armstrong said violence was often being wrongly blamed on militias.

"It seems to be quite common that whenever there is any disagreement between the East Timorese, one will say, 'he is militia'," Col Armstrong said. "And then we investigate it turns they had nothing to do with the militia."

Humanitarian worker Alexandre Pires, just returned from Atabai, about 100km west of Dili, said refugees crossing back from West Timor were being targeted by CNRT. "They are terrified to talk," he said. "The local Atabai police will beat them and possibly kill them. I know, because I am from Atabai and because of my work."

Human rights activist Joaquim Fonseca said some CNRT bosses, like the militias, must be brought to justice. "It is regrettable that at this stage the CNRT is acting in contravention to the principle they have defended for years," he said.

There were reports of CNRT officers ordering the confiscation of personal assets for what they described as state work. Such an order would directly contravene the UN's mandate to govern the country. CNRT chief and independence fighter Xanana Gusmao said he was not aware of any such orders. "If they are ... hurting people, confiscating buildings or cars, I will take action." Catholic Bishop Carlos Belo said he was concerned about the CNRT's actions. "I've had meetings with young people, with different groups in the church and we talk openly about this," he said.

The evidence against Wiranto

Jonathan Head -- It was at the beginning of last year that we first started to hear reports of attacks by new pro-Indonesian militia gangs in East Timor. It was not, however, the first time the Indonesian army had used such a tactic.

Soon after their invasion of East Timor in 1975, local people were recruited to help fight the pro-independence guerrillas who continued to resist the occupation.

In the early 1990s, paramilitary youth groups were formed by the Indonesian military to counter the clandestine campaign against Indonesian rule being conducted by Timorese civilians in the towns.

Army commanders routinely denied any connection with the groups, but according to official military documents obtained by the BBC in 1998, the paramilitaries came directly under the local army command structure.

Evidence that the military were behind the new militias became even clearer. Last February I sat in the headquarters of the Indonesian garrison in Dili, waiting for an interview with Colonel Tono Suratman, the local commander.

Next to me was a group of rough-looking Timorese. One had part of his ear missing. He explained that they were part of the Garda Paksi, a pro-Indonesian paramilitary group, and they had come to obtain more weapons from the army to combat the increasingly assertive pro-independence movement. They were welcomed like friends by the soldiers. I have little doubt that they got their guns.

Integration or death

A few days later I met Cancio Cavalhao and Eurico Gutteres -- little known back then, but later to become the two most notorious militia leaders.

Eurico was shy with us -- it was only later that he developed an appetite for bombarding the media with emotional and often contradictory speeches -- but Cancio was quite explicit about what they were planning, and who was helping them.

A good-looking former civil servant in the Indonesian Justice Ministry, he had just formed his own militia group, Mahidi, an acronym for Live or Die for Integration with Indonesia.

He explained how he had been given modern automatic weapons by the Indonesian military, and how he had used them in an attack on a village in which six people died, including a pregnant woman.

If President Habibie persisted with his plan to offer East Timor independence, he said, the militias would fight to the death, and destroy the country.

Our reports at the time were widely publicised in Indonesia, and General Wiranto, then the armed forces commander, was asked about them. He simply denied that they could be true.

He also supported the formation for so-called People's Defence Groups under the army's command, even though militia leaders like Cancio Cavalhao were allowed to lead these groups.

Blood-splattered church

Last April, the militias began expanding from their stronghold near the border with Indonesia towards Dili. In their path lay the seaside town of Liquica, a known pro-independence stronghold.

Three of my colleagues and I arrived there a few hours after they took it over. There was blood spattered all around the church. Badly wounded men lay groaning on the ground. Several women wept hysterically, saying dozens of men had been slaughtered.

The local priest later told us how Indonesian soldiers and riot police helped the militias in their attack on the town's population -- we could still see militia leaders and soldiers chatting and smoking together. The final death toll from Liquica may exceed 50.

We reported the army's involvement, and the way militias were killing with impunity. General Wiranto did nothing. Against all the evidence, he described the incident as a clash between pro- and anti Indonesian gangs.

Soldiers cheered militias

On 17 April, hundreds of militiamen were allowed to rally in front of the Governor's office, waving their weapons. Anywhere else in Indonesia this would not have been tolerated. But in East Timor, the Indonesian soldiers cheered their paramilitary allies.

Led by Eurico Gutteres, the militias then went on a rampage through the town that left at least a dozen people dead. We filmed him and his men, using automatic weapons with their Indonesian army serial numbers still clearly visible, firing into a house where more than 100 were hiding. The 17 year-old son of pro-independence campaigner Manuel Carrascalao was one of those killed.

When I tried to approach the house, armed Indonesian police blocked my way. Behind them, the militiamen could be seen using army trucks to take the bodies away.

I raised the clear collaboration between the two with several Indonesian officials, and was told to mind my own business. General Wiranto was interviewed that night, and insisted that his men had done everything possible to control the violence.

No action was taken against any militiamen. They moved about Dili freely, displaying their Indonesian weapons as a warning to the rest of the population.

Strict hierarchy

The militia attacks, and the refusal of the Indonesian military to stop them, continued after the arrival of the United Nations in May. The UN complained frequently to General Wiranto. Just as often he promised to curb the militias, but although there were some lulls, they were never long.

The appalling scenes of destruction we witnessed last September were merely an escalation of what had been going all year, indeed throughout the Indonesian occupation. We now have documents and tapes that show beyond doubt that the militias were being armed and directed by senior commanders of the Indonesian military.

It is inconceivable that General Wiranto did not know about this -- in fact, given the strict hierarchy within the armed forces, it is highly unlikely that the order to back the militias, or perhaps even to set them up, did not have General Wiranto's direct approval.

There is some evidence that by last September, General Wiranto had started to lose control of the monster he helped create. But from everything I witnessed during my seven trips to East Timor last year, there is a powerful case for him to be held responsible for many of the terrible events that took place there.

Workers strike at floating hotels

Negotiations continued Friday to resolve one of East Timor's first labor disputes, which saw a day-long walkout from the two floating hotels housing UN employees.

About 40 East Timorese workers at the Olympia and Amos W. hotels walked off the job on Thursday to protest wages, working hours and alleged discrimination.

They were back cleaning rooms, doing laundry and catering Friday as hotel management moved to address their complaints. "Yes, they were right in their points," said Wouter Lap, acting manager of the two floating hotels.

The strikers work for Eurest, an international firm subcontracted by the hotels, Lap said. "We insist to them they must increase our salary," said Domingos da Silva, one of the strike leaders. The employees earn five Australian dollars (about 3.5 US dollars) a day but were asking for 25 dollars, he said.

De Silva, a room boy, said they want their 72-hour work week reduced. They also object to searches of their bags conducted in front of East Timorese bystanders on the docksides outside the hotels, he said. "They are suspicious that maybe we are steal something," da Silva said.

"We want justice," said another room boy, Milton Dias Ximenes. Lap said negotiations to resolve the dispute have been conducted with the help of two representatives from the National Council of Timorese Resistance. He said wages can be raised to between 8.50 and 9.00 dollars a day, while the subcontractor is prepared to reduce the work week.

Spot checks of workers leaving the hotels will continue, but in a more sensitive manner, he said. "In any hotel operation, you have to have spot checks," he said. Lap also said new managers are arriving to run the sub-contractor's operation. "The two guys who are there now, they will leave within a week's time," Lap said. Workers were not happy with the two foreign supervisors, he said.

During the day-long strike, more than 30 East Timorese working in the bar, security and front office, employed directly by the hotel, continued to work. Those workers already earn a minimum of eight Australian dollars a day.
 

Government/politics

The taming of the general

Sangwon Suh and Dewi Loveard, Jakarta -- After two weeks of tense standoff, it was over. Late on Sunday, February 13, Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid finally carried out what he had been promising to do: remove Gen. Wiranto, coordinating minister for security and political affairs, from his cabinet. The announcement was received with surprising grace and composure by Wiranto. No tanks appeared in the streets, and the stock market remained calm. The world let out a collective sigh of relief. Indonesia's democracy appeared safe, at least for now.

The confrontation between the two men began on January 31, when the National Human Rights Commission released a report implicating a number of military officials, including Wiranto, in the East Timor violence last year. Wahid, who was in Europe at the time, called on the general to step down. Wiranto refused, saying there was no evidence to support the commission's conclusions.

As Wahid made his way through Europe, he reiterated his call for Wiranto's resignation, but the general steadfastly declined to budge. All the while, Indonesians and the international community watched the long-distance standoff with growing unease. If Wiranto prevailed, it would be a blow to the four-month-old civilian government, a sign that the president could not control the military. If Wahid prevailed, then who knew how the former armed-forces chief and his hardline supporters would react?

Wahid returned to Indonesia on February 13 for what would be a final showdown. He immediately called a meeting with Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri, Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman and Wiranto at the presidential palace. According to sources in the palace, Wiranto insisted that his case should be first investigated by the attorney-general's office; he charged that the commission's report was more a "political phenomenon than law." Darusman, who is also chairman of the commission, countered that it would be difficult to carry out an impartial probe while Wiranto was still in office. "Our investigators would feel reluctant to investigate such a high-ranking officer," he later told Asiaweek.

Unable to sway Wiranto, Wahid announced afterwards that the coordinating minister would remain in his post. It was a blow, it seemed, to the president and to Indonesia's reformist forces, and on Monday morning newspaper headlines around the region trumpeted this setback. But even before the papers came out, Wahid had already made a dramatic U-turn. That Sunday night, he summoned Megawati (who was at a restaurant at the time and had to leave with her food in take-away bags). After conferring with her, Wahid made his decision: Wiranto would be suspended from the cabinet until a final verdict on his East Timor role came out. The news, formally announced the next morning, took everyone, including Wiranto, by surprise.

Later that day, Wiranto attended the swearing-in ceremony of his replacement, Home Affairs Minister Surjadi Sudirja. Wiranto was not accompanied by his wife. A source from the general's office explained: "His wife is still shocked, since the family was only told of the news at 6am, after they had finished their morning prayers." At the ceremony, Wiranto's colleagues tried to relieve the tension by giving him hugs and hearty handshakes.

There were grumblings from hardline elements in the military over the latest development. "Gus Dur [Wahid's nickname] has gone too far," complains one active general. "I hope this is the last time he causes the military to lose face in public; otherwise we're afraid we will have to take some action to restore our dignity." For the time being, though, Wiranto's removal seems to have happened without much fuss. Wiranto himself greeted the suspension with equanimity, saying it was within the president's power to make such a decision.

"This is a task that is given by God, by the government and by the nation," he said. "If the confidence is not there anymore, I am ready to accept that I have to stand down."

How did Wahid manage to defuse the situation without triggering a crisis? First, he took care to make the pill easier to swallow for Wiranto. By suspending him, rather than sacking him outright, the cleric-turned-president enabled Wiranto to save some face and also left the door open for the general's return, should he be exonerated of any crimes. Wiranto's successor Surjadi underlined this point when he was being sworn in. "I only serve this position until there is a conclusion about Wiranto's position," he said. "If within one month he is proven not guilty, I will give it back to him."

Another factor is the sheer support that Wahid commands, both inside and outside the country. The US repeatedly warned would-be conspirators in the military not to harbor any ideas of a coup. Wahid's recent overseas tour served to cement his standing among world leaders, a point underscored by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's visit to Indonesia on February 14. It was also clear that any coup would come at a heavy economic price, as foreign investors would pull out at the first sign of political uncertainty. Wiranto himself said as much after his suspension: "Without my standing down, it would be difficult to invite foreign investors to put their money in Indonesia."

Domestically, too, Wahid's standing is unassailable. As the country's first democratically elected leader in decades, he remains popular among ordinary Indonesians. Equally significant, the armed forces are behind him; they reaffirmed their support for the president after Wiranto's removal. The latter is at least partly Wahid's doing. Over the months, he slowly whittled away at Wiranto's power base, removing the general's supporters from key positions and replacing them with reformist officers. Thus, says a two-star general, Wiranto never had a chance to mobilize his power within the military. "I can assure you that no action is underway following the announcement," he says. "This crude but brilliant president has been able to unscrew most of the bolts of Wiranto's machine."

The final key to Wahid's success is his modus operandi. Both his critics and his followers have complained that his intentions can be very difficult to fathom, given his penchant for making confusing, even contradictory, statements. This tendency was not absent during the standoff. Throughout his Europe tour, Wahid's message was consistent: Wiranto had to go. But at times he made conciliatory noises, causing observers to think he was backtracking. One moment, he was saying he would remove Wiranto as soon as he got back; next, he was crediting the general with saving him and Megawati from an assassination plot a few years ago. Such seeming changes of heart confounded his European hosts -- and no doubt kept his enemies wrongfooted (as did his complete flip-flop after his return to Jakarta).

This approach has led many to wonder if the apparent madness in the method is deliberate or if he is fumbling around aimlessly. Brilliance or just dumb luck? Sometimes, it is hard to tell. But whatever it is, it seems to be working -- for now.

Wiranto goes on TV to defend allegations

Jakarta -- Former Indonesian armed forces chief General Wiranto appeared on television here Wednesday to defend himself against allegations that he let his troops go on a bloody rampage in East Timor last year.

Wiranto's public appearance coincided with the last day of a visit to Jakarta by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and came three days after he was suspended as security minister by President Abdurrahman Wahid.

Annan has repeatedly urged Indonesia to prosecute those found guilty of violence in East Timor, and warned the UN will try to set up an international war crimes tribunal if it doesn't.

In the lengthy interview with the private RCTI television channel, Wiranto displayed his own collection of video compact discs showing his peace message at the inauguration of a peace pact between conflicting East Timorese factions before the UN- sponsored vote on independence on August 30.

"The TNI [military] as a solid institution ... which carries out a mission based on clear guidelines and procedures, would never plan something that can violate human rights," Wiranto said. The ballot itself was a success but was tainted by rigging by local UN officials, Wiranto charged.

"We could create a peaceful situation for four months [before the vote]. There were 4,000 foreigners and all of them were safe. We received praise from foreign countries," Wiranto said of his efforts to keep peace in the territory.

"But the ballot was announced too early ... and the result was a blow to pro-integrationists. This triggered emotional outburst," he said of the result, which was overwhelmingly in favor of independence from Indonesia after 24 years of a quasi-military rule.

He admitted some of his troops took part in an orgy of burning, looting and killing unleashed by pro-Indonesian militia as soon as the vote results were announced on September 4. "I never denied this. I accept this as a fact," he said. "I admit there were individuals from the military and police who acted against the law, and they happened to be native East Timorese." He also said he had asked his successor as military chief, Admiral Widodo Adisucipto, to process those participating in the violence according to the law.

On Tuesday in an interview with a radio station Wiranto hit out at military officers close to Wahid and hinted they might have influenced the president's decision to drop him from the cabinet.

Late Sunday, Wahid suspended Wiranto as coordinating minister for political and security affairs in a dramatic turn-about after the general appeared to have won a two-week standoff with the president.

Wiranto, who has accepted the decision, and five other senior generals have been implicated in human rights abuses during the East Timor violence.

On the possibility of his supporters creating havoc following his removal from the cabinet, Wiranto said: "That's what I'm worried about. Don't let this affair become a pretext for other parties to create new troubles. Our nation already has a multitude of problems." he said.

The Jakarta Stock Exchange composite index dropped 2.4 percent on Wednesday amid rumors Wiranto's followers might try to create trouble. Widodo on Monday reassured the president publicly that all branches of the armed forces supported his decision to drop Wiranto.

Wahid 'bowed to international pressure on Wiranto'

Jakarta -- Indonesia's President Abdurrahman Wahid decided to suspend General Wiranto over his involvement in human rights abuses in East Timor after significant international pressure, a leading legislator, Mr Amien Rais, said yesterday.

Mr Wahid, who reversed an announcement made six hours earlier that his Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs could stay in his job, had explained the intense pressure in a phone call, Mr Rais said.

Mr Rais, chairman of Indonesia's highest legislative body, the People's Consultative Assembly, applauded Mr Wahid's change of mind, and said responsibility for the atrocities in East Timor should rest with General Wiranto.

But the Speaker of Parliament, Mr Akbar Tanjung, who is also chairman of the second largest party, Golkar, said General Wiranto could join his political team anytime, even if the Attorney-General, Mr Marzuki Darusman, found he had a case to answer over East Timor.

"If he resigns from the military and becomes a civilian we would welcome him to join Golkar," Mr Akbar said. When asked if that would apply even if there were a cloud over General Wiranto's name, Mr Akbar replied: "It's OK, never mind."

Mr Rais said Mr Wahid's manner of suspending General Wiranto was "a bit reckless" but that most people supported him. "Eight hours before he made the decision, the final decision, President Gus Dur [Mr Wahid's popular name] was talking to me over the phone saying that he was under international pressure," Mr Rais said. When asked whether he thought the pressure had come from other countries, international institutions or foreign investors, Mr Rais said: "All of them".

General Wiranto has been suspended after being named, with five other police and military officers, by an independent Indonesian investigation into violence in East Timor. But Mr Rais did not think the other officers mentioned in the report should also be suspended. "Wiranto was the man in charge," Mr Rais said.

He said the two-week long-distance saga over whether General Wiranto would resign had taken a toll on Mr Wahid's credibility, but Mr Rais said the Central Axis grouping of Muslim parties he represents would not make a hasty decision.

"We can still accept Mr Gus Dur as our president, but we will watch him very closely. "If he deviates a little bit we will ... flip his ear, and if he deviates too much we will spank him politically, and if he violates the Constitution we will stop him. It remains to be seen whether he will really do stupid things or not. After Wiranto's resignation, if the steps taken by Gus Dur are accountable, are reasonable, in parallel with the expectation of the people in this reform era, I think he will continue holding his job."

High-wire act leaves them guessing

Vaudine England -- Interpreting the statements and intent of President Abdurrahman Wahid is a full-time, fascinating, but often frustrating task for anyone interested in tracking the evolution of this new and highly original democracy.

Broadly, there are two ways of watching this near-blind man doing his high-wire act. The first perspective is that Mr Wahid, or "Gus Dur" as he is called locally, is an erratic, ill and arrogant man who vacillates wildly and talks too much.

To those who say this, President Wahid makes up policy on the hoof, fails to consult or listen, and delights in confusing everyone, producing what appears to be an endless succession of gaffes and contradictions.

"This is just another big game of Wahid's -- he just likes to play with peoples' emotions," said a proponent of this view yesterday. "His office is chaos and policy is all over the place. I ask you, is this the way to run a country?"

Meanwhile, the second school holds that, in fact, Mr Wahid is a profoundly clever man with a sharply honed political sense and a mind which works on many levels at once.

Under this scenario, Mr Wahid is calculating all manner of permutations and results which we are all too simple to understand, so that his statements are part of a clearly conceived plan aimed at accommodating the country's many complexities in a brilliant blend of ideals and rigorous realpolitik.

"There is nothing he does which is not all worked out in advance," said a confidant of the President. "Basically there is nothing chaotic," said Marine Resources Minister Sarwono Kusumaatmadja. "The thread is clear. Gus Dur is consolidating his position," he said. "This is just his style."

There is truth in both points of view; Mr Wahid is a victim of two strokes and is virtually blind, relying on an inner circle of friends and relatives to receive his daily information. He is also a highly educated and sophisticated man who managed, during the rule of former strongman Suharto, to be both a daring leader of the democracy movement and a regular visitor to Suharto. At the same time, he led the country's largest Muslim organisation, the Nahdlatul Ulama, while being one of Asia's most tolerant and inclusive men of religion.

Juggling acts like these are a political art form, especially in a polity such as Indonesia, where ritual, pride and high stakes combine in a sweetly devious mix. "Wahid's style is to float first this way, then the other, back and forth, and then he will decide very quickly," Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono said. "Oh yes, we all have to get used to his style. Everyone has to -- ministers, diplomats, journalists. We all have to learn."

Wahid achieves delicate balance

Vaudine England, Jakarta -- Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid yesterday achieved exactly what he wanted -- General Wiranto's absence from government -- without destabilising the nation's delicate political balance.

He also protected national honour by suspending the man accused of rights crimes in East Timor, just one day before United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan was due to arrive in Jakarta to assess whether Indonesia can prosecute its own or if an international war crimes tribunal should be formed.

But the way he achieved this victory raised doubts about his credibility. Mr Wahid can claim victory on two fronts: asserting his right to hire and fire whom he pleases, even leading generals; and displaying support for the rule of law and human rights institutions. But this event's place in the struggle between civilian and military rule is more significant, as those hoping to see General Wiranto face trial will probably be disappointed.

"Gus Dur [Mr Wahid] firmly believes that Wiranto is not ultimately culpable," said Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono. Mr Wahid's achievement, in just more than 100 days in power, has been the emasculation of the military and the whittling away of some of its privileges in government, to make the point that civilian rule is supreme.

Under ex-president Suharto, soldiers enjoyed impunity for deeds ranging from petty corruption to rape and robbery, and were rarely called to account.

Despite all the contradictory statements and apparent turnarounds, it is clear that this state of affairs is coming to an end. "He's done it at last, thank goodness," said a Western diplomat. "But why did he have to take us all round in circles along the way?"

Most Indonesians are not shocked by the twists and turns and even the armed forces spokesman, Air Force Rear Marshal Graito Usodo, said: "It's his prerogative. Gus Dur has the right to change his mind."

The result is a government, chosen in the country's most democratic elections so far, which is highly dependent on the complex mind and manoeuvres of one man. The imposition of Mr Wahid's will on General Wiranto is the most dramatic in what can be seen as a long line of steps towards his goal of putting the military in its place.

Mr Wahid has already appointed a civilian as defence minister and made the previously army-dominated post of forces chief over to a navy man. He sacked the armed forces spokesman who dared to question a civilian president's right to interfere in military matters.

His success lies in his ability to keep everyone off guard, and his staff divided, so that no one is strong enough to challenge him in his highly vulnerable position as leader of a large, poor and violently fractious country. But observers at home and abroad might wish there was more clarity and less chaos in the process.

Wiranto goes out with a whimper

Lindsay Murdoch, Jakarta -- Indonesia's military yesterday pledged its loyalty to President Wahid after he suspended General Wiranto in an extraordinary back-flip just hours after declaring that he could remain in the Cabinet.

Ending a tense stand-off that was threatening Indonesia's transition from military to democratic rule, Mr Wahid removed General Wiranto as Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs.

Appearing shattered, General Wiranto later admitted for the first time responsibility for the bloodbath in East Timor last year because he was the armed forces commander at the time.

But he denied any direct involvement and called for people to await the outcome of the Attorney-General's investigation into the violence. Speaking at the presidential palace, General Wiranto said: "I'm responsible for human rights abuses in East Timor ... that needs to be clarified by the Attorney-General before they take it to court."

For months he has rejected accusations by Indonesian and United Nations investigators that he was responsible for the military- backed violence in East Timor, and at times even tried to deny that it had happened.

General Wiranto told reporters that he refused to resign as Mr Wahid had repeatedly requested during the President's recent overseas trip because "I wanted to help him get a full report before he made the decision". "If there are changes, it is his right," he said. "Don't make it as a big matter."

After avoiding confronting General Wiranto during a meeting at the palace late on Sunday and saying he could remain pending the investigation, Mr Wahid prepared papers formalising the sacking and telephoned him with the news.

As Indonesians woke to find Mr Wahid had acted, the armed forces commander, Admiral Widodo, moved to dispel rumours that soldiers loyal to their former commander would act to remove Mr Wahid, the country's first democratically elected president.

"I, together with the navy, army and air force chiefs of staff, believe that what has been decided by the President has of course gone through a process of comprehensive consideration ... the President's decision is intended for the national interest." Admiral Widodo added: "Therefore all levels in the TNI [armed forces] are loyal and will safeguard the decision to be implemented in a good manner."

In a move indicating that Mr Wahid has no intention of bringing General Wiranto back into the Cabinet, the President announced that the Minister for Home Affairs, Lieutenant-General Surjadi Soedirdja, would take over his ministerial responsibilities. General Soedirdja is a former governor of Jakarta and member of Mr Wahid's National Awakening Party.

Mr Wahid, a frail Muslim cleric who was elected in October, has already promised that he will pardon General Wiranto if he is found guilty by an Indonesian court.

Before leaving the presidential palace, General Wiranto took a swipe at one of the army's highest-profile reforming officers, Major-General Agus Wirahadikusuma, who on Sunday had urged Mr Wahid to sack General Wiranto. General Wiranto said he felt "sad and guilty" because it had been his job to guide officers under his command. "I feel I have failed because those officers which I had trained have taken that kind of attitude ... they criticised me in a public forum. According to the officers' ethic code that's unethical."

Amien Rais reelected PAN chairman

Sri Wahyuni and Asip Agus Hasani, Yogyakarta -- The expectations spoke for themselves when Amien Rais remained virtually unchallenged in his bid to retain the National Mandate Party chairmanship on Sunday.

Amien won 584 of the 786 votes cast in the election that marked the final day of the party's first congress. Outgoing secretary- general Faisal Basri earned 124 votes, while the other candidate qualifying for the race, A.M. Fatwa, took 77. Only one ballot was declared invalid, because it named two candidates.

Originally, five candidates qualified for the election, but Abdillah Toha and Hatta Rajasa threw in the towel, saying they realized they had only a remote chance of beating Amien.

"Amien is like Mike Tyson for me. I would have certainly lost," Abdillah said, referring to the former undisputed world heavyweight boxing champion. In a late night session, the congress participants elected four members of the party's central board of executives to be in the Amien-led team assigned to select the party's new executives: Faisal, Fatwa, Hatta Rajasa and Patrialis Akbar. Other members of the board are Yogyakarta chairman A.R. Iskandar and his East Java and South Sulawesi counterparts Suwardi and M. Askin.

Faisal said he would decline a second term as secretary-general, citing personal reasons. "I reject my candidacy [for the secretary-general post], not because I was against any changes to the party's founding platform, but because I have to honor my commitment to hold a position only once," Faisal said. "I need a new challenge." Faisal's withdrawal paved the way for Hatta to take the team's key post.

Amien said after his election that this would be his last term, which will last until 2005. "I hope there will be a young cadre, who is better than me, to take the top job in 2005. One of my concerns is how to generate brilliant party cadres, mainly because the party is very young," Amien said.

The voting, which lasted three hours, went smoothly, but many of the voters vacated the convention room during ballot-counting. Some of them were seen packing their bags or enjoying an entertainment performance near the swimming pool in the Mustika Sheraton Hotel, which hosted the four-day congress.

Asked about Amien's reelection, Faisal said he accepted whatever the congress decided and would support the party's efforts to win the most votes in the 2004 general election. "Pak Amien received a very significant mandate from the congress, but personally I asked him to also struggle for what my friends and I envisioned for PAN," he said.

Bara Hasibuan, a close associate of Faisal, however, said that having collected 124 votes, Faisal deserved a key position as one of the party's deputy chairmen. Faisal said he was surprised by his vote earning. Prior to the congress he predicted he would only win up to 10 percent of the vote. "It was indeed beyond my expectations," he said.

He presumed his support came mostly from young constituents, especially those who shared his progressive way of thinking. "But I hope they won't be too progressive compared to what I did [in criticizing the party], which seems to me I perhaps went too far," he said. Political observer Mahfud M.D. of Yogyakarta's Indonesian Islamic University said Amien's reelection came as no surprise.

However, he praised the fact that there were no signs of blocking any candidates from running for the chairmanship. "We have seen in the past a strong candidate pressing his or her contenders, who then made an early exit," he said.

Mahfud said Amien's heaviest burden would be how to unite factions within the party. "If disputes are not quickly and wisely settled, especially the one regarding the party's founding principle, the split will remain," he said.

"I think the solution which meets the conflicting interests is keeping the founding platform. The ad hoc committee should decide so as faith and devotion could be applied in the program, not necessarily in its official platform," he added.

According to Faisal, the most urgent task of the chairman for the following years is to make the party understand the needs of its constituents. "We are intelligent, but intelligence does not guarantee that we can understand the demands of our constituents," Faisal said.
 

Aceh/West Papua

Death toll in Aceh tumult reaches 179 this year

Banda Aceh -- Nine more people were reported killed in Aceh in the last two days, raising the death toll for the year to 179.

A total of 151 civilians, 15 Indonesian Military (TNI) members and 13 policemen were recorded as casualties in the continuing violence in the restive province. The toll is expected to rise and may well exceed last year's total of 293 as a political solution to end the violence has yet to be found. Last month the National Police announced that 202 civilians were among those killed in Aceh last year.

The latest deaths occurred at three separate places on Thursday. Six men, believed to be members of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), were shot in Panggong village in Krueng Sabe district, West Aceh, military resort chief Col. Syarifuddin Tippe said in Meulaboh. However, Abu Khaidir, the GAM spokesman in Krueng Sabe, said the six victims were farmers working in their fields who were caught in the crossfire of the clash between GAM and the military took place.

Still in West Aceh, two men were found dead at an oil palm plantation with their throats cut. Local police said the two, Kariono and Karim, were workers of the plantation in Darul Makmur district. Their bodies were sent to Meulaboh hospital.

In North Aceh a civilian, identified as Zulkifli Adam, 45, was shot dead by two unidentified youths in front of junior high school SMP Seunuddon, North Aceh Police hief Lt. Col. Syafei Aksal said on Thursday.

Also on Thursday a resident of Lhoksukon, Ibrahim, 35, survived a shooting by an unknown man. In North Aceh, a 10-year-old girl, Ainol Mardhiah, was hurt when a grenade was thrown at Samudra Police Station. Police said unidentified man threw the grenade as the girl played in the station's yard.

9 policemen, 3 civilians wounded in Irian Jaya riot

Jakarta -- Nine policemen were injured and three residents suffered gunshot wounds when police opened fire during a riot in a town in Indonesia's easternmost province of Irian Jaya, a report said Thursday.

Some 400 residents of Merauke, many armed with primitive weapons, went on the rampage in the town Wednesday, vandalizing the local state radio station and pelting a local police office with stones, the daily Kompas newspaper said.

A total of nine policemen were wounded when several of the protestors stabbed them with sharp weapons in two separate attacks, Kompas said. Troops opened fire to try to disperse the protestors, wounding three residents who were later listed in serious condition, it said.

The riot was triggered by protesters who ran amok after a rally outside the city's parliament building to demand that officials to stop promoting a government autonomy proposal.

Irian Jaya police chief, Brigadier General S.Y. Wenas, was quoted by the newspaper as saying that police had no choice other than to open fire to stop the mob from going berzerk. "Therefore we have to take stern action by firing towards the crowds ... one of them was shot in the stomach ... and then they became more brutal," Wenas said.

Earlier reports received from Merauke Wednesday had said three people were injured in the riot. Police in the area could not be reached by telephone.

[On February 17, the Jakarta Post reported that according to the Institute of Human Rights Studies and Advocacy, an 18 year- old high-school student, Paskalis Betayob, was killed in the clash. One of the institute's executives, Aloysius Renwarin, said he died of gunshot wounds in the back and chest. Please have yet to confirm the death - James Balowski.]

`Suspect went missing to thwart investigation'

Jakarta -- The independent commission on rights abuse in Aceh has suggested that the disappearance of a key suspect in an alleged massacre in the province, was engineered to conceal the identity of the "intellectual perpetrators" of the violence.

"It is too obvious not to believe the disappearance is politically engineered. A particular institution clearly wants to hamper the investigation," said Rosita Noer secretary to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Violence in Aceh.

Speaking at a media briefing here on Tuesday, Rosita would not elaborate when asked which institution she meant. "We all know who it is," she remarked. "Sudjono is the material witness to the killings and his presence at the trial can be used to find the intellectual engineers behind the violence," Rosita added.

Lt. Col. Sudjono, intelligence chief at the Lhokseumawe-based Lilawangsa Military Command, was officially declared a deserter on January 18 after failing to return to duty after being given permission to go on a two-week leave to his hometown in West Java.

Sudjono is among 20 military and civilians to stand trial for the Bantaqiah killings which occurred in the Beutong area in Aceh in July when soldiers allegedly shot dead religious teacher Tengku Bantaqiah, his wife, students and several farmers. The military claims that they were killed in an exchange of fire and were supporters of rebel groups in the province.

According to officials a joint military civilian court was due to commence this month to try the case. However the trial has now been hampered by Sudjono's disappearance. The case would have set a precedent as it was one of the five central cases of violence brought forward by the commission last year as evidence of rights abuses in Aceh.

The Indonesian Military (TNI) have repeatedly denied suggestions that they were involved in Sudjono's disappearance.

Commission chairman Amran Zamzami said it was too much of a coincidence for Sudjono simply to disappear after his name was implicated in the commission report. "His name has been included in our list [in the report] since September. After we pushed for trials, suddenly the Attorney General says Lt. Col. Sudjono is missing," Amran remarked.

Rosita added that after announcing its report, the commission proposed a witness protection program and close scrutiny of alleged suspects, but the government ignored the proposals. "We have worked hard and the investigation and evidence implicates Sudjono as a suspect so we demand the related institution find him," she said.

Recently, Attorney General Marzuki Darusman said the government will have to decide whether to proceed with the trial without Sudjono. The commission was formed in July 1999 to investigate numerous reports of human rights abuses in the restive province, most of whom were allegedly perpetrated by security forces.

Many observers see the uncovering of these abuses and eventual trial as the first step to healing the wounds from riotous discontent in the province.

The commission also called on Monday for the government to show more concern in expediting the trials of alleged rights abuses in Aceh. "What we hear now is promises from the Attorney General and the military that the trials will begin soon. But till today, we've heard of no developments," Amran said. He said any attempt at reconciliation in Aceh [will fail] if these five cases are not sufficiently prosecuted.

The other four cases in question are: the rape of a woman in Pidie in 1996; the killing of seven people in Idi Cut in February; the fatal shooting of dozens of protesters in North Aceh in May; and the tortures between 1997 and 1998 in Rumah Geudong, Pidie. "It's already mid-February 2000 and we've been promised (a trial) since December 15," Amran said.

The commission revealed that it was in the final stages of an investigation of another five cases in Aceh. However they have decided to suspend further work till the government shows that it is serious in responding to them. "We've almost completed the inquiries, but we halted the work because we feel it's useless. The government doesn't seem to appreciate our work," Rosita said.

However, unlike the previous five, these cases include attacks on both civilians and security forces. They are -- the shooting of protesters in front of the South Aceh Police headquarters on Sept. 11, 1999; the shooting of civilians in front of Samadua Police Subprecinct in South Aceh on November 10, 1999; the attack on Mobile Police Brigade personnel at Gunung Geurutee on December 19, 1999 in Sajeun village in Aceh Besar and on December 20, 1999 in Mareuhum Daya village in West Aceh; the killing of military personnel on December 29, 1998, in Lhok Nibong, East Aceh; and the Peudada incident on May 25, 1999 in which a medical military team was killed in an ambush.

"We surely cannot continue with these five cases, if the government is not serious in following up with the ones we've completed," Rosita said.

Apart from the Sujdono case, there have also been questions surrounding the death of legislator Tengku Nashiruddin Daud, found dead earlier this month in Sibolangit, North Sumatra, reportedly after being abducted.

National Police Lt. Gen. Roesdihardjo said here on Tuesday that Julizar, described as a member of the Information Center for Aceh Referendum (SIRA), has been declared as a suspect in the murder.

But in Banda Aceh, the chief of SIRA's presidium, Muhammad Nazar, denied on Tuesday that Julizar was a member. "We will ask for further clarification from the police because their statement is nonsense," Nazar said, while stressing that Julizar is not a SIRA activist.

"He [Julizar] once participated in a SIRA congress in February last year as representative of the United Development Party (PPP)," Nazar recounted of the group's only connection with the suspect. Nazar claimed that police were merely "looking for a scapegoat" in naming the group.

House of Representatives Speaker Akbar Tandjung recently suggested that politics may be behind the Nashiruddin murder as he was a member of a House special commission tasked with the probe of past atrocities in Aceh.

Irianese's life expectancy only 40 years

Jakarta -- The life expectancy of the Irianese is about 40 years, the shortest among ethnic groups in Indonesia, due to malnutrition and a poor health service, a senior local official says.

"Reaching the age of 40, let alone 50, is an extraordinary divine reward," Decky Asmuruf, chief of the Irian Jaya provincial office for social affairs, told Antara in Jayapura last week. According to the United Nation's Development Program's (UNDP) 1999 Human Development Report, life expectancy in Indonesia as a whole is 65.1.

Asmuruf attributed the untimely deaths in Irian Jaya to widespread malnutrition and common chronic diseases like malaria, respiratory problems, tuberculosis, leprosy and skin diseases. Malnutrition and poor medical care are complicated problems for the cash-strapped Irian Jaya provincial government. Tribespeople living in isolated areas lack adequate health facilities. The life expectancy is also attributed to the high rates of infant and maternal mortality in indigenous peoples in the hinterland.

Asmuruf warned that unless the central government in Jakarta did something to reverse the situation, Irian Jaya would see its indigenous population shrink every year. The high mortality rate in Irian Jaya has resulted in an increasingly large number of orphan children. "Just imagine, with a population of only 2.3 million, Irian Jaya has 76,779 orphans," he said. "Most of the children live a miserable life because their parents died young." At present, the local government accommodates only 17,340 orphans in orphanages and with foster parents.

Statistics at the social affairs office show that Irian Jaya has 11,900 people with physical disabilities, 38,092 unemployed women and 2,720 prostitutes. "The unemployed women are mostly at their productive ages. It is feared that they will turn to prostitution if they cannot get employment," Asmuruf said.

Police, military chiefs among 3 dead in Aceh

Bandah Aceh -- A police chief, a military subdistrict chief and a policeman were shot dead by unknown gunmen today in the latest attacks on security officers in Indonesia's restive Aceh province, police said here.

Second Lieutenant Cut Ajad, the police chief of the Kluet Selatan subprecinct, was killed in an ambush by gunmen in the village of Pulo Ie while patrolling in a car, Aceh police spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Sayed Husaini was quoted as saying.

Two other police were injured in an exchnage of fire during the incident, Husaini said, adding one of the wounded had died later in hospital.

"The group were in Ayi village, about four kilometers from police headquarters, when the armed group opened fire," Husaini said. "Police chief Ajad died on the spot, and Sergeant Major Hayat died in hospital."

Gunmen struck again today shooting dead Captain Muhammad Lara, the head of the military command in Darul Imamah subdistrict early in the afternoon on the outskirts of the provincial capital of Banda Aceh, Lietenant Colonel Ira Suparmo of the local military command said. Lara had been on his way home to Paseu Beutong district, he said,

Yesterday Second Lieutenant Djamil Yahya, the head of Mutiara police subdistrict, was shot by an unidentified man when he was riding a motorcycle near a market in Pidie district, police said. All the victims Sunday and Monday were natives of Aceh, residents said.
 

Labour struggle

Workers demand better working conditions

February 11, 500 workers from clothing manufacturer PT Matahari Sentosa I in Bandung, West Java, staged a sit-in at the parliament building here. The workers, members of the militant Indonesian National Front for Labour Struggle (FNPBI) trade union, were demanding a 100% wage increase from their present daily pay of 7700 rupiah. This does not cover their living costs, which have increased more than 200% in recent months.

The day before, together with workers from Kahatex and Primatex in Bandung, West Java, the unionists protested at the local parliament building.

PT Matahari Sentosa I, one of Indonesia's largest garment factories, produces clothes for export to the United States, Europe and Australia. Among the workers other demands were the end of military and police involvement in the political system (the dual function of the military), that workers be allowed to join unions other than the government-approved All Indonesian Trade Unions (SPSI), and the abolition of racist discrimination on the job. The workers reported that promotions are given only to people based on their ethnic background.

The demand for the end of the dual functions of the military has arisen from the workers' daily experiences. Soldiers intimidate workers at the factory who gather for political and union discussions.

One worker at the Jakarta protest, Nasro, told Green Left Weekly: "In my work place, management hired police from the special mobile brigade [known as Brimob] to be field supervisors. In this way, the company can control the workers.

There is no way for us to talk to each other. We also have to face attacks [from them] whenever we try to `escape' from the factory to give solidarity to other workers on strike or to protest to government representatives or local parliamentarians."

Nasro also reported that police and members of the local military had intimidated workers not to leave for the Jakarta protest. Some workers were scared and did not leave.

The PT Matahari Sentosa I workers' struggle has been a prolonged one, with the first protests taking place a year ago. After a week-long strike that ended on February 23 last year, the company and workers signed two agreements that contained important improvements in working conditions, such as a Rp1000 meal allowance, the provision of transportation and uniforms, awards for diligent workers and the creation of a health and safety facility within one year. The agreements have yet to be implemented.

Leaders of the protest in Jakarta asked to meet members of the parliamentary commission which deals with labour issues. No commission members were prepared to meet the workers, except Yakob from Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), who is also chairperson of SPSI.

However, Yakob asked the workers to leave because it would be hard to get the company to negotiate. The workers then asked to speak to the minister of labour power. "I voted for PDI-P in the last election", one worker, Heri, said, "but a person like Yakob does not seriously support our struggle".
 

Human rights/law

Missing persons' reports flood rights office

Bandung -- The newly created Office of the State Minister of Human Rights Affairs has received some 3,000 reports of missing persons, most of them alleged abductions in Aceh, East Timor and Jakarta.

The office's third deputy, Asmar Oemar Saleh, said on Thursday the missing persons' reports were part of a total of 4,000 submitted to the office in the past three and a half months.

Speaking at a human rights seminar at Padjadjaran University, Asmar said there were restrictions on how his office could pursue investigation of the reports.

"Unfortunately, we haven't been able to cope with the reports as the government has not yet come up with a policy to handle cases of missing persons," Asmar said. "Moreover, most of the cases were quite vague and did not have clear leads." He said many of the disappearances occurred a long time ago.

"We haven't got any clear answers from both the governments of Soeharto and Habibie about these cases, which occurred during their tenure." To address the institutional problems and lack of legal instruments to tackle the reports, Asmar said the ministry would hold a symposium next month to gather opinions on policies to handle the missing persons' cases.

In a related development, the coordinator of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras), Munir, supported previous claims that the disappearance of Lt. Col. Sudjono, a suspect in a mass shooting in Aceh, occurred to "eliminate the link to his commanding officers". "Sudjono was supposed to be protected as a key suspect and witness by the Indonesian Military (TNI) commander and the attorney general. But now they don't know his whereabouts. It's utterly puzzling.

"The authorities must take responsibility and take concrete steps. Don't just say that he deserted." He added that Kontras was also ready to provide legal counsel to Sudjono's family because he presumably "went missing against his will".

Munir said several Kontras activists were searching for Sudjono in cities such as Banda Aceh, Medan and ones in West Java, but to no avail. Munir contended that Sudjono should be termed a "key witness" rather than a "suspect" because his actions resulted from orders from his commanders.

Sudjono was allegedly involved in the shooting death of religious teacher Tengku Bantaqiah, his wife, his students and dozens of farmers last year. A government-sanctioned inquiry in December concluded they were killed by soldiers.

Munir conceded that in processing and uncovering human rights cases, priority was given to cases with higher political or public visibility. "East Timor has the top priority because it concerns the fate of high-ranking officers threatened with a military tribunal. While Aceh does not have such urgency."
 

News & issues

Protest rally at Jakarta airport

Tangerang -- Traffic heading to and from the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport here was blocked for at least three hours on Saturday afternoon by some 300 angry protesters, causing delays of several international and domestic flights.

None of the protesters, believed to have been upset after being banned from running illegal businesses at the airport, were arrested by the police. Tangerang Police chief Lt. Col. Pudji Hartanto Iskandar said four of them, identified as Udin, Basuki, Soleh, and Rubiah, were only questioned.

Airport records showed that the delayed international flights included those leaving for Hong Kong, Riyadh, Singapore, and Taipei. The domestic ones included those with end-point destinations of Padang in West Sumatra, Pekanbaru in Riau, Pontianak in West Kalimantan and Semarang in Central Java.

Witnesses said that the protesters, mostly residents living near the vast airport complex, started to occupy the entrance gate outside the airport's premises at the toll road to Jakarta, from midday until 4pm. They allowed no vehicles, including the Damri airport buses, to pass through, causing a traffic jam kilometers in length.

A couple, who witnessed the blockade, said that some of the vehicles, whose drivers decided to pass through, were pelted by stones. But officer Pudji insisted that no such incident happened during the protesters' barricade. He said the people finally dispersed after police threatened repressive action against them.

Detik.com reported that the protesters stopped the blockade and abruptly sprinted to different directions after witnessing the arrival of a troop of the police elite Mobile Brigade.

When asked about the protesters' demands, the officer refused to comment, saying that his duty was to keep the airport safe. "You should contact the officials of Angkasa Pura II [the airport operator] as it was their internal affair," he said, Head of the airport operator branch, Arifin Razak, was unable to be reached and no company officials were willing to give comments.

However, a well-informed police officer at the scene said it was an old dispute between the company and the local residents. "The residents protested Angkasa Pura's recent raid against them and their business at the airport premises in which they were driven from the airport compound," the officer said under the condition of anonymity.

The residents, he said, usually flock the airport to work as unofficial parking attendants, car washers, and food sellers. The airport authorities, he added, had to finally ban these people following complaints from many passengers. It has been reported in the press on several occasions that the illegal workers often forced people to use and pay for their service.

After disbursing them the first time, Angkasa Pura allowed them back to their businesses and even distributed free T-shirts to them after the residents pledged to organize themselves.

Once, the firm also offered some amount of money and vocational training for the residents to start small-scale businesses instead of working in the airport. "But it seemed that the residents prefer fast money instead of having their own businesses," he added. When conditions returned again to a state of disorder, the company decided to expel all of them.

Passengers at the international airport had long complained about the presence of the people, as they often caused discomfort. The airport is also noted for the crowd of unauthorized people who act as ticket agents and brokers for unlicensed taxis, often following the passengers, particularly women.

Annan winds up a protest- peppered visit

Jakarta -- UN Secretary General Kofi Annan wound up a protest- peppered, two-day visit to Indonesia Wednesday urging the government not to use force against separatist rebels and warning Jakarta to bring East Timor rights abusers to trial or face UN action.

Annan was scheduled to head early Thursday to East Timor, on what UN staff there have described as an intensely personally- important trip for the man instrumental in sanctioning the dispatch of UN troops there.

His last appointment in Jakarta was a dinner at the palace with President Abdurrahman Wahid, Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri and senior cabinet ministers.

In a back-breaking schedule involving calls on ministers, human rights bodies, and the president, Annan's message remained the same -- Indonesia must bring those responsible for the wave of murder, arson and forced deportations in East Timor to trial. And if it does not, the UN Security Council will move to set up an international war crimes tribunal.

Not all Indonesians were happy with the message. A small but vocal group of 15 protestors dogged Annan as he visited the headquarters of the National Human Rights Commission headquarters, where some 75 police stood guard.

Shouting for him stop "playing Rambo," the 15 students, from the nationalist Forum for Upholding the Nation's Sovereignty stood behind a banner reading "We're happy you came to Indonesia, but we'd rather you were back in New York." Waving a placard showing Annan as a Rambo figure with the slogan "America's ally," they said Indonesia had the right to defend its own country and accused the rights commission of "prosecuting people who are innocent."

A special team from the commission has recommended the attorney general's office here probe 33 people, including six top generals, for last year's atrocities in East Timor.

After meeting Wahid earlier, Annan warned the Security Council would have the right to convene an international war crimes tribunal if those guilty of involvement in the East Timor violence were not tried in Indonesia. It was the bluntest statement yet made here by Annan, who has so far praised Jakarta's efforts to investigate the violence. "Of course if that doesn't happen the council has the right to refer it to [an international tribunal]," he said. "We are all aware that the government has begun a judicial process to make [sure] ... those who are responsible for the violence are brought to justice and I think that process is taking its course," he said.

In a speech later to the Indonesian Council of World Affairs Annan sought to allay fears that the United Nations was pro- separatist.

He also urged Jakarta to forsake the use of force against two virulent separatist movements in the provinces of Irian Jaya and Aceh. "It may well feel to some of you as if Indonesia's very existence is under attack from covert forces which believe the country is too large, and want to break it up," Annan said. But separatist movements "are political problems, and as such ... require political solutions."

Since East Timor gained independence from Indonesia last year through a UN-organized ballot, Jakarta has been adamant it will not bow to the demands of separatists in Irian Jaya and Aceh.

On Tuesday police violently broke up a crowd pelting the UN mission here with eggs and tomatoes, blaming Annan for the loss of East Timor. The same day police blocked two busloads of Irian Jayans, trying to reach Annan to ask for help in their separatist cause, and on Wednesday some 100 Acehnese students asked his help to talk to the government to halt the violence there.

In a petition to Annan, the protestors urged the UN to send a task force to Aceh to establish a "relief zone" -- an area declared free of intervention by both the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian military.

A decade of harsh military crackdowns against the rebels left 5,000 children orphaned and 2,000 women widowed in Aceh, a staunchly Muslim province on the northern tip of Sumatra island.

"Please do not think ... the United Nations is predisposed in favour of separatism, or that its purpose is to break up large states into smaller ones. On the contrary, the purpose of the United Nations is to enable peoples to live together without conflict," he said.

Wiranto turns radio DJ day after suspension

Jakarta -- A day after he was removed as senior government minister, Gen. Wiranto dropped into a popular Jakarta radio station and became their disc jockey for more than an hour, news reports said Wednesday.

The former military chief, an avid karaoke singer who recently listed his hobbies as music and body building, flirted on the phone with a local movie star and played several rock 'n' roll songs on Radio M97-FM, Kompas newspaper reported. "I was just driving around and thought I'd stop by," Wiranto reportedly told listeners after coming on air on Tuesday.

The four-star general's music tastes run to classic rock, Queen, Led Zeppelin and Jimi Hendrix. Indonesia's President Abdurrahman Wahid suspended Wiranto from his Cabinet on Monday. Wahid said he wanted the four-star general to have time to concentrate on defending himself in the face of allegations that he, as Indonesia's military chief when pro-Jakarta militias went on a violent rampage in East Timor last year, should be held accountable for the murder and destruction.

"I am well, no problem," Wiranto said, responding to a listener who asked him how he was after being suspended. "I think the problem will be resolved."

At the height of the violence in East Timor in September last year, Wiranto publicly sang Feelings, the 1975 hit popularized by Paul Williams.

Radio M97-FM's program director Ella Suid said the station, which specializes in oldies, was shocked when Wiranto arrived unannounced. "He was not invited, he just came," she said. "We then invited him to be a guest on the talk show program but he wanted to do it all himself."

Wiranto's radio debut came amid market rumors that he wasn't satisfied with being ousted from the Cabinet. Rumors that there would be some form of reaction from the military weighed on Jakarta stocks and the rupiah Wednesday, despite the fact that senior military and government officials have repeatedly dismissed any chance of a coup or other form of concerted military action against the government.

Probe on PDI HQs attack to take 3 months

Jakarta -- National Police chief Lt. Gen. Rusdihardjo vowed on Tuesday that the police would take up to three months, to complete an investigation into the July 27, 1996 bloody takeover of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) headquarters.

"We have started the investigation and we hope to finish it in three months," Rusdihardjo said in a hearing with the House of Representatives Commission I for defense and security, foreign affairs, information, and legal affairs.

The police, he said, were now collecting new evidence in connection with the bloody incident at the party's headquarters on Jl. Diponegoro, Central Jakarta, on July 27, 1996. The takeover was conducted by the party's splinter group led by Soerjadi, which was backed by elements in the former Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI).

The takeover triggered the sympathy of residents throughout the city, many becoming involved in massive unrest in support of then party chairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri. The unrest resulted in the deaths of at least five people and injury to 149 others. Meanwhile, 23 people caught in the midst of the incident are still missing.

Rusdihardjo's statement was made in response to comments made by legislator A. Effendy Choirie of the National Awakening Party (PKB), who asked the police chief to give a deadline for completion of the investigation. "The police must be able resolve this case, and not follow the steps of the former police chief, who only spoke and never showed any results," Effendy told reporters after the hearing.

Separately, the National Police on Tuesday morning called a closed meeting of National Police detectives and intelligence officers, to decide which civilians and police officers would be summoned.

The meeting was led by assistant to National Police chief for intelligence affairs, Maj. Gen. Guntur Sumastopo. "We should have the complete list by Wednesday latest. So far, it includes the names of (former Central Jakarta police chief) Col. Aboebakar Nataprawira, (former Jakarta Police chief) Maj. Gen. Hamami Nata, (former National Police chief) Gen. Dibyo Widodo and (former PDI secretary-general) Buttu R. Hutapea," Col. Saleh Saaf of the National Police information department told The Jakarta Post.

Saleh refused to comment on whether the list would include the names of former city military commander, Governor Sutiyoso, a retired lieutenant general who opted for civilian status, and former ABRI chief of social and political affairs Lt. Syarwan Hamid, who is a retired lieutenant general. "We'll see later... let's not discuss them now," Saleh said.

Following the takeover, Megawati established the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) and won last year's General Elections with 34 percent of total votes.

The demand to reopen the 27 July case was triggered by President Abdurrahman Wahid's statement on former minister of defense and security/Indonesian Armed Forces commander Gen. (ret.) Feisal Tanjung, whom he accused as the one responsible for the takeover. Earlier, Abdurrahman said that Feisal tried "to eliminate" him as chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama Muslim organization, and Megawati as the party chairwoman. Feisal has denied the accusations, but admitted that TNI had financed the PDI congress in Medan, North Sumatra, two months before the takeover.

The 1996 government-sponsored PDI congress in the North Sumatra capital of Medan named Soerjadi as the party's chairman, replacing Megawati, who was said to be incapable of solving the party's internal problems.

This led to the July 27 takeover of PDI headquarters, which was still occupied by Megawati and her supporters. Like the ongoing investigation of the 27 July incident, legislator Effendy said that deadlines were also needed for ongoing investigations into the murders of labor activist Marsinah in Surabaya, East Java, and the Yogyakarta-based journalist, Muhammad Syafruddin alias Udin.

Victor is a victim in liberty's triumph

Seth Mydans, Jakarta -- In the nearly two years since Indonesia's strongman, Suharto, stepped down in May 1998, it is the press that has been the most free, and the most tumultuous, of Indonesia's institutions. It has been the fundamental underpinning for the continuing move toward a democratic society.

But in some ways today it is also a victim, not just a protagonist, in the liberation -- and disorder -- it has helped unleash. Its condition reveals a lot about the chaotic freedoms of the new Indonesia, where the harsh hand of the dictator has often given way to the unpredictable passions of the mob.

In many arenas the rules that governed, and often stifled, the nation have been eased or removed or simply ignored. As a result -- as in many newly liberated nations -- Indonesia's road from repression to democracy is wild and uncertain.

This week, the focus of change is on the military, with President Abdurrahman Wahid returning Sunday from a foreign trip to confront his most prominent general, Wiranto, who has so far refused the president's demand to resign.

The general, accused of human rights abuses, represents the old guard that, under Suharto, saw itself as standard bearer and enforcer of a top-down regime known for corruption, repression, and the silencing of dissent.

Since Suharto's fall, the military has been retreating under the pressure of a popular demand for civilian rule. But its new weakness in the eyes of society comes with a social cost: It has contributed to the uncertainties and instabilities the nation faces.

"At the present moment," said Susanto Pudjosumatono, chief editor of the daily Jakarta Post, "who cares about the law? Street justice is the order of the day. Mobs deal with thieves and burglars. Police are caught red-handed as burglars. Villagers loot estates. Communal conflicts are flaring. People resort to violence to settle disputes."

This is the arena in which the press now operates. Freed of the fear of arrest or the closure of their newspapers, editors no longer censor themselves to please authorities. But self- censorship is alive among editors of newspapers both big and small. It is the mob they fear.

When Christian churches were burned on the island of Lombok recently, one newspaper, sidestepping the religious conflict, declined to identify them, calling them blandly "houses of worship."

When mobs demonstrated in the eastern Indonesian city of Ujungpandang late last year, local editors said they refrained from revealing the instigators for fear that the mobs would turn on them as well.

In the central Javanese city of Solo, the most devastated city in the huge riots of early 1998, armed thugs have threatened reporters in their newsroom.

Even in the capital, Jakarta, not long ago, a mob protested outside the offices of Tempo, the nation's leading magazine, vandalizing vehicles.

Clear and professional reporting can be the most difficult in the places where it is most needed, places like Ambon and Aceh where separatist or communal conflicts threaten to touch off a nationwide backlash.

Bambang Harimukti, the editor of Tempo, said that to assure that his reports are complete and unbiased he must consider sending in non-local staff members who leave the area as soon as their reporting is done. "It is not the authorities wielding their power who are the biggest threat anymore," Susanto said. "Now the clear and present danger comes from the people."

In this unstable arena, the press has played a crucial role in keeping the country's political and social evolution more or less on course. As an independent institution, its reforms came quickly, leading the way into a new atmosphere of openness. "With all the changes we've seen, the press is perhaps Indonesia's most transformed institution," said Warief Djajanto, an executive at the Indonesian news agency, Antara.

In the first 18 months after Suharto stepped down, 1,500 press licenses were issued by the liberal-minded new minister of information, Yunus Yosfiah. Then, under a new press law passed last fall, the requirement for licenses was abolished. Nobody knows now how many newspapers and radio stations have joined the babble around the nation, but they have contributed to a brand new sense that anything goes.

The best of the newspapers offer serious political reporting and analysis, investigations of corruption and military abuses, high-stakes policy debates and fundamental explorations of new directions for Indonesia.

But with so many new outlets, the country suffers from a crippling shortage of trained journalists and much of what is printed and aired lacks fundamental elements of accuracy and fairness.

With so few resources, some small newspapers do not even pay their reporters. They simply issue them press cards and leave them to seek whatever fees and payoffs they can earn from their sources. "When we organize training for young reporters, many lack professionalism both in journalistic competence and in ethical competence," Susanto said.

Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono, in a recent interview, complained of widespread tabloid journalism. "We have a vigorous press but it is often a vigorous and irresponsible press," he said. "A lot of hopes have been placed in the press but I don't think these hopes have been fulfilled."

Perhaps those hopes were too high at this early stage. Without the free press, flawed as it is, Indonesia might have made far less progress than it has.

When Suharto was president, just about every institution in Indonesia had one thing in common: from the courts to the bureaucracy to the military to the press, they were tailored to serve his interests. When he departed, he left intact a venal and self-serving legislature, a power-hungry military and a thoroughgoing culture of corruption that, without the pressure of an overwhelming popular will, might well have reverted to their old ways.

They never had a chance. Suddenly, political talk shows filled the airwaves, an unfiltered puree of wisdom and nonsense. But at their heart was a powerful momentum for change.
 

Environment/health

Big names probed over forestry funds

Jakarta -- A team of seven prosecutors from the Attorney General's Office are investigating the alleged misuse of reforestation funds by five major figures linked to former president Soeharto.

Minister of Forestry and Plantations Nur Mahmudi Isma'il said on Wednesday the misuse of reforestation funds totaling some Rp 784 billion reportedly involved the former president's close friend Mohamad "Bob" Hasan, his eldest daugther Siti Hardijanti "Tutut" Rukmana, his half brother Probosutedjo and his other friends Prajogo Pangestu and Ibrahim Risjad.

"The prosecutors will prove the allegations and decide whether the culprits should be charged under criminal or civil law," he said on the sidelines of a hearing with House of Representatives Commission III for agriculture and food affairs.

The report said Prajogo and Soeharto's eldest daughter Tutut, who controlled some stakes at industrial forest estate developer PT Musi Hutan Persada in South Sumatra, had allegedly manipulated particular documents regarding the size of the company's 193,500 hectares in order to obtain more reforestation funds. Prajogo and Tutut allegedly misused about Rp 346.87 billion of reforestation funds.

The report alleged that Probosutedjo was given special treatment by then president Soeharto and the minister of state secretary in obtaining more reforestation funds. Probosutedjo allegedly manipulated some Rp 144.40 billion of reforestation funds he received through his industrial forest owner PT Menara Hutan Buana, which controls about 268,885 hectares of area in South Kalimantan.

The report also alleged that Soeharto's golf buddy, Mohamad "Bob" Hasan, had allegedly misused Rp 207.81 billion in reforestation funds he received for his industrial forest estate PT Surya Hutani Jaya.

Businessman Ibrahim Risjad allegedly used the reforestation funds of Rp 85.36 billion assigned by the government for his industrial forest developer PT Aceh Nusa Indrapuri to, among other things, purchase space at the Menara Batavia building, according to the report.

Developers of industrial forest estates are allowed to obtain reforestation funds from the government to finance their forestry projects as cheap loans. But many used the funds for other business purposes and some even marked up the size of their estates to get larger funds. Nur Mahmudi said that in line with the ministry's commitment to curb corruption and other misconduct in the forestry sector his office had temporarily suspended 46 forest concession contracts due to alleged flawed documents and improper management by the logging operations. "They may resume operation after our investigation has proven that they did not violate any regulations," he said.

Nur Mahmudi added that his office had also considered investigating plantation firm PT Tanjung Lingga in Central Kalimantan, which is owned by Abdul Rasyid, a member of the People's Consultative Assembly, over allegations of illegal logging. "Illegal logging practices have definitely taken place in the plantation area. We have received some reports about it. But we have to prove it first before making any decisions," he said.

The management of Tanjung Lingga was recently accused by local environmental group Telapak Indonesia for threatening its director Ruwindrijarto and an expert from the Environmental Investigation Agency, Faith Brunskill, during their visit to the plantation area in January. Tanjung Lingga's Abdul Rasyid has strongly denied the accusation and has instead charged the two environmentalists with trespassing on his property.
 

Arms/armed forces

US resumes training army officers

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Jakarta -- The Defense Department has quietly resumed training Indonesian military officers in the United States, restoring one element of its relationship with Indonesia that was suspended last year after Indonesian soldiers participated in the violence that engulfed East Timor.

The training program is small, involving only seven Indonesian officers. But US officials said it was restarted without fanfare to avoid criticism on Capitol Hill and among human rights groups, which argue that Indonesian government-supported militias are still discouraging refugees from returning to newly independent minded East Timor.

US officials stressed that they have not resumed full military-to-military relations and warned that the training program will not be continued if the Indonesian military does not actively deal with the refugee problem and other issues.

Nevertheless, US officials said they are heartened by Indonesia's efforts to reform its armed forces since the country's first democratically elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid, took office in October.

The country now has a civilian defense minister, a respected former academic who is trying to ferret out corruption and extricate the military from politics. The government also is investigating dozens of military officers -- including the now- suspended armed forces chief, Gen. Wiranto -- for human rights abuses in East Timor. The attorney general this week promised suspects will be brought to trial within three months. "There have been some very positive strides," said a US official here. "The determination was made that this would be a good first step."

The official said the training program was not resumed as a quid pro quo for specific Indonesian military reforms. But Washington has been pleased with many of the changes -- particularly Wahid's decision this week to suspend Wiranto during the human rights investigation -- and is hoping resumption of training will serve as an incentive to follow through with other reforms.

Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono said in an interview that cooperation with the United States will help his efforts to change the Indonesian military. "We need all of this management training," Juwono said. "We are trying to become a people's army that respects civilian control."

Political analysts had feared that Wahid's effort to suspend Wiranto might result in a military backlash and possibly a coup d'etat. But many top armed forces officers publicly threw their support behind the president.

Juwono said the "principle of civilian control" now is "firmly entrenched" among soldiers. But he worried that "the substance of it still has to be worked out." "Our civil society is still very weak," he said.

The country's 500,000-strong armed forces has long boasted a "dual function" role in Indonesian society, involving itself in virtually every aspect of political and business life. The military, for instance, had been allotted a number of seats in parliament and certain top civil-service posts, and it has been involved in a vast array of business ventures from construction to pharmaceutical and textile production.

Juwono said he will soon begin to thin the ranks of senior generals and promote junior officers committed to civilian military leadership. "I've told my generals that the party's over," he said.

The violence in East Timor, which was prompted by the territory's overwhelming vote in August to separate from Indonesia, led the US government to suspend arms sales and all military-to-military contacts. At the time, 18 Indonesian military officers were in the United States participating in the International Military Education and Training Program.

Eleven of them returned to Indonesia, but seven had been staying in the United States, waiting to resume classes. The officers went back to their classes in mid-January.

Military's role in economy will be hard to reduce

Jakarta -- It will much longer to reduce the Indonesian military's influence on the economy than on politics or government, an observer said.

"Stopping the military's role in the legislative body or the cabinet is now feasible. But stopping [it] in the economic field will take a longer time," Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, a researcher from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), said Wednesday.

Speaking in a discussion organized by the Study-Action Forum for Indonesian Democracy, Ikrar questioned the military's businesses through various foundations and cooperatives. "Most of the businesses are no longer directed to step up the welfare of the military personnel, but dedicated to the affluence of some generals," he noted.

According to him, the Indonesian military's involvement in business began during the reign of Soekarno and came to dominance during the three decades of Soeharto's rule.

During the process of nationalization of big businesses left behind by the Dutch colonial rule in 1956-57, Ikrar said, there had been fierce competition for assets control between the military and the then Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

President Soekarno finally allowed military, particularly the Army, to manage a few business establishments. It was during this time that the military started to invite Chinese businessmen to cooperate in managing the businesses.

Following the ascent of Soeharto to power, the military got a greater opportunity in business. Chinese businessmen then sought cooperation individually, and some generals became backers to various business undertakings. "The generals' involvement in business is still going on," he said.

According to Ikrar, the state would need the right plan if it were to eliminate the military's role in business. "The civilian circle should be willing to negotiate with the military about appropriate compensation if the latter is to relinquish its control over all business assets," Ikrar said.

Under attack at home, military reels

Seth Mydans, Jakarta -- Perhaps the most telling insult to Indonesia's armed forces, people here say, is that mothers no longer encourage their daughters to marry a military man.

"They used to tell us: 'Marry a soldier. You'll have money and prestige,'" said a young woman who recently graduated from college. "Now not so much. We are all hearing too many bad things about the military."

From the earliest years of the nation, half a century ago, there was no prouder profession in Indonesia than to be a member of the military, a "son of the revolution" and "guardian of the nation." Manipulated by former President Suharto into a mainstay of his 32 years of rule, the armed forces became Indonesia's most powerful and privileged institution, effectively running the country, from small villages to major government ministries.

And in the service of the president, as well as their own personal and economic interests, they employed the force of arms with impunity. As the joke had it, if someone steps on your toe in the bus, you say to him: "Are you a member of the military? If not, please get off my toe."

The shift in popular perception has been swift. With the forced resignation of Mr. Suharto nearly two years ago and the powerful momentum of a nationwide reform movement, the military is retreating in disarray from its commanding position in society. And like any cornered fighter, some officers are snarling in dangerous defiance.

On Sunday, President Abdurrahman Wahid is to return from a two-week foreign trip during which the country's most prominent general, Wiranto, refused his demand to resign as coordinating minister for security affairs. The general's defiance touched off rumors of a coup. And while that now seems unlikely -- with the general and the president expected to talk out the situation face-to-face -- the resistance of parts of the military to civilian command is now an open issue.

The humiliation of a once-proud -- once-arrogant -- institution poses serious risks for Indonesia. A scattered and fractious archipelago of 210 million people, it has relied on its armed force of 350,000, rather than on democratic processes, to maintain national unity.

More than ever today, many political analysts agree, there is a need for security forces to calm the explosions of religious and ethnic conflict that have spread in this time of national transition and weak central government.

While the current military may not be able to play that role, it also cannot be recreated or pushed out of public life overnight. "It's dangerous to ask the military to completely withdraw from the political arena," said Amien Rais, the speaker of Parliament, who has been an advocate of military reform. "We must give it time."

With its top generals branded war criminals abroad and facing human rights investigations at home, with the president taunting restive officers as "cowards," and with the history of their abuses literally being exhumed from mass graves, Indonesia's military is at its lowest point. "In the country's contemporary history the military has never been so humiliated and disrespected by civilians," said Hermawan Sulistyo, a political commentator.

While some officers remain defiant, some are offering elaborate statements of contrition. "I would like to apologize for past military violence and I call on the people to stop condemning the military," Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, a regional commander, said recently. "Give us a chance to restore our image and if necessary troops who are used to the practices of the past regime will have to be brainwashed."

Indeed, the gap between generals like this and the poorly trained, poorly paid soldiers they command is a deep one, said Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a political analyst who was a top aide to former President B. J. Habibie. "Most of the people on the ground have a very narrow interpretation of nationalism," she said. "For a lot of them, nationalism means going around with a red-and- white band around their head and doing horrible things to people." Red and white are the colors of the Indonesian flag.

Many other officers express bewilderment, said Salim Said, a prominent expert on military affairs. Criticized from all sides for doing what they believed to be their job, pressed to withdraw from politics without a thank you, they now are uncertain of their mission.

Oddly, he said, little has been done legislatively to redefine the proper role of the military; the institution has been expected to create its own reforms. "I had dinner with a general last night," Mr. Salim said, "and he told me: 'What is important for us is the confidence to do our job. We need to know what is allowed and what is not allowed today. Because we do not want to end up like our superiors who were doing their jobs in East Timor and then were accused of human rights violations.' "

Allegations of military abuses in East Timor are at the heart of the military's problems today, although they are not the first or the only arena in which the military faces criticism.

Last week, separate investigations by an Indonesian government panel and by the United Nations found five top generals -- including General Wiranto -- at fault for the violence and destruction that followed East Timor's vote for independence from Indonesia last August.

Mr. Wahid immediately called on General Wiranto to resign. The general says he wants to make his case directly to the president before deciding what to do, and the president has begun to talk vaguely about promising him an eventual pardon if he is tried and convicted of war crimes.

But looking around them as they face this challenge from a newly confident civilian government, military officers have found few expressions of public support.

What is most dangerous, say some local analysts, is the possibility of a backlash by at least some elements of the military as they realize how isolated they have become and see their economic power and social privileges threatened.

Indeed, many analysts believe that disaffected officers may be instigating much of the current unrest in an attempt to preserve their local power or destabilize the central government.

And yet, unpopular as it may have become, the military remains an essential fixture in Indonesian society. Juwono Sudarsono, a major symbol of reform as the country's first civilian defense minister in 40 years, noted recently that the civilian government was still not ready to take over the broad political and administrative functions the military has performed.

In an interview, he called the armed forces "the most organized, or at least the least disorganized, of all the disorganized elements in society." Earlier, he warned publicly: "If civilian leaders are not able to develop a healthy and independent political life, then we will sooner or later return to a military-dominated role just like in Pakistan and some African states. "So objectively, as an observer and not as a minister, I have to say that at least for the next 10 years turmoil is still unavoidable here, although it would not be as frequent and severe as we expected."

Even with the constitutional and legal status of the military still unchanged and its powerful regional commands still exercising local control, its influence has been steadily whittled away over the last year or more.

Its parliamentary voting bloc has been cut in half, to 38 seats. Its abuses in the provinces of Aceh, Irian Jaya and elsewhere have come under investigation, along with its role in political killings and kidnappings here in Jakarta.

And Mr. Wahid has acted to undercut to power of the most politically aggressive service, the army, by appointing naval and air force officers to a number of key posts, including the armed forces chief of staff.

In a move three weeks ago that crystallized the shifting balance of power, Mr. Wahid fired the military's spokesman, Major General Sudrajat, who had frequently been critical of his policies.

In one of his last, injudicious statements, the general had posed what seemed to be a direct challenge to civilian authority, asserting that the president "does not have the right to interfere in the affairs of the military."
 

Economy & investment

Total of 72 banks suffered losses in 1999

Jakarta -- A total of 72 national banks suffered combined losses of Rp38.7 trillion (US$5.5 billion) last year, while 92 others managed to register profit, a study said.

The study conducted by the research bureau of Infobank magazine on 164 national banks, a copy of which was made available on Thursday, suggested the loss was lower than the previous year's Rp62.49 trillion.

By September 1999, among the banks suffering the greatest loss were those taken over by the government or joining the recapitalization program. They were Bank Niaga (JSX:BNGA), Bank Danamon (JSX:BDMN), Bank Duta, BII (JSX:BNII), Lippo Bank (JSX:LPBN), Bank Universal (JSX:BUNV) and state banks Bank Mandiri, BTN and BNI (JSX:BBNI).

Despite the losses, most of the banks saw improved profitability last year. Infobank noted there were two factors enabling the banks to keep their losses down.

First, some of the large banks had recovered from the so-called "negative spread" disease following the central bank's decision to lower interest on time deposits from January to September 1999. Second, the policy to restructure banking credits had in stages improved the quality of credits. It also noted most of the banks that posted big profit last year had low cost of fund.

In terms of balance sheets, most of the banks saw remarkable expansion of assets. The banking sector's assets grew by 29.69 percent to Rp812.13 trillion. The same also applied to the public fund which rose by 33.11 percent to Rp768.155 trillion. The banks also saw improvement in their capital. By September 1999, a total of 13 national banks had capital adequacy ratio (CAR) below 4 percent.

Infobank predicted until the middle of this year banks with low cost of fund would have the greater chance to make large profit because they would continue to speculate in Bank Indonesia's short-term promissory notes (SBI). They were also expected to extend credits to the consumer loan sector and the medium-and small-sized trade sector.

Indonesia economy records growth

Jakarta -- Indonesia's economy grew 0.2 percent last year following its collapse during the 1998 Asian financial meltdown, according to statistics released Wednesday. The Central Statistics Bureau said the economy expanded 5.8 percent in the fourth quarter alone from a year ago. The economy grew 0.9 percent in the previous quarter. The economy's 14 percent decline in 1988 caused massive riots and public protests and led to the ouster Indonesia's longtime authoritarian leader Suharto.

The statistics bureau said 1999 economic growth was mainly driven by domestic consumption -- especially a 1.5 percent increase in household consumption and a 0.7 percent rise in government expenditure. It forecast the gross domestic product would grow by 4.0 percent in 2000.

Astra sell-off pilot role in debt war

Kate Linebaugh -- Indonesia's bank rescue agency (Ibra) inched nearer to recouping the cost of propping up the nation's lenders this week when it replaced management at the country's biggest car-maker, clearing the way for the agency to sell its 43 percent stake.

Once that sale -- expected to raise about US$500 million -- is completed, though, the two-year-old agency still has to find buyers for Bank Central Asia, Bank Danamon, Bank Bali, Bank Niaga and hundreds of lesser-known assets. And the job is only going to get tougher, analysts say.

Even if it gets top dollar for everything it controls, Ibra faces a quandary: a US$25 billion gap between the value of the assets and the recovery cost. That is a lot of money in a country where annual wages average less than US$1,000. "Where does the difference go?" said Ibra chairman Cacuk Sudarijanto. "That debt will never get paid."

Ibra was formed at the peak of Indonesia's financial crisis as the rupiah lost as much as four-fifths of its value and interest rates passed 70 percent. As the economy shrank 14 percent in 1998, Ibra took control of the assets of interconnected companies and banks in return for propping up failing lenders. If the nation's nascent economic recovery is to succeed, it must now restructure the banking industry.

So far, the bank rescue agency is on target to meet its asset- recovery target by 31 March, Mr Cacuk said. With the planned sale of Astra -- Lazard Asia Fund; Bhakti Investama, a publicly traded securities company linked to George Soros' Quantum Fund; a consortium of US investors led by Gilbert Global Equity and Newbridge Capital; and the Government of Singapore Investment Corp have expressed interest -- Ibra is selling its crown jewel.

The car-maker booked a profit of US$108 million last year, after two years of losses. The same cannot be said of the country's banks. Bad loans reached more than 80 percent of all loans at the height of the financial crisis and, with few exceptions, the lenders are still losing money.

Analysts say that will make it tough for Ibra, which has said it plans to raise US$400 million from selling Bank Central Asia, and also has an eight percent stake in First Pacific Co of Hong Kong. Meanwhile, Bank Mandiri, the country's largest bank, also hopes to raise US$1.5 billion through an initial share sale in August to repay the government for bailout funds.

Privatisations will help fund part of the recovery cost. For the new budget year to 31 December, the government wants to raise 5.9 trillion rupiah (HK$6.49 billion) this year selling state companies such as domestic call monopoly operator Telekomunikasi Indonesia and dominant international call operator Indosat.

Still, analysts believe the government will face a shortfall in the medium term when bonds the government issued to help recapitalise the banking industry begin maturing. And if it does not have enough cash to pay, many fear the government may simply print money to fill the gap.

"The question is how much money do they need to print in the end," said Qaisar Hasan, head of research at Jardine Fleming in Jakarta. In late 1997, Indonesia printed money to prop up its banking system, but most of that was then taken out of the country by the delinquent bank owners -- contributing to a surge in inflation to more than 80 percent in 1998.

Coupon payments on the government bonds are expected to cost 178 trillion rupiah -- almost the entire planned expenditure in this year's nine-month budget -- between now and 2004, on top of the 643 trillion rupiah cost of fixing the banks.

The government sold 282 trillion rupiah in bonds with maturities of up to ten years paying quarterly interest. More bonds will be sold this year for Bank Negara Indonesia, Bank Niaga, and two other state banks. That will bring the government's debt to 95 percent of its gross domestic product by the middle of the year.

Still, the newly independent central bank -- along with the International Monetary Fund -- are unlikely to agree to increasing the money supply.

The bonds could be refinanced on the country's fledgling domestic bond market, said Miranda Goeltom, Bank Indonesia deputy governor. That will work as long as it does not interfere with the government's target of reducing its debt to 60 percent of GDP by 2010. Whatever the long-term cost, Indonesia must begin selling assets to start paying for it immediately, said Kian Guntur at Nomura Securities in Jakarta. "If they can get Astra out of the system, hopefully it will trigger more interest," he said.