Democratic struggle

PRD statement on the 52nd anniversary of the 1945 revolution

Peoples Democratic Party - August 17, 1997

[The following is a translation of a statement sent to ASIET by the underground Peoples Democratic Party (PRD)]

Today, August 17, is an extremely important day in Indonesian history in the road towards freedom. Because today is the day of our nation's revolution of independence, exactly 52 years ago. The struggle to gain independence resulted in the loss of many of our heroes, especially those from the revolutionary groups. The struggle to free ourselves from Dutch colonialism and imperialism was shouldered by all groups and political parties of the nation: Nationalists, Communists, Moslems, Catholics, Christians, Social Democrats and others.

But exactly half a decade and two years after the independence of our nation, a great irony now exists. Our nation is no longer colonised by another country, but is now colonised by its own government, the New Order dictatorship of president Suharto. The sovereignty of the people, which was wrested at the cost of so many of our heroes, has now been taken away completely our own government.

The freedom of association and option which were previously denied by the colonists, have now been obliterated by our own government. Previously, freedom fighters were jailed and tortured by the colonising country, now they are tortured and jailed by our own government. Previously, the people were exploited and oppressed by the colonisers, now they are exploited and oppressed by the business cronies of the president himself.

What is of even more concern, is that those who struggled for this nation's independence were determined to abolish all forms of colonialism, as included in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution. Now the Indonesian government has become the colonialist by invading its neighbour, East Timor. Why then are we now commemorating independence day with such extravagance if we ourselves colonise and oppress our neighbours? Why do we celebrate freedom, when our government slaughters, oppresses and exploits its own people and those of our neighbours?

We firmly believe that the sovereignty of the people must be upheld! The freedom won by the August 17 revolution, which has now disappeared, taken away by the oppression of the New Order dictatorship, must be retaken. In this [task] the PRD are determined to mobilise the people to crush the New Order dictatorship and replace it with a peoples democratic coalition government.

Learning from the August 17 revolution, we are certain that the struggle to free the people from oppression must be shouldered by all political groups. The PRD has repeatedly called for, and tried clear the way for, the formation of a united front. A united front is a vehicle by which to unite the pro- democratic struggle in a joint program and platform. With a united front we will be able to mobilise the masses in large numbers to pierce the very heart of New Order's power.

The peoples' level of political consciousness is already high, anti-dictatorship sentiment has spread everywhere. This can be seen from the vigor of the peoples' resistance (1) since the July 27, 1996 crackdown: Situbondo, Tasikmalaya, Sangau Ledo, Samarinda, Jakarta, Bangkalan, Sampang, Jember and other places (2). The peoples' radicalisation has increased so quickly because of the increasing burden of oppression which they suffer, added to by the "heating up" of the political situation in the lead-up to the next session of the MPR (3) and the twilight years of president Suharto. The thing we regret is that the peoples' resistance has been categorised as a problem of SARA (4). The issue of SARA appeared because there was no political leadership from pro-democracy groups. Without leadership, the angry masses can be exploited by military agents to turn it into a SARA issue so that it is not directed towards the authorities. The masses are easily exploited by military agents because for 32 years they have been separated from the world of politics and do not know how to fight effectively.

In the future, our task should be to provide political leadership to the angry masses. [The task of] our leadership is not to end the riots, they cannot possibly be stopped by pro- democracy groups, or even the dictatorship's itself. Riots such as this are a part of the history whenever there is no democracy. Such riots as part of the course. With all of the democratic institutions shackled, manipulated and sterilized by the dictatorship, the people know no other way to struggle for their interests.

In March next year, the puppet session of the MPR will be held. This is a gimmick of the New Order to give the impression that it practices democracy. In reality, we all know that the MPR is no more that a puppet of Suharto. Only a small part of the MPR is chosen at the general elections – which [in themselves] are unfair and undemocratic – most members are appointed by the president himself. Manipulation has started even before the MPR session has begun, that is by appointing H. Harmoko, who is also the Golkar [state party] chair, as a "Minister of Special Affairs". The coming session of the MPR will not be about the sovereignty of the people, as pictured by the New Order regime, but only to maintain the power of Suharto and his reelection as president. Because of this we must reject the outcome of the MPR session! Reject the engineering of the MPR session! Reject the renomination of Suharto!

Apparently Suharto is aware that he will face increasingly difficult challenges as the MPR session approaches and after he is chosen again. These challenges have emerged from within the country in the form of the peoples' resistance and from international pressure which continually corners the dictatorship. We all know that resistance from within the country combined with the support of international solidarity is most effective in fighting the dictatorship.

In order to face this challenge, Suharto has already begun pressuring members of the DPR (5) and the MPR to reenact MPR regulation No. VI/1998, which legitimises him to carry out and enforce repressive regulations. Apparently the dictatorship has no other means to handle the social unrest except repression, even though it has been proven that repressive measures to handle social unrest are no longer effective.

This threat of repression must not make the democratic movement retreat, instead we should make it the impetus to increase our militancy and push us to find more sophisticated methods of resistance. Where ever and when ever struggles to free people from oppression have faced repression, the measure of the quality of the movement is whether or not we are able to maintain ourselves under such repression. A movement of such quality will have the strength to survive in this most repressive atmosphere. And we have already proved this, we have already passed the "smaller test" of the July 27 crackdown which did not destroy our movement. After July 27, the quality of our movement increased.

A final word. In reflecting on the August 17 revolution we can increase the quality and militancy of our struggle. A struggle which is radical, militant and disciplined, added to by unity between all of the pro-democracy groups, is the key to winning democracy. And there is something we must remember. The struggle to uphold democracy in Indonesia must be combined with the East Timorese struggle for self-determination. The struggle for democracy in Indonesia and the East Timorese struggle for self- determination face the same enemy, the New Order regime. Continue the struggle!

Translators notes:

1. The original term used was "pemberontakan". "Pembrontakan" is closer in meaning to "rebellion", "revolt", "uprising" or "mutiny" rather that resistance/struggle. In other sections of the text "pembrontakan" has been translated as "riot". These refer to locations of mass riots and/or violent confrontations with the authorities over the last year.

2. MPR: Mejalis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly. The highest legislative body in the country with 1,000 members, 425 of whom are elected with the remainder being appointed by the president. It meets once every five years (usually around a year after the general elections) to hear an outgoing report from the president, enact the Broad Outlines of State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN) and to vote on nominations for the president and vice-president. The next session of the MPR will be held in March 1998.

3. SARA: Suku, agama, ras dan antar golongan, An acronym meaning ethnic, religious, racial and inter-group conflicts. A loosely defined term with negative connotations, it is frequently used by the regime to describe conflicts which are deemed to threaten "national unity" or "stability" and are at odds with the state ideology of Pancasila and the concept of "unity in diversity".

4. DPR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Peoples Representative Assembly (Parliament). Consisting of 500 members, 425 elected from the three officially recognised political parties during the general elections: Golkar (the state party), the United Development Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party. The remaining 75 members are appointed by the president from the military (who are not allowed to vote).

[Translated by James Balowski]

Building a united front against the dictatorship

Info-Pembebasan (Liberation) - July 11, 1997

[The following is a translation of an interview between Mirah Mahardika. Coordinator, Central Leadership Committee, Peoples Democratic Party (KPP-PRD) and Pembebasan (Liberation)]

Organisational questions

Pembebasan (P): After a number of PRD members were arrested, the underground KPP-PRD (Komite Pimpinan Pusat-Partai Rakyat Demokratik) was formed. What is the organisational form of KPP- PRD?

Mirah Mahardika (M): KPP-PRD was formed on the instructions or a mandate from the PRD chair, Budiman Sudjatmiko. KPP-PRD is made up of three departments. The department of education and propaganda, which I head, the organisational department headed by Rizal Ampera and the department for coordinating our united front work headed by Siswa Ahmadi. Each department has members assigned according to their needs. The leadership of KPP-PRD is of a collective nature.

The existence of KPP-PRD does not nullify the central leadership of the PRD chosen at its congress. Our function is to run the activities of the party while the leadership is in jail and until a future PRD congress can be organised.

The regional PRD leadership is the City Leadership Committee (Komite Pimpinan Kota, (KPK). Like KPP, each KPK is also made up of three departments.

P: How many members does the PRD have at the moment?

M: I cannot reveal the actual number because this could be used to calculate our strength. However since we have gone underground, we have continued to recruit new members. Certainly since the July 27 crackdown there have members who have left, however the new members are far more radical and their courage rarely fails. Although the July 27 crackdown was a blow against our organisation, it also had a positive impact, that is to reveal which elements in the party were afraid and vacillating and those elements which were committed and radical. It was a selection process for the party. Those who were committed to the struggle stayed, while those who were afraid and vacillating, pulled back. This was very good for our organisation at this time.

New members that join are carefully chosen. Those that join are a selection, people who are fully aware of the risk involved in the struggle. Those who are afraid, opportunistic or unconvinced do not join.

P: Operating underground, how does the PRD get its program out to the people?

M: Operating underground means that we cannot be heard as widely [as before] though newspapers or mass actions. But we have other means to communicate with the masses. Every month, the PRD publishes the bulletin Pembebasan (Liberation), which is distributed underground and also via the internet, including the email news list Indonesia-l. KPP-PRD also regularly publishes Info-Pembebasan which is distributed on the internet. Large numbers of leaflets are also produced periodically.

P: What about the mass organisations affiliated with the PRD, such as SMID, PPBI, STN and Jaker? (1)

M: These mass organisations are also still operating underground. Since going underground, KPP-PRD has functioned as the spokesperson. This is done for the security of the organisation.

P: There were rumors that there was a split in the PRD. Apparently between those in jail and the KPP-PRD.

M: That is untrue. As I have already said, KPP-PRD was itself formed on the basis of Budiman's mandate. How can this be said to be a split? Certainly there are two leadership, but we had already reached agreement on our separate tasks.

P: It has also been said that there are sharp differences within the PRD, that is between those who believe that "there can be dialogue" and hard line elements who believe "there can be no dialogue"?

M: This is an extremely funny view... ha... ha... ha... I don't know where this rumor originated. I think that all PRD members are hard liners. With regard to the question of whether "there can be dialogue", that depends on who the dialogue is with. With the military, the authorities, with the oppressors? No way! Let's have the discussion in the parliament, that is the place! Open dialogue with other pro-democratic forces, that we accept. We have always called for the formation of a united front, forming a coalition and so on. What is more, within the structure of KPP- PRD there is a department for the formation of a united front, this is one of the three departments that exist.

P: PRD campaigns overseas have been ongoing. Is this a priority in the organisational work of the KPP-PRD?

M: The struggle for democracy is the responsibility of all people throughout the world. The struggle to democratise Indonesia is not just the responsibility of the Indonesian people, but the responsibility of all nations. Thus building international solidarity to strengthen the Indonesian struggle is extremely important work. For this task, the PRD setup international representatives based in Sydney and Amsterdam. But two offices are not enough and we plan to establish representatives in other places.

Strategy and tactics

P: In the framework of mobilising the masses, the PRD first used the tactic of calling for an election boycott (2). When the elections still went ahead, and the people did not campaign for a boycott, what tactic did the PRD then employ?

M: Although the elections went ahead, there were many riots. But according to the regime it was still a success. And the people did not come out into the streets calling for an election boycott. There were only minor actions [openly] calling for an election boycott. But we can't say that the tactic of calling for an election boycott failed totally, just because the election went ahead and the masses did not come out into the streets calling for a boycott.

Why didn't the masses come out into the streets calling for a boycott? I believe there were two main reasons. First, many still have illusions in the elections and still hoped that things could be changed through the elections. Secondly, the means or an "umbrella" [organisation] to build a mass boycott campaign did not exist. The most correct tool [for this] is a united front, which represents a grouping of different mass organisations and parties with a mass base. If such an "umbrella" [organisation] had existed, under conditions of sharp repression, it would not have been a problem.

But there was still an opportunity to use the elections as a way to mobilise the masses, that is actions rejecting the election results and calling for the elections to be rerun. Rejecting the election results in fact grew out of the tactic of boycotting the elections. So, the result of the boycott issue was that we had an issue for mass actions, that is actions rejecting the election results and demanding that the elections be rerun. I see this as having real potential because it can unite may different groups; those that Golput-ed (3), those that boycotted the elections, pro-Megawati Sukarnoputri Indonesian Democratic Party members and the United Development Party which was cheated [in the elections]. But once again, without an "umbrella" [organisation to channel the] large mass actions it is very difficult to build such large mass actions.

P: What was the means used to raise the issue of rejecting the election results and an election rerun, and how successful was this?

M: The measure of success is whether or not large numbers people could be mobilised, primarily in Jakarta and other strategic areas. But of course we cannot hold large actions without [going through] a longer [political] process. Small actions rejecting the results of the elections and an election rerun are just the beginning, they must become constant and nation wide.

Aside from the this, these issue must consistently be raised, through illegal publications, leaflets, graffiti actions and the like. Drawing together as many groups as possible on a common platform to hold joint actions on these issues is most strategically [useful] and important.

P: Before, the PRD prioritised the labour sector, but is now prioritising the urban poor. Isn't this inconsistent?

M: "Zig-zagging" between the labour sector and the urban poor was done because resistance by the urban poor matured first. Resistance by the urban poor is extremely high and militant. While workers are consistent in actions on economic issues, they are not very political. The political consciousness of workers is still low, and many workers still have illusions in simple economic demands. In reality this is only an illusion. Improvements in workers' prosperity – and anyone else's – is actually determined by the political system. So from this the struggle to raise the quality of people's lives requires a political struggle.

In pushing forward the struggle of the urban poor, the PRD aims to increase the political "temperature". If the national political "temperature" is hotter, the non-politicised sectors will become political, because it is influenced by external social condition. Thus the working class will become politicised, so to the peasantry, the middle class and the like.

However it must be noted, that the economic actions by the working class do have meaning. They continue to have meaning by increasing the political "temperature".

This must be emphasised. This tactic does not mean we are abandoning [work in] the labour sector. Not at all! Organisational work among workers is being continued.

P: At some time will the PRD reemerge in mass actions under the PRD flag as before?

M: Absolutely. But when, that depends on the situation. If the situation makes it possible for mass actions under the PRD flag, the PRD will do so. But if the situation is such that it is still not possible, the PRD will use other means, such as graffiti actions, distribution of leaflets, illegal publications or other innovative means.

Translators notes:

1. SMID: Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi, Student Solidarity for Indonesian Democracy.

2. PPBI: Pusat Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia, Indonesian Center for Labour Struggle.

3. STN: Serikat Tani Nasional, National Peasants Union.

4. Jaker: Jaringan Kesenian Rakyat, Peoples Cultural Network.

5. The original Indonesian term was "memboikot" (derived from the English word) and is distinct from another commonly used acronym, Golput (Golongan Putih, White Movement), which first emerged as a campaign by students in the 1971 elections and derives its name from the idea of not marking the ballot paper. Championed by people such as Arif Budiman, the movement did not reemerge in later elections until 1992. Golput is a more "passive" form of protests – abstaining from voting – while "memboikot" refers to a open political campaign which had the aim of disrupting the elections and through a public and mass display of resistance render the results invalid. Ibid.

[Translated by James Balowski, ASIET Publications and Information Officer. The original interview was untitled and the one used was chosen by the translator.]

East timor

Xanana prefers prison to deportation

SiaR - August 15 1997

Xanana Gusmao, the commander of the pro-independence forces, FALINTIL, who is currently serving a twenty-year prison sentence, has declared that he would prefer to remain in prison rather than be deported to any foreign country, including Portugal or Australia.

SiaR recently quoted Xanana as saying that he had heard about the possibility of his being released on condition that he is deported; he said that the essential issue is the position and status of East Timor, not the question of his release.

According to SiaR sources, Xanana cannot agree to his being released if this takes the form of deportation. 'He only smiled when other inhabitants at Cipinang Prison greeted him, saying that they would probably not be together in prison much longer,' said the source.

Some pro-independence East Timorese activists contacted by SiaR said that they are quite convinced that Xanana will not agree to any such condition for his release.

But news that he would be released and deported gained credence on Thursday when several embassies in Jakarta, having sought confirmation from the Foreign Ministry, received positive answers about the possibility of his release.

One European embassy told SiaR that in response to its request for confirmation of reports of Xanana's release, it was told that the Indonesian government was considering the possibility of Xanana being released soon.

As is known the question of Xanana's release emerged following the controversy surrounding a letter sent by President Mandela to President Suharto. During his visit to Indonesia, Mandela had requested to meet Xanana. The request was granted and the two men met at the State guest-house on 15 July.

The meeting was to have been kept secret but GATRA weekly 'leaked' news of it. GATRA is owned by the conglomerate of Bob Hasan which is strongly pro-government. Observers in Jakarta see the leak as a deliberate move by the government to prepare public opinion in advance of the government releasing Xanana on condition that he is deported to a third country.

Observers expect that the release will take place on 17 August, the 52nd anniversary of Indonesian's independence. Each year on that day, the Indonesian government releases a number of prisoners or grants them remission.

Mandela may provide 'face-saving' end to East Timor

Reuters - August 13, 1997

Michael Perry, Sydney – South African President Nelson Mandela's mediation in East Timor could provide the "face-saving" device for Indonesian President Suharto to end the 22-year conflict, 1996 Nobel Peace Prize winner Jose Ramos Horta said on Wednesday.

East Timor independence leader Horta said Mandela's intervention was a major step towards bringing peace to East Timor, possibly by the year 2000.

Horta said Suharto's consent to a recent meeting between Mandela and jailed rebel leader Xanana Gusmao could be a sign that Suharto wants to resolve the East Timor conflict soon. "We could only think he (Suharto) wants to resolve the conflict as he's reaching the end of his regime," Horta told a Rotary Club- sponsored meeting in Sydney.

Suharto, 76, has been president for almost 30 years and is expected to be re-elected unopposed in 1998.

"I believe that 22 years after the invasion, with so many people killed on the Timorese side, but also thousands of Indonesians killed in the battlefield in East Timor, Suharto may be realising there has to be a solution," Horta said.

"President Mandela's mediation is a face-saving device," he said.

Mandela met Gusmao in Jakarta during his state visit to Indonesia in July and later sent a letter to Suharto suggesting Gusmao be released.

Mandela, 79, spent 27 years in prison for his opposition to apartheid in South Africa. Gusmao, 50, is serving a 20-year term for resisting Indonesian annexation of East Timor.

Indonesian officials have said Suharto will consider Mandela's suggestion, but have not given a time frame.

"If anyone can talk to Suharto, it is Mandela," said Horta, who recently returned from South Africa where he was briefed by Mandela on his meeting with Gusmao.

"Suharto has high regard for Mandela...because Mandela is slightly older and Suharto prefers to listen to older people."

Indonesia traditionally frees prisoners on its independence day August 17, although Indonesian sources have suggested November or early 1998 would be a more likely timing for Gusmao's release. Suharto ordered thousands of Indonesia troops to invade East Timor in 1975 after Portugal abandoned the colony in 1974.

Jakarta annexed the territory in 1976, but the United Nations has never recognised Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.

Human rights groups estimate that 200,000 people have died in the East Timor conflict, mostly through famine and disease.

Labour issues

Monitoring Nike in Indonesia

Pacific Asia Resource Center - August 13, 1997

Saeki Natsuko – Nike is one of the biggest sports goods manufactures in the world. Ohmae Kenichi, a well-known Japanese commentator who is an advisor to the company, described the secret of its success in production and sales activities as a marvelous combination between "core skill" and "out-sourcing".

In Nike's case, the "core skill" means marketing strength and the know-how to go out and acquire world-famous athletes to promote their products. It also means crating catchy slogans like "Just Do It!" and "There is no finish line!"

The "out-sourcing" that Ohmae has praised so much means contracting out all works except for the "core skills." In concrete terms, Nike owns no factories, so it commissions its production work to factories which are mostly located in Asian countries, including China, Indonesia and Taiwan. People at the headquaters in Oregon, the United States, send blueprints through computer networks, and some 300 engineers visit contract factories to perform qualityn control. Ohmae has claimed that Japanese companies who are burdened by high labor costs might look toward Nike as a good management model.

The harsh reality

The reality of the workers in the Nike factories, however, is seldom the focus of debates on the company's "success." Up until about 1988, many of the company's shoes were manufactured by companies based in Korea and Taiwan, but they then began to move to Indonesia in search of lower wages and a "stable political situation" (or in other words, the lack of recognition of worker's rights). Most of sports shoes producted by companies like Nike are now manufactured at the Indonesian subcontractor factories of Korean and Taiwaniese companies. The majority are located in West-Java Province, and 50% are in Tanggerang. By 1988, there were 78% export-oriented sports shoes manufacturing factories in the Botabek area (Bogor, Tanggerang, Bekasi), and by 1992 this number had climbed to 256. Some 80% of the shoes are exported.

I had a chance to interview Nike workers in Indonesia last year, and found that roughly 85% of the workers are young single women from rural areas, which is apparently because these women are said to be principled, obedient and industious compared to males. They are recruited through classified ads in newspapers and local radio stations, or through direct recruiting. As Nike is a world-renowned brand, getting a job at one of its affiliated factories is likely a status symbol for local people, and it may be that some offer bribes to local officials or factory security officers.

The average daily wage is US$2.10. To put this figure into perspective, it is said that in 1993 Nike signed promotional contracts for US$20 million with basketball superstar Michael Jordan. In the same year, the total salaries paid to 12,000 Indonesian workers came to just US$5 million.

Workers engage in ten hours a day of repetitive work, and some injure their fingers in press machines. These kinds of job- related accidents are a daily affair, and the manager pays only for tratment, not for compensation. Though the factories have first aid room, there is not sufficient medicine or other equipment to cope with major injuries.

Aside from these poor working conditions, the managers of the factories have caused other serious problems for the workers. When the Korean companies first came into Indonesia, most managers were former military officers, and they seemed to believe that the "lazy Indonesians" needed to receive a military training. The workers were forced to stay at company dormitories, and needed permission before going out. They were also searched before using the praying room or toilet to "prevent sabotage." Some were dismissed simply for being late for work because they could not use the toilet, and others for temporarily losing track of papers with internal information.

It is difficult in Indonesia for workers to speak out in order to improve the poor working conditions they face. They are not allowed to organize unions outside of the one recognized by the government. On September 28, 1992, 6,000 workers of the Sung Hwa Dunia company went on strike, demanding a raise in their wages from Rp.2,000 a day to the minimum wage of Rp.2,600, the recognition of menstruation leave, and improvements in accident compensation. These were quite resonable and limited demands. The management, however, asked the police to investigate and find out who lead the strike. As a result, 21 workers who were suspeced of being leaders were temporarily laid off for questioning. The workers brought the issue to court, and it is still unresolved.

A recent Nike financial report (the third quaters of 1996) shows that their net profits are $23.7 billion, up 77% from the previous year. Nike's Japan sales also doubled. If we remember that when Nike was in management crisis, Japan's Nissho Iwai supported it financially, we find that Japan's "contribution" to Nike's "success" has been considerable.

Human rights

Supreme Court refuses to review Pakpahan verdict

Reuters - August 13, 1997

Jakarta – Indonesia's Supreme court has said it will not review the conviction of independent labour leader Muchtar Pakpahan jailed on charges that he incited workers to strike, the Jakarta Post newspaper reported on Wednesday.

Chief Justice Sarwata was quoted by the newspaper as saying the Supreme Court could only consider a review if the request is made by a government institution.

'If I permit a ruling on a request by an individual, then I would have committed collusion,' Sarwata said, while answering reporters' questions. He did not elaborate.

[Pakpahan's lawyers had informed the court at the first hearing that they have 11 witnesses ready to testify that they received a circular from the union on March 25 1995, calling for the strikes to be delayed from April 1994 to October that year.]

Lawyers for Pakpahan last week began proceedings in the East Jakarta Court to review its decision in October 1996 to re- instate his four-year sentence for inciting riots in April 1994.

Pakaphan was jailed by a court in Medan for three years. The Medan High Court boosted the sentence to four years but the Supreme Court then freed him in April 1995 and quashed his conviction in September that year.

However in an unprecedented move, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision in October 1996 and upheld the conviction. The decision came after Pakpahan was arrested on subversion charges which carry a maximum penalty of death. That arrest came after the riots in Jakarta last year.

Comment

While awaiting a comment from Pakpahan's lawyers of this extraordinary decision, for the Supreme Court judge to allege that he would be accused of collusion in acting on a request for a review from an individual suggests that he is not acting on the basis of any legal procedure. In law, only a defendant may seek a review of a Supreme Court decision. The Court was therefore acting unlawfully by agreeing to make a review on the basis of a request from the prosecutor which is what happened in October 1996. This is much more likely to be a case of collusion.... with the Executive! The Court appears to be under instructions not to open the way for Pakpahan's sentence to be reviewed.

Environment/land disputes

Boycott Bob Hasan's worldwide forestry business links!

George J. Aditjondro - August 17, 1997

[The following is a slightly abridged letter from George J. Aditjondro to the Norway Rainforest Foundation in reponse to a an inquiry about Indonesian timber tycoon Mohammad ("Bob") Hasan's business connections in Norway - JB]

PT Aspex Paper, it is indeed 20% owned by Mohammad ("Bob") Hasan, one of Suharto's closest business crony. I did not know before that they were importing waste paper from Norway. This in itself is an anti-social act of Bob Hasan, because thousands of Indonesian urban poor people could assist PT Aspex Paper with our own waste paper in the cities.

What I can tell you about this PT (PT is the same as your S.A.) is that it is one of the two companies which monopolyze the supply of newspaper print paper. The other one is PT Kertas Leces, a state company. Which means that Bob Hasan is holding the "physical lifeline" of Indonesia's print media, while another crony of Suharto, General Hartono, as Suharto's new Minister of Information, controls the content of the media.

In addition, Bob Hasan was also the only person who Suharto trusted to hijack journalists from the banned TEMPO magazine, to set up a new weekly magazine, GATRA, which has become an additional instrument of the regime to attack Indonesian environmentalists and other NGO activists, often accusing them of serving foreign interests rather than Indonesia's so-called national interests.

Boycotting Bob Hasan's companies in Norway, and if possible in the entire Nordic sphere, is highly recommandable from the social justice as well as ecological perspectives. He is currently often labelled Indonesia's "forest king", since he controls about 3.5 million hectares of forests in Indonesia – 2.5 million hectares in East Kalimantan (Borneo), Aceh, and the Moluccas through one timber conglomerate he is heading, namely the Kalimanis Group, and another million hectares through another conglomerate he is heading, namely the Astra Group, which main business is in automotives, but also controls timber concessions in East Kalimantan, Riau, and West Papua.

In both conglomerates, Kalimanis Group and Astra Group, Bob Hasan does not only represent his own family interests, but also Indonesia's First Family interests, through a company, PT Nusamba, which is 80% owned by three foundations headed by Suharto, 10% by Suharto's eldest son, Sigit Harjojudanto, and 10% by Bob Hasan himself. Apart from that, several army-owned foundations are also involved in the Kalimanis Group. In addition to heading those two large Indonesian conglomerates (Astra belong to the top five), as head of the Indonesian Timber Society (MPI), the Indonesian Plywood Association (Apkindo), and the Indonesian Furniture Association (Asmindo), Bob Hasan is also involved in a 1.5 million hectare concession to harvest Central Sulawesi's ebony forests, as well as in a 50,000 hectares forest plantation in East Timor, which occupies the customary land of the Maubere people in eleven villages in three subdistricts of Viqueque. The latter project of Bob Hasan does not only violate the East Timorese people's right to self-determination, but also their sovereignty over their nature resources.

Based on my understanding of all the ecological and human rights violations carried out by Bob Hasan in his capacities as the bosses of the Kalimanis Group (which includes PT Aspex Paper) and the Astra Group, as well as head of the three business associations mentioned earlier, I recently returned the Indonesian national environmental award, Kalpataru, which I received from Suharto on World Environment Day, ten years ago.

As I mentioned in my letter to Suharto, I felt insulted and shocked by the various environmental awards which the US and Indonesian governments had recently donned on Bob Hasan and his top executives. In early April 1997, Bob Hasan received the Harry A. Merlo Award from the World Forestry Center in the US, where Bob Hasan himself serves as one of the Board members, supposedly for his contributions in linking forest conservation and development in Indonesia.

Then, on April 28, 1997, in a ceremony in the White House, a top executive of the Kalimanis Group received a Certificate of Recognition from the U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation (USIJI), for the "reduced impact logging" which the Group has supposedly carried out in its more than two million hectares timber concessions in East Kalimantan. According to estimates from President Clinton's Climate Change Task Force, 56,400 metric tonnes of carbon dioxide will be saved in the next 40 years from those timber concessions.

Finally, on World Environment Day, June 5, 1997, one of the Kalimanis Group member companies, PT Kalhold Utama Plywood, received a national award for its water pollution treatment facilities, which was considered one of the best in Indonesia during the last three years. This time Bob Hasan himself received that award from the Indonesian authorities.

All those awards are a joke, since in all his capacities as Indonesia's "shadow forestry minister," Bob Hasan has never ordered the executives of his companies and members of his associations to carry out thorough and sincere analyses on the social and environmental impacts of all those timber concessions, plywood, paper and pulp factories, timber plantations, and rattan monopolies under his control.

From my own studies in Eastern Indonesia (in particular in Central Sulawesi, the Moluccas, and West Papua), the plywood factories controlled by Bob Hasan have had a tremendous negative impact to the indigenous communities who have lived for generations from harvesting the copal from the Agathis trees, without cutting down the trees as has happened now after Indonesia – under Bob Hasan's leadership – became a major player in the global plywood market. As head of Apkindo, Bob Hasan is also responsible for the depletion of the ebony stocks in Central Sulawesi by an Apkindo company, PT Fendi Indah, which shares are co-owned by an Indonesian army foundation, Yayasan Trikora. From a forest ecology perspective, this ebony concession in Central Sulawesi, which mainly caters for the Bali and Japanese markets, is a major disaster, since techniques to rejuvenate the ebony forests are still unknown to the silviculture community.

Likewise, in his capacity as head of Asmindo, which authored the export ban for semi-processed ratan products, Bob Hasan is also responsible for the famine caused by this policy to the thousands of rattan collectors and rattan mat (tatami ) producers in Central and South Kalimantan in the early 1980s, because all the rattan produced in Kalimantan had to be sold – for a very cheap price – to Bob Hasan and Asmindo's rattan furniture factories in Java.

So, friends, feel free to publish this letter of mine in your newspapers and bulletins, and do launch an international boycott of all Bob Hasan's timber-related enterprises. As I have often stated in my public speeches in opposition to the Suharto oligarchy, Suharto fights with bullets, we – the opposition – respond with bulletins!

Do not worry about the alleged unemployment effect of such an international boycott, because actually all the paper recycling activities in Indonesia's major urban centres as well as other more ecologically sound forest management activities in Indonesia's tropical forests can provide many more jobs than all the jobs currently provided by Bob Hasan's enterprises!

Arms/armed forces

New wave, old ties Suharto loyalists take top military posts

Far Eastern Economic Review - August 14, 1997

John McBeth, Jakarta – The long-awaited generational change in the Indonesian armed forces is now taking shape. But if the new wave of 1970s military-academy graduates have different views of the world than their more insular elders, that doesn't mean there will be any overnight transformation in style or substance. "If you look at the guys in key positions," notes one political analyst in Jakarta, "you'll see they all have direct or long-term connections to the old man."

The "old man" is President Suharto and, even in the waning years of his rule, his grip on the military remains tight. While they generally earn high marks for their professionalism, many of the generals in the new military leadership have either served as the 76-year-old president's adjutant or as one of his bodyguards. Their loyalty is unquestioningly to Suharto–if not necessarily to those around him.

The latest reshuffle comes eight months before the People's Consultative Assembly meets for an expected endorsement of Suharto's seventh term and coincides with the release of the 1997 Defence White Paper. The reshuffle underlines the president's influence over the process that was once the domain of the military promotions board. "The president has his own personnel file and it is more decisive than the one kept by the board," observes one Defence Ministry insider. "The older Suharto gets, the more he relies on his loyalists."

Among the cream of that crop: Newly promoted army chief of staff Gen. Wiranto served as presidential adjutant in 1988-89, then went from Jakarta military commander to head of the Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad), Indonesia's two-division combat force.

Kostrad commander Lt.-Gen. Sugiono was a presidential adjutant from 1993 to 1995, then served as commander of the Presidential Security Squad before being promoted to his current post last June.

New deputy army chief Lt.-Gen. Subagyo was a group commander in the Presidential Security Squad from 1988 to 1993, later taking charge of the important Central Java regional command.

Special Forces (Kopassus) commander Maj.-Gen. Prabowo Subianto is married to Suharto's middle daughter, Siti Hedijanti Herijadi. He is also one of the few senior officers with well-developed connections in the business community.

Jakarta chief of staff Brig.-Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, now being tipped to replace Maj.- Gen. Sutiyoso as Jakarta commander, is a former group commander in the Presidential Security Squad.

Newly appointed presidential bodyguard Maj.-Gen. Endiartono Sutarto served previously as assistant chief of staff for operations.

Suharto began taking a more personal interest in military promotions in the late 1980s with the retirement of Gen. Benny Murdani, the powerful armed-forces commander. Murdani stayed on as defence minister until 1992, but as one Indonesian military analyst notes now: "The president suddenly woke up to the fact that he was surrounded by Benny's people. He realized he had become isolated and he didn't like it."

Since then, the president has either informed the promotions board of his preferences, or in some cases has insisted on changes to promotional lists after they have been made known within the armed forces. "What Suharto is really doing is improvising," says the analyst. "Promotions are now made for security reasons, not for the overall development of the armed forces."

It took more than five years to make a significant dent in Murdani's residual influence, and several serving officers have seen their careers stunted by their perceived association with him. But even with his own loyalists in place, Suharto's level of trust goes only so far, underlined by the fate that befell his brother-in-law, former army chief Gen. Wismoyo Arismunandar.

The dumping of the independently minded Wismoyo in early 1995, just at a time when he was widely expected to make the final move to armed-forces commander, may have been an object lesson for the ambitious Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-law. Prabowo's family status doesn't always exact favour anyway, and has sometimes created problems for him among his peers.

Analysts say that by playing one officer against another, the wily Suharto keeps everyone in line. Prabowo is no exception, with Wiranto now in a position to dictate his longer-term future. And apparent Prabowo rival Maj.-Gen. Bambang Yodoyono recently moved from the South Sumatra command to take over as deputy chief of social and political affairs–a job that will put him in line for his promotion to three-star general early next year.

Bambang has a reputation as one of the military's brightest thinkers and there is talk of him being considered as chairman of the powerful commission that will formulate state-policy guidelines for next year's People's Consultative Assembly.

Although Wiranto is a 1968 graduate, he and the 1970s generation–represented by Prabowo, Bambang and a dozen other key players–are more open-minded than their older colleagues, with a focus that centres on traditional defence concerns as much as on the past preoccupation with internal security. While they remain wary of national political mobilization, they do accept the inevitability of political change, an important factor in itself in the post-Suharto era.

Now almost certain to replace armed-forces commander Gen. Feisal Tanjung next April, Wiranto will no doubt want to do things differently from his predecessor, new Information Minister Gen. Hartono. The former army chief created unease in the officer corps by aligning the military more closely with the ruling Golkar party–something observers put down to his close association with the president's eldest daughter, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, or Tutut, one of the party's eight co-chairmen.

The political role Wiranto and the new generation of military professionals will play in the waning years of the Suharto presidency could prove intriguing. "Wiranto doesn't like to play politics, but he can't afford to ignore realities," says one analyst. "In the end, I think he's going to follow Suharto's directions."

While the fortunes of the 1970s generation rocket upwards, the latest reshuffle has shelved the active careers of no less than five regional commanders, all of whom are joining the 75-strong military faction in the House of Representatives under former social and political affairs chief Lt.-Gen. Syarwan Hamid. The wholesale house-cleaning is typical of the way the eight regional commands have been used as a revolving door over the past few years, sometimes changing as many as three times in 12 months.

Defence Ministry sources say that with the generals stacking up, the president is relieving the pressure from below, while at the same time trying to strike a balance between his loyalists and other senior officers unhappy after being passed over for promotion. Smoothing ruffled feathers is also going to be a job for Wiranto, but insiders say much of his focus will also be on how the military re-establishes its identity after Suharto goes.

Under those circumstances, staying loyal to the president, while maintaining the loyalty of the military, may not be so easy.

New Army officers installed in East Timor

The Jakarta Post - August 6, 1997

Dili – Col. Suryo Prabowo, former secretary to the chief of general affairs of the Armed Forces, was installed yesterday as deputy chief of Wira Dharma Command.

Col. Suryo, who had served in East Timor as the command's chief of staff, replaced Col. Soekotjo HS, who was promoted to chief of Wira Bhakti Command, overseeing West Nusa Tenggara.

Wira Dharma Chief Col. Slamet Sidabutar also installed yesterday Lt. Col. Hardiono Saroso as chief of Aileu District Command.

The post was previously held by the command's current chief of staff, Lt. Col. Suwarno.

[Col. Bambang Pranoto was installed as deputy chief of East Timor Police on Saturday, Antara reported. Bambang, formerly a lecturer on criminal law and police operations management at the Police Academy in Semarang, replaced Col. Atok Rismanto. Atok was promoted to chief of East Timor Police.]

Economy and investment

The dark side of prosperity: World Bank critic alleges waste and graft

Asiaweek - August 12, 1997

Keith Loveard, Jakarta – Cafe Galeri in Jakarta's upmarket suburb of Menteng is a trendy testament to the success of Indonesia's economy. On its walls hang abstract oil paintings that sell for $4,000 each. The Cafe is one of a growing number of galleries in Jakarta and Bali that appeal to Indonesia's nouveau middle class, and it reflects in part the happy consequence of economic growth averaging around 6.5% over the last 30 years. The beneficiaries of that sustained boom find it easy to splash out not only for art but pricey imported cars, crystal chandeliers, marble foyers and other trappings of the good life.

But there may be a darker side to at least a portion of the material success. Many analysts believe some newfound wealth among Indonesians comes courtesy of under- the-table deals with government bureaucrats, connections to influential political leaders, or simple theft and extortion. The fact is, fancy cars and chic works of art represent convenient ways of laundering and hiding ill-gotten cash.

It was at Cafe Galeri last month that a U.S. academic named Jeffrey Winters launched a fusillade of criticism at the World Bank over what he claims are billions of rupiah wasted and stolen in Indonesia. Winters, an associate professor in the department of politics at Northwestern University, has long complained of shoddy account-management practices by the World Bank, which is a major source of development funds to emerging economies worldwide. This year, he has targeted Indonesia as a place where the bank faces particular problems.

Such allegations are not new to Jakarta. The Hong Kong-based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy said in March that Indonesia rated as one of six Asian nations where corruption has become a "serious" problem. And at the end of July, Transparency International, based in Germany, said its survey of business executives and public opinion found that Indonesia is among the world's 10 most corrupt places in which to do business – and Asia's second most corrupt after Pakistan.

Although some people argue that corruption is both victimless and an expected cost of doing business in Asia, Winters disputes both claims. He says Indonesian taxpayers wind up footing the bill for about one-third of World Bank loans that never reach their targets. "It is unfair that Indonesian society, especially the poor, should be responsible to pay these funds back with interest," he says.

Winters alleges that as much as $8 billion of World Bank money has gone missing since President Suharto and his New Order government came to power in 1967. The academic says one of the most popular methods of stealing from the World Bank has been to overcharge for capital goods. "The ways of skimming have been raised to a high art at which bureaucrats are quite adept," he says.

The allegations have elicited angry responses from both the World Bank and the Indonesian government. "We know exactly where our money is going," says Jean- Michel Severino, the bank's vice president for East Asia and the Pacific. "We do not tolerate corruption."

Indonesian National Development Planning Minister Ginandjar Kartasasmita, whose agency disburses aid funds, questions the reliability of Winters's sources – bank officials who spoke with the academic. Says Ginandjar: "Given [the World Bank's] tight and elaborate [accounting] procedures, it would be impossible to have such a high level of wastage."

Winters's allegation that 30% of World Bank loans are lost dovetails with independent research by Prof. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, a former finance minister, into government spending. His study of the matter last year concluded that the same portion of Indonesia's federal budget – about one-third – vanishes. Finance Ministry sources agree that huge sums are swallowed by the nation's extensive black market. One former Finance Ministry auditor adds that when he attempted to bring a case of clear corruption to the attention of his superiors, he was shunted aside to audit accounts on which he couldn't cause trouble.

Winters does not argue that all World Bank-funded programs are flawed. But successful ones, he says, are invariably those that work directly with low-level officials at the grassroots level. In fact, World Bank officials say they are already moving in that direction. "We are continuing the power projects and other large investments," says Stephen Dice, a World Bank staffer in Jakarta. But the organization is focusing increased attention on "more decentralized projects," he says. Nevertheless, if Winters's allegations are correct, some of the art hanging on the walls of Cafe Galeri will be purchased with money that was supposed to spread the benefits of economic growth to the poorest villages. Such a reverse redistribution of wealth is not likely to go down well for those far removed from stylish galleries or high-priced oils.

The World Bank in Indonesia

Funding since 1967:

$24.7 billion. This makes it the government's largest single creditor. Loan commitments this year: $1.5 billion. 250 projects have been supported with World Bank loans, including electricity production, irrigation and flood control, and conservation. To date, the biggest projects include:

$423.6 million Suralaya thermal power project in Java $398 million national rural electricity program $375 million national telecommunications project

Miscellaneous

Hartono joins Islamic group 'to learn more about Islam'

Straits Times - August 8, 1997

Derwin Pereira, Jakarta – Indonesia's Information Minister, Mr Raden Hartono, has denied any political motives in joining the influential Islamic group, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), amid speculation that he will use it as a platform for his political ambitions.

Stressing that he had joined the ICMI for personal reasons, he said there was a lot he could learn from the association's experts.

His decision to become a member also stemmed from his empathy towards the ICMI's aims and activities.

"Over time, ICMI has developed into a great organisation with activities that have benefited the nation," news reports yesterday quoted him as saying.

"I want to broaden my knowledge of Islam. I believe it will be useful for me to join ICMI. In due time, we will see how beneficial it is."

The former army chief, with strong links in the Muslim communities of Central and East Java, disclosed his intention to join the group last week.

He said it was easier for him to be an ICMI member now, after retiring from active military service. Military officers are not allowed to join political parties or other groupings.

Mr Hartono was given the green light after ICMI chairman B.J. Habibie met President Suharto on Tuesday.

Said Mr Habibie, who is also the Minister for Research and Technology: "The President said there is no problem with Hartono joining ICMI."

He added that the ICMI, which has more than 42,000 members, welcomed Mr Hartono's entry.

The membership is a mixed group which includes non- governmental Muslim leaders as well as long-serving Cabinet ministers.

The ministers include Vice-President Tri Sutrisno and State Minister for Development Planning Ginanjar Kartasasmita. Political observers here told The Straits Times yesterday that Mr Hartono's membership was a logical outcome of his longstanding backing of the ICMI.

Sources said he was one of the few senior military officers who backed its establishment in late 1990 despite opposition from many others.

He was also the military commander of East Java when a meeting was held there to form the association.

Noted Mr Umar Juoro of the ICMI-linked think-tank Centre for Development and Information Studies: "He has a right to be part of the organisation because of his constant support for it even when the chips were down."

Despite Mr Hartono's denial, some analysts believe his decision to be a member was guided purely by political imperatives.

Said an analyst: "There is no question of him using it as a political base because he needs the support of the Islamic constituency if he has plans to become vice-president next year."

Observers also believe that Mr Hartono could take over as ICMI leader from Mr Habibie, who has been the association's chairman since its founding.

Linked to this is speculation of potential rivalry between Mr Hartono and Mr Habibie for the vice-president's post next year.

But ICMI secretary-general Adi Sasono brushed aside such suggestions.

He was also quick to dismiss the view that Mr Hartono's entry would boost the association's political standing and leverage.

The ICMI was not a political organisation, he said.

It was set up as a sounding board for Muslim input to public policy, rather than as a mass-based political vehicle.

The association aims to unify Indonesia's Muslims and improve their economic well- being, as well as to ensure that Islamic values are reflected in government policy.

You should try shooting, police tell journalists

Straits Times - August 7, 1997

Jakarta – Indonesian police have suggested that local journalists receive special training and shooting lessons to help them with the accuracy of their reporting, the official Antara news agency reported yesterday. "If you need it, you can have shooting training with the riot police in order that you know that to shoot is not easy so that you are not always attacking the police if they make a mistake," national police spokesman Brigadier-General Trimada Dani said.

Police in Jakarta have shot dead at least 70 criminals so far this year compared with 46 the whole of last year. They said the victims – almost always repeat offenders – were shot while trying to resist arrest or escape from custody, and insisted that police always fired warning shots before aiming for the body.

Brig-Gen Trimada said during a social gathering on Tuesday that the shooting training would make them less cynical about reporting that the police were "bad shots".