APSN | Press statement on plans to create a new Korem in Merauke and locate Kostrad's Third Division in Papua

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Press statement on plans to create a new Korem in Merauke and locate Kostrad's Third Division in Papua

SNUP Press Statement - March 29, 2005

The commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces General Endriartono Sutarto, the commander of KOSTRAD Lt.General Hadi Waluyo, and spokesman for the Armed Forces, Brig.General Hotmangaridja Panjaitan recently declared that the Indonesian Army will shortly establish 22 new Territorial Commands throughout Indonesia, including a new Korem (Resort Command) to be located in Merauke, as well as a plan to locate KOSTRAD's Third Division in Papua.

These plans will turn KOSTRAD into one of the Army's largest forces in Indonesia. KOSTRAD's First Division is based in Cilodong, West Java with a total of 10,000 personnel, its Second Division is based in Singosari, Malang, East Java. The plan to locate KOSTRAD's Third Division in Sorong, Papua will result in an increase of between 12,000 to 15,000 troops in the period from 2005 to 2009.

It is planned to locate the first 5,000 troops which are to be taken from KOSTRAD 's Third Brigade in Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi. At the same time, three Infantry Battalions will be based in KODAM XVII/Trikora (the Military Command in West Papua): Battalion 754 in Timika, Battalion 755 in Wamena and Battalion 756 in Merauke, in addition to the three KOSTRAD Infantry Battalions which are already there, Battalion 751 in Jayapura, Battalion 752 in Sorong and Battalion 753 in Nabire. These measures will also include placing several Rifle Companies consisting of 1,039 personnel.

Several reasons have been given by senior TNI officers for the creation of the new territorial commands and the location of a KOSTRAD Division in Papua:

1. The urgently needed increase is being undertaken to deal with the lack of troops in Papua, which is almost three and a half times the size of Java.

2. The additional troops are intended to safeguard the border between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.

3. To be ready for or anticipate threats coming from three possible intra-island areas (the Sunda Strait, the Lombok Strait and Makassar, and the Bandan Strait and the Maluku Sea). The measures are being taken as a consequence of the requirements of large and small archipelagic defences.

4. To facilitate the mobilisation of troops from a point closer to areas which are deemed to be in need of strengthening.

5. Bringing troops in from outside Papua always requires an adjustment period of one month before the troops are able to perform their duties.

Solidaritas Nasional Untuk Papua (SNUP) urges the government and the Armed Forces to reconsider and withdraw the plan to create a new Korem in Papua based in Merauke and the plan to locate KOSTRAD's Third Division in Papua.

SNUP regards these plans as counter-productive to intentions to turn Papua into a Zone of Peace which is being sought by all sections of Papuan society, as was proclaimed by representatives of all components of Papuan society at a Jakarta hotel in November 2002, calling for Papua to become a Zone of Peace.

Endeavours to uphold human rights and to peacefully resolve the conflict in Papua will be undermined by the large-scale placement of TNI troops in Papua, for the following reasons:

1. Efforts to uphold human rights in Papua have failed to make significant progress, particularly in view of the proceedings in courts which are handling human rights abuses, as is evident from the Abepura case before a court in Makassar, which should be followed by the Wamena 2003 case and the Wasior 2001 case.

2. Bearing in mind the conditions in Papua during the past two years, where conflicts have actually involved the security forces, as is evident from the Wamena, Wasior, Kimaam, Sarmi and now the Puncak Jaya incidents, as well as the series of vertical conflicts in Papua. These conflicts have involved the security forces, and SNUP therefore sees no reasons for locating more troops, taking into account the nature of the conflicts.

The presence of large numbers of troops has only traumatised the Papuan people.

The following examples are taken from recent incidents:

1. The conflict between security forces and Goliath Tabuni who is accused of being an OPM leader in Puncak Jaya which has been going on since August 2004, traumatising about 5,000 local people in the vicinity of Mulia and Tolikara. They have fled into the mountains around Mulia and are now facing hunger because of the lack of supplies. Before they fled, members of the TNI's SATGAS (Task Force) inflicted torture, then killed the Reverend Eliza Tabuni. There have been arbitrary arrests and sweepings, which resulted in the burning down and destruction of 250 honai and family gardens. The violence spread uncontrollably following the involvement of militia groups who entered and burned down schools and the office building of the District of Tolikara. These incidents did not come to public attention because of the remoteness of the location and communications difficulties.

2. The conflict in Timika which occurred when the community demanded that the local government recognise their traditional rights, following the creation of a new district in Patowaiburu by the Mimika local government. A clash occurred with the security forces because the local community rejected this plan. Four persons were killed in Timika on 22 January 2005: Yunus Makai, Yulius Makai, Okkto Pakuwai and Alex Maki. According to eye witness accounts, the four men were shot dead by Brimob (riot forces of the police) wearing civilian clothes but fully armed. This occurred at 13.00 on Friday in Patawai Kampung, Timika.

3. The involvement of security forces in human rights abuses also involving illegal logging, none of which has been dealt with. This means that the placement of a large number of troops in Papua can only intensify vertical conflicts, leading to another series of human rights abuses and yet more illegal logging.

4. The creation of a Korem in Merauke and the location of a KOSTRAD Division in Papua will need a great deal of money and it is feared that the money for this will be taken from funds budgeted for regional needs and funds set aside for special autonomy. The best thing would be for this money to be allocated to projects to improve the welfare of the Papuan people, 80 per cent of whom live below the poverty line.

5. Under Law 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua, the police force should be strengthened. Strengthening the role of the police force should be accompanied by provisions being made for improving local education (Article 48).

6. Conflicts in Papua are more in the nature of security problems or social conflicts and have nothing to do with defence or armed military threats, which means that the role of the police should be reinforced. Resolution of conflicts in Papua should be achieved through dialogue, not by repressive measures or in militeristic ways.

7. It is not the job of the Indonesian Army or KOSTRAD to safeguard maritime regions. This requires an enhancement of the Indonesian Navy for maritime defences in the three straits around Indonesia. The same goes for the creation of a Korem in Merauke; there have been no significant conflicts in the region along the border between Indonesian and PNG warranting the mobilisation of additional troops.

8. It would be better for the Armed Forces to devote their resources to humanitarian work in Aceh following the tsunami, or security disturbances that need the Army's response to piracy in the Malaka Strait or the possibility of conflict along the border between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Conflicts that have occurred in Papua in the past two years do not need any additional troops or the creation of a new territorial command.

29 March, 2005

Bonar Tigor Naipospos Emmy Sahertian Orry Rahman Satria Cahyadi Parulian Sihombing Mulyadi Goce John Menanti Ferdinand Tetro Nasira Andy D. Manoby Jerry Sumanpouw

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