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Though limited by its mandate, the CTF revealed a great deal

Tapol - July 21, 2008

When the Commission of Truth and Friendship was set up in August 2005 by the governments of Timor-Leste and Indonesia to "establish the conclusive truth regarding the events prior to and immediately after the Popular Consultation in 1999", there was scepticism about what it would achieve.

1999 will go down in the annals of both countries as the year when the Timorese people voted overwhelmingly to independence from Indonesia, but also when the Indonesian army waged a final orgy of killings, rapes and numerous other atrocities in revenge for Timor's rejection of Indonesian sovereignty over their country. The Timorese death toll reached 1,400 while hundreds of thousands fled their homes in search of safety.

The Commission's mandate made it clear that its aim was to promote reconciliation and friendship between the two parties. Point 13 (c) of its Terms of Reference states: "Based on the spirit of a forward-looking and reconciliatory approach, the CTF process will not lead to prosecution and will emphasize institutional responsibility", while point 13 (d) said that it would "promote friendship and cooperation between the governments and peoples of the two countries and promote intra and inter-communal reconciliation to heal the wounds of the past".

Such caution was the inevitable consequence of a commission set up by two governments keen to promote the ties of friendship between them; nor did not augur well for a thoroughgoing investigation. Under such circumstances, the CTF did not win international approval and the United Nations which had been involved in the situation in Timor-Leste since the Indonesian invasion in 1975 refused to support the Commission or allow its personnel to testify.

The terms of reference made it clear that the perpetrators of gross violations of human rights could sleep safely in their beds because they would not be named but would be shielded by the fiction of "institutional responsibility". The CTF was clearly of a very different character than other investigations conducted previously, in particular that conducted in 2000 by the KPP-HAM which was set up by Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission whose members included highly respected human rights activists including the late Munir Said Thalib. Moreover, the mandate was strictly limited to the events prior to and following the Popular Consultation in 1999 and would not encompass or refer to earlier events which certainly had a great bearing on the events of 1999. This was to be, as is repeatedly stated in the Report, a "forward-looking" investigation.

Yet, although it was bound by these limitations, the CTF was able to produce what is, in many places, a hard-hitting account of the violations that were visited upon the population of Timor-Leste, in particular after they voted so overwhelmingly to reject Indonesia's offer of autonomy and in favour of independence from Indonesia.

With regard to Gross Human Rights Violations and Institutional Responsibility: The Commission concluded that "gross human rights violations in the form of crimes against humanity did occur in East Timor in 1999 and that these violations included murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, illegal detentions, and forcible transfer and deportation carried out against the civilian population." It said that there was "institutional responsibility for these Violations". With regard to crimes committed in support of the pro-autonomy movement, the Commission concluded that "pro-autonomy militia groups, TNI, the Indonesian civilian government, and Polri (the Indonesian police) must bear all responsibility for gross human rights violations targeted against civilians perceived as supporting the pro-independence cause. These crimes included murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, illegal detention and forcible transfer and deportation."

As for crimes committed in support of the pro-independence movement, for judicial reasons this could not be conclusively determined, but the Commission said it was nonetheless possible to conclude that "pro-independence groups were responsible for gross human rights violations in the form of illegal detentions that targeted civilians who were perceived as pro-autonomy supporters".

Institutional responsibility of the TNI and pro-autonomy militias

The Commission's findings about institutional responsibility were unequivocal: "The evidence clearly proved that pro-autonomy militias were the primary direct perpetrators of gross human rights violations in East Timor in 1999."

With regard to the extent to which Indonesian institutions also met the criteria for institutional responsibility, it concluded that "the evidence was sufficiently clear and abundant to justify... that TNI personnel, police, and civilian authorities consistently and systematically cooperated with and supported the militias in a number of significant ways and contributed to the perpetration of the crimes enumerated above." The evidence also demonstrated that "TNI personnel sometimes directly participated in the operations that led to these crimes. Such participation included direct participation in the actual commission of the crimes by members of TNI units and the direction of militia operations by TNI officers who were present when the crimes were committed." Moreover, it found that "TNI commanders in East Timor controlled the supply, distribution and the use of weapons to the militia groups and did so in an organised manner". The TNI's support for militias "extended beyond the provision of weapons and included funding and other material resources. Local TNI headquarters were used as facilities for illegal detention, where severe forms of mistreatment of civilians, including torture and sexual violence sometimes took place."

The chapter devoted to the evidence of widespread attacks (the word widespread is given special emphasis) on the civilian population, lists fourteen priority cases which, the Commission stresses, were selected at random. Significantly, three of the incidents occurred around the time when the Popular Consultation was announced (on 6, 12 -13 and 17 April) while ten others all occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Consultation, (from 5 to 25 September). It pointed out moreover that many of these cases "entail(ed) multiple and grave human rights violations". For example, priority case number 11 is: "Killing and forced disappearance by the troops of Battalion 745 on 10-21 September 1999 (spans Lautem, Baucau, Manatuto and Dili districts." Priority case number 12 is: "Killing of nuns and priests in Lautem on 25 September 1999 (Lautem district)."

The results of the Popular Consultation, it should be recalled, were announced by the UN on 4 September, revealing that 78.5 per cent of the population had rejected autonomy and voted in favour of independence.

With responsibility for the crimes being so clearly apportioned to the Indonesian armed forces (TNI), It is now a question of taking forward these findings by bringing to justice those who are known to have been in control of the situation in Timor Leste when these horrendous crimes were being perpetrated. As Usman Hamid, executive director of Kontras, the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence, pointed out: "Crimes against humanity are not subject to amnesty or a statute of limitations, and are retroactive. Therefore, the CTF's report can be used for future prosecution of those found most responsible."

As soon as it became known that Commission was going no further than pointing to "institutional responsibility" and that its findings would not lead to prosecutions, retired General Wiranto quite shamelessly claimed that "the case of disturbances in Timor Leste has now been resolved". Ignoring the results of several earlier investigations, he boasted that: "All generals who were considered to have been involved in human rights violations in Timor were found not guilty by a Special Military Tribunal." (Kompas, 15 July 2008) General Wiranto was commander-in-chief of ABRI, the Indonesian Armed Forces and Minister of Defence and Security at the time of these atrocities and therefore held command responsibility for what happened in 1999. In February 2003, he was indicted along with seven other high-ranking officers by the Special Panel for Serious Crimes in East Timor and a warrant for his arrest was issued on 10 May 2004 by an international judge of the Special Panel. The indictment was accompanied by over 15,000 pages of evidentiary material in support of the indictment.

Having enjoyed impunity for more than five years, Wiranto who is facing such serious charges now heads a political party in Indonesia that will participate in next year's general elections and has put himself forward for election in the presidential election due to take place in September 2009. It beggars belief that an indicted general could be elected president of a country that prides itself on being one of the world's new democracies which upholds the rule of law.

Another Indonesian general who spent time in Timor Leste and is remembered for his many crimes against the population, Prabowo Subianto, has also put his name forward as a candidate in next year's presidential election.

In the interests of justice and accountability for the crimes of humanity perpetrated in Timor-Leste, we urge the two governments to publish the CTF report without delay and, in cooperation with the international community, to undertake to support efforts to bring individual perpetrators to justice and ensure that persons accused of serious crimes are no longer eligible for public office or continued active service.