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Truth and Friendship Commission undermines search for justice
Tapol Bulletin No 178 - March-June, 2005
On 18 February, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced the establishment of an independent commission of three experts to review the progress made by judicial processes in Indonesia and East Timor towards accountability for serious violations of human rights committed in East Timor in 1999. In a calculated move to pre-empt and undermine the work of the Commission, the governments of Indonesia and East Timor have agreed to set up a parallel Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF).
It is extremely doubtful whether the outcome of the CTF will bear any relation to the truth about the Indonesian army's orchestrated destruction of East Timor and its responsibility for intimidation, terror, killings and other acts of violence which resulted in over 1,400 people being killed and 250,000 people being forcibly displaced to West Timor. Moreover, the CTF is unlikely to contribute to sustainable friendship between the peoples of Indonesia and East Timor given its apparent aim to bury the past ('bring to a closure a chapter of our recent past'), undermine the search for justice, and sanction impunity.
The CTF was hastily agreed following a meeting in December between Presidents Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia and Xanana Gusmao of East Timor when it became clear that Kofi Annan was intent on setting up the Commission. The terms of reference were agreed on 9 March. The East Timorese government's agreement to participate in the CTF process because of its desire to foster good relations with the country's former occupier has been strongly criticised by East Timor's Catholic Church, human rights groups and many others.
The CTF's terms of reference state that the process will not lead to any prosecutions. Instead it can propose amnesties for those involved in human rights violations. It can also 'recommend rehabilitation measures for those wrongly accused of human rights violations'. Remarkably the rights of such accused are given precedence over the rights of victims since there is no similar provision for rehabilitation or reparation for victims.
The victims are not mentioned throughout the CTF's lengthy terms of reference.
An editorial about the CTF in the Jakarta Post newspaper posed the question whether Indonesia can come to terms with its own history, or whether it will once again turn history into fiction ['Reconciling East Timor' Jakarta Post, 23 February 2005]. The latter outcome is almost certain. One of the main features of the trials in Jakarta's ad hoc human rights court was the way in which both the prosecution and the defence comprehensively distorted the truth about events in East Timor. The violence was falsely portrayed as a resulting from a struggle between two violent East Timorese factions in which the Indonesian security forces were essentially bystanders. Primary blame was directed at the UN.
The establishment of the CTF may also undermine the work of East Timor's Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the value of its final report due for publication later this year.
The Jakarta Post pointed that Indonesia could be seen as a bully on the CTF since 'real politk defines the relationship between Indonesia and East Timor as an unequal one'. That is certainly the case and it is difficult to see how the CTF will do anything but serve the interests of the powerholders in Indonesia.
The UN Commission of Experts ('the Commission') will be formally tasked with assessing the proceedings of Jakarta's ad hoc human rights court -- widely regarded as a travesty of justice -- and the serious crimes process involving the Serious Crimes Unit and the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Dili.
The three experts appointed by Kofi Annan are Justice Prafullachandra Bhagwati, a former chief justice of India, Professor Yozo Yokota of Japan, a former UN special rapporteur on Burma, and Ms Shaista Shameem, director of the Fiji human rights commission.
The Commission is required to recommend further measures and/or mechanisms so that the perpetrators are held accountable, justice is secured for the victims and the people of East Timor, and reconciliation is promoted.
The failures of the Jakarta trials and the obstacles and difficulties encountered by the serious crimes process in East Timor have been well documented (1). The establishment of the Commission is an admission that the two processes have not delivered justice. It has been welcomed by civil society groups in East Timor.
There are a number of options which the Commission should consider and a combination of approaches may be appropriate (2). Its most immediate task should be to make recommendations concerning the future of the serious crimes process in East Timor as UN support is due to end in May 2005.
The Commission must look at the ways in which the Serious Crimes Unit can complete its tasks and ensure that evidence is transferred to any new mechanism. It should consider whether the serious crimes process can itself be transformed into a new international justice mechanism. In any event, the possibility of setting up some form of international criminal tribunal must be high on the Commission's agenda.
Given Indonesia's refusal to co-operate with any procedures which it does not control and the financial and political obstacles in the way of solving the problem of justice for East Timor, the task of the Commission will be difficult but not impossible. Its success is crucial to the UN's commitment to justice, peace and security for East Timor and to the struggle against impunity in Indonesia and elsewhere.
Notes:
1.See, for example:
TAPOL Bulletin No. 176, pp. 1 &2; No. 171/172, p. 22; No 169/170, p. 20;
no. 168, p. 16. No. 166/167, p. 15.
Intended to Fail: The Trials Before the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta, International Center for Transitional Justice, August 2003: http://www.ictj.org/downloads/IntendedtoFail_designed.pdf;
Justice for Timor Leste: The Way Forward, Amnesty International and Judicial System Monitoring Programme, April 2004: http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA210062004; and
Unfulfilled Promises: Achieving Justice for Crimes Against Humanity in East Timor, Open Society Justice Initiative and Coalition for International Justice, November 2004: http://www.cij.org/pdf/Unfulfilled_Promises_Achieving_Justice_for_Crimes_Aga inst_Humanity_in_East_Timor.pdf
2. For suggestions, see ibid. and Rethinking Justice for East Timor, Watch Indonesia & others, February 2005: http:// home.snafu.de/watchin/Rethinking_Justice.htm
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