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[The following is the full text a secret report for the Indonesian Government which makes it clear that the TNI directed the militia violence against East Timor's independence vote and that top generals approved of some of the worst atrocities. The report was obtained by the Sydney Morning Herald and published on its web site on April 30, 2001. In an earlier article published on April 28, the Herald's foreign affairs editor, Hamish MacDonald, wrote: "The report on human rights violations in East Timor during the last months of Jakarta's rule has been sitting like a pent-up volcano in the office safe of the Attorney- General, Marzuki Darusman, for the past 15 months." Chapter I of the report was not published.]
Contents
36. Legally, and especially after the New York Agreement in May 1999, the special nature of the East Timor case made international bodies pay more open attention to human rights violations and the duty of the Indonesian government to watch over security and order.
37. Sociologically, East Timor post-Options combines several variables: political and security policies, the development of armed groups or mlitias with the increase in violence, and reactions from pro-independence segments of society. All of these variables were present in one time frame: they began from the announcement of the options and continued until after the ballot.
38. Violence has been a daily experience for the people of East Timor, and it heightened after the Indonesian military entered the territory in 1975. One form of violence was arming of civilian groups, including WANRA (popular resistance). Some of them were later organised into the TNI or TNI through a program of militarisation or milsas as soldiers, whereby they had rank and were paid just as regular soldiers. Milsas -- which senior military officials in Jakarta often referred to as regional sons of the TNI -- functioned only in East Timor to assist TNI East Timor operations. Partisans from elite circles were made administrative officials. Examples were Joao Tavares Bupati Bobonaro who was the leader of the Halilintar militia and Emundo da Silva Bupati Lautem who led the Alfa at Los Palos. Apart from this there are also found the team names Saka/Sera at Baucau and Makikit at Viqueque.
39. After President Habibie launched the two options, these old militia groups were revived and supported in order to achieve victory for Autonomy. Besides this, military units for young people were supported, which according to Udayana Military Region Commander Major-General Adam R. Damiri in his report to the Minister Coordinating the Fields of Political and Security were "Pro-integration groups driven by young people to establish patriotic organisations. According to various reports, these young people were members of Gada Paksi (Young Guard Establishing Integration), which was recruited, trained and funded by the TNI, especially Kopassus, in 1994-1995. Eurico Gueterres, the leader of the Aitarak militia, and the leaders of the BMP militia in Dili were figures in the Gada Paksi. These militia groups were later recruited into the Integration Fighting Force with its Commander Joao Tavares and deputy Eurico Gueterres and head of staff Herminio da Costa da Silva.
40. These pro-integration militia groups, according to a statement by the Regents and Governor of East Timor to the East Timor Human Rights Violation Investigative Commission, were called Pam-Swakarsa [Volunteer Security Forces], and were formed in each village and directed by the village chiefs to achieve autonomy. In a Statement of Regent Workforce II Dili which was issued in May 1999, Eurico Gueterres, Commandant of Aitarak, was mentioned as Coordinator of the Organisation Field of Pam- Swarkarsa Dili, which numbered 2,651 people. Some 1,521 people among them were members of the Aitarak militia. In this Aitarak 78 people were joined together as members of KAMRA. In the Pamswakarsa Dili 25 Babinsa people and 25 Binpolda were from ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) elements. Further in the same document all the expenses of the militia were borne by the Provincial Government Budget, while the Advisors were the Governor and Police Commandant 164/WD together with the Regional Assembly Tk II Dili, headed by the Mayor of Dili and the Deputy Head of Kasdim 1627/Dili and the Deputy Head of Dili Police Station. Brigadier General of the TNI Tono Suratman in his statement to the Investigative Commission stated that this militia was the responsibility of the Regional Government and its development was in the hands of the Regional Police, while the TNI/Police Command gave support.
41. The existence of Pro-integration militia was also recognised by TNI General Wiranto in his Plan to Combat Contingency: The armed force is about 1,100 people with 546 weapons of various kinds, including assembled weapons; they are joined in pro- integration organisations. The mass of militant supporters is 11,950 people joined in opposition organisations like Besi Merah Putih, Aitarak, Mahidi, Laksaur Merah Putih, Guntur Kailak, Halilintar Junior, Pancasila Team, Mahadomi, Ablai and Red Dragon.
42. According to a statement by Eurico Guterres to the Investigative Commission, all the military organisations are joined into the Force of Integration Fighters with its political wing the Front of the People of East Timor (BRTT) and the Forum for Peace, Democracy and Justice (FPDK). Regarding these two pro-integration political wings -- BRTT and FPDK -- TNI General Wiranto in his letter to the Coordinating Minister for Defence and Security on 15 June 1999 wrote,
One of the development efforts with regard to the pro-integration groups that also needs to gain support from all of the Relevant Department/Agencies is to watch that they remain united and do not split, continue to stress efforts for dialogue and discussion and avoid physical activities aimed at intimidation which will simply be very counter-productive in the struggle for respective aspirations. In this connection, two Pro-Integration factions joined in the FPDK and the BRTT have been successfully united in one fighting forum, the Joint Pro Autonomy of East Timor (FBPOTT) with collective leadership from those two factions.
43. The implication is definitely victory of the autonomy option. The same kind of thing was directed to TNI General Wiranto in his statement to the Investigative Commission which said that ... in a moral sense there are indeed efforts to make Autonomy win so that East Timor will still be one with Indonesia and at the same time strengthen the pre-existing Determination of the MPR. Apart from that, if autonomy won the risk is more slight. This can very much be seen in the security and government apparatus in the region.
44. The effort to make autonomy win which involved TNI elements and civil officials pushed pro-autonomy civil groups to mobilise the masses in 13 regencies. In 1999 a large scale meeting was held by the militia with the sacred oath for integration at Balibo on 19 February, and later the same public meeting was held on 10 April 1999 at Viqueque and continued at Zumalai, Covalima on 11 April 1999. The was the large pro-integration public meeting in the grounds of the governor's office in Dili on 17 April 1999. Every military alert meeting was attended by thousands of people and various militia and regional units. Some present were reported to be carrying firearms and sharp weapons. The public meeting at Dili was attended by all militia units from 13 regencies. In each public meeting of armed militia, East Timor military and civil officials were present. After the Dili meeting, the masses led by Aitarak attacked and burned the house of Manuel Carrascalao in Dili and killed 12 people, among them the son of Manuel Carrascalao.
45. The Military Area Commander, TNI Major General Adam Damiri, in his report to the Coordinating Minister for Defence and Security, stated that the attack on the Liquica Church which caused loss of life on the anti-integration side had stymied the anti-integration youth. Meanwhile on the incident TNI Major General Adam Damiri stated that after the attack the social reaction was patriotism towards Indonesia. It was only then that East Timor society became aware that the integration group clearly had many supporters.
46. Mass support and mobilisation were directed to breaking the domination of the Conselho Nationalida de Resistencia da Timorense (CNRT) group and at the same time supporting the domination of the pro-integration group in society. In this mass support to bolster integration, the military apparatus was involved at various levels. The mass support at the same time showed a reaction of the civil and military officials in East Timor to the rise of pro-referendum political support powered by CNRT previously, especially from October to December 1998.
47. On the ties between the pro-integration Militia and the military, with the statement of TNI General Wiranto states: "... at present there is only the forces of popular opposition that are assisting in each District Military Command. From before they assisted the District Military Command; they were organised. They were given official incentives from the government, and were also armed, though with old weapons and not with modern weapons."
48. Ties between high-ranking TNI officers and the militia were revealed by Thomas Goncalves, former Bupati of Ermera. In a statement written under oath he stated that he had directly heard of support from high-ranking TNI officers and had obtained confirmation that "... the one who was directly responsible in militia field operations was General Zacky Anwar."
The majority of the core leadership and personnel of the militia were members of Kamra, Wanra, milsas, Gada Paksi and hansip and members of the District Military Command. From long before they had been trained by the military to use weapons in various TNI operations. And in fact some of the barracks of these militia were at Makodim or Koramil. Further, in their patrols the militia often used military facilities such as vehicles, or they patrolled together.
After capturing and torturing people they suspected as CNRT supporters they would give them over to Kodim or Koramil. and according to the statements of witnesses, Members of the Komando/Nanggala/SGI/Tribuana and/or members of the TNI and Kodim or Koramil together with members of Battalion 745 and/or 744 often helped the militia in detecting and capturing CNRT people. The SGI in the official Korem structure was the Satgas Tribuana which originated from Kopasus which was BKOed to Korem.
50. The militia's connection with the military can also be seen from the weapons used. Besides the assembled weapons and the weapons said to be left by Portugal, it is apparent that the general types of weapon which they used were the SKS, M16, Mauser, G-3, grenades and pistols. According to a statement by Thomas Gonzalves (former regent of Ermera), he received 300 long-barrelled weapons directly from the hands of the commandant of Satgas Tribuana, Lieutenant Colonel Yayat Sudrajat. Intelligence staff of Kodim/lautem Serda Gabriel de Jesus several days before listing had dropping of 40 SKS weapons to Kodim from Korem. The weapons were later put away and used by the Alfa militia. At Makodim, the Alfa Team also had their own rooms and members of the Alfa militia even often came and went carrying SKS type weapons. Support with weapons for the militia from the Kodim of Suai was also mentioned by Kakanwil Depsos Suai Jorge Manuel de Jesus who was active in the BRTT. The weapons that were given to Laksaur by Dandim Suai Agus Tarman were a Mauser and a pistol. Joni Marques revealed to the Investigative Commision that the Team Alfa mlitia which he led also used SKS type weapons. While Eurico Gueterres revealed to the Investigative Committee that he and his force did possess M16 weapons. According to him the weapons had been left with the police but on the eve of the announcement of the results of the ballot they took them back from where they were stored. The testimony of Eurico is strengthened by a statement by TNI Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim to the Investigative Commission mentioning the fact that weapons from the militia were stored in various military barracks and they could be taken back when needed.
51. The connection of the militia with the military can be seen from operations and patrols that they carried out together. BMP, Mahiti and the Red Dragon for example at the Regency of Maubara, Liquisa, in vrious measures were always together with several TNI elements. The TNI elements which were involved with BMP were BTT 134, and the Koramil posts in various Subdistricts. Most prominent was the Koramil 03/Maubara apparatus. In fact most of the BMP barracks were at the Makorimils Apart from that also ivolved in the BMP wee members of Kodim 1638/Liquisa. The BMP movers in the villages were the Babinsa. Acts carrid out by the BMP and the military supporting them generally followed the pattern of capture, abduction, torture and murder. While on a daily basis they threatened, robbed, terrorised and intimidated the popultion so that it might joined with BMP and choose autonomy. Usually they would capture residents that they suspected as supporters of the CNRT and detain them at the Makoramils, among which one was Makoramil 03/Maubara. The BMP acts that were most unusual were the slaughter of residents in the complex of the Liquica Church on 5 and 6 April 1999. According to the statement of witnesses saved from the slaughter in the Church, the BMP militia before attacking first met in the morning in a meeting at the Kodim Barracks field that was across the road from the Church. The other militias had the same support methods as the BMP. So also the patterns of action they carried out and the victims they aimed at were the same, that is the supporters of the CNRT. This means that from the evidence at the field it was found that the presence of the militia groups was directly supported by the military apparatus and the local regional government. Proof of the support from military and civil authorities is that militia members openly carrying out murder, torture, abduction and capture were never caught by the security apparatus. Even if they were caught, before very long according to the Head of the Regional Police East Timor, Police Colonel Timbul Silaen, the detention of those that were caught would be postponed. This kind of thing continued from January up to 7 September 1999.
52. The Investigative Commission also received a statement noting that some time before the results of the ballot were announced, at Maliana, Dili, Los Palos, Liquica, Suai, Oekusi (Ambeno) an act of destruction and torching by the militia took place, with the assistance of the TNI and the Indonesian Police. Especially in Dili, witnesses state that some security cadres on 4 September, just before the announcement of the results of the ballot, carried out sporadic shooting as well as burning.
53. Apart from that the active role of the Indonesian military, the militia and the bureaucratic apparatus were also involved together in the process of violence towards the civil population of East Timor. The case of the slaughter at Suai Church [E:?] and Liquisa [E:?] proved that the military apparatus together with the militia were involved acts of violence that forced the population to leave their homes. At Suai in fact the regent Herman and the Danrmil of Suai, in their statement to the Commission, revealed that they had prepared means of transportation for the movement of the population, several days before the results of the ballot were announced.
54. On the basis of the chain of events above, it is evident that, first there is found a strong connection and linkage between the TNI, Indonesian Police and the civil Bureaucracy; second, the violence that occurred in East Timor beginning from post announcement of the giving of Options up to post ballot announcement was not caused by a civil war but was the result of a systematic course of violent action carried out by the Militia with the support and with strong assumption organised by the TNI and Indonesian Police apparatuses.
55. TNI, Indonesian Police and Civil officials asked for statement at the National Commission for Human Rights in general denied their linkage with the militia.
57. In the beginning, various acts can be seen in the form of gross human rights violations. Because acts carried out contained various elements set out in various international human rights instruments, especially international civil and political rights conventions, among others:
59. Following international legal and customary principles, these acts fulfil these conditions:
60. Referencing several international laws and customs and UN resolutions, among others the Resolution of the UN General Assembly 2712 1979, the Report of the International Law Committee concerning the Principles of the Nuremberg Trial, 1950, the Rome Statute concerning the Trial of International Crimes, 1998, then on the basis of the form and nature of the crime, the act fulfils the aspects of being systematic, planned, collective and massive, and spreading in a time frame since the announcement of two options by the government of Indonesia until the official handover of East Timor to the UN. The form of the acts fulfils conditions for the category of criminal acts against humanity.
61. Considering that:
63. In future responsibility for crimes against humanity can also be referred to relevant regulations of state legislature and principles of international law. Crimes against humanity requesting state responsibility or individual responsibility and official status of the individual do not have special immunity.
64. In particular, based on the Rome Statute concerning International Criminal Trials, 1998, clause 7, a criminal act against humanity is: Any act which is carried out as part of a generalised or systematic attack, directed towards the civilian population, namely:
66. The dynamics of the violence that caused criminal acts against humanity in East Timor can be traced from the victims, the perpetrators and the political motives together with their ideological roots long before the announcement of the two options by the government of Indonesia.
67. The rise of the popular movement in East Timor, the development of discussion of the East Timor problem and several political measures by President Habibie have influenced aspects of life of the people of East Timor. Political change in Jakarta has opened the way for the East Timor people to express their aspirations. The university student movements organised by the Council for Solidarity of University Students and High School Students of East Timor (DSMPTT) in Dili developed to become a mass movement throughout East Timor up to Subdistrict level. Meanwhile, President Habibie began to discuss the status of the territory of East Timor. At the international level, the governments of Indonesia and Portugal began to enter a more advanced stage of negotiations.
68. Open conflict broke out with the incident at Alas. On 11 October 1998, a spokesman for Korem East Timor announced that 50 people including guerillas had attacked Koramil Alas on 9 October 1998. Six (6) people had been captured, two (2) people among them had been declared dead and four (4) people remaining had admitted complicity in the attack. The district of Alas was later blockaded by the military. The population left their villages in droves and fled to the Alas church. Information able to be obtained a large scale arrest took place, together with torture and maltreatment, killing, abduction, burning of houses, destruction of cattle and food crops and severing of water pipes. Later on 29 October 1998, the Danrem of East Timor, Col. Tono Suratman, stated that 3 corpses (two soldiers and one civilian) had been found without weapons beside a river around the village of Waberek. Meanwhile, Falintil stated that there had been armed contact between the TNI and Falintil that had killed 3 members of the TNI. This incident was then responded to by the TNI with a chain of killings and burning of villages, cattle and belongings of the citizens of the village of Waberek. According to various pieces of information, about 300 from the 340 families in the village fled and had not returned up to the end of December 1998.
69. Violence on the Alas model developed in other areas. Two TNI members were found killed in the village of Gualolo, Subdistrict of Cailaco, Bobonaro. The next day, a joint force TNI and Halilintar force retaliated with gunfire towards the houses that were close to the location where the corpses were found, ransacking houses and torturing the residents. After the attack, 130 young people sought refuge in Dili. The retaliation spread to other villages. From 2-6 December 1998, residents of the villge of Aidabaleten, Subdistrict of Atabae, Bobonaro, was attacked by a joint TNI and Halilintar force. Six people were captured and tortured.
70. The violence at Alas invited an international reaction. As a reaction to international pressure against the TNI violation of basic human rights and the increasing demands for a referendum, armed groups arose that were later known by the term "pro- integration militia".
72. Leading up to the announcement of options at the beginning of 1999 up to the end of September 1999 there were recorded at least 394 acts that took away the right to life of civilian members of the East Timor population in 142 cases that included the regency of Dili (59 cases); Aileu (3); Ainaro (3); Ambeno (4); Baucau (3); Belu (2); Bobonaro (24); Covalima (8); Ermera (3); Lautem (14); Manufahi (1); Viqueque (1); and 1 case at Kupang (East Nusatenggara).
III.2 Torture and maltreatment
73. In nearly every case of violence carried out by the militia, there are many reports and proofs about the torture and maltreatment towards the civilian population who had different political convictions. Before the ballot process, the maltreatment was carried out by militia towards civilians who refused to join with or become members of the militia. One example of a case was the maltreatment of Lnginus in the village of Ritabou on 14 April 1999. Soldiers and the Halilintar Militia captured a resident of the village of Ritabou, Subdistrict of Maliana, named Longinus, 38 years old. The victim was captured at his home and brought to the village of Batugade, Subdistrict of Balibo, in a Toyota Kijang. At Batugade the victim was mistreated until he died (K:142). The remains of the victim were not given to the family but were buried by the militia.
74. During the process of the ballot, maltreatment was carried out towards civilians who participated in the process of enrolment for the ballot. After the announcement of the ballot, maltreatment became part of the acts of terror and threat of murder that took place in every attack and on every occasion of destruction of physical infrastructure, including various cases of ambush of columns of refugees.
III.3 Enforced disappearances
75. Involuntary/enforced disappearances happened after the two options announcement. Civilians who were critical and had divergent political convictions were intimidated, threatened and made to disappear. This enforced disappearance was carried out by militia groups that were thought to obtain assistance from the security apparatus through the means of abduction or capture later to be summarily executed. As an example on 12 April 1999 Koramil Kailako dan Halilintar Militia abducted six residents of Kailako, Bobonaro. The six people were abducted and brought to Koramil Kailako. There they were detained, interrogated, and tortured. The next day they were killed in the house of Manuel Gama. Apart from this case it is not known whether this enforced disappearance ended with murder.
76. In the Investigative Commission record in April and September 1999 there are at least 5 cases of enforced disappearance, that is 3 at Dili, 1 case at Bobonaro, an 1 at Liquica; with 17 people disappeared, 3 people among them "abducted" while they were sheltering at Polsek Liquica after an attack by the BMP militia at the village of Dato, Liquica. The fate of these people has not been confirmed to now, except for one member of the Komnas of Women who is known to be safe. Meanwhile at least 6 cases of abduction were carried out by the militia before the time of the ballot.
III.4 Violence based on gender
77. Cases of violence towards women identified by the Investigative Commission included torture and public sexual humiliation by the militia and the TNI, forcing under age females to serve the sexual needs of the militia, enforced prostitution and rape. Rape of East Timor women was characterised by these situations: (a) one perpetrator with one woman, (b) more than one perpetrator with one woman, (c) more than one perpetrator with a number of women at one location, and (d) use of one fixed location where the act of rape was carried out several times.
III.5 Enforced movement of the population
78. Although evidence has been found of evacuations that have been carried out voluntarily, statements and proofs obtained by the Commission indicate that there were two patterns of enforced movement of the civilian population.
III.5.I Prior to the ballot
79. Soon after the formation of the militia in January 1999, the intensity of violence increased. At the beginning of that year alone there were movements of the population in the thousands, flooding the city of Suai (6,000 people) and Dili (1,000 people). The militia attacked residences and burn homes and gardens. The residents fled and sought protection in the nearest subdistrict city, as happened in April at the Suai Church, the Liquica Church, and the house of Manuel Carascalao.
III.5.2 After the announcement of the results of the ballot
80. The militia attacked villages, and forced the population to leave their residences. At the same time, on various roads vehicles readied by the security apparatus were waiting and were used to take residents to the territory of East Nusatenggara.
81. Especially after the announcement of the results of the ballot, there was a wave of mass evacuation from the territory of East Timor. KPP HAM found at least six cases of large scale evacuation at Dili, Baucau and Lautem. Around 250,000 were forced to flee to East Nusa Tenggara territory.
82. This enforced evacuation was preceded by cruel and fierce intimidation, threats and terror by the militia together with the security apparatus so that the civil population lost the courage to choose to stay. It is necessary also to note that the enforced evacuation was in the beginning carried out by pro-independence civilians who felt that their life was threatened by intimidation and terror by the militia and the security apparatus (B:776, B:778, LIK:991001 and 991004). But the number of civilians fleeing purely because of fear of the threat of the militia making East Timor into scorched earth was very large. This evacuation was carried out into the forests, the hills and most of all into East Nusa Tenggara territory.
83. The enforced evacuation was carried out under various kinds of modus operandi which affirmed the existence of a systematic plan. Documents obtained provided indications that the enforced evacuations were planned long before in anticipation of defeat in the ballot (B:719). All of this was strengthened by the statements provided by refugees in East Nusa Tenggara territory (Atambua and Kupang).
II.6 Scorched earth & destruction
84. Field study carried out in East Timor provided clear proof that there had been damage, destruction and burning on a large, planned and systematic scale in various cities (Dili, Suai, Liquisa etc). Scorched earth was implemented in relation to civilian housing, shops, stalls, hostels and office buildings. Statements provided generally affirmed that the scorched earth was implemented by the militia and elements of the security forces, or at least elements of the security apparatus from TNI and police elements did not carry out acts of prevention towards the scorched earth that took place.
85. In this scorched earth policy there also happened various acts of looting, stealing and robbery of goods. The violation that occurred was violation of the right to property. It is estimated that around 70% of the civilian buildings (shops and residences) were smashed or burnt after the announcement of the ballot, including thousands of vehicles. This scorched earth by the militia and the TNI is said to be only a manifestation of the dissatisfaction of the militia and the pro-integration population towards the result of the ballot because of fraud by Unamet.
86. General Pattern of Violent Operations
87. Elements of crimes against humanity above indicate a systematic work process in the form of acts of violence (see Table 1) which was born from the process of justification and planning of which the pattern of events was as follows: Violence recorded to have happened in the time period from 27 January-5 May 1999, 58 events, while from 6 May-31 August 1999 there was a decline from only 34 events and in the period 1 September to 9 October there were 106 events. This decline in spread accords with a change in the number of types of violation that show an increasingly high tendency in March, going down in May and going up again in August and peaking in September (See Table 2).
III.6.1 After the option announcement
88. After the option announcement in January 1999, an effort was mounted to establish a pro contra impression and civil war among the civilian population. This was carried out by pushing and forming civilian groups that were mobilised in the name of pro- integration and security.
III.6.2 Formation of militias
89. The formation of Militias in the drive to mobilise supporters of integration passed through the group work format under the direct coordination of the TNI. This included the plan to legalise militia units through Pamswakarsa and Kamra. In this the core strength of militia units both in going though Wanra and several partisan groups that had been formed long before, were proxy forces for the TNI. Pamswakarsa was developed in the framework of justification for the violent operations by the militia that were armed, facilitated, in arms, training, funds, vehicles, and control by the TNI apparatus. Included in this wa protection and allowed for actions of violence that were carried out by the militia units.
90. The planning and discussion of the formation of armed civilian groups as noted above were located in East Timor, in Bali, and in Jakarta, and involved officers with authority in commando chains, at both the military region and centre level.
III.6.3 Terror and intimidation
91. The mobilisation of militia forces to support pro-integration forces was developed through politics of terror with various forms of violence towards members of society who had differing political views. This pattern can be seen from the existence of acts of violence of the military, police, civil bureaucracy and militia apparatuses, in the form of murder, efforts at enforced evacuation, people being disappeared, etc. The aim was to increase the number of pro-integration supporters and membership of the militias.
III.6.4 Policies of the TNI leadership
92. Acts to mobilise military force went along with the existence of various policies of the TNI leadership and the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, who indicated that they had strong interests in the creation of conditions for negotiation in New York, like the formation of a Tribuana task force, and P4OKTT Task Force, and so on. The tendency for fluctuation in violence paralleled the presence of political and security policies that took place. Through January up to May, the chain of violence caused changes in determination of when the ballot would be carried out. Violence aimed at causing the ballot to fail peaked in April 1999, and the cases of violence at Liquisa and Maliana which claimed so many victims among civilians strengthened that tendency.
III.7 The Civil War Scenario
III.7.1 After the option of autonomy
93. There were found various steps directed towards strengthening a pro contra picture and even a civil war in society over the autonomy option. This pattern changed with the existence of agreement in New York which provided for sufficient security conditions, and the involvement of international organisations towards an ballot.
94. The violence that involved TNI members or units drastically in fact decreased in May 1999, in accord with the existence of an agreement in New York on 5 May 1999. The result of this agreement in New York placed Indonesia under international supervision with the duty to implement security and watch over peace. The decrease in violence was also connected with security policies to make the implementation of the 1999 General Election in East Timor a success.
95. However, at this stage, there was an escalation of violence by militia elements as a Pro Integration force. However this did not mean direct contact between the TNI elements and the militia violence did not continue. TNI elements and Indonesian Police were playing a role to build an impression of neutrality and effort to make the ballot successful. For this the P3TT units were formed to facilitate connection with international institutions.
96. Steps to build an image of neutrality were demonstrated by TNI and Indonesian Police through efforts at good offices as mediators n the conflict between th Militia and the Pro- Independence, as in the Peace Agreement of 21 Aril 1999 at Dili, and 18 June 1999 in Jakarta. This agreement was followed in a lively fashion by the process of cantonisation and peace propaganda, but the mass mobilisations inevitably follow the need to ensure victory in the ballot.
97. The policy of Jakarta was to prepare for the framework of defeat of Option 1, taking the form of a plan for withdrawal and evacuation (B:719; B:518). Those sites were not only efforts for security for the ballot but they were more directed towards efforts to ensure that supporters of pro-integration more than the results of the ballot. Included in this were the issue of a psychological burden, popular anger against fraud by Unamet, and Pro-Independence violence.
III.7.2 After the ballot announcement
98. After the announcement of the results of the ballot, violence escalated drastically over almost all of the territory of East Timor. The violence was in the form of murder, abduction, rape, destruction, looting of goods and residences, burning and destruction of military installations, offices and residences of the people, and ended in efforts at enforced evacuation.
99. The TNI, Indonesian Police and militia apparatuses became the core forces of the violence operations that went on systematically, expanding in a planned manner, as in the policy frameworks that have been set out above.
100. The pattern of work was directed towards reassuring International Society that the results of the ballot should be doubted and the society of East Timor preferred to be secure in East Nusa Tenggara territory. At this stage the need to maintain the territory, and deny the choice of the people of East Timor, was carried out through the practice of violence and a high stage of preparedness for pacification through the avenue of forced evacuation.
101. The violence that continued indicated the unbroken connection between elements of the TNI, Indonesian Police and the Militia in carrying out conditioning, choice of actions, fixing of times, and targets from the evacuation project.
The last stage of the violence operation was the continued operation of the three components of violence above in guarding concentration of the number of refugees in East Nusa Tenggara territory. The configuration of the scattering of the refugees indicated the control connection over society by the Militia and TNI Elements to the end of October 1999, except in several fixed places, such as Tuapukan was still under control. The acts of murder, people being disappeared, maltreatment, violence with a gender aspect were patterns of terror to watch over the attitudes of the people so that they would remain in the territory.
IV.1 The slaughter at Liquica Church (E:3)
104. On Easter Day, 4 April 1999, according to statements of witness to the Investigative Commission, there occurred a fire and the wrecking of houses of pro-independence figures by the militia group Besi Merah Putih (BMP) at Maubara. After carrying out the attack, some 25 BMP militia people escaped to Koramil Maubara. The people, who were dissatisfied and angry at the attack, surrounded the Koramil barracks, armed with bows and machetes, but the disturbance was able to be held off by Pastor Rafael (S:39) together with the Subdistrict Head, the village head and Danramil (E:16).
105. On 5 April 1999 the BMP militia together with police and Koramil members carried out arrests and attacks against people who were considered Pro-independence at Maubara. In this incident, two citizens died as a result of being slashed with sharp weapons by militia. Around 8.00 o'clock the news was heard that the BMP militia, the police and members of Koramil would move from Maubara to Liquica. Hearing this, the group from Liquica went towards the border to face up to the BMP militia and the Koramil members. At the border there was a confrontation between the people and the BMP militia. The police and members of Koramil who were at left and right of the road did not try to prevent this but instead fired at the people, causing the death of 2 and wounding 7 (E:16).
106. Around 13.30 hours throughout the city of Liquica there was herd the sound of firing from the security apparatus for about one hour. Hearing this the people rushed out of their houses and sought refuge in the church complex. Around past 14.00 the BMP militia that were on the border began to enter the city of Liquica. BMP militia and soldiers were seen entering the Liquica district military command complex. From there around 15.00 to 16.00 they began to burn the houses of pro-independence figures. According to the testimony of witnesses, there were about 2000 citizens of Liquica who were forced to shelter in the church complex, among them a number of pro-independence figures.
107. On 6 April 1999, about 06.00 militia equipped with sharp weapons and firearms were outside the fence of the Liquica church complex. About 08.00 militia begn to surround the church complex, and then a mobile brigade with two officers came, who were Lieutenant Damianus Dapa (P:877) and Lieutenant Franciscus Asisi Ali Baba (S:580). The two officers asked Pastor Rafael whether Gregorio and Jacinto da Costa Conceicao were among those who had taken refuge in the church. The Pastor answered that there was only Jacinto da Costa Conceicao (K:42), head of a village in Liquica. The two officers asked the pastor to surrender the village head to BMP. The pastor refused to surrender the village head to the BMP. The officers went back to carry out coordination with their commandant.
108. Between 08.00-09.00, 5 Mobile Brigade members led by First Lieutenant Johanis Rea (P:867) from the District Police asked the pastor to surrrender the firearms that according to the police had been brought by Jacinto da Costa Conceicao to the church complex. The pastor denied that Jacinto da Costa Conceicao had brought firearms. Jacinto da Costa Conceicao was able to meet with First Lieutenant Johanis Rea but refused to be taken out of the church.
109. Finally Pastor Rafael asked for security protection from First Lieutenant Johnais Rea and it was agreed to locate about one platoon of police around the church complex. Outside the fence BMP was still threatening to attack the church complex, while awaiting the arrivl of assistance from Halilintar and Aitarak. The police apparatus was seen chatting with militia as if nothing was going to happen.
110. Around 10.10 the Aitarak leadership Eurico Gutteres (P:3) was present, in a Kijang driven by a member of Kopassus {Special Forces Command]. According to the pastor, Eurico tried to solve the problem but failed because the Regent of Liquica Leonito Martins (P:747) and the commandant of the BMP militia Manuel de Sousa (P:786) were not prepared to have a dialogue with the pastor.
111. At 12.00 the militia and the District Military Command apparatus entered the complex and carried out an attack against the civilians who were sheltering in the house of Pastor Rafael. The attack was begun with one shot and teargas. According to witnesses, the militia and the cadres who were wearing civilian clothes mounted a slaughter using sharp weapons and firearms. Village Head Jacinto da Costa Conceicao, Aghusthino (K:180), Victor (K:133) and Leovirgildo (K:44) who were on top of the building and hiding in Pastor Rafael's bathroom were killed by militia, military cadres and Mobile Brigade members who were wearing civilian clothes. In the incident Pastor Rafael and his colleague Pastor Daslan were saved by District Military Command memebers and taken directly to District Military Command barracks. At the District Military Command barracks, Pastor Rafael saw Liquica Regent Leonito Martns, Commandant of District Military Command Asep Kuswana (P:46), Police Commandant Salopas, the Chairman of the Regional People's Legislative Assembly, the Deputy Commandant of the Military Post, and several officials of East Timor origin.
112. On return from the District Military Command, the pastor did not find any corpses in the church complex; there remained only splashes of blood in the rooms, and everything in the house was smashed. According to testimony, the corpses were loaded on a Hino truck belonging to TNI and buried somewhere. It is estimated that at least 30 people were killed in this incident. Some of the corpses of the victims were thrown into the sea around the Subdistrict of Maubara using 7 trucks and 4 jitneys.
113. According to a statement by Julio da Sousa (S:808) on 6 April 1999 he himself together with Barloe, Antonio and 4 other denizens of the village of Labukoe, Maubara, were ordered by the Commandant of the Military Rayon of Maubara Carlos dos Amaral and the Subdistrict Head of Maubara Jose Afat to bury five corpses of victims of the slaughter at Liquica Church. The corpses were brought by Second Sergeant Jacob dan Second Sergeant Tome, members of Liquica District Military Command. Burial was carried out at night by the electric light from the house of Albina, a member of the Military Rayon Command of Maubara.
114. Fransisco da Silva (S:815), a member of BMP, on 6 April 1999 at 17.30 received a command from a member of the Rajawali force to bring a military truck to transport 15 corpses from inside the Liquica complex. These corpses were later brought to the Masin lake near Maubara about 15 km from Liquica. After the corpses were unloaded from the truck, the witness was ordered to return to Military Rayon Command barracks at Maubara (E:182).
IV.2 Murder of citizens of Kailako, Bobonaro on 12 April 1999 (E:51)
115. On 12 April 1999 the Kailako Military Rayon Command and the Halilintar militia abducted six residents of Kailako, Bobonaro who were suspected of being sympathisers of the pro-independence group. The six were abducted and taken to Kailako Military Rayon Command. There they were detained, interrogated and tortured. The next day they were killed in the house of Manuel Soares Gama, a member of society in Kailako, Bobonaro Regency. The names of the six victims were: Antonio Soares (K:205), Joao Evangelita Vidal (K:211), Joao Matus (:236), Joes Paulelo (K:216), Manuel Maulelo (K:222), and Paulino Banumali (K:225). The Investigative Commission identified units of TNI elements suspected of being directly involved in the arbitrary detentions that later became a case of killing outside the legal process. So also was it with units from armed civilian groups that accompanied TNI elements.
IV.3 The ambush of Manuel Gama's group
116. The Investigative Commission received a report of another act of violence that happened on the same day, 12 April 1999. In the incident there was an ambush of the group of Manuel Soares Gama in the journey from Maliana to Kailako by an armed group suspected of being members of Falintil. In this ambush 3 people died including Manuel Soares Gama, and 2 other victims were members of TNI. Meanwhile 4 other people were wounded. The victims of the act of violence were: Angelino Bere Asa (K:767), Head Private TNI; Aristides (K:771), I Ketut Subrata (K:770), Luis Antonio (K:772), 1sr Corporals TNI; Manuel (K:769); Manuel Soares Gama (K:365); and Miquel (aged 23) (K:768).
IV.4 (Summary) Execution of members of civil population at Bobonaro (E:47)
117. On 13 April 1999, at around 0600 hours, there was an execution of several civilian residents of Bobonaro, namely, Antonio Soares (38) (K:205), teacher at the State Primary School, Kailaco; Joao Evangelita Vidal (35) (K:211), teacher at the State Primary School, Dahudu (?); Jose Paulel (?) (K:216); Manuel Maulelo (38) (K:222), teacher at the State Primary School, Maumela; Paulina Batumali (9) (K:225); Joao Matus (32) (K:236), farmer. All the victims had been previously abducted on 12 April 1999 and their respective homes [verb apparently missing] by members of the Halilintar paramilitary and members of Bobonaro Military District Command, because they were suspected of helping FALINTIL and being supporters of the CNRT. The victims were first taken to the Military Rayon Command and interrogated and tortured. Later, the victims were taken to the house of Manuel Soares Gama (P:?) and executed in front of the mourners of the late Manuel Soares Gama (K:?). The corpses of the victims were thrown into the Marobo River, 10 km east of Kailako. After the execution was carried out, TNI Lieutenant Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian, Commandant of the Military District of Bobonaro who was at the site said to the mourners who consisted of civilians and local government officials that anyone who opposed the Army or the government of Indonesia would meet the same fate (B:466). According to witnesses' statements, it should be assumed that the Commandant of the Military District of Bobonaro, TNI Lieutenant Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian and Joao da Silva Tavares (Commander of the Fighters of the Forces of Integration) (P:?) directed the execution.
118. The Investigative Commission noted the linkage between this incident and other incidents, namely the incident of the abduction of six citizens of Kailako, Bobonaro (E:?) and the incident of the ambush of the group of Manuel Soares Gama at Kailako (E:?).
IV.5 The attack on the house of Manuel Carrascalao (E:1)
119. On 17 April 1999 at 1000 hours, a crowd of about 5000 pro- integration people from 13 regencies in et held a public meeting in front of the Office of the Governor of East Timor in connection with the strengthening of the Pro-Indonesian Militia of Aitarak Command under the leadership of Eurico Guterres. The integration or militia forces that were present were among others Mahidi, Aitarak, Halilintar, Lafaek, AHI, Alfa, Besi Merah Putih and Dadurus Merah Putih. They were equipped with weapons like clubs, traditional weapons, machetes and bows. Acting as master of ceremonies was Joao Tavares and in his speech he said that he was ready to sacrifice himself body and soul for integration. The public meeting continued with a mass procession around Dili.
120. After the public parade, some of those from the mass procession went to the office of the Voice of East Timor, the only newspaper published in East Timor, situated not far from the Dili Diocese. they wrecked the building and office equipment such as computers, television sets and so on. The attack is thought to have been connected with the accusation that the news in the Voice of East Timor daily newspaper favoured only the pro- independence group, especially in the reports of the case of the Attack on the Liquica Church, April 1999 (B:?, E:?).
121. Coming to late afternoon, there ws an attack on the house of Manuel Carrascalao (S:712) by militia consisting of Besi Merah Putih and Aitarak (B:452, B:466). This house ws also the secretariat of the Movement for Reconciliation and Unification of the People of East Timor (GRPRTT). Manuel Carrascalao was the chairman of this organisation. Victims of the attack were refugees from Liquica, Alas and Turiscai who at the time were seeking shelter in the house of Manuel Carrascalao and Manuelita Carrascalao, son of Manuel Carrascalao. The refugees who were in the house of Manuel Carrascalao were estimated to number 143, and the number of victims killed as many as 15 people, namely Agustinho Ximenes (K:537), Alberto dos Santos (K:527), Alfredo de Jesus (K:535), Alfredo Sanches (K:533), Carmelinda Guterres (K:167), Cesar (K:526), Christina (K:525), Januario (K:528), Joao (K:534), Joo Junio Caerio Alves (K:532), Manuel Ario Intamanu Viegas Carrascalao (K:1), Marcelina Carrascalao (K:168), Marito alias Micky (K:5) and Pen (K:998). After the attack about 50 refugees who were safe were transported by police to East Timor District Police, including the family of Manuel Carrascalao and the family of CNRT figure Leandro Isaac.
IV.6 Riots in Dili
122. In connection with preparations for the ballot, both the autonomy faction and the pro-independence faction were given time to mount campaigns. On 25 August, suddenly the turn came for the pro-independence group under the umbrella of the CNRT to carry out a campaign in Dili. Using at least 400 trucks and buses, about 16,000 people participated in the campaign, which proceeded without incident.
123. On 26 August 1999, the pro-autonomy faction carried out the final campaign. But this campaign changed to become a riot where a group of Aitarak militia joined in to surround Dili and force the local people to join in an pro-autonomy parade. This caused anger on the part of the pro-independence group (B:219). The result of the riot was that several victims fell. Among others there were two members of the Aitarak militia, Abdullah (K:459) and Abai Saleh (K:460), who died at the Comora Market from stab wounds, Acacia (K:469) who was killed at Pantai Kelapa, Virgilio Faria Rodrigues da Costa (K:465) and Ameta (K:473) who died after being shot at Kuluhun, Bernardino (Bedino) Agusto Guterres (K:469) and several unknown others. When the disturbance broke out, the Police/Mobile Brigade were present at the scene but were not able to control the situation.
124. The case of the summary killing by the Mobile Brigade of a student from the University of Satya Wacana, Salatiga, named Bernardino (Bedino) Agusto Guterres at the village of Bemori, Dili, on 26 August 1999 was witnessed by a number of domestic and international journalists, and the incident received wide coverage, including sequential photographs of the shooting in Life Magazine of December 1999. The Head of the District Police of East Timor at that time, Colonel Timbul Silaen, in his statement to the Investigative Commission on 12 January 2000 (B:?) admitted the incident, but no legal action was taken against the perpetrator or the Mobile Brigade squad involved in the incident, the reason given being lack of material evidence.
IV.7 Attack on the Dili Diocese
125. After the announcement of the results of the ballot on 4 September 1999, the militia carried out a mass action in Dili. In the action the pro-integration militia carried out a search for pro-independence people in Dili Harbour. This measure caused disorder that was marked by the outbreak of series of shots. According to several witnesses (B:182,B:778, B:776), in the middle of the day the militia carried out criminal acts, damaging and burning several buildings. The targeted buildings were residences, shops, kiosks, rice storage facilities, and public facilities like markets and schools. The situation in the city of Dili became uncertain and the frightened populace sheltered or fled to places that were felt to be fairly safe, such as the Hosana Protestan church, the Dili Diocese, the District Police Barracks and the house of Bishop Belo.
126. The situation on 5 September 1999 worsened, marked by bursts of gunfire which were increasingly frequent and widespread, together with burning and looting. While the disorder was happening, apart from the citizens who were on the streets in flight, there were also security cadres consisting of members of the police and TNI members on watch. Apart from that, citizens witnessed a group of militia in black clothing with the red and white emblem. At 14.30 hours, the citizens who were sheltering and evacuated at Camra Eclesestica (Dili Diocese) were startled at an attack and act of burning at that location (B:377,B:182). In this incident according to a statement by Bishop Belo there were as many as 25 people who fell victim (B:176).
IV.8 Attack on the house of Bishop Belo
127. On 6 September 1999 at about 0700 hours intimidation occurred by the militia to refugees sheltering in the house of Bishop Belo, estimated at 5000 people. According to a statement by Bishop Belo, from 30 August 1999 the refugees had sought refuge at his residence. The refugees were alarmed to see the militia threatening to kill them. The reason was that Bishop Belo had asked for assistance with transport from the Chief of the District Police of East Timor and the Commandant of the Military District to evacuate the people to Baucau but the request had been disregarded. On 6 September, a TNI officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel entered the residence of Bishop Belo and asked him to come out to be evacuated to the District Police Barracks.
128. After Bishop Belo left his residence, the militia group among who some were in Aitarak uniform (P:6) carried out an attack against the refugees sheltering in the house. The refugees were forced to obey the commands of the militia to come out of the yard of Bishop Bela's housing complex, and this was accompanied by acts of violence. According to witnesses at around 0900 the militia carried out burning of the Bishop's house (B:840,B:507). This militia attack was accompanied by shots which according to Bishop Belo claimed 2 victims. The total number of victims is not known.
129. In connection with the statement of witnesses concerning the involvement of the Aitarak militia in this attack action, the Investigative Commission has asked the commandant of Aitarak Eurico Guterres (B:899) to provide an explanation. According to Eurico Guterres, he knew about the incident but when the attack happened he was not in Dili because he was taking refugees to Atambua. When he arrived back in Dili, the disturbance was already over.
IV.9 Burning of the houses of the population at Maliana, 4 September 1999 (E:4)
In the investigation in et, the Investigative Commission received testimony and case reports about the burning of people's houses and buildings at Malianaon 4 September 1999. (B:20). Based on the direct observation of the Investigative Commission on the site, the level of destruction of the city of Maliana reached 80%. This incident was tied to the security situation in the city of Maliana where since 30 August 1999 the city of Maliana could not be traversed by people because it was guarded closely by pro- integration militia, TNI elements, and Indonesian Police (B:20). Several local staff of UNAMET and pro-independence activists were killed on the spot or abducted in a cleansing operation by the Dadarus Merah Putih militia (DMP) (P:22) and Halilintar (P:23) assisted by the local District Military Command. Hundreds of houses were burnt on 4 September, while residents who were escaping were shot by militia members and TNI members. Several eyewitnesses also saw residents attacked with firearms on the street. After that in the district of Bobonaro, especially Memo and Batugade, examination posts were set up by the militia to investigate refugees going to ntt territory. Statements of several witnesses (:20) indicated the incidence of cases of enforced disappearance of refugees who had been examined at these posts.
IV.10 Attack on the church complex, Suai (E:61)
131. According to the testimony of Domingas do Santa Muzinho (S:589), on 4 September 1999 at about 1400 hours, the village of Debos at Suai was attacked by the Laksaur militia and police apparatus. In the attack houses of the Debos population were shot at and burned. Several perpetrators were known by witnesses among them Alipio Mau (S:?) and Olivio (S:?). The shooting was carried out wildly and caused the death of a senior high school student, whose corpse was put into a Kijang official vehicle of the Police Contingent, Lorosae. As a result of the attack, the people took refuge at the Nossa Senhora de Fatima Church which was also often called the Suai church or the Ave Maria church by the common population [awan "cloud" in error for awam "common"], guarded by the militia firing shots (E:120).
132. Based on the statement of Jorge Manuel de Jesu (S:928), on 4 September 1999 at about 1400 hours, the burning of the population's houses and buildings belonging to the government in the city of Suai took place at night on 5 September 1999. The burning was carried out by Laksaur militia and members of the TNI Territorial Battalion. Beginning from 6 September 1999, the population were forced to leave their houses, and then the contents of the houses were looted and burnt. According to the statements of witnesses, Commandant of the Military Rayon Sugito (P:182) joined in the looting and burning, among others with the older brother [or sister] of the witness.
133. On the Sunday 5 September the Laksaur and Mahidi militia began to threaten the citizens that had fled to the Suai church complex. On 6 September at about 1430 there was an attack on the citizens who had fled to the Suai Church complex by the Laksuar Merah Putih and Mahidi militia, the TNI aparatus and the Police. According to the testimony Fares da Costa (S:837) mentioned that the attack was directly led by Regent Kovalima Herman Sedyono (P:873) and Lieutenant Sugito of the Military Rayon Command who at the time was wearing the jungle green uniform and holding a long-barrelled weapon. Witnesses heard Regent Herman and Military Rayon Commandant say that all the Pastors, male, female who had these attitudes would be killed.
134. According to witnesses, at the time there were about 100 refugees in the old church with an unknown number outside. The witnesses sa Romo Hilrio (K:52), shot in the chest once and his corpse trodden on by Igidio Manek (P:587) by a member of the Laksaur militia. Passtor Francisco (K:51) was stabbed to death and slashed by Americo (P:841) who was also a member of the Laksaur militia. Another witness, Domingas dos Santos, testified that Pastor Dewanto was killed in the old church. The same testimony was stated by Juliana Cardoso (s:852), who saw Pastor Dewanto (K:50) killed. At the time of the attack the Police, the Loro Sae Mobile Brigade Contingent and soldiers were outside the fence shooting refugees that wanted to flee out of the church complex.
135. After the shooting, the refugees that were not killed, particularly women and children, were transported by truck to the Military District Command. It is estimated that at least 50 people were victims in the incident. The perpetrators also stole money, TVs and refigerators from the church complex. At about 1700 hours, 3 TNI Hino trucks cme to transport the corpses to the west of the city of Suai.
136. In the Investigative Commission visit to the location of the incident on 19 November and 13 December 1999, there were found signs of the burning of the slaughtered victims around the church complex. At the location there were found remains of human bones and skulls and clothes of the refugees that had been burnt black. Besides that almost all of the buildings belonging to residents and to the government in the district of Suai had been burnt down to the ground.
137. According to the evidence of Serma Kanakadja (S:888) and Second Lieutenant Sudarminto (S:859) to the Commission on 7 September 1999 about 0900 hours Central Indonesian Time, they saw burial activity at the seashore at Weluli, South Alas Village, Subdistrict Kobalima, Dati II Regency, Belu. The activity of burial of the corpses was directed by First Lieutenant Sugito, together with 3 TNI members and a Laksaur militia team (E:171).
138. The corpses were taken by First Lieutenant Sugito from Suai about 0830 hours past the Police post at Metamauk in the jurisdictional area of the Polsek Wemasa using 1 yellow truck DH.8323 M. and one red Kijang DF 9025 AA together with a jitney without number plate, marked "EVER DADE".
From the results of an Exhumation of Mass Grave of Victims of the Slaughter at Suai Church carried out by the Investigative Commission on 25 November at a location with coordinates LS:09.46814 degrees and BT:125.08109. From the three graves which were dug up the remains of 27 persons were found. From the results of an autopsy carried out by the Forensic Team of the Faculty of Medicine, University of Indonesia, 16 males and 8 females could be identified, with 1 probable male and one probable female. The age of the victims ranged from 5 years to adults aged over 40. Three among them were Pastor Tarsisius, SJ; Pastor Hilario Madeira; and Pastor Francisco Soares.
According to the statement of the Head of Polsek Kanakadja, TNI First Lieutenant Sugito said to him that the corpses were the victims of the killings at Suai which took place on 6 September 1999. First Lieutenant Sugito was able to request Polsek Head Kanakadja to keep the incident secret.
The Investigative Commission investigation of First Lieutenant Sugito which went on twice, on 23 December 1999 and 17 January 2000 respectively, could not proceed properly because those involved were not able to give logical answers to the questions that were put.
IV.11 The killings at the Maliana police station (E:181)
In the investigation of the violation of fundamental human rights that took place at Maliana, Regency of Bononaro, by the Investigative Commission, there were found preliminary statements about and preliminary evidence of the incidence of mass killings of refugees sheltering at the Bobonaro Police Station complex at the city of Maliana. According to the statement of witnesses (S:792,S:781,S:718) on 8 September 1999 there occurred a mass killing of refugees sheltering at the Police Station barracks complex. According to the eyewitness evidence at the scene of the incident, the mass killing took place at night. When carrying out a visit to the location, by the Investigative Commission found a large number of cartridge shells scattered in several rooms within the complex.
According to statements of several witnesses (S:781), after the end of the ballot, pro-autonomy leaders encouraged the people not to run away and become refugees because nothing would happen. It was said that a peace agreement had been reached among BRT, FPDK and CNRT. Despite this, many had fled to the hills.
On 2 September 1999 at 1700 hours there were shots throughout Maliana, and members of the TNI Territorial Battalion who were on duty at their posts went down to the District Military Command to join with the Dadarus Merah Putih group to carry out an operation against pro-independence people. From 3 to 5 September it seems that militia were in evidence freely coming and going at the Police Station barracks. On 6 September an announcement was issued by the Posko of the Police Station asking the people who were sheltering in the garage and in police accommodation to vacate these areas, because they were to be used by members of the Police Station who would be stationed at the Police Station. In the end the people were forced to move to the central area of the Police Station complex. A statement was obtained, before this, on 6 September 1999, around 0800 hours the Commandant of the Military District Burhanuddin Siagian, Commander PPI Joao Tavares, the Chairman of Bappeda II Francisco Soares came to observe the Posko Police Station.
On 8 September 1999, the Maliana Police Station complex which was occupied by refugees was surrounded by four separate groups of militia. The first group entered from the direction of the PLN [electricity company] office, the second from the direction of the BRI office, the third from the direction of the Subdistrict office and the fourth closed off the main road in front of the Police Station barracks. Behind the militia members of the TNI and the Mobile Brigade were visible. After surrounding the complex the militia groups attacked the refugees inside.
Among the victims of the mass killing were the head of the village of Ritabou Dominggos Pereira (K:313), Manuel Barros (K:816), provisional official of the Chairman of the District Representative Council, and Julio Barros (K:818), the Subdistrict Head of Maliana. The perpetrators of the mass killings were members of the Dadurus Merah Putih militia. Apart from these three people, witnesses also saw a number of unidentifiable victims. Most of the victims were killed by blows with a cleaver. According to witnesses, neither the local police nor the Loro Police Contingent took any action to stop the violence by the militia. At about 2300 hours the electricity was switched off and the corpses were taken away in a pick-up truck and disposed of in an unknown place.
IV.12 The murder of Sander Thoenes (E:154)
A journalist from Holland name Sander Thoenes (K:790) was killed on 21 September 1999. His remains were found by local people at Becora Village, East Dili on 22 September 1999. It is thought that Sander Toenes left the Hotel Tourisme, Dili between 1630 and 1745 hours Central Indonesian Time on a motor cycle driven by Florinda da Conceicao Araujo towards Becora Village, Dili. It is thught that the two had gone 300 meters when they were blocked by unknown people riding three motor cycles, a truck and a car. They wore TNI uniform and were armed with automatic weapons. They fired at Sander Thoenes and Florinda da Conceicao Araujo (S;929) and made the motorcycle roll over. Araujo managed to save himself, although he was shot. Sander Thoenes was killed on the spot; when his remains were found they had been moved from where Florinda da Conceicao Araujo had seen his corpse. It is thought that the death of Sander Thoenes occurred between 1650 and 1745 hours on 21 September 1999. It is known that 745 Battalion was in the region at that time.
The Investigative Commission interviewed the Commandant of 745 Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Djoko Sarosa (B:847) to obtain a further explanation about Battalion's involvement in the incident. He explained that Battalion 745 (P:521) had in fact passed the location during a journey from Pos Palos to Kupang. But he denied that Battalion 745 had been involved in the killing of Sander Thoenes (K:790), because his troops had passed the location before the incident had taken place. Examination by forensic pathologist Dr Michael Anthony Zillman at the Royal Darwin Hospital on 24 September 1999 showed that the causes of death of Sander Thoenes were gunshot wounds. Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Djoko Sarosa in his statement stated that the cause of death was wounds inflicted by a sharp weapon.
Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Djoko Sarosa did admit, however, that there had been a robbery, of cameras belonging to two foreign journalists named Joe Swain (K:976) and Charles Hires (K:975) on 21 September 1999 by members of 745 Battalion (E:238). He further said that the robbery had been motivated by suspicion of foreigners and dissatisfaction with the fraudulent actions of UNAMET. Later he admitted that he had been detained for a week over the incident and two lower ranking officers had been detained for two weeks over it.
In this connection, Major General Kiki Syahnakri explained to the Investigative Commission that the robbery had been triggered by TNI members' dissatisfaction at being photographed by the two journalists. The robbery had been preceded by intercepting two taxis occupied by the two foreign journalists together with an interpreter named Ancaleto da Silva and a driver. They took among other things a camera and 50 rolls of film, a bag, a video camera and a passport. They then fired at the wheels of the taxi to prevent the journalists continuing their journey. The two journalists were left at the place of the incident, which was about two kilometres from the centre of the city of Dili.
IV.13 The murder of the church group at Los Palos 25 September 1999 (E:152)
Based on statements that were able to be collected, it is known that on 25 September 1999 an attack took place on a church group that was journeying to Baucau, by the Tim Alfa militia group (P:637) consisting of Joni Marques (P:783), Joao da Costa (P:785), Manuel da Costa (P:786), and Amilio da Costa (P:791).
In its investigation visit to East Timor, the Investigative Commission met with the suspects who were suspected of carrying out executions outside the process of law, in the Interfet detention centre in Dili, and obtained a direct statement from Joni Marques (B:797). The Investigative Committee also obtained statements that the militia group Tim Alfa had been formed and trained by a Kopassus unit. Based on the testimony of a perpetrator to the Investigative Commission, the involvement of a member of a Kopassus unit who had ordered the killing was stated.
There were nine victims of the mass killings: Agus Mulyawan (K:780), Indonesian journalist; Celeste de Carvalho (K:773), Head Sister; Erminia Cazzaniga (K:779), nun; Erminia Rudy Barreto (K:&&&); Fernando dos Santos (K:774); Jacinto F. Xavier (K:775); a youth of 13 (K:782); Titi Sandora Lopez (K:781); Valerioda Conceicao (K:776).
IV.14 Violence towards women
IV.14.1 Sexual enslavement
IV.14.1.1 Case 1
From statements by witnesses and citizens around the office of the village of Wemasa, at the end of September 1999 a number of mothers and children were set down from a car that stopped next to the village complex of Wemasa-Raihenek, Kobalima Subdistrict, Regency of Belu, East Nusatenggara. According to witness statements, they were separated from other refugees because they were thought to be pro-independence sympathisers. Numbers were not known, nor was anything known about the husbands. They were placed in a tarpaulin tent near the Wemasa village office. The position and situation were very open, and people outside could see the situation inside the tent.
155. Every night between 2000 and 2100 hours a group of Laksaur militia would come to these tents and rape the mothers. A witness told of a case of sexual enslavement of a mother who was still breastfeeding her child and was forced to serve members of the Laksaur militia. This testimony was strengthened by other witnesses who still maintained family relationships with the victims. Another witness reported a case of shooting of a female refugee who reused to have a sexual relationship with members of the Laksaur militia. The victim was shot in the back with a home made weapon by a Laksaur militiaman.
156. Early information concerning the locking up of 30 women in a refugee centre was followed up by contacting a witness at Wemasa. From the information obtained the women had scattered to the area of Raihenek (Kobalima Subdistrict, Belu Regency, East Nusatenggara) so that it was difficult to locate them. From witness statements, the women experienced sexual violence at the hands of the militia.
IV.14.1.2 Case 2
157. From the statement of a witness -- whose two friends had become victims of detention and prostitution (A and M) brought from East Timor and forced to live with Commandant Kompi Mahidi, J, in East Nusatenggara. They came from the same district, Ainaro. The two women were forced to ome by Hatubiliko (an East Timor army group formed by the TNI), when they were bathing. Their home was ransacked and they were taken to Aitekalarang- Ankais, Malaka Berat Subdistrict, on 16 September 1999. They sold vegetables all day long outside J's house and looked after family interests. At night they had to serve the friends of Dank Mahidi who came to visit and drink at his house, and this included serving them sexually. Their movements were constantly observed by DanKi J and his men. To the witness, A and M said that they were ashamed to return to East Timor because many people knew that they had been kept women of DanKi J and his friends.
IV.14.1.3 Case 3
158. On 6 June 1999, there was an arbitrary arrest of 23 women by the BMP militia at the post near Gugleur, Maubara Subdistrict, Liquica Regency. The victims were forced to cook and wash for the BMP and become victims of sexual violence.
159. Cases of violence towards women, especially rape, were also reported in the report of the UN Special Thematic Reporter of 8 December 1999 (B:566).
V.1 Description of victims
Regarding victims, the Investigative Commission found several key dimensions.
The victims especially chosen as targets for acts of violence by the militia and the military and civil apparatus were students, university students, and CNRT activists. This report is also strengthened by several reports of summary execution of Bernadino Guterres before dozens of witnesses; the killings carried out by members of the Aitarak militia deliberately in front of students of East Timor in Dili harbour; the attack on the CNRT office and the murder of CNRT activist Ferisimo King of Los Palos at Los Palos; the attack, destruction and killing at the refugee camps carried out bythe militia against CNRT activists and East Timor university students, including journalists.
Apart from the individuals that were targeted, many victims were civilians who were totally removed from any political affiliations at all. Among them were children and church people, journalists and humanitarian workers. The Investigative Commission found that at the slaughter at the Suai Church at least 26 people were killed, consisting of a number of adults, two children and three pastors found as remains. Apart from this hundreds of thousands of civilians, to avoid killing and violence, were forced to leave their homeland, becoming refugees living in camps under the guard of the militia.
A number of reports were specially obtained on acts of sexual violence carried out by both the militia and the apparatus against a number of women. One report said that rape had occurred with women in a Kodim barracks by militia members with the knowledge of the local police and military apparatus, while they were held over awaiting evacuation. The same report also noted the efforts at enforced concubinage carried out by a leader of the Laksaur Militia with a refugee.
Apart from human victims, the cruelty caused the total destruction of nearly all the local social and cultural structure, with the destruction of the whole physical infrastructure and damage, looting and destruction of the possessions of the civilian population. This cruelty has been carried over into the territory of East Nusatenggara and is directed against the refugees with their possessions.
V.2 Desciption of perpetrators
The account of events, which in geographical terms spread across the 13 Regencies of East Timor, shows the fact that the violence in qualitative and quantitative terms covers a wide landscape; and it was carried out in a directed way, involving systematic mobilised actions that were based on a great antipathy towards the civilians of East Timor who rejected the special autonomy option. This means that such sudden wide damage can only have been achieved through well planned and organised field activities.
The pattern of mobilisation of the population out of East Timor was caused by two special factors, evacuation before the announcement of the results of the ballot, carried out by the refugees themselves to avoid quarrelling and the possibility of violence; evacuation after the announcement, which was forced. Statements have been received about the activities of the security apparatus and the militia groups that entered houses to examine and force out the residents, with threats, the firing of shots and even direct fatal shooting.
The pattern of evacuation was first to bring the population to offices or barracks of the local military and police, with oversight by the military, militia and police apparatus. This oversight was experienced by the East Timor refugees even after they were in refugee camps. A number of Regents/Heads of District Level II East Timor among others TNI Colonel Herman Sudiono (Regent of Covalima), stated to the Investigative Committee that among them some had prepared for the possibility of evacuation of the population before 4 September 1999, and even before that date, Regent Guielherm Dos Santos (Regent of Maliana) stated that he knew about the violence in various districts of East Timor after the ballot announcement.
Several factors show the clear fact of the elements of directed violence, like the violence that took place in the attack on the UN Mission on East Timor (UNAMET) barracks, the murder of UNAMET staff, the burning of the Dili Diocese, the attack on the Bishop Belo residence, the slaughter at Suai Church Liquisa Church which all point to involvement of the armed militia and the Indonesian apparatus. The leader of the Aitarak militia Eurico Gutterres told the Commission that the blockade of the streets of Dili was to identify and seek out pro-independence leaders and activists, showing clearly the direction of all the violence. The clear nature of the violence was to some degree strengthened by TNI General Wiranto who said that the violence took place as a reaction to dissatisfaction over the failure of the referendum. Thus what happened in the field was justified by a statement by TNI General Wiranto.
The perpetrators intimidated and terrorised the refugees in East Nusatenggara. Surveillance, control and a measure of violence that happened to the East Timor population during evacuation, such as murder, torture and sexual violence showed the links between the perpetrators of violence against the refugees in the camps, as the same people who had done this before the evacuations. The militia and the security apparatus were common to both situations.
Seen from what it did to the bodies of the victims, the violence was cruel and massive, with the use of blunt and sharp weapons and firearms. To classify the victims, although many were ordinary civilians, statements showed that young intelligentsia and CNRT activists were special targets. There was found a kind of categorisation or grouping constructed by the perpetrators concerning who were to be made priorities in becoming victims.
The violence generally showed support from the military civil apparatus involving financial aid taken from the official regional budget, facilities of the barracks of the command and coordination, and infrastructure of various levels. The pattern of violence showed that the military apparatus and the local bureaucracy controlled the perpetrators in the field.
The violence cannot be separated from the role of a number of high TNI officials from TNI Headquarters who carried out a series of activities in the field, beginning from acting as liaison officials, and even shadow command in intelligence operations. They did nothing to stop the destruction, even though the violence in East Timor was known by high level TNI and contingency plans had long been prepared. Worse, there was no appropriate response from the TNI even though reports and requests for assistance had been directly requested (for example the request of Bishop Belo to General Wiranto on 5 September in Dili).
High TNI officials did not take firm action to stop the acts of the militia and the civil and military apparatus in the field. Answers from TNI high officials that said "the troops are suffering from psychological stress" to prevent violence keeping in mind their long-term solidarity with the militia, and "the perpetrators of violence are those who are disappointed with the results of the ballot" show sufficient knowledge on the part of TNI high officials about the possibility of violence and the close links between the militia and the Indonesian military.
170. And so the responsibility for the chain of violence in the field during the period in question falls on the shoulders of three main agents:
As the result of various time limitations, conditions and preconditions and the efforts of certain parties to lose pieces of evidence, KPP HAM has only been able to describe part of the human rights violations that happened.
KPP HAM has been successful in collecting facts and proofs that provide strong indications that serious violations of human rights have been carried out in a planned and systematic manner and on a large and wide scale in the form of mass murder, torture and maltreatment, forced disappearance, violence towards women and children (including rape and sexual slavery), forced evacuations, scorched earth policies and destruction of property, all of which constitute crimes towards humanity.
KPP HAM also found strong evidence concerning getting rid of and destroying evidence, which is a criminal act.
From all the facts and evidence, KPP HAM did not find evidence of the crime of genocide.
The facts and evidence also indicate that the civil and military apparatus including the police cooperated with the militia creating a situation and conditions that supported the occurrence of crimes against humanity, which were carried out by the civil, military, police and militia group apparatuses.
The militia forces with different names in various locations directly or indirectly were built up on the basis of the formation of popular opposition groups (Wanra), popular security groups (Kamra) and Volunteer Security Forces (Pamswakarsa) which directly or indirectly were armed, trained, supported and funded by the civil, military and police apparatuses.
The types of acts and the pattern of crimes against humanity were as follows:
VI.1 Mass murder
Mass murder with many victims among the civilian population was carried out systematically and cruelly several places. The mass murder generally took place at places of shelter such as churches, police stations and military bases. These acts were carried out using sharp weaponsd and firearms by military groups and or with the support of the military apparatus or allowed to happen by the military and police apparatuses.
VI.2 Torture & maltreatment
Torture and maltreatment was carried out on a large, wide and systematic scale against the pro-independence civil population. The torture and maltreatment happened during several moments that is before the killing was carried out and after the arbitrary arrests for the purpose of extracting information from the victims. In several cases, the torture and the maltreatment also happened spontaneously at the time of attack on the houses of the victims. At the time of evacuation, torture and maltreatment were often carried out against victims identified as university students, high school students and CNRT members.
VI.3 Enforced disappearance
Enforced disappearance took place along the lines of the following pattern. First in connection with the recruitment of members of the militia. A number of civilians disappearing was the result of their refusing to be made militia members. Second, the enforced disappearance that happen as an act of making supporters of independence submit. Third, the enforced disappearance towards a number of victims from among university students and supporters of independence was also reported to have happened as a continuation of military activity in places of evacuation.
VI.4 Sexual slavery and rape
Sexual slavery and rape happened in houses, in military barracks and places of evacuation both before and after the ballot.
VI.5 Scorched earth policy
Scorched earth tactics were carried out before and after the results of the ballot were announced against houses of the population and various government offices and other buildings. Before the ballot, scorched earth tactics were carried out especially against houses of the population suspected of being pro-independence. This action increased in intensity and spread after the results of the ballot were announced until it comprised wrecking of buildings and other property in nearly the whole territory of East Timor.
VI.6 Enforced movement and evacuation
Terror and intimidation before the ballot caused the occurrence of evacuation of the population to places considered safe such as churches and the hills. After the announcement of results enforced movement and evacuation on a large scale, with logistical and transport support from the civil, military and police apparatuses, following a pattern prepared previously. This enforced movement was a further target of various forms of violence and scorched earth at various places. The enforced movement and evacuation and hindering of refugees returning to their place of abode was carried out through terror and intimidation. Up to now some refugees have still not been able to return.
VI.7 Damage and elimination of evidence
The elimination of evidence by those carrying out crimes against humanity was carried out deliberately and in a planned fashion by for example destruction of documents, mass graves, and the removal of remains to hidden locations. The locations of mass burial up to now are still being found.
The whole chain of crime against humanity were the responsibility of three groups of perpetrators, namely:
The Investigative Commission can confirm that from the whole process of investigation including the collection of facts and documents together with statements of witnesses and other parties, the whole range of violations of fundamental human rights carried out in a wide and organised manner that happened in the period before and after the ballot in East Timor was fully known to and realised by the ABRI/TNI Commander General Wiranto (P:358) as being the one responsible for national security, and the whole run of civil and military officials in connection with their responsibilities in working and operating in East Timor at that time. The breadth and lack of control of the human rights violation situation at the time in due course required the announcement of military emergency, but the situation could still not be controlled and INTERFET was invited because the TNI was institutionally incapable of controlling the situation.
All of the crimes against humanity in East Timor, direct or indirect, took place because of the failure of the TNI Commander to guarantee the security of the implementation of the announcement of two options by the government. The police structure at that time under the command of the Minister for Defence did not go along with the weakening of the ability of the police apparatus in carrying out the task of security based on the New York agreement. For this, TNI General Wiranto as Commander of the TNI was the one who must bear responsibility.
As a special note the Investigative Commission feels that without lessening the rights of those investigated to receive proper legal aid, the fact that all those investigated except the military obtained legal aid from what called itself the HAM Team of Advocates of TNI Officers ignored the possibility of conflict of interest between one side and another. The possibility of finding conflict of interest was very great between TNI officers, Police officers, the former Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. This fact, directly or indirectly, could hinder the work of investigation in collecting facts to establish material truth and form an obstacle to the affirmation of law and justice.
VI.8 Recommendations
Based on the conclusions above, the Investigative Commission puts forward recommendations as follows:
Dr.
Albert Hasibuan, SH Chairperson
Dr.
Todung Mulya Lubis, SH, LLM Deputy Chairpersonp
Asmara
Nababan, SH Sekretaris
Dr.
Ir. H.S. Dillon Member
Drs.
Koesparmono Irsan, SH, MM, MBA Member
Nursyahbani
Katjasungkana, SH Member
Dra.
Zoemrotin KS Member
Munir,
SH Member
See also:
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